Los Ayoreos bolivianos enfrentan una lucha por el reconocimiento de su territorio, su demanda jurídica se inicia al final de los ochenta; en 1999 a través de la Ley Nº 1715 logran que cuatro de sus comunidades sean reconocidas como Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCO). El año 2009, la nueva Constitución cambiará el nombre de TCO al de Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino (TIOC) esta nueva denominación trae conflictos en su reconocimiento territorial y avasallamiento. Aproximadamente hace 20 años que no logran (...) ningún tipo de reconocimiento territorial, aunque la Constitución les reconoce como “nación” y el dominio ancestral sobre sus territorios. (shrink)

El objetivo del artículo es plantear un concepto de preexistencia y los elementos que lo componen para las identidades históricas de América del Sur, denominadas: indígenas, pueblos indígenas. Por dos razones: a) porque han sido cercenadas por divisiones internas de los Estados y las fronteras territoriales de dos o más países, b) porque la normativa constitucional e internacional no reconoce este derecho apropiadamente. El método utilizado fueron trabajos previos de la autora sobre los aymaras, quechuas, kichwas (2012-2016) y ayoreos (2020-2021). (...) Finalmente se presentan soluciones para este reconocimiento: la emancipación de estas identidades y la constitucionalización de los derechos históricos. (shrink)

This article elaborates an interpretive and polemic on the study of law, starting from different coordinates to that of legal science in order to postulate an alternative to the understanding of law. For this work, we problematize and detach ourselves from its valuation as a science. We take as a basis the philosophical orientation that views science from the materialistic perspective of the Theory of Categorial Closure, in order to subsequently examine and conceive law as a techno-praxis in relation to (...) the three-dimensional theory as a conceptual framework, thus allowing to consolidate an usable project at the service of the legal researcher. (shrink)

El objetivo de la investigación es demostrar que la aplicación del Flipped Classroom mejora el nivel de logro del aprendizaje significativo en estudiantes universitarios. Para la recolección de datos en los grupos control y experimental se aplicaron dos instrumentos: el pre-test y el post-test. Concluido con la aplicación de los talleres basados en la metodología FC, en el postest se observó que en el grupo control, 26 estudiantes obtuvieron una calificación aprobatoria y 11 reprobatoria, mientras que en el grupo experimental, (...) 38 estudiantes, de acuerdo a los criterios de evaluación, todos lograron una calificación aprobatoria. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to problematize, from a sociopolitical and psychoanalytic point of view, the current rise of the new rights, especially in Latin America. Although this extremist renaissance is loosely and indicatively referred to as fascism, we believe that, after careful analysis, today’s far-rights are not simple repetitions of the fascisms of the s. XX. It is about an unprecedented governmentality and ideology that, on the one hand, is not reduced to neoliberalism and, on the other hand, (...) surpasses the European-Anglo-Saxon alt-right and contemporary libertarianism. We give it the particular name of liber-fascism, to the extent that it brings a new mode of political subjectivation: the defender of himself. We divide the text into two sections. In the first, we discuss the sociopolitical particularities of liber-fascism: the emergence of a social ontology of the defender of himself that conceives of the capitalist market as an instance to be defended using false news, conspiracy theories and, of course, organized violence. In the second, we clarify the functioning of the liber-fascist unconscious by analyzing the peculiarity of its fantasy: it is an ideology that, in its relationship with others, uses violence no longer as a simple means, but as a vehicle for jouissance. (shrink)

Este artículo explora el concepto de trauma colectivo y su aplicación en el contexto histórico y social de las sociedades latinoamericanas. La transferencia del término «trauma colectivo» desde el campo del conocimiento psicológico a la esfera social e histórica plantea preguntas sobre su legitimidad y marco conceptual. El estudio examina la fidelidad de esta transferencia conceptual y su relación con la comprensión psicoanalítica temprana de los fenómenos traumáticos. El contexto cultural europeo de finales del siglo xix y principios del siglo (...) xx proporcionó la base para teorizar las consecuencias de experiencias intensas y violentas, lo que resultó en el concepto de «neurosis traumática», influenciado significativamente por el trabajo de Freud. El artículo discute la apropiación de herramientas psicoanalíticas en la crítica histórica y cultural para comprender eventos que desafían marcos tradicionales y la inteligibilidad social, como el Holocausto. La noción del trauma como una fuerza enigmática y recurrente en la experiencia histórica se explora a través del enfoque de los estudios del trauma. El artículo pone de relieve a destacados y destacadas académicas en este campo y su uso de conceptos psicoanalíticos, demostrando la preservación y aplicación significativa de estas nociones en la comprensión de fenómenos históricos y colectivos. Al acortar la brecha entre las experiencias psicológicas individuales y los traumas colectivos, los estudios del trauma ofrecen un enfoque único para interpretar y representar eventos que resisten las narrativas históricas tradicionales. (shrink)

Existen diversos factores influyentes en la autoeficacia parental, mediada por la motivación personal de los padres de familia hacia la escuela. Se utilizó el modelamiento de ecuaciones estructuradas de cuadrados mínimos parciales para el análisis. El estudio se realizó con 446 participantes, principalmente mujeres con un 81.2% y hombres con un 18% en tiempos de postpandemia. El estudio concluye que la comunicación con la escuela influye positivamente en la autoeficacia parental y la motivación personal hacia la escuela en los padres (...) de familia y la comunicación con los hijos influye en la autoeficacia parental y la motivación hacia la escuela. (shrink)

Growing evidence suggests mothers invest more in girls than boys and fathers more in boys than girls. We develop a hypothesis that predicts preference for girls by the parent facing more resource constraints and preference for boys by the parent facing less constraint. We test the hypothesis with panel data from the Tsimane’, a foraging-farming society in the Bolivian Amazon. Tsimane’ mothers face more resource constraints than fathers. As predicted, mother’s wealth protected girl’s BMI, but father’s wealth had weak effects (...) on boy’s BMI. Numerous tests yielded robust results, including those that controlled for fixed effects of child and household. (shrink)

Previous research addressing the association between leisure and happiness has given rise to the hypothesis that informal social activities might contribute more to happiness than solitary activities. In the current study, we tested how the two types of leisure—social and solitary—contribute to a person’s subjective sense of well-being. For the empirical estimate, we used four consecutive quarters of data collected from 533 people over the age of 16, from 13 Tsimane’ hunter-farmer villages in the Bolivian Amazon. Results suggest that only (...) social, not solitary, leisure has a positive and statistically significant association with subjective well-being. The association between solitary leisure and subjective well-being was negligible or negative. Future research should focus on emic definitions of social and solitary time, for solitary time might not always be equivalent to leisure and productive group activities might substitute for social leisure. (shrink)

Using the theoretical approach he introduced in his acclaimed Religious Reason, and drawing on contemporary rationalist ethical theory as well as a variety of religious traditions and issues, Ronald M. Green here provides a simple, effective model for understanding the complexity of religious life. He shows clearly and convincingly that the basic processes of religious reasoning are the same everywhere and that they give rise, in perfectly understandable ways, to the rich diversity of religious expression worldwide. This is a major (...) resource for courses in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In retrospect, I think I was right to compose Natural Supernaturalism by relying on taste, tact, and intuition rather than on a controlling method. A book of this kind, which deals with the history of human intellection, feeling, and imagination, employs special vocabularies, procedures, and modes of demonstration which, over many centuries of development, have shown their profitability when applied to matters of this sort. I agree with Booth that these procedures, when valid, are in a broad sense rational, and (...) subject to analysis and some degree of definition. But the rules underlying such a discourse are complex, elusive, unsystematic, and subject to innovative modification; they manifest themselves in the intuitive expertise of the historian; and the specification of these rules should not precede, but follow practice. . . . After the fact, nevertheless, a book like Natural Supernaturalism is subject to close critical inquiry about its methods and rationale. I am grateful to Booth for opening up such an inquiry, and for doing so in a way that is not only disarming, but seems to me to be the most promising of useful results. That is, instead of adopting a prosecutorial stance, demanding: "Justify the rationality and probative force of what you have done; it looks dammed suspicious to me," he has adopted the friendly tactic of saying: "Your book, in my experience of it, has yielded discoveries that I want to call knowledge, by methods, however deviant from standard rubrics of valid reasoning, that it seems irrational to call non-rational. Let's set out to clarify what these methods are, and to see what grounds we can find for the claim that they provide warranted knowledge." M.H. Abrams' contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Deconstructive Angel" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

t. 1. A-D -- t. 2. E-M -- t. 3. N-S -- t.4. T-I︠A︡.

This book is a specialized monograph on interpolation and definability, a notion central in pure logic and with significant meaning and applicability in all areas where logic is applied, especially computer science, artificial intelligence, logic programming, philosophy of science and natural language. Suitable for researchers and graduate students in mathematics, computer science and philosophy, this is the latest in the prestigous world-renowned Oxford Logic Guides, which contains Michael Dummet's Elements of intuitionism, J. M. Dunn and G. Hardegree's Algebraic Methods in (...) Philosophical Logic, H. Rott's Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, P. T. Johnstone's Sketches of an Elephant: A Topos Theory Compendium: Volumes 1 and 2, and David J. Pym and Eike Ritter's Reductive Logic and Proof Search: Proof theory, semantics and control. (shrink)

In his report to the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev noted that "our philosophical and economic front, indeed the social sciences in general, find themselves in a state … somewhat removed from the demands of life."1 He further pointed out that "the times demand that the social sciences address the concrete needs of practical activity on a broad front, that social scientists respond keenly and deftly to the changes taking place in life, that they not lose sight of (...) new phenomena and draw conclusions capable of truly guiding practical activity". (shrink)

In CQ 20 , 277–87, 1 argued for dating Corinna to the third century B.C. In my Greek Metre , p. 141, I continued to assume this date, observing that not everyone accepted it but that I knew of no attempt to answer my arguments. I must confess to having overlooked at least one such attempt, by A. Allen in CJ 68 , 26–8; and now M. Davies has mounted another in SIFC 81 , 186–94, largely repeating Allen's points but (...) with some new touches. Allen upholds the traditional fifth-century date. Davies has yet to come to a decision, but meanwhile he is eager to discredit what he regards as an unsatisfactory case for a Hellenistic dating. (shrink)

Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

This volume offers the first-ever complete English translation of Leibniz’s Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria together with a critical edition of the original Latin text on fa...

Our research is based on a rather large "library" of various works by M. Drahomanov, which contains his views on religion. Among them: Paradise and Progress, From the History of Relations Between Church and State in Western Europe, Faith and Public Affairs, Fight for Spiritual Power and Freedom of Conscience in the 16th - 17th Centuries,, "Church and State in the Roman Empire", "The Status and Tasks of the Science of Ancient History," "Evangelical Faith in Old England," "Populism and Popular (...) Progress in Austrian Rus, Austrian-Russian Remembrance," "Pious The Legend of the Bulgarians "," The Issues of Religious Freedom in Russia, "" On the Brotherhood of the Baptist or the Baptist in Ukraine, "" The Foreword, " Shevchenko, Ukrainianophiles and Socialism "," Wonderful thoughts about the Ukrainian national affair "," Zazdri gods "," Slavic variants of one Gospel legend "," Resurrection of Christ ", etc. (shrink)

Time has not worn out the urgency and the novelty of these essays on existentialism published first in 1950 and again in 1959. The nothingness on which Paci writes so poignantly here is being as dealt with in the various historico-philosophical positions of transcendence. This suggestion of Paci is Heideggerian in character: being and nothingness are after all identified. But since Paci has in mind the inevitable destruction of human finitude by philosophical conceptions of transcendence, his words of caution apply (...) to Heidegger's intentions as well. Heidegger in fact destroyed metaphysics, i.e., the possibility of enclosing transcendence within any philosophical system. Yet by making this destruction systematic he opened up a new transcendence which encompasses existence as speech oriented in the philosophical mode. For Paci all of these philosophical positions end up identifying being and nothingness precisely because none of their images of transcendence can be properly superimposed upon the freedom and the finitude of man; thus, they become irrelevant, they lead nowhere. Three philosophical directions in Paci's background lead him away from this irrelevancy: the Augustinian emphasis on the existentiell that leads through Kierkegaard to Jaspers; the immanentistic [[sic]] sense of human development that flows parallel in Marx and Croce; the constitutive role of experience and expression in the late Husserl. Concerning the latter, Paci sees some important connections between constitution and myth in the two central chapters of his work, one of which is about existentialism and neo-Kantianism and the other about myth and existence.--A. M. (shrink)

A sensitive, carefully demonstrated interpretation of Nietzsche's entire philosophy as culminating in, unified by, and also self-directed through the theory of eternal recurrence. The doctrine of the superman is shown to be the presupposition of the doctrine of eternal recurrence, for only the man who has surpassed himself can will the eternal recurrence of all being. The author also shows that, for Nietzsche, eternal recurrence is both "the way of the world" and moral task, and that, though Nietzsche struggled in (...) all his works to make these two "interpretations" of eternal recurrence coincide, in fact the notion of eternal recurrence remains ambiguous, revealing through its ambiguity that Nietzsche failed to reconcile man with the cosmos. --C. M. (shrink)

This particular volume differs from other members of the series, in that it is historically as well as dialectically oriented, and is also less encyclopedic than the others. The first part develops six different theories of happiness and the second presents different controversies about happiness. In the first chapter, the author proposes Aristotle's eudemonism [[sic]] as the most complete and most influential of all theories of happiness, and he uses it as a matrix for most of the discussions in the (...) second part. Chapters following this initial exposition of Aristotle treat Plato's "mixed" eudemonism [[sic]], Stoic suppression of desire, concepts of transcendent happiness in Plotinus, Augustine and Aquinas, Kant's valorization of duty and Hegel's critique thereof, and Bentham's and Mill's utilitarianism. Moral issues discussed in the second part include: self-realization, happiness vs. performance of duty, fulfillment vs. prudence, and eudemonism [[sic]] vs. hedonism. The last thirty pages focus on contemporary pursuits of the good life, centered around the issue of self-actualization. This section is predominantly psychological, and treats very briefly some theories of Kurt Goldstein, G. W. Allport, Robert W. White, A. H. Maslow, Marie Jahoda, Carl Rogers, and Fromm. Although the author take sides, he does stimulate reflection about the good life through expositions which avoid more difficult philosophical problems but which definitely evoke practical individual and social overtones.--C. M. R. (shrink)

Inspired by Martin Buber's I and Thou, the author holds that the self is neither mind nor body, but rather the "I" which engages in dialogues with itself, with its fellows, and with God. Philosophers and scientists are criticized for their "reductionism" with regard to the self, and the Hellenic tendency to view history and the self as "structured artifacts" is rejected. The author calls for renewed allegiance to the Hebraic heritage of Western culture, and for a more religious view (...) of the self and its role in history. He is perhaps less explicit than one might wish concerning the positive contributions which such a view could make.--C. M. (shrink)

The first six chapters of this book present and criticize six views of the nature of proper names, among which are theories that proper names have no meaning or connotation, that proper names have more meaning than other signs or that their meaning is infinite, that ordinary proper names should be analysed into "logically" proper names, etc. This part of the book is the best. One may find in these chapters several well-reasoned arguments which seem to totally demolish the theories (...) under investigation. Chapters seven to nine present the author's own solution to the problem. Sørensen holds that a proper name does have a meaning—otherwise it would not have been a part of language at all. The meaning of a linguistic sign, he argues, is a set of conditions to be satisfied by an extra-linguistic entity, such that this entity may be identified as denoted by the said sign. A proper name is an individual name, and its meaning is a series of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of the individual entity which this name is intended to denote. It is Sørensen's view that this series consists of a definite description of final length including space and time indicators. The definiens formula for proper names is thus 'P' = 'the x that... t... p....' The discussion of this proposal is, however, greatly impaired by Sørensen's utter disregard for the rich philosophical literature existing on the subject: no attempt is made to confront his view with the now standard arguments against theories of that type. Even many inner difficulties of the proposed solution are ignored. E.g., one may ask what values do 't' and 'p' take in the definition of 'Zeus'. Or take the following puzzle: are 'The x that taught Aristotle in p at t' and 'The x that studied with Socrates in p at t' both the meaning of 'Plato'? Sørensen's view that "A national register may be looked upon as a dictionary of proper names" suggests a positive answer, but surely R and S cannot be the same meaning. Many similar problems bother the reader of Sørensen's book, but, unfortunately, they are nowhere discussed.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

Given the tremendous burst of activity in the philosophy of science during the last quarter century, the number of books by trained philosophers dealing with the logic of biology is surprisingly small. Simon’s book resembles Morton Beckner’s The Biological Way of Thought in its comprehensive ambitions: "trying to discover what, if anything, is distinctive about biological science, its concepts, and its mode of explaining." The most obvious difference of the two books is Simon’s long central chapter on "Theories, Models, and (...) the Concept of the Gene," which deals with the history of genetics from Mendel’s predecessors to the successors of Watson and Crick. Beckner paid little explicit attention to the history of biology. Another difference lies in Beckner’s dogged assessment of all problems in the logic of biology from the perspective of what he called the Humean Pattern of Explanation—a detailed and difficult variant of the approach of Hempel, Oppenheim, and Nagel. Simon’s philosophical position is more flexible than Beckner’s. He provides an acceptable review of the literature of the last decade and a half; some of his conclusions are most interesting—even when incompletely supported by his arguments; and the utility of his book is insured by the fact that it is necessary to go back over twelve years to find another with which it can be compared. The first chapter contains a very effective critique of J. J. C. Smart’s thesis that biology is no more an autonomous science than is electrical engineering, but is merely applied physics and chemistry. Smart had argued from the grounds that all biological generalizations implicitly refer to terrestrial evolution and are not truly universal, and Simon demonstrates the general lack of success of all efforts to demonstrate a difference in kind between so-called laws of nature and empirical generalizations of the sort found in biology. The second chapter continues in this same vein, drawing an interesting contrast between phylogenetic explanation in biology and the explanation of individual events in human history, and claiming that ‘explanatory’ status may be granted to accounts which do not meet the requirements of the deductive-nomological model, as in the case of Darwin’s theories of the geographical distribution of plants and animals and the persistence of rudimentary organs. The author’s negative reaction to much of the recent philosophical literature concerning the role of functional analysis in biology seems particularly well placed. Following Hempel, most philosophers writing in the past ten years have regarded the occurrence of the item whose function is in question as the event to be explained. Simon correctly points out that in the biological literature, statements indicating the presence of this item are part of the explanans, usually one component in an explanation of the normal functioning of the organism. He also insists that functional or teleological statements cannot effectively be replaced by nonteleological ones. A functional account is one that relates an entity to the role it plays in an organized system. In the first of several serene non-sequiturs which mar the latter half of this book, Simon insists that the above account shows that the notion of function is essentially an "extrinsic" one and that teleological principles generally cannot be used to account for experience. No better argument than an appeal to Kant’s authority backs up this conclusion. The third chapter deals with the recent history of genetics; its summary makes the claim that "at no time during this history was it correct to say that one model was replaced by another one; rather, the development appears to have been one involving successive correction and refining of earlier conceptions. There has been no revolution: geneticists have always succeeded in either repelling or accommodating critical attacks on the model." The evidence presented earlier in the chapter confers some plausibility on this conclusion, but no more: Simon takes no notice of the controversy surrounding Kuhn and the notion of scientific revolutions, and provides no criteria by which to distinguish "revolutions" from "accommodations." The precise nature of the methodological continuity to be found in the history of genetics is crucial for the view that "biology, or at least genetics, must be regarded as incapable of yielding a complete explanation of the phenomena that come within its purview; if the ultimate principles appealed to are not those of chemistry and physics and hence essentially nonbiological, the explanation cannot be regarded as complete." The text does not clearly indicate the extent to which the author agrees with the statement just quoted; perhaps he only attributes it to "many biologists" impressed by the successes of molecular genetics. It is clear the Simon regards something he calls the "Cartesian attitude" as pervasive in biology. "Biologists are committed to attempting to explain the phenomena of life in terms of the nonliving... The property of being alive or being associated with a living system is simply not treated as a logical primitive within biological science." But this seems to take us back full circle—to the position of Smart, that biology is no more than applied physics and chemistry. Simon disagrees with Smart. How does he stand vis-a-vis this last statement of the Cartesian spirit he finds so pervasive in biology? I think he disagrees with it, but it is very hard to tell. Perhaps the answer is that the resolution of the issue of the autonomy of biology is a pragmatic matter, relative to a complex set of needs and commitments: the sorts of things that determine life styles, political attitudes, and religious points of view, as well as the growth of scientific understanding. The question of the precise configuration of Simon’s pragmatism remains very vague indeed—a consequence of his over use of the style of impersonal attribution rather than direct assertion. Simon says generally sane and familiar things about Biology and the Idea of Progress and about Biology and Ethics. The really startling assertion of the penultimate chapter, that "consciousness" is neither a biological nor a behavioral predicate, and that its foundations are essentially moral and legal, is unfortunately supported by no argument whatsoever. Instead, the reader is urged to examine two of the author’s previous articles.—E. M. (shrink)

A mimeographed book on the philosophy of "Being" from Thales to Aristotle. The author states that the book has evolved out of his lectures in an introductory course on metaphysics. Almost half the pages are devoted to Platonism. The whole treatment is somewhat repetitious and is more pedagogic than scholarly, making relatively free use of terminology.--M. G.

This book's purpose is the exposition of the inability of natural science to disprove the existence of God. Clark argues that the acceptance of a mechanistic world view based on Newtonian science makes, unjustifiably, a philosophy of science in which science forgets the many idealizations built into its laws' mathematical formulations. The philosophy of science Mr. Clark espouses is Percy Bridgman's operationalism, i.e., the reduction of the meaning of a concept to the operations used to measure it. The separation of (...) the physical world from what the scientist says about it leads Clark to deny that science is cognitive. It is, rather, a way of increasing nature's utility. As such, it may not be used to support any ethical position whatever.—J. M. B. (shrink)

Of Peter Abelard's logical writings, the fruit of thirty-five years of his activity as a teacher and dialectician, there have been to date only four editions worthy of note: that of Cousin in 1836, of Geyer in 1919 and 1936, of Dal Pra in 1954, and lastly the critical reconstruction of Abelard's literal glosses by L. M. Rijk in 1956. With this handsome second edition of minor but relevant glosses of Abelard, Dal Pra aims to fill the gap still existing (...) in the previous collections. His volume includes Abelard's writings found in the Paris BN manuscripts n. 13.368 and 7493. Chronologically the former belongs to the period when Abelard was given the chair of dialectic at the University of Paris in 1114 and the latter to Abelard's more mature period when he began original speculations on the logical status of propositions in 1121. Dal Pra argues at great length that the glosses in the first manuscript are to be read as the best and only introduction to Abelard's own work on dialectic. Hence he suggests against Rijk the title Introductiones Dialecticae rather than Introductiones Parvulorum. He assembles them according to what he believes was Abelard's intellectual development at the time. They are: the glosses to Porphyrius, to Aristotle's Categories, to the De Interpretatione, and to Boethius' De Devisione. [[sic]] The second section of the volume contains the glosses Super Topica where Abelard discusses among other subjects his first position on the problem of universals. Against Geyer who had consigned these works to the literal glosses of Abelard, Dal Pra offers strong evidence for locating them in the bulk of Abelard's De Ingredientibus precisely between the De Interpretatione and the De Syllogismo Hypothetico. The modernity of Abelard's logical theory is well known among contemporary logicians. Dal Pra's finely planned and handsomely executed edition makes an excellent contribution to the history of medieval logic as well as to contemporary logical theories on names and propositions.--L. M. P. (shrink)

The body of this book consists of facing English and Latin versions of Scotus' treatise prepared by Father Wolter from study of existing manuscripts. Textual variants are marked in frequent notes, but, perhaps because he doubts that one correct or personally written version ever existed, inconsistencies in the argument or apparent errors in the text are unremarked by the editor. Included as a 30 page appendix is Wolter's translation of Scotus' commentary on Peter Lombard's work, Two Questions from Lectures on (...) Book I of the Sentences. Wolter considers this to be an early version, of which the Treatise is the definitive argument. Scotus' demonstration intends to overcome two classical problems afflicting other proofs of the existence of God: the conclusion that the universe is eternal, and that either God's omnipotence or man's moral freedom is limited by His necessary inclusion in the causal order of the world. These metaphysical difficulties are avoided through Scotus' skilled use of modal logic. The book should be of great interest to students of logic and analytic philosophy on account of the display of technique in the logic of contingency and necessity, as well as to medievalists, for reasons of its substance. Wolter performs a real service in making available this workmanlike edition of a powerful and ingenious original.—M. B. M. (shrink)

This volume is the reprint of perhaps the best study of Goethe's philosophy. Its importance lies in its method. Instead of trying only to collect material pertaining to traditional, philosophical problems, it makes a deep-reaching attempt to grasp and to extricate the metaphysical foundations and basic themes of Goethe's Weltanschauung. There is a thoroughgoing analysis of his "morphological" method and excellent, long passages on his magnificent studies of the life and the structure of plants. The culmination of the whole work (...) is its third part: on the symbol considered what it truly is, not a merely esthetical [[sic]], but an essentially metaphysical notion. The book is not easy to read and it does presuppose a certain familiarity with Goethe's whole oeuvre. Those interested in the history of German idealism will certainly appreciate the parallels with Kant, but unfortunately Weinhandl omits the important parallels with Schelling.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This is the second volume of the author's ambitious attempt at outlining the history of the dogma of original sin from its beginning to our days. The reader of the first volume witnessed a concerted attack against the dogma and especially against its Augustinian formulation. The second volume deals with perhaps the most obscure period of this dogma's development: the one between the fifth and the eleventh centuries. In the West—thanks to Augustine's undisputed authority—the dogma became accepted as an integral (...) part of Christian theology, even though those theologians of the Dark Ages tried to "humanize" its original, savage formulation. The Christian East, however, would never have accepted it, and took a rather ambiguous position towards the meaning of the "curse of Adam." This is, briefly, the author's thesis, and to prove it he marshals an impressive array of quotes and references, fruits of a wide and often really impressive scholarship. Yet, the whole book is written in the same spirit of crusading, shallow rationalism as was the preceding volume. The speculative issues are not really treated and the whole work lacks that synthetical approach which is so indispensable for an enterprise of such magnitude.—M. J. V. (shrink)

The author briskly gives the principles of criticism which he will follow in examining Kant's theory of time, and the distinctions between absolute time, psychological time, and the duration of events and processes which must be made in order to deal with the time theories of Kant and his great predecessors Newton and Leibniz and their defenders. Al-Azm then follows Kant's writings from 1747 through his brief conversion to the Newtonian "receptacle" theory, through the critical period. He considers the Dissertation (...) of 1770, at least in so far as it deals with space and time, to belong to the latter. The principles of criticism are especially relevant to Al-Azm's interpretation of Kant's time doctrine in the critical period. He holds that we must carefully bear in mind Kant's alternation of analytic and synthetic methods, and their dialectic interplay. If we do so, we can explain away the "patchwork" theory of Kemp Smith and others, as the obscurities and apparent inconsistencies and paradoxes which are resolvable in the light of the roles played for Kant by the approaches he employs. Within the first Critique, the teachings on time in the Aesthetic and the Analytic constitute a "genuine dialectic of a highly complex order." Thus, Kant's final position should be sought in the progressive modifications of the preliminary position. Al-Azm regards the Aesthetic as offering merely provisional statements on the subject of time, reached by a process of analysis, at an early dialectical stage, and offering a starting point for a fresh stage in analysis which aims "at the unveiling of the synthetic processes of the understanding." This is accomplished in the Analytic. In a last section, on the first Antinomy, the author considers Strawson's essay, The Bounds of Sense, published in 1966, and cites passages which he feels defend Kant's theory of time, seen in its relation to the critical philosophy, as successfully against Strawson's interpretation as against the claims of its Leibnizian and Newtonian rivals.--M. B. M. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of papers and selections of previously published books of Russell. The six divisions concern themselves with the distinction between formal and empirical sciences, the connexion of sense data with the structure of physical reality and with the philosophy of science, problems concerning mental phenomena, cause vs. inference, and finally, the relation of science to its cultural matrix.—P. J. M.

The present reprint of Reinhold's principal work is a great service to anybody undertaking a genetic study of the evolution of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre from Kant's Critique. Reinhold was by no means an original and creative mind. His major importance lies in his systematic formulation of some central problems in the Kantian philosophy in an attempt to overcome the latter's major weakness: the rigid separation of the knowing faculties from each other. But the unified "faculty of representation" proposed by Reinhold shifted (...) the focus of epistemological considerations into an overtly psychological direction which only Fichte was to correct. All the same, among the epigons [[sic]] and half-Kantians of the outgoing eighteenth century, Reinhold alone can still be read with interest and genuine appreciation.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Is it a mistake to use "true" or "false" in certain contexts? White sets the stage for dealing with this issue by laying out a field of usages. He develops his position by characterizing and criticizing contemporary treatments of these data, moving rapidly from case to case. His numerous summaries and conclusions, obviously based on a wider view of the material than is presented in the text, may leave the uninitiated alternately puzzled, bristling, or suspicious. While White's data are expressed (...) clearly, the goal of his arguments and his organizational principles are frequently less apparent. White's discussions of fiction and modality are of particular historic interest. Here we find Frege and Russell arguing about whether they can argue about the King of France. We meet with Aristotle's ancient problem of the future naval battle, witness latter-day skirmishes over the nature of moral language, and find Leibniz, Hume, and Kant debating the logic of necessity and contingency. Are there really different types of truth which correspond with different modalities and existence presuppositions, as White seems to assume? This question, harking back to books 5 and 6 of Plato's Republic, is passed over by White in his usage-oriented quest for the sense of "truth." Truth will suit both student and researcher alike and is to be recommended for its breadth of concern and for its 18 pages of bibliography.--M. D. P. [[sic]]. (shrink)