Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Maria Alvarez presents a fresh and incisive study of these concepts, centred on reasons and their role in human agency.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the responsibility of AI experts for guiding the development of AI in a desirable direction. More specifically, the aim is to answer the following research question: To what extent are AI experts responsible in a forward-looking way for effects of AI technology that go beyond the immediate concerns of the programmer or designer? AI experts, in this paper conceptualised as experts regarding the technological aspects of AI, have knowledge and control of AI (...) technology that non-experts do not have. Drawing on responsibility theory, theories of the policy process, and critical algorithm studies, we discuss to what extent this capacity, and the positions that these experts have to influence the AI development, make AI experts responsible in a forward-looking sense for consequences of the use of AI technology. We conclude that, as a professional collective, AI experts, to some extent, are responsible in a forward-looking sense for consequences of use of AI technology that they could foresee, but with the risk of increased influence of AI experts at the expense of other actors. It is crucial that a diversity of actors is included in democratic processes on the future development of AI, but for this to be meaningful, AI experts need to take responsibility for how the AI technology they develop affects public deliberation. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to argue for a position holding that epigenetic responsibility primarily should be a political and not an individual responsibility. Epigenetic is a rapidly growing research field studying regulations of gene expression that do not change the DNA sequence. Knowledge about these mechanisms is still uncertain in many respects, but main presumptions are that they are triggered by environmental factors and life style and, to a certain extent, heritable to subsequent generations, thereby reminding of aspects (...) of Lamarckism. Epigenetic research advances give rise to intriguing challenges for responsibility relations between the society and the individual. Responsibility is commonly understood in a backwards-looking manner, identifying causally responsible actors to blame for a bad outcome. If only a backwards-looking responsibility model is applied, epigenetics might give rise to arduous responsibility ascriptions to individuals for their health and the health of their future descendants. This would put heavy responsibility burdens on actors constrained by unequal social and economic structures. In contrast, a forward-looking responsibility notion takes account of structural conditions and pay attention to who is best placed to do something about conditions contributing to bad outcomes. A forward-looking responsibility notion would partly free disadvantaged individuals from responsibility, and identify actors with power and capacity to do something about structural factors constraining genuine choice. (shrink)

This special focus issue brings to the Journal of Religious Ethics fresh considerations of moral anthropology as practiced by four emergent voices within the field. Each of these essays, in varying ways, seeks not only to advance an understanding of ethics in a particular time, place, and context, but to draw our attention to shared aspects of the human condition: its discontinuities and fractures, its practices of perception and attention, its interplays of emotion, intuition, and reason, and its thoroughly intersubjective (...) nature. To learn something of Thai Buddhist life-worlds, contemporary Russian modes of being, or the experience of immorality in today's China, each essay argues in turn, is to gain new insight into ourselves. (shrink)

Background: Autonomy and participation are threatened within the group of older people living in nursing homes. Evidence suggests that healthcare personnel act on behalf of older people but are still excluding them from decision-making in everyday care. Objective: The purpose was to describe registered nurses’ experience of caring for older people in nursing homes to promote autonomy and participation. Research design: A descriptive design with a phenomenological approach was used. Data were collected by semi-structured individual interviews. Analysis was inspired by (...) Giorgi’s method. Participants and research context: A total of 13 registered nurses from 10 nursing homes participated. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval was obtained from the Regional Research Ethics Committee. Informed consent was achieved and confidentiality guaranteed. Findings: The essence of caring for older people in nursing homes to promote autonomy and participation consisted of registered nurses’ awareness of older people’s frailty and the impact of illness to support health and well-being, and awareness of acknowledgement in everyday life and trusting relationships. Paying attention to older people by being open to the persons’ wishes were aspects that relied on registered nurses’ trusting relationships with older people, their relatives and surrounding healthcare personnel. The awareness reflected challenges in caring to promote older people’s right to autonomy and participation in nursing homes. Registered nurses’ strategies, hopes for and/or concerns about development of everyday life in nursing homes were revealed and mirrored their engagement in caring for older people. Discussion and conclusion: Awareness of older people’s frailty in nursing homes and the importance of maintained health and well-being were described as the main source for promoting autonomy and participation. Everyday life and care in nursing homes needs to be addressed from both older people’s and healthcare personnel’s perspectives, to promote autonomy and participation for residents in nursing homes. (shrink)

The scientist Richard Lovell Edgeworth, educated at Trinity College, Dublin, and Oxford, was a Member of the Lunar Society of Birmingham, where he exchanged ideas with other scientists, including James Watt, and was known for his significant mechanical inventions. However, Edgeworth's real interest was education: in this 1788 two-volume work, written with his daughter, the poet Maria Edgeworth, he draws on his own experience of raising twenty children, from which the work derives its authority and innovative character. The work was (...) very influential, and led to his Essays on Professional Education. The two volumes discuss the theories of philosophers and educationalists, while in general arguing for the importance and formative character of early childhood experiences. Volume 1 deals with different areas of childhood education, including play, learning, and obedience and good behaviour. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam is one of the world’s leading philosophers. His highly original and often provocative ideas have set the agenda for a variety of debates in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. His now famous philosophical thought experiments, such as the ‘Twin earth’ and ‘the brains in the vat’ have become part of the established canon in philosophy and cognitive science. _Reading Putnam_ is an outstanding overview and assessment of Hilary Putnam’s work by a team of (...) international contributors, and includes replies by Putnam himself. Divided into clear sections, it contains chapters on key aspects of Putnam’s large body of writing, including: Scientific realism and the changes that Putnam’s thought has undergone on this topic analyticity and ontology, including the important interconnections between the views of Putnam and Quine Putnam’s arguments concerning externalist views of meaning and reference, questions of conceptual relativity, and his preoccupation with ethics through a denial of the fact–value dichotomy Putnam’s developing views on perception. Offering an excellent survey of Putnam’s work, _Reading Putnam_ is essential for those studying philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science, as well as for anyone interested in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This article examines Sanskrit and Pali conceptions of contempt, and explores how they work in a number of ancient Indian genres, with a sustained focus on the Rāmāyaṇa. The article argues that while Indian texts often analyze emotion words and concepts systematically and with intricate granularity, contempt was not seen as an interior state to be theorized or managed therapeutically or morally. Rather, words for contempt are used to describe behaviors, etiquette, and social relationships, and are principally concerned with stipulating (...) social status. (shrink)

Concealed questions are determiner phrases that are naturally paraphrased as embedded questions (e.g., John knows the capital of Italy ≈ John knows what the capital of Italy is). This paper offers a novel account of the interpretation of concealed questions, which assumes that an entity-denoting expression α may be type-shifted into an expression ?z.P(α), where P is a contextually determined property, and z ranges over a contextually determined domain of individual concepts. Different resolutions of P and the domain of z (...) yield a wide range of concealed question interpretations, some of which were not noted previously. On the other hand, principled constraints on the resolution process prevent overgeneration. (shrink)

Ethicisation refers to the tendency to frame issues in ethical terms and can be observed in different areas of society, particularly in relation to policy-making on emerging technologies. The turn to ethics implies increased use of ethics expertise, or at least an expectation that this is the case. Calling for experts on ethics when ethically complicated questions need to be handled helps us to uphold central virtues, but there are also problems connected with ethicisation. In policy-making processes, the turn to (...) ethics may not always be a sign of a sincere aspiration to moral performance, but a strategic move to gain acceptance for controversial or sensitive activities, and ethicisation may depoliticise questions and constrain room for democratic participation. Nevertheless, ethicisation, and the ensuing call for ethics experts, suggests an expectation of confidence in ethics and ethics expertise, and that ethical guidance is an effective way of governing people’s behaviour in a morally desirable way. The purpose of this article is to explore democratic and epistemic challenges of ethicisation in the context of emerging technologies, with a specific focus on how the notions of _under-reliance_ and _over-reliance_ of ethics expertise can unpack the processes at play. By using biotechnology and the EU process of bio-patents and the publication of ethical guidelines for AI development as illustrations, it is demonstrated how ethicisation may give rise to democratic and epistemic challenges that are not explicitly addressed in discussions on the political use of ethics expertise. (shrink)

Good actors appear to become their characters, making them come alive, as if they were real. Is this because they have succeeded in merging themselves with their character? Are there any positive or negative psychological effects of this experience? We examined the role of three characteristics that may make this kind of merging possible: dissociation, flow, and empathy. We also examined the relation of these characteristics to acting quality. Acting students and non-acting students completed a dissociation measure, and then performed (...) a monologue that was recorded and rated on the dimensions of acting. Participants were then reassessed on dissociation to determine whether it increased as a function of performance. They were also then assessed on flow and empathy. Actors did not differ from non-actors on dissociation, but did score significantly higher than non-actors on some flow and empathy subscales, indicating a positive psychological experience and outcome. While non-actors’ dissociation marginally increased post-performance, actors’ dissociation rose significantly, which could indicate a negative psychological experience. Surprisingly, acting ratings were unrelated to the levels of dissociation, flow, or empathy. We concluded that, while these are tools used by actors to immerse themselves fully in their characters, they may not be necessary to create the illusion of an imaginary character come to life on stage. (shrink)

Razón, poesía, historia.--La cuestión del estoicismo español.--El querer.

Thus one should define, in a double way, name and form in all phenomena of the three realms. …In this essay, we want to bring together two issues for their mutual illumination: the particular use of that hoary Indian dyad, "nāma-rūpa," literally, "name-and-form," by Buddhaghosa, the influential fifth-century Theravāda writer, to organize the categories of the abhidhamma, the canonical classification of phenomenal factors and their formulaic ordering;1 and an interpretation of phenomenology as a methodology. We argue that Buddhaghosa does not (...) use abhidhamma as a reductive ontological division of the human being into mind and body, but rather as the contemplative structuring of human phenomenology.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Philosophy of Emotion in Buddhist Philosophy (and a Close Look at Remorse and Regret)Maria HeimIt is an honor to guest-edit a special issue for the Journal of Buddhist Philosophy for its inaugural issue, and even more to be invited to write a somewhat longer article than is typically the privilege of the guest editor. It was thought that something of a broader statement of the state of the (...) field in this emerging subfield of philosophy might itself be useful in situating current work and aspirations for future endeavors.That the study of emotions in Buddhist philosophy is still in its infancy is somewhat surprising given that Buddhist texts offer 2,500 years of exceedingly fine-grained analyses and reflections on experience.1 It could be that scholars have been thrown off by the word "emotion" itself, given that the English term does not map easily onto Buddhist categories. No single term in any Buddhist language does exactly what "emotion" does. Of course, "emotion" does not map precisely onto premodern Western categories of experience (affections, passions, sentiments, and so on) either, and has a notably shallow history even in European contexts, dating in something like its current usage only to the early nineteenth century (see Dixon 2003 for this history). And if "emotion" fits only awkwardly with Buddhist categories, it should occasion no surprise that many of the debates and dichotomies preoccupying Western philosophy on emotions—is emotion affective or cognitive? Physical or mental? Socially constructed or universal? Are emotions feelings? Evaluations? Motivations?—ill fit the debates and discussions that Buddhist texts offer about experience. The modern [End Page 2] Western categories and terms of the discussion may well inhibit Buddhist philosophical participation in these debates.I have found that this predicament is best met by calling into question the putative universalism of the English term and the assumption that "emotion" names a natural or ontological category. Increasingly, philosophers and neuroscientists are casting doubt on the notion that emotion is a natural kind (Rorty 2004; Griffiths 2004; Barrett 2006, 2017). That emotion is not easy to distinguish from feelings, motives, moods, and propositional attitudes, and that lists of emotions, when elaborated, seem hardly to fall into a generic family of phenomena, suggesting that its boundaries and borders are not carved in nature. This has implications for how "emotions" are to be studied in the lab, as Lisa Feldman Barrett suggests; the natural-kind view "underlies the major questions, the experimental designs, and the interpretation of empirical findings that characterize emotion research as a domain of scientific inquiry," even while the empirical evidence increasingly suggests that this view is the "result of an error of arbitrary aggregation" (Barrett 2006). For reasons piling up in the empirical literature, it is coming to look less and less likely that the English term emotion carves nature at the joints.2This situation can help us shake free of "emotion" early on, even if we may not be able to part entirely with it. A special issue on "the philosophy of emotion" gestures toward the kinds of phenomena these papers take up, even if they vary in the extent to which they find "emotion" to be analytically useful when interpreting Buddhist texts. Indeed, stepping away from assumptions of English-language universalism clears the deck for looking at very different, but no less meticulous and reflective, ways of carving up experiences of the very sort we do get in Buddhist texts. The way forward, in my view, is to permit English words like emotion, affect, and feeling to open the door to the kinds of phenomena we might want to investigate. We can at the same time resist tightly defining what these English terms mean, defending the borders around them, or closely tethering Buddhist conceptions to them. Working with Buddhist categories and meta-categories suggests ways to treat experiences that are, from the ground up, different than the modern West. These in turn can interrupt its supposed universalism and offer fresh questions and interventions.For example, Emily McRae's paper in this issue on kleśas—dysfunctional mental states—offers a Buddhist intervention for how philosophers might reconfigure and aggregate experience differently... (shrink)

"Meaning, the complex phenomenon of individuation and the definition of identity are the core theme of this work. Grounded on a theoretical framework that gives particular emphasis to the semiotic process common to all forms of cognition, human cognitionis conceived here as specific of organisms that, in the course of their interactions, produce symbolic forms, defining the specific physical, social and cultural environments in which they evolve. Individuation, inherent to that semiotic process, is complex and double-sided. It involves, on one (...) hand, the definition of semantic identities and their acknowledgment as world objects naming; on the other hand, it comprehends the specific lexical and morphosyntactic strategies different languages have found todesignate particular entities referring. The definition of world objects and its symbolic translation presents variations from language to language. In the second part of the book, we define what we have called a 'structure-motivated ontology' to represent how this symbolic translation is accomplished in English and European Portuguese. Plus, we try to show how the nature of this symbolic translation affects structural realisation, namely the individuation of reference and the construal of 'one-off referring' expressions."--Publisher's description. (shrink)

IN THE LAST PART of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith puts his theory in a class with those of his contemporaries Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, namely, the systems that make sentiments the principle of approbation. Despite recognizing important differences with both of them, he thinks that since he has placed the origin of moral sentiments in sympathy, and in particular the fact that we are able to enter into the motives of the agent and get pleasure from (...) finding them appropriate to their cause, sentiments are the foundation of his theory of morals. Many of Smith’s commentators, in fact almost all of the most important studies over the last few years, reaffirm the author’s self-description. However, my aim in this paper is to challenge this view by showing that Smith’s system can also be plausibly seen as a theory of practical reasoning, and in some important aspects very similar to Aristotelian ethics. Surprisingly few scholars have seen this parallel. Laurence Berns, Samuel Fleischacker, Charles Griswold, and Gloria Vivenza are the latest exceptions, identifying several points of coincidence between Adam Smith and Aristotle’s ethics. None of them, however, has tied all these similarities under a unified interpretation, such as the one I propose here: The basic analogy between these theories, and the source of those particular coincidences, is the operation of practical reason. Moreover, and besides the common elements with Aristotle’s ethics, Smith’s reconstruction of practical reason simultaneously announces some of the main features of modern accounts of ethics, such as impartiality and universality as preconditions of moral judgment. The integration of these ancient and modern elements in a single coherent theory allows Smith’s TMS to overcome the insufficiencies and paradoxes of both these traditions, and it constitutes one of the most interesting and challenging proposals of modern ethics. (shrink)

Many philosophical counselors seem to be counselors who use or point to phil­osophical texts or use abstract indeed logical or rational methods when working with a client. I want to introduce the idea of a counseling philosopher, who uses the client’s own concrete experiences as the basis for philosophizing with the client about the nature of the client’s dilemma - using ‘the between’ (Buber) as that special creative space where one em­ploys the art of philosophizing to the unique situation. Otherwise, (...) the particularity of that client gets subsumed under theory or methods, much like what has happened in psychology and which gave rise to Achenbach’s criticisms of psychology/psychiatry. The dialogical of which Buber and Friedman speak is the give and take between client and counseling philosopher of understanding and expanding perceptions confirmed through the actual relationship. Philosophy as an art (and not a method) helps us restore the trust Buber talks about which allows us to engage the world directly and not through categories of thought grounded in psychological or philosophical texts and theories. (shrink)

There is a strong tendency in both theory and practice to view education’s democratic role as that of equipping students with specific attributes presumed necessary for democratic life. Discussions thus center around identifying the required values, skills, and capabilities, as well as the types of educational endeavors that best foster them. What underpins such discussions is the assumption that the child is inherently lacking, which, I argue, leads to a conceptual dead end. In this article, I explore how the concept (...) of childism can expand the epistemological framework for understanding and theorizing education’s democratic role. Using theoretical concepts from Biesta and Rancière’s sporadic democracy, along with Fricker’s theory of epistemic injustice, I discuss a case from a Danish state school where a teacher harasses a student. I argue that the perception of the child as a deficit being causes children to suffer systemic epistemic (and other) injustices, as incidents of adults harassing children can go unnamed and unrecognized. The potential long-term harm is a loss of trust in one’s ability to know, interpret, and understand the world. I argue that this is also a loss in potential claims for equality based on the perception of injustice, a loss that damages the democratic quality of society. The article advocates a childist turn in research on education’s democratic role. Childism enables a hermeneutical breakthrough that can spark new discussions of scholarly, social, and political norms regarding the question of democracy and education. (shrink)

Heim responds to the five articles by anthropologists concerned with contemporary Buddhist practices and ideologies of emotions, arguing that a history of emotions approach that attends to the centrality of emotions and their evaluations can be important for ethics. She submits that while sometimes studies of moral psychology in Buddhist ethics have focused on individuals, these articles suggest how emotions can have a very public and collective impact on social, economic, and political life. She is also interested in how these (...) anthropological studies of contemporary Buddhist communities trouble textual accounts of Buddhist ethics on central questions of giving, karma, merit, and compassion. (shrink)

The progressive multistage stabilization of memory (consolidation) relies on post-acquisition neural reorganization. We hypothesize that two processes subserve procedural memory consolidation and are reflected in delayed post-acquisition performance gains: (1) synaptic consolidation, which is classical Hebbian, and (2) in some tasks, concurrently or consequently, “system consolidation,” which might in some skills be sleep-dependent. Behavioral interference may affect either type of consolidation.

The comprehension problem in Broca's patients does not stem from an inability to represent argument traces. There can be good comprehension in the presence of (object) traces and impaired comprehension can result in constructions where there are no (object) argument traces. This leads to an alternative understanding of Broca's comprehension, one that places the locus of the impairment in an inability to construct syntactic representation on time.

En este trabajo critico la interpretación moralizada de la obligación política en Hobbes que defiende Luciano Venezia. Exploro una lectura diferente que evita una dicotomía tajante entre las razones prudenciales y las razones morales y subraya en cambio la discontinuidad entre la normatividad subjetiva de la ley natural y la normatividad objetiva de la ley positiva. Sostengo que el contrato de sujeción política establece obligaciones objetivas recién cuando el soberano exige el cumplimiento de los contratos. La obligación política es entonces (...) una forma de obligación jurídica. Además, enfatizo que la comunidad moral de Hobbes solo es posible dentro del Estado. In this paper, I criticize Luciano Venezia's moralized interpretation of the Hobbesian concept of political obligation. I explore a different reading that avoids a clear-cut dichotomy between prudential and moral reasons and underscores instead the discontinuity between natural law's subjective normativity and civil law's objective normativity. I contend that the pact of political subjection establishes objective obligations only when the sovereign requires the fulfillment of contracts. Political obligation is then a form of legal obligation. In addition, I emphasize that Hobbes's moral community is only possible within the State. (shrink)

So far, we have focused on discourse reference to atomic individuals and specific times, events, and states. The basic point of the argument was that all types of discourse reference involve attention-guided anaphora (in the sense of Bittner 2012: Ch. 2). We now turn to discourses involving anaphora to and by quantificational expressions. Today, we focus on quantification over individuals but the analysis we develop will directly generalize to other semantic types. The basic idea is that quantification is one more (...) species of top-level anaphora--to wit, anaphora to top-ranked sets. (shrink)

By this point, we have developed some articulated analyses of top-level temporal anaphora, including temporal quantification, in languages with grammatical tense and/or aspect systems, represented by English, Polish, and Mandarin. But it is still not clear how this approach might extend to temporal anaphora in a language such as Kalaallisut, which has neither grammatical tense nor grammatical aspect, but instead marks only grammatical mood and person. Most theories of mood and modal reference either ignore temporal reference or analyze modal and (...) temporal reference as unrelated phenomena. Such theories provide no inkling how temporal reference in a tenseless mood-based language can be as precise as in English. (shrink)

Last time we introduced the notion of an illocutionary perspective . The basic idea is that the very act of speaking up introduces several discourse referents. The speech act itself (e ) is introduced as the central perspective point ( ε ). In addition, all the speech spheres (p ) where this speech act is realized, as well as the worlds of each sphere (w ∈p ) are introduced as modal topics ( Ω and  ω ).

In the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, learning is not a paradox, as suggested by Plato’s Meno, but the fundamental form of experience. To experience is precisely to be permeable and open to being reshaped by one’s experiences. I explore the reconceptualization of the human subject within Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy that allows us to understand how the body-subject can be a learning subject. Fundamentally this involves consideration of the nature of habit, and the way in which habit simultaneously locks us into a repressiveattachment (...) to a specific past and opens us up to the possibilities of meaningful engagement with the world. Through an analysis of the temporality of habit, I conclude that understanding habit as the fundamental launching-place of learning also allows us to see how essential learning is to the experience of human freedom. (shrink)

Through the analysis of Mariano Campo’s published works and thanks to further insights offered by some unpublished manuscripts, the profile of a philosopher is outlined, whose main interest, throughout his academic and research activity, has been aesthetics. More specifically, Campo has focused on the centrality of feelings to human aesthetic experience: it is through feeling that we experience a transfiguration of reality, which happens paradigmatically when, in front of an artwork, we appreciate it as an integral whole, a totality.

Este estudio tuvo como objetivo caracterizar investigaciones sobre representaciones sociales de docentes y estudiantes acerca de la escritura en la educación superior. La revisión sistemática se efectuó siguiendo la metodología propuesta por la Declaración PRISMA. La búsqueda, que fue realizada en las bases de datos WOS, Scopus, Scielo y ERIC, permitió identificar 20 artículos entre los que predomina el enfoque cualitativo. Como elementos recurrentes se destacan la necesidad de que en la universidad se enseñe explícitamente a escribir y la persistencia (...) de representaciones, que vinculan la escritura con la evaluación. (shrink)

Here is an example using a picture book story: A New House, in Grasshopper on the Road: by Arnold Lobel Grasshopper sees an apple on top of a hill and decides, yum! lunch, as he takes a big bite out of the apple. This, however, causes the apple to start rolling down the hill. Grasshopper hears a voice inside the apple, telling him to keep his house from being destroyed as it is rolling down the hill. My bathtub is in (...) the living room; my bed is in the kitchen. Grasshopper is trying to catch the apple, as it is rolling faster and faster down the hill. In the end it crashes into a tree at the bottom of the hill and is smashed into a hundred pieces. Luckily, it is an apple tree, and Worm has decided to find a new house to live in, one without a big bite in it, either. The question is, should Worm be angry at Grasshopper? The children often agree that he shouldn’t be angry. Grasshopper didn’t mean to hurt Worm and destroy his home. The aporia question is, isn’t Worm justified in being angry at Grasshopper for destroying his home, even though it was an accident? Should I be angry with someone who hurt me, even if it is not done on purpose? I am hurt; so can’t I be angry because I have been hurt? The children often feel that when it was not done on purpose, you can’t really be angry. Another aporia question is, can you punish someone when what they have done wasn’t done on purpose? Is it OK for your parents to punish you when you have done something wrong, even though you didn’t do it on purpose? Another aporia question is then whether we are justified in punishing someone who is innocent? Does it make sense to punish your baby brother for breaking your toy? Or are the police ever justified in shooting an unarmed Black man? (shrink)

En este trabajo abordamos algunos de los aspectos más relevantes del pensamiento del poeta y filósofo Teixeira de Pascoaes acerca de la Saudade, destacando su dimensión más “metafísica”.

Jan WoleĔski Kazimierz Twardowski and the Development of Philosophy of Science in Poland Kazimierz Twardowski studied with Brentano and followed his style of doing philosophy, in particular, the thesis that the method of philosophy is  ...

While thinkers of the material turn offer new conceptual resources for talking about non-human ontologies, interaction researchers are trying to reassemble the social situation fragmented by telecommunication. Conversation analysts tend to see technical objects in their situation-constitutive role, but they can also disrupt the current projects of the participants whilst remaining "unseen and unnoticed" (e.g. Zoom delays). We propose a conceptualization of the relationship between the participant and the interaction environment as a source of agency, which makes it possible to (...) preserve an emic perspective. We illustrate our thesis by analyzing a case study of interaction between a Deaf and a hearing participant in VRChat. In this case, virtual pencils that leave durable inscriptions in the air are used by participants for communication. We analyze a simple question-and-answer sequence and demonstrate that: the participants treat the inscriptions as material; the hearing participant is less capable of communicating in this space than the Deaf person; the answer to the question is produced jointly due to the instructional work of the Deaf participant. The results allow us to draw the following conclusions about the nature of materiality, agency and communicative competence: 1) the materiality of the environment is not a purely analytical category, but is constructed by the participants in the interaction; 2) the agency of the participants depends on the environment and at the same time has a distributed character; 3) communicative competence is not directly related to the "internal" characteristics of the agent, such as atypicality. (shrink)

Leading scholars examine the relation between Irigaray’s early writings and her later, more political work.

É provável que eu morra nos próximos dez, quinze, anos- Tenho filhos e netos, amei e fui amada, escrevi livros, ouvi música e viajei- Poderia dar-me por satisfeita, o que não me faz encarar a morte com placidez- Se amanhã um médico me disser que sofro de.