Este artículo analiza el papel de la escritura en la consultoría filosófica desde una perspectiva nietzscheana, proponiendo que esta facilita la expresión y reconfiguración de las interpretaciones del consultante sobre su vida. Se parte de la premisa de la «voluntad de poder» como principio explicativo de la realidad, que impulsa a los individuos a buscar comprensión y transformación. Así, la actividad filosófica se concibe como una constante interpretación, donde la escritura emerge como herramienta crucial de manifestación de estas interpretaciones preexistentes, (...) para luego ser reinterpretadas. Por su parte, la consultoría filosófica se constituye como un espacio propicio para este acto interpretativo, utilizando la escritura como medio. Este proceso permite a los consultantes examinar y reconfigurar sus percepciones e interpretaciones, conduciendo a nuevas comprensiones de sí mismos. En síntesis, el artículo argumenta que la escritura en la consultoría filosófica no solo es un medio de expresión, sino una actividad filosófica que permite el autoconocimiento a través de la reinterpretación constante de la propia vida. (shrink)

Tal vez una de las razones por las cuales la tendencia del ser humano a plantearse preguntas que exceden sus posibilidades resulta tan problemática es que nos es imposible negarla o ignorarla. Hacerse preguntas metafísicas pareciera ser un rasgo característicamente humano, e indisociable de su propio cuerpo. Nietzsche muestra que los presupuestos metodológicos del proceder metafísico surgen de tensiones y exigencias fisiológicas, pues la propia relación del cuerpo humano con su entorno conlleva precisamente a la necesidad de ciertas formas de (...) comprensión del mundo. Blumenberg se apoya en esta idea en la medida en que la ausencia de medios biológicos para defenderse de los peligros de la realidad obligan al ser humano a hacer uso de su intelecto y creatividad. Esto conlleva a una forma de relación indirecta y mediada, es decir, metafórica, con el mundo. El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar cómo la perspectiva blumenbergiana complementa e integra las críticas nietzscheanas a la metafísica, de manera que es posible concebir la inclinación natural del hombre a las preguntas metafísicas como su rasgo antropológico característico de su fisiología. (shrink)

Properly speaking, the corporation, considered as an entity distinct from its members, cannot be morally responsible for wrongful corporate acts. Setting aside (in this abstract) acts brought about through negligence or omissions, we may say that moral responsibility for an act attaches to that agent (or agents) in whom the act "originates" in this sense: (1) the agent formed the (mental) intention or plan to bring about that act (possibly with the help of others) and (2) the act was intentionally (...) brought about through bodily movements over which that agent had direct control (i.e. the kind of direct mental control that I have over the body I refer to as "my" body) and through which the agent carried out his (mental) intention or plan. Corporate acts do not thus originate in some corporate entity distinct from its members because the corporation has neither a mind to form intentions nor a body it directly controls: it lacks the proper mind/body unity. Instead, corporate acts originate in individual autonomous human beings who make up the corporation and who intentionally bring about corporate acts through their own bodily movements. Such human individuals, and not "the corporation," are morally responsible for corporate acts. Moreover, to say that an entity is "morally responsible" for a wrongful act is to say that the entity is liable to blame and punishment. But it is not possible to impose blame and punishment on a corporation without inflicting it on corporate members. Thus, to say that a corporation (as an entity distinct from its members) is "morally responsible" for a wrongful corporate act is to imply that a (possibly innocent) corporate member legitimately may be punished for something for which another entity was morally responsible. This violates the moral principles that underlie blame and punishment. To hold that the corporation can be morally responsible for its acts is to adopt a dangerous organicism. (shrink)

There is a widespread view in philosophy of language and in philosophy of mind according to which the «quinean» rejection of analyticity can be made compatible with some sort of realism about meaning. Against such compatibilist claim, Paul Boghossian has recently held the thesis that one cannot coherently reject the analytical/synthetical distinction maintaining at the same time a meaning realism. His arguments are very pervasive, but they can be replied. The main objective of this paper is to show that in (...) fact it is possible to reject analyticity being at the same time a meaning realist, even a meaning realist of a non-holist kind. The prevailing view is basically right. Moreover, it is possible to go on maintaining the compatibilist claim in its most radical form. In short, even if we adopt a non-holist meaning realism, we must reject analyticity because language is always conceptually motivated and engaged with reality. There is no linguistic arbitrariness. That forces us to go far from classical conceptions of meaning and to have a much more pluralistic one. With respect to it, for instance, to say that some statements are true once their meanings are fixed would not entail that they are true by virtue of meanings. The problem to get such a conception of meaning remains open. However, the reasons against analyticity do not force us to any irreductible meaning holism. (shrink)

En el texto al que quisiera dar aquí respuesta, o, más exactamente, con el que quisiera conversar, José María Lassalle abunda en los argumentos desarrollados en su último y enjundioso libro (Lassalle, 2017). Su diagnóstico sobre el fenómeno populista es a la vez original y plausible, en la medida en que rehúye los lugares comunes y apunta hacia factores cuyo papel en la génesis y expansión de los movimientos populistas no ha recibido la atención suficiente. No tengo así objeciones insuperables (...) contra sus tesis, que en lo que sigue me limitaré a glosar o complementar…. (shrink)

In the past the ethnic duality of the Visigoths and the Hispano-Romans has been seen as one of the main characteristics in the formation of the Spanish Visigothic kingdom. This study shows that, instead of an ethnic division of the population, a Gothic identity, which was above all politically defined, was already applied to the entire population in the 6th century, and that overall it had less effect than is generally assumed. An analysis of the extant literary sources takes into (...) account the historical conditions and new methodical approaches to interpretation. (shrink)

Standard models of practical rationality face a puzzle that has gone unnoticed: given a modest assumption about the nature of deliberation, we are apparently frequently briefly irrational. In what follows, I explain the problem, consider what is wrong with several possible solutions, and propose an account that does not generate the objectionable result.

El formalismo no es la única dolencia que aqueja al Derecho o, mejor, a quienes tienen la función de interpretarlo y aplicarlo. Pero es quizás la más perniciosa en los países latinos por el carácter de enfermedad endémica que ha adquirido en nuestra cultura jurídica. Es cierto, por otro lado, que no todo lo que se llama a veces "formalismo" es igualmente rechazable; e incluso hay un formalismo -un significado de esa expresión- que no lo es en absoluto. El Derecho (...) es, en buena medida, un fenómeno de autoridad; en el mismo, las razones formales tienen una importancia fundamental, lo que no ocurre, por ejemplo, en la moral. Por eso, los jueces no deben dialogar, como a veces se dice, de tú a tú con la Constitución y con las leyes, sino que deben reconocer la autoridad de la una y de las otras; en el caso del juez constitucional, el sometimiento a la Constitución debe ir unido a la deferencia hacia el legislador como principio interpretativo fundamental. Si las cosas no fueran así, no habría Estado de Derecho, simplemente porque el imperio de la ley habría pasado a ser imperio o gobierno de los jueces. (shrink)

While applying general ethical principles and reasoning to the dilemmas presented by the development of nanotechnology is often useful and always legitimate, we also need to find a way to bridge the gap between general principles and the specific issues that arise from the development of individual nanotechnologies. Drawing inspiration from pragmatist thinking, a useful strategy is to focus on the links between the epistemological, political and social representations of a particular case. Using the example of a nanotechnological house, this (...) paper analyzes the problematic connections between scientific knowledge, technical expertise, decision-making and public engagement in nanotechnology representational networks. (shrink)

The way digital information technologies work and, more specifically, the possibilities for action that technological devices offer to us affect our processes of political belief formation. In particular, there seems to be a close connection between our digital affordances and the increase of the sort of polarization that threatens the proper functioning of democracy. In this paper, we analyze whether the type of polarization linked to the use of digital technologies, and which endangers the health of public deliberation, has to (...) do with the adoption of beliefs whose contents are increasingly extreme—extremism—or, on the contrary, has more to do with increasing our credence in the core beliefs of our political identity—radicalism. (shrink)

According to an environmental application of Rawlsian principles of justice, the well-ordered society cannot tolerate the perpetration of certain environmental harms. This paper gives an account of those harms committed in the form of ecocide. The concept of ecocide is developed, as well as the ideal of eco-relational pluralism, as conceptual tools for defending citizens’ environmental interests. This paper aims to identify persuasive and reasonably acceptable justice claims for compelling states to curtail environmentally destructive activities through recourse to principles firmly (...) established in the liberal tradition, while simultaneously exploring the limitations of such an approach. (shrink)

Kripke formula cuatro objeciones en contra de una solución disposicionalista simple al enigma wittgensteiniano sobre seguir una regla. En este trabajo presento dos propuestas parcialmente disposicionalistas diferentes a la teoría disposicionalista simple que Kripke discute y defiendo que aquellas cuatro objeciones no les afectan. Una de esas dos propuestas puede atribuirse, con cierta precaución, al propio Wittgenstein. La otra, que me parece preferible, invoca una noción teleológica de disposición. Ambas propuestas apelan al concepto de simplicidad, o —alternativamente— al concepto de (...) similitud natural. Rechazo también ciertas críticas que Kripke hace del uso de tales conceptos para solucionar el enigma sobre seguir una regla. (shrink)