Clarifies and systematises the concepts and presuppositions behind the influential new field of assemblage theoryRead and download the preface, by series editor Graham Harman, and the Introduction to Assemblage Theory for free nowManuel DeLanda provides the first detailed overview of the assemblage theory found in germ in Deleuze and Guattari's writings. Through a series of case studies DeLanda shows how the concept can be applied to economic, linguistic and military history as well as to metaphysics, science and mathematics.DeLanda then presents (...) the real power of assemblage theory by advancing it beyond its original formulation allowing for the integration of communities, institutional organisations, cities and urban regions. And he challenges Marxist orthodoxy with a Leftist politics of assemblages.Key FeaturesCritically connects DeLanda with more recent theoretical turns in speculative realismMakes sense of the fragmentary discussions of assemblage theory in the work of Deleuze and GuattariOpens up assemblage theory to sociology, linguistics, military organisations and science so that future researchers can rigorously deploy the concept in their own fields"e. (shrink)

The paper presents a renewed Habermasian view on transnational multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) and assesses the institutional characteristics of the Equator Principles Association (EPA) from a deliberative democracy perspective. Habermas’ work has been widely adopted in the academic literature on the political responsibilities of (multinational) corporations (i.e., political corporate social responsibility), and also in assessing the democratic qualities of MSIs. Commentators, however, have noted that Habermas’ approach relies very much on ‘nation-state democracy’ and may not be applicable to democracy in MSIs—in (...) which nation-states are virtually absent. We argue that Habermas’ detailed conceptualization of the institutionalization of deliberative democracy can be applied to transnational MSIs if these initiatives can be said to have their own ‘dèmoi’ that can be represented in associational decision-making. Therefore, we develop a definition of the dèmos of an MSI based on the notion of collective agency. Subsequently, we explain how Habermas’ approach to democracy can be applied to MSIs and show that it has more to offer than hitherto has been uncovered. Our illustrative analysis of the EPA confirms the criticisms regarding this MSI which have recently been articulated by researchers and practitioners, but also yields new findings and possible avenues for the further development of the EPA: That is, although our assessment suggests that the EPA in its current state is still far from being a democratic MSI, the possibility of a sensible analysis of its democratic character indicates that transnational MSIs can, in principle, help to fill governance gaps in a democratic way. (shrink)

El artículo expone la contraposición entre dos posiciones filosóficas (deconstrucción y reconstrucción), dos autores (Jacques Derrida, Jean Luc Ferry) y dos libros (Apprendre à vivre enfin, Apprendre à vivre). En última instancia, dos formas de entender las relaciones entre filosofía y vida. Más allá del logocentrismo, objeto de la deconstrucción, el biocentrismo es el eje de la tarea de reconstrucción de una filosofía articulada como ontología o teoría de lo real, filosofía moral o teoría de la justicia y sabiduría o (...) teoría de la salvación. En suma, una forma renovada de asumir la necesidad de la filosofía. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is to reconstruct Anthony Collins’ challenge to the authority of orthodox Anglican figures, which arises due to arguments Collins develops in his Vindication of the Divine Attributes (1710) and Discourse on Free-Thinking (1713). In addition to shedding light on a hitherto underappreciated argument by Collins, my reconstruction allows me to propose a solution to the interpretive problem posed by §§16–22 of the fourth dialogue of Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732). While it has been acknowledged that Collins looms (...) large in the background of these sections, Berkeley’s argumentative strategy has remained perplexing to commentators, particularly his references to several Scholastic thinkers. I argue that we can make sense of Berkeley’s strategy and references if we appreciate that these sections are intended to evade Collins’ challenge. (shrink)

Las principales disputas que han tenido lugar en el seno del tomismo contemporáneo han estado marcadas por un fuerte criticismo respecto a la escuela tomista dominicana. Las tesis más discutidas pueden sintetizarse en torno a la comprensión del esse y su énfasis en el conjunto de la filosofía del ser. El dominico canadiense Lawrence Dewan quiso contrarrestar este criticismo equilibrando este énfasis sobre el esse haciendo valer el papel de la forma en el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino. La forma, (...) que es algo divino en las cosas, no es sólo mera potencia receptiva, sino causa del esse y mediadora del acto creador del ente. En este artículo vamos a estudiar detenidamente las ideas principales del tomismo dewaniano a la luz de los aspectos más originales de la enseñanza del Aquinate, desde una perspectiva crítica. (shrink)

One of the great dangers of our time is that the cumulative long-term action of smart socio-technical environments engineered to control thought and behavior results in an excessive loss of freedom. In response to this challenge, that we shall call humanity’s socio-technical dilemma, we outline here some fundamental ideas of a political program to control these environments, which is similar to the one proposed by Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger. It is similar insofar as we share their paternalistic and humanistic (...) approach. But it is different insofar as we claim, first, the duty to admit that it is a version of Sloterdijk’s controversial human zoo; second, the theoretical and practical convenience of identifying the human capabilities to be promoted by these environments with the capabilities necessary for the democratic electorate to comply with the competence principle; and third, the awareness of the probable long-term unsustainability of the program in a context of competition between countries and companies, in spite of which it must be implemented because of its moral superiority. (shrink)

Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths and offered different accounts of why certain necessary truths seem to be contingent. One of these accounts was used by Kripke in an argument against the psychophysical identity thesis. I defend the claim that the explanatory force of Kripke's standard account of the appearance of contingency relies on the explanatory force of one of the more general accounts he also offers. But the more general account cannot be used to undermine (...) the psychophysical identity thesis. Specifically, a crucial feature in Kripke's standard account, which is needed to argue for dualism, is explanatorily superfluous. Alternative accounts that are similar to Kripke's original one but lack that trait would also explain the phenomenon. Consequently, the Kripkean dualist argument is blocked. /// Kripke ha argumentado que existen verdades necesarias a posteriori, y ha ofrecido diferentes explicaciones de por qué ciertas verdades necesarias parecen contingentes. Una de esas explicaciones se usaba en un argumento con el que Kripke criticaba la tesis de la identidad psicofísica. En este trabajo sostengo que la fuerza explicativa de la explicacion kripkeana estándar de la apariencia de contingencia depende de la fuerza explicativa de una de las otras explicaciones que Kripke también propone. Pero esa otra explicación, más general, no sirve para rechazar la identidad psicofísica. Con-cretamente, un rasgo crucial de la explicación kripkeana estandar resulta explicativamente superfluo. Explicaciones alternativas, similares a la de Kripke pero que carezcan de ese rasgo, explicarían también el fenómeno. Como consecuencia, el argumento dualista kripkeano queda bloqueado. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se expone la crítica que Lawrence Dewan hizo de Étienne Gilson en torno a la fórmula quidditas Dei est ipsum suum esse, en la que el canadiense entiende que el medievalista francés ha errado interpretando que santo Tomás despoja a Dios de su esencia. Para ambos autores, el auténtico tomismo pasa necesariamente por la comprensión adecuada de esta fórmula en la que el ser y la esencia, a diferencia de los entes, se identifican. A través de (...) este estudio trataremos de llegar a una respuesta sobre qué explicación es más cercana a la metafísica del Aquinate. (shrink)

La diócesis de Coria-Cáceres ha celebrado su XIV Sínodo diocesano. El presente artículo pretende señalar algunas claves teológicas sobre la sinodalidad eclesial recogida en el derecho canónico y extraer algunas consecuencias sobre la sinodalidad de la Iglesia en misión que pueda ayudar a discernir las claves pastorales de una Iglesia diocesana en el siglo XXI.

There is robust scientific evidence from meta-analyses in psychotherapy research that common factors such as the alliance between patients and therapists, empathy, goal consensus/collaboration, positive regard/affirmation and genuineness have a much greater effect on the overall psychotherapy outcome than the so-called specific factors like particular treatment methods or ingredients of therapy.1 The current evidence base also suggests that the effects of telepsychiatric treatment are comparable with those of face-to-face treatment, not only regarding clinical outcome parameters but also with respect to (...) patient satisfaction, acceptance and adherence—all common factors of psychotherapy.2 According to a comprehensive review of the main ethical arguments for and against different forms of online psychotherapy, the online setting provides several weighty advantages: for example, increased access, availability, flexibility, convenience, satisfaction, acceptance and increased demand.3 Among the arguments against online psychotherapy, privacy, confidentiality and data security issues, emergency issues, as well as communication issues have been mentioned.3 Frittgen and Haltaufderheide 4 are concerned that telepsychiatry could ‘impact ethically relevant aspects of the therapeutic relationship’. They conclude that ‘there is evidence for ethically relevant changes of the therapeutic relationship in video-based telepsychiatric consultations’,4 particularly pertaining to ‘respect for autonomy, lucidity, fidelity, justice and humanity towards each other’.4 Indeed, video-based consultations as technically mediated communication ‘do not only transmit but transform what can be perceived, …. (shrink)

Tras una inicial aproximación a la génesis del concepto de responsabilidad, génesis en la que se empiezan a percibir algunos de los rasgos del mismo que terminarán por hacerse explícitos en nuestros días, el trabajo se centra en señalar las implicaciones que tiene adscribir decididamente la responsabilidad a la época moderna y, en concreto, al surgimiento de la civilización industrial. Acaso una de las más importantes sea la de obligarnos a plantear toda una serie de asuntos en conexión necesaria con (...) otro tema-eje del pensamiento moderno, el de la identidad. Junto a dicho tema, en el texto quedan apuntados otros, como el de la justa escala en la que abordar tales asuntos o el del mal, por citar sólo dos, cuya envergadura puede servir como indicador de la importancia que presenta el concepto de responsabilidad en el pensamiento contemporáneo. (shrink)

I examine the extent to which Dennett’s account in Freedom Evolves might be construed as revisionist about free will or should instead be understood as a more traditional kind of compatibilism. I also consider Dennett’s views about philosophical work on free agency and its relationship to scientific inquiry, and I argue that extant philosophical work is more relevant to scientific inquiry than Dennett’s remarks may suggest.

The ancient commentaries on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias give us important elements to understand more clearly some difficult passages of this treatise. In the case of the indefinite names and verbs, these commentaries reveal a doctrine which explains not only the nature of the indefinites, but also why Aristotle introduces these kinds of term in Peri Hermeneias. The coherence and explanatory capacity of this doctrine is entirely absent in modern exegesis of Peri Hermeneias. This fact has important implications: it can make (...) us to think whether there will be another topics in which the ancient commentators are still indispensable to understand Aristotle. It can also make us to think to what extent a profounder reflection of the ancient commentators can modify our idea of Aristotle and the ancient world. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the Special Issue ‘Foundational Issues in Conceptual Engineering’. The issue contains contributions by James Andow, Delia Belleri, David Chalmers, Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Eugen Fischer, Viktoria Knoll, Edouard Machery and Amie Thomasson. We, the editors, provide a brief introduction to the main topics of the issue and then summarize its contributions.

Examino Acerca del cielo (De caelo) I 2 con el fin de mostrar allí la presencia de la demostración científica. Este desarrollo pretende aportar nueva evidencia en favor de la no discrepancia entre teoría y praxis científica en Aristóteles (Barnes, 1969) y de relativizar la interpretación de que el método real y únicamente usado es la dialéctica (cuyo antecedente se remonta a Owen, 1980). Además, siguiendo la propuesta hermenéutica de Gotthelf (1987) y Detel (1993 y 1997), mostraré de qué modo (...) se utiliza la demostración científica en la prueba de la existencia del cuerpo simple o éter. Ofreceré también una reconstrucción de las pruebas mediante la elaboración de un esquema que abarque el conjunto de las deducciones. Estos últimos desarrollos constituyen el aporte más novedoso del presente artículo. I examine On the Heavens (DC) 12 in order to show there the presence of scientific demonstration. This development tries to contribute new evidence in favor of the not discrepancy between theory and scientific practice in Aristotle (Barnes, 1969) and to make the interpretation that method real and solely used is dialectic relative (whose precedent goes back to Owen, 1980). In addition, following the hermeneutic proposal of Gotthelf (1987) and Detel (1993 and 1997), I will show how scientific demonstration is used in the proof of simple body (ether) existence. I will offer also a reconstruction of the proof by means of the elaboration of a scheme that includes the set of deductions. The latter developments constitute the most new contribution of the present paper. (shrink)

A proposal to account for the objectivity of thought and language in terms of identity between facts, meanings and contents is offered. Furthermore, their normativity is related to their world involving character. Both proposals are jointly quietist: they avoid philosophical theorizing that explains thought in terms of world or viceversa.

En una época en la que estamos cayendo en la barbarie de eliminar la filosofía y la literatura de los planes de estudio de ciertos niveles de la enseñanza, o bien en la excesiva especialización nacida de un pensamiento burdamente técnico, este libro reivindica esos dos espacios de creación entendidos no como identidades puras, sino como procesos en continuo trance de transformación y desfiguración. De este modo, se llava a cabo un recorrido por los principales momentos históricos de tal transformación (...) y desfiguración, teniendo en cuenta las ramificaciones que han tenido lugar en dicho recorrido: éticas, metafísicas, sexuales, formales, retóricas, etc. (shrink)

E l auto r , a pa r ti r de l análisi s d e un a seri e d e ejemplo s d e ponderació n judicial , trat a de contesta r la s cuestione s centrale s de l debat e enta b lad o e n l a teorí a de l derech o contemporánea entr e pa r tidario s y crítico s d e est e pa r ticula r procedimient o a r (...) gumentat i vo qu e po r l o demás e s d e u n us o frecuent e e n nuestro s tribunales , especialment e e n lo s tribunale s supremos y constitucionales . E n prime r luga r , tomand o com o punt o d e pa r tid a la s apo r tacione s de Al e x y , trat a d e responde r a la s cuestione s d e e n qu é consist e l a ponderación , cuále s son su s característica s y e n qu é s e diferenci a d e l a subsunción . E n s e gund o luga r , abord a el pro b lem a d e cuánd o h a y qu e pondera r y cuánd o est á justi f icad o hacerlo . F inalmente , trata d e responde r a l a cuestió n d e s i l a ponderació n e s u n procedimient o raciona l y e n qu é consist e es a racionalida d , mostrand o frent e a su s crítico s cóm o lo s criterio s d e l a ponderación utilizado s e n la s decisione s d e lo s tribunales , y e n concret o de l T ribuna l Constitucional, puede n se r considerado s u n bue n ejempl o d e cóm o pued e opera r l a racionalida d práctica e n e l ámbit o de l derecho. (shrink)

Kalinowski conceives metaphysics as a set of propositions which can be axiomatized. This paper exposes the typical rules of an axiomatic system comparing them with the metaphysical system developed by Kalinowski. These rules are linguistic rules, but also admission-rules and transformation-rules. They always refer to the metaphysical propositions (wich are first or second propositions, as it is usual in logical systems). This paper tries to evaluate Kalinowski's attempt.

This dissertation focuses on the topic of analyticity. The traditional concept of analyticity characterizes analytic sentences in at least two ways. On the one hand, these sentences are thought to be true in virtue only of the meaning of the expressions that constitute them. On the other hand, they are thought to be such that they can be concluded by competent speakers in an a priori fashion--that is, merely on the basis of the speakers' knowledge of the meaning of the (...) expressions contained in the sentences. In the dissertation I argue that these two ways of characterizing analyticity do not single out the same set of sentences, and that at least two different notions of meaning should be postulated to account for this fact. ;To show this I focus first on the notion of truth in virtue of meaning. I identify two ways in which a sentence can be said to be true in virtue of meaning: on the one hand, if the condition it expresses necessarily obtains; on the other hand, if semantic facts concerning the reference of the expressions that constitute it determine that it has to be true. I argue that the sets of sentences that can be said to be true in virtue of meaning according to these two criteria and the set of sentences ordinarily deemed analytically true do not coincide. ;I focus then on the second traditional criterion for analyticity--i.e., apriority. This criterion determines a set of sentences--what I call a priori acceptable sentences--that seems to coincide most closely with the set of sentences we ordinarily judge to be analytic. To account for the disparity between the extensions of this and the 'truth in virtue of meaning' criteria I propose that a distinction should be made between truth-conditional meaning--which concerns the contribution of expressions to truth-conditions--and conceptual meaning--which concerns the abilities necessary for competence in a language. I finally argue that conceptual meaning cannot always guarantee the truth of a priori acceptable sentences. (shrink)