Analizar epistemológicamente los problemas de salud requiere incorporar la epistemología a los programas de posgrado en ciencias de la salud. Con el propósito de caracterizar los campos problemáticos que fundamenten el diseño de un programa académico para el curso de epistemología en ciencias de la salud se realizó un estudio con el enfoque de la hermenéutica gadameriana en tres etapas. El punto de partida expone la concepción de hombre, conocimiento y epistemología. El horizonte de comprensión se elaboró con tendencias epistemológicas (...) hegemónicas. La fusión de horizontes integró las características de los siguientes campos problemáticos: epistemología de las ciencias de la salud, lógica de las ciencias de la salud, tendencias epistemológicas en ciencias de la salud, problemas epistemológicos de las ciencias de la salud. Se concluye que los campos problemáticos descritos introducen al estudiante a la reflexión de su práctica científica mediante el análisis racional, axiológico y crítico. Analyzing health problems from an epistemological point of view requires epistemology to be included on health sciences postgraduate courses programs. Aimed at characterizing the problematic fields used as basis for the design of a health sciences epistemology academic program, a study with an approach to Gadamer hermeneutics in three stages was carried out. The starting point shows man, knowledge and epistemology conceptions. The comprehension horizon was made with epistemological-dominant trends. The horizons merge included characteristics from the following problematic fields: health sciences epistemology, health sciences logic, epistemological trends in health sciences, health sciences epistemological problems. It was reached the conclusion that the described problematic fields introduce students to their scientific practice reflection through a rational, axiological and critical analysis. (shrink)

Queremos pensar nuestro tiempo y pensamos a nosotros mismos. Queremos hablar y escuchar porque tenemos algo que decirnos. Queremos seguir reflexionando sobre lo que significa una comunidad cultural iberoamericana y, dentro de ella, qué significa pensar en español. Como dice Ernesto Garzón Valdés: "queremos pensar sin descuidar nuestra tradición filosófica y sin olvidar desde donde reflexionamos". A estas alturas del proceso ya sabemos lo que tenemos que evitar: el casticismo que lleva al provincianismo y lo abstractamente universal que esquiva la (...) realidad. Queremos pensar los temas de nuestro tiempo situadamente y para ello nada mejor que dejarse guiar por el lenguaje que compartimos: el español o el portugués. [Fragmento]. (shrink)

The rise of foundational dualism and the eclipse of the body -- "Body am I entirely, and nothing else": non-reductive materialism and the struggle against dualism -- Toward a materialist phenomenology of religion -- The phenomenology of embodiment and the study of religion -- Religious bodies as social artifacts -- Holding social constructionism in check: the recovery of the active, lived body -- A cultural neurophenomenology of religion: enter the embodied mind -- The eclipse of practice: textualism at large -- (...) "Ceci n'est pas un texte": from textualism to practice -- Expanding the conversation on emplaced religion -- Mobility, networks, and ecology. (shrink)

Presupposition, vagueness, and oddness can lead to some sentences failing to have a clear truth value. The homogeneity property of plural predication with definite descriptions may also create truth-value gaps: The books are written in Dutch is true if all relevant books are in Dutch, false if none of them are, and neither true nor false if, say, half of the books are written in Dutch. We study the projection property of homogeneity by deploying methods of general interest to identify (...) truth-value gaps. Method A consists in collecting both truth judgments and, independently, falsity judgments. The second method, employed in experiment series B and C, is based on one-shot ternary judgments: completely true vs. completely false vs. neither. After a calibration of these methods, we use them to demonstrate that homogeneity projects out of negation, the scope of universal sentences and the scope of non-monotonic quantifiers such as exactly two, to some extent. We assess our results in light of different theoretical approaches to homogeneity—approaches based on presuppositions, scalar implicatures, and something like supervaluations, respectively. We identify free parameters in these theories and assess various variants of them based on our results. Our experimental paradigms may be of broader significance insofar as they can be applied to other phenomena which result in the failure of a sentence to have a definite truth value. (shrink)

The problem of divine attributes was one of the most intensely debated topics in the 17-18th century Irish philosophy. Simply put, the problem revolves around the ontological question (i) whether human and divine attributes differ in degree or in kind, and the semantical (ii) how we ought to describe these divine attributes by means of our human language. While there was a consensus that analogies play a key role in solving the semantical problem there was a controversy about the kind (...) of speech they allow for. Especially, it was contested if using analogies for divine predication allows for a separate kind of speech, i.e. allows us to speak neither literally nor metaphorically but analogically. The aim of my paper is to contextualize George Berkeley's position on the problem of divine attributes as developed in § 21 of the IV. Dialogue in Alciphron.More specifically and contrary to what most scholars hold, I argue Berkeley fails to follow Cardinal Cajetan with remarkable closeness. Despite paraphrasing parts of Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia in § 21, the solution Berkeley advances is closer to the position of John Duns Scotus – and hence, ironically, with the position Cajetan aimed to reject. (shrink)

Hispanic specialists in the Alphonsine work have studied the distinction between ‘natura’ and ‘nature’ of the Partidas. The conclusions of these analyzes affirm that this distinction is born from a semantic displacement that is situated in a plane of legal-social relationships, within a naturalistic model in the Alphonsine political project that shows a Christian Aristotelian reading. The present paper does not differ from these conclusions, but we believe that it is necessary to modulate this naturalistic model from broader metaphysical conceptualizations (...) that better explain what that Christian Aristotelianism consists of. We will try to reinforce these theses from assessments that have the multidisciplinary nature present in the Alphonsine scriptorium as a backdrop. We present the possible influence of the philosophical schemes of the First Franciscan Scholasticism in this distinction of the terms ‘nature’ and ‘nature’. (shrink)

Conceptual atomism of this type is incompatible with many other semantic approaches. One of these approaches is justificationist semantics. This book assumes conceptual atomism.

This essay characterizes a version of internal realism. In §1 I will argue that for semantical reasons we should be realists of a strong kind. In §2 I plead for an internalistic setting of realism starting from the thesis that truth is, at least, not a non-epistemic concept. We have to bear the consequences of this in form of a more complicated concept of truth. The ‘internal’ of ‘internal realism’ points to the justification aspect of truth. The ‘realism’ of ‘internal (...) realism’ points to the correspondence aspect. A thesis concerning the irreducibility of the two aspects will be established in §3. (shrink)

¿De qué manera afecta el Antropoceno a la ética ecológica? Sabido es que el primero no solo da cuenta de la formidable transformación de origen antropogénico experimentada por los sistemas planetarios, sino que de paso constata que el impacto humano sobre la Tierra es menos un accidente o contingencia que la consecuencia inevitable del modo de ser de la especie. Este artículo explorará las consecuencias que la actual emergencia planetaria tiene para la ética ecológica, arguyendo que la ausencia del sujeto (...) político "humanidad" incrementa la importancia de un comportamiento individual que está, agregación mediante, en la raíz del cambio climático y demás manifestaciones del Antropoceno. Se defenderá la idea de que la virtud más importante para el ciudadano ecológico es la virtud epistémica de la reflexividad o autoconciencia, cuyo resultado habrá de ser la formación de una subjetividad planetaria orientada a la sostenibilidad y, idealmente, a la reparación de las relaciones de la humanidad con el mundo natural. (shrink)

While applying general ethical principles and reasoning to the dilemmas presented by the development of nanotechnology is often useful and always legitimate, we also need to find a way to bridge the gap between general principles and the specific issues that arise from the development of individual nanotechnologies. Drawing inspiration from pragmatist thinking, a useful strategy is to focus on the links between the epistemological, political and social representations of a particular case. Using the example of a nanotechnological house, this (...) paper analyzes the problematic connections between scientific knowledge, technical expertise, decision-making and public engagement in nanotechnology representational networks. (shrink)

I’ve been told that in the good old days of the 1970s, when Quine’s desert landscapes were regarded as ideal real estate and David Lewis and John Rawls had not yet left a legion of influential students rewriting the terrain of metaphysics and ethics respectively, compatibilism was still compatibilism about free will. And, of course, incompatibilism was still incompatibilism about free will. That is, compatibilism was the view that free will was compatible with determinism. Incompatibilism was the view that free (...) will was incompatible with determinism.1 What philosophers argued about was whether free will was compatible with determinism. Mostly, this was an argument about how to understand claims that one could do otherwise. You needn’t have bothered to talk about moral responsibility, because it was just obvious that you couldn’t have moral responsibility without free will. The literature was a temple of clarity. Then, somehow, things began to go horribly wrong. To be sure, there had been some activity in the 1960s that would have struck some observers as ominous. Still, it was not until the 1980s that those initial warning signs gave way to real trouble. The meanings of terms twisted. (shrink)

A theory of the beliefs of non-human animals is not closed to us, only because we do not have beliefs of their kind. Starting from a theory of human beliefs and working on a building block model of propositional attitudes a theory of animal beliefs is viable. Such a theory is an example of the broader conception of a heterophenomenological approach to animal cognition. The theory aims at outlining the crucial differences between human and animal beliefs as well as the (...) relations between these attitudes and theories of them. By this it contributes both to a theory of human cognition and to a theory of the evolutionary origin of human cognition. The capacities of animals can thus be appreciated without making animals minor humans. Human cognition can be seen in its uniqueness without cutting the ties to its evolutionary origin. (shrink)

A todo el mundo le gusta estar enamorado, el amor alimenta la fantasía de poder ser otro sin dejar de ser el mismo. Devolvemos a la persona amada la imagen exagerada de sus cualidades amplificadas. Sin embargo, nuestra sociedad jalea de puertas para afuera a los enamorados y desconfía de ellos puertas para adentro. Como el resto de humanos, los grandes pensadores vivieron intensamente, para bien o para mal, el amor. Sin embargo, ellos nos han dejado el legado de todas (...) las ideas que tuvieron sobre este sentimiento. ¿Quién no ha sentido amor platónico? ¿Quién no se ha dejado arrastrar por el deseo? ¿Quién no se ha obsesionado con el amado? ¿Cuántas veces nos hemos enamorado de la imagen que nos hacemos de alguien en lugar de la persona real? (shrink)