A philosophy of management that incorporates the big picture of human experience, all levels, and degrees of awareness in relationship with the world, will better develop and sustain an environment conducive to creative contributions that meet organizational goals. Quantum physics reveals the nature of reality to be connection and creativity engaged in a process of actualizing possibilities. Human beings participate in this process of actualization, as both observer-creator and experiencer of the universe through multiple domains of knowing – a collaborator (...) in Alfred North Whitehead’s panexperientialism. Whitehead’s God of process, the primordial field of creative possibilities, and the consequent nature which holds all the experiences of every actualization, supports human consciousness, as it self-actualizes by engaging and integrating the experience of external and internal events and their effects on awareness. Through understanding the participatory nature of consciousness with God and the world as experienced, deep meaning emerges for human life. Tapping into this deeper meaning through a philosophy of management that acknowledges the full human experience, including the embedded spiritual connection to the creative energy that is God, strengthens an organization’s vision, mission and contributions to a community. This brief overview traces a path toward a preliminary framework for a philosophy of management based on God and the ideas of connection, creativity and process. (shrink)

Moral virtue is, for Aristotle, a state to which an agent’s motivation is central. For anyone interested in Aristotle’s account of moral development this invites reflection on two questions: how is it that virtuous motivational dispositions are established? And what contribution do the moral learner’s existing motivational states make to the success of her habituation? I argue that views which demand that the learner act with virtuous motives if she is to acquire virtuous dispositions misconstrue the nature and structure of (...) the habituation process, but also obscure Aristotle’s crucial insight that the very practice of virtuous actions affords a certain discovery and can be transformative of an agent’s motivational states. Drawing attention, in Aristotle’s account, to an asymmetry between the agential perspective and the observation of others, I consider what the agential perspective affords the learner, and offer a novel interpretation of the role a learner’s existing motives play in her habituation. (shrink)

Clough's theological account of animals critiques the familiar negative identification of animals as not-human. Instead, Clough highlights both the distinctive particularity of each animal as created by God and the shared fleshly creatureliness of human and nonhuman animals. He encourages Christians to recognize Jesus Christ as God enfleshed more than divinely human, and consequently to care for nonhuman animals as those who share with human animals in the redemption of all flesh. This move risks downplaying the possibilities for creaturely specific (...) forms of redemption; limiting the cosmic efficacy of salvation in Christ; and losing the particularity of Christ's divine and human natures. Another, possibly less risky, direction to take Clough's insights about creatureliness and well-formed theological ethics might attend to the perverse ways that humans assess the worthiness of human and nonhuman animals by substituting particularities of use and abuse for the particularities of creation and salvation. (shrink)

Moral virtue is, for Aristotle, famously acquired through the practice of virtuous actions. But how should we understand the activity of Aristotle’s moral learner, and how does her activity result in the acquisition of virtue? I argue that by understanding Aristotle’s learner as engaged in the emulative imitation of a virtuous agent, we can best account for her development. Such activity crucially involves the adoption of the virtuous agent’s perspective, from which I argue the learner is positioned so as to (...) appreciate the value of virtuous action—its fineness—and what it would be to act finely herself. (shrink)

Religious capacity is a highly elaborate, neurocognitive human trait that has a solid evolutionary foundation. This book uses a multidisciplinary approach to describe millions of years of biological innovations that eventually give rise to the modern trait and its varied expression in humanity’s many religions. The authors present a scientific model and a central thesis that the brain organs, networks, and capacities that allowed humans to survive physically also gave our species the ability to create theologies, find sustenance in religious (...) practice, and use religion to support the social group. Yet, the trait of religious capacity remains non-obligatory, like reading and mathematics. The individual can choose not to use it. The approach relies on research findings in nine disciplines, including the work of countless neuroscientists, paleoneurologists, archaeologists, cognitive scientists, and psychologists. This is a cutting-edge examination of the evolutionary origins of humanity’s interaction with the supernatural. It will be of keen interest to academics working in Religious Studies, Neuroscience, Cognitive Science, Anthropology, Evolutionary Biology, and Psychology. (shrink)

The essence of artefacts is typically taken to be their function: they are defined in terms of the goals or aims of the artisans that make them. In this paper, an alternative theory is proposed tha...

Volume 18, Issue 5, October 2019, Page 535-544.

The modern revival of classical republican themes in political thought has not in general been sympathetic to nationalism. Despite the communitarian overtones of the republican critique of liberal individualism, the vivid sense of political solidarity, and the commitment to shared responsibility for a public world, republicans have in general conceived of citizenship as an alternative to nationhood rather than an expression of it. Moreover, republicans have sometimes explicitly claimed or more often tacitly assumed that good citizens are patriotic but not (...) nationalistic. Republican polities, in other words, tend to be understood as different from nation-states, with different and less objectionable sources of solidarity. (shrink)

European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 21, Issue 1, Page 25-46, January 2022. This article explains how 19th-century radical republicans answered the following question: how is it possible to be free in a social order that fosters economic dependence on others? I focus on the writings of a group of French thinkers called the solidarists who advocated “liberty organized for everyone.” Mutualism and social right were two components of the solidarist strategy for limiting domination in commercial/industrial society. While the doctrine (...) of mutualism was rooted in pre-industrial artisan culture, social right was a novel idea that built on Durkheim’s analysis of the division of labour. In this article, I describe the main features of the solidarist account: solidarity, social property, quasi-contractual debt, and restorative justice. Classical republicanism was deeply concerned with citizen participation and the balance between popular and elite power, but 19th-century radical republicans thought that these goals must be approached differently in market societies in which enormous power is exercised outside the state. The solidarists cautiously embraced the state as a mechanism for regulating the market in order to ensure equal liberty. Social right and mutualism were also conceived as ways of limiting the centralization of state power. (shrink)

Pet adoption from an animal rescue shelter would seem to be one of those indisputable things in life that only increases a person's positive karma. Kant spoke of morality residing in a good will and pure intention; saving a dog from being euthanized by providing it with a loving, secure home seems the living embodiment of that. Or so it would seem.

Some very persuasive arguments have been put forward in recent years in support of the disunity of science. Despite this, one is forced to acknowledge that unification, especially the practice of unifying theories, remains a crucial aspect of scientific practice. I explore specific aspects of this tension by examining the nature of theory unification and how it is achieved in the case of the electroweak theory. I claim that because the process of unifying theories is largely dependent on particular kinds (...) of mathematical structures it is possible to have a theory that displays a degree of unity at the level of theoretical structure without an accompanying ontological unity or reduction. As a result, unity and disunity can coexist not only within science but within the same theory. (shrink)

This paper argues that Adolf Gr nbaum's evaluation of the scientific status of psychoanalysis is marred by its failure to locate Freud's notion of natural science. Contrary to his claims, Griinbaum does not assess Freud's theory on Freud's own terms. The presuppositions that Griinbaum brings to the question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis are problematic and his criticisms and methodological restrictions may not be defensible when psychoanalysis is taken to develop methodologically out of medical science rather than out of (...) physics. I question the adequacy of the epistemological and methodological norms that Griinbaum brings to his analysis and I examine his arguments against the scientific credibility of Freud's theoretical claims. I argue that Griinbaum fails to consider the tension between clinical practice and psychoanalytic theory, ignores the evolution of Freud's thought and distorts and simplifies the complexity of the domain under investigation. Therefore his conclusions regarding the scientific credibility and evaluation of psychoanalysis are questionable. (shrink)

This paper is intended as an extension to some of the recent discussion in the philosophical literature on the nature of experimental evidence. In particular I examine the role of empirical evidence attained through the use of deductions from phenomena. This approach to theory construction has been widely used throughout the history of science both by Newton and Einstein as well as Clerk Maxwell. I discuss a particular formulation of maxwell's electrodynamics, one he claims was deduced from experimental facts. However, (...) the deduction is problematic in that it is not immediately clear that one of the crucial parameters of the theory, the displacement current, can be given an empirical foundation. In outlining Maxwell's argument and his attempts to arrive on an empirically based account of the electromagnetic field equations I draw attention to the philosophical implications of the constraints on theory that arise in this particular case of deduction from phenomena. (shrink)

In his paper on the “Methodology of Positive Economics”, Milton Friedman warned his readers that, “more than other scientists, social scientists need to be self-conscious about their methodology.” (1953, p. 34). But until quite recently, he seems either to have spoken to deaf ears or, more plausibly, to have been so successful in promoting his own views on methodology as to lead economists to be complacent about the many problems which plague their discipline. Many current textbooks, for example the one (...) by Eugene Silberberg, present economics as a science attaining the falsificationist standards once set down by Karl Popper, despite much evidence to the contrary. Indeed, as Douglas W. Hands (1985) has recently shown, even Sir Karl did not intend economics to be subjected to such severe standards. (shrink)

The seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations in 1945 invites us to look back at the achievement of creating this new organization even before the guns had fallen silent in World War II. It also prompts us to ask: Where is the organization today? How well has it fulfilled and is it still fulfilling the high ideals of its Charter? Even more importantly, how confident can we be that what has grown into the complex UN system will (...) not just survive but also provide its member states and the peoples of the world with the organizational structures, resources, and tools needed to address twenty-first century challenges? (shrink)

Our paper examines the impact of the intersection of cultural and gender identity on moral reasoning. Much research has been done on gender differences in moral thinking/reasoning, and increasingly research has also examined cultural differences in moral thinking. In agreement with a number of scholars we support the following claims about culture, moral reasoning, and concepts of self: concepts of self and approaches to moral reasoning are connected, concepts of self are differing by gender and culture, moral reasoning differs by (...) gender and culture. We propose that philosophy, particularly moral philosophy, follow the lead of psychology and strive to be as inclusive as possible by including the full range of human diversity and experience. For philosophers, this would mean embracing – indeed, starting from – a multicultural, feminist approach to moral theories and questions; this approach would not only be sensitive to gender and cultural bias, but also offer an alternative model to the paradigmatic rational, autonomous, independent agent of traditional moral theory. The implications of this go far beyond moral reasoning, but also have implications for other areas of philosophy as well, such as recent work in philosophy of mind on the idea of extended cognition. (shrink)

Human services planning for crews who go to Mars is in its earliest phase, but the modalities for service delivery are well worth anticipating because they could involve some of the first innovations that merge physical, biological, and digital capacities on the new planet. This chapter examines the constraints of the planet Mars, itself, on all humans. It anticipates how “exogenous stressors” might affect the psychological, social, and cultural capacities and conflicts of the earliest crews. Several types of service modalities (...) are explored: hibernation; medication management; traditional psychotherapy; long-distance modalities to approximate the “talking cure”; digitized, keyed psychology workbooks; robotics, or service delivery without verbal feedback; AI technologies, or service delivery with verbal feedback; problem-solving at the cultural level; digital bulletin boards to substitute for journaling; and a special section on the issue of privacy. The chapter rounds out with a section, on types of spiritual services that may be beneficial even for those who profess no faith. We focus on “sacred space,” and on death and burial ritual on Mars. Factors explored here reflect the backgrounds of the two authors: one, a cultural anthropologist and biologist, and the other, an astronomer who is also a Catholic priest. (shrink)

The introduction of the National Health and Medical Research Council guidelines for the ethical conduct of Indigenous health research: Values and Ethics: guidelines for ethical conduct in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health research (NHMRC, 2003), has prompted renewed debate about the ethical assessment of Indigenous health research in Australia. Concern has been expressed that these guidelines provide inadequate protection of Indigenous interests and that their introduction will result in a rolling back of important Indigenous research reform gains of the (...) past three decades. Another view is that the participatory focus of the Guidelines will help ensure that key Indigenous values are positioned as central to the development of research involving Indigenous interests. In this article we provide an overview of recent commentary on the Guidelines, and canvass practical proposals for their implementation into practice. In particular, we present a case for applying the Values and Ethics Guidelines as a foundation for establishing negotiated research agreements between Indigenous peoples and professional researchers at the local community level. The intention of this proposal is to give voice to the concerns and perspectives of Indigenous peoples through research, and to provide a framework for monitoring research after ethics approval has been granted. (shrink)