Aphantasia, a recently labelled spectrum condition affecting mental imagery, has brought to the fore the centrality of imagination in our lives. Intuitively it may seem that we cannot have a normal life without the possession of imaginative abilities. Yet, aphantasics do not seem to be much affected by their condition. Can aphantasia tell us anything about the nature and role of our imaginative abilities? I contend that an important distinction that can shed light on this question has been largely overlooked, (...) namely that between two senses of mental imagery: as a type of mental content (viz., mental imagery strictly speaking), and as a kind of psychological attitude (viz., sensory imagination). Drawing on this distinction, I suggest three possible conditions: (i) impairment in mental imagery only, (ii) impairment in sensory imagination only, (iii) impairment in both mental imagery and sensory imagination. I show that core cases of aphantasia are better understood as impairments in sensory imagination only, but I indicate empirical strategies to investigate whether some cases of aphantasia rather involve impairments in mental imagery, which would point toward a plurality of forms of aphantasia. Sensory imagination, however, does not exhaust the imaginative realm, therefore we shouldn’t jump to the hasty conclusion that aphantasics have no imagination. Most aphantasics lack sensory imagination, but arguably can exploit other forms of imagination. This would explain in which sense they still possess imaginative abilities. (shrink)

The Conventionality of Simultaneity espoused by Reichenbach, Grunbaum, Edwards, and Winnie is herein extended to mechanics and electrodynamics. The extension is seen to be a special case of a generally covariant formulation of physics, and therefore consistent with Special Relativity as the geometry of flat space-time. Many of the quantities of classical physics, such as mass, charge density, and force, are found to be synchronization dependent in this formulation and, therefore, in Reichenbach's terminology, "metrogenic." The relationship of these quantities to (...) 4-vectors and their physical significance is discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper explores the ethical aspects of introducing cultural circumcision of children into the EU public health system. We reject commonplace arguments against circumcision: considerations of good medical practice, justice, bodily integrity, autonomy and the analogy from female genital mutilation. From the unique structure of patient‐medicine interaction, we argue that the incorporation of cultural circumcision into EU public health services is a kind of medicalization, which does not fit the ethos of universal healthcare. However, we support a utilitarian argument (...) that finds hospital‐based circumcision safer than non‐medicalized alternatives. The argument concerning medicalization and the utilitarian argument both rely on preliminary empirical data, which depend on future validation. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the influence of war as a metaphor in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. After an introduction on the traditional analysis of the war metaphor, we address the social consequences of using this metaphor, a topic that has been widely debated with regard to public communication in the context of COVID-19. We pay particular attention to a theory that many intellectuals have raised: the possibility that the use of the metaphor in this context is harmful (...) to a democratic society because it may lead citizens to accept limited civil liberties and authoritarian policies. After presenting the extensive literature on the use of the war metaphor before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, in the final section of the paper, we analyse experimental evidence of the effects of this metaphor. In the conclusion, we hint at open questions and suggest that the current evidence does not support claims of direct liberticidal influence. (shrink)

We consider a sequence of absolute-space kinematical theories which differ more or less from the special theory of relativity (STR) in the amount of clock retardation which they predict, but which agree with STR with respect to roundtrip light experiments, such as Michelson-Morley and Kennedy-Thorndike. This sequence of theories is imbedded in the synchrony-free formulation of STR developed by Winnie by modifying the equal passage time principle. The paper has bearing on the relationship between the slow clock transport behavior of (...) clocks and the one-way velocity of light. Experiments which claim to measure the latter are discussed. (shrink)

Supposition is frequently invoked in many fields within philosophy, including aesthetics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and epistemology. However, there is a striking lack of consensus about the nature of supposition. What is supposition? Is supposition a sui generis type of mental state or is it reducible to some other type of mental state? These are the main questions Margherita Arcangeli explores in this book. She examines the characteristic features of supposition, along the dimensions of phenomenology and emotionality, (...) among others, in a journey through the imaginative realm. An informed answer to the question “What is supposition?” must involve an analysis of imagination, since supposition is so often defined in opposition to the latter. She assesses rival explanations of supposition putting forward a novel view, according to which the proper way of seeing supposition is as a primitive type of imaginative state. Supposition and the Imaginative Realm: A Philosophical Inquiry will be of great interest to students of philosophy of psychology, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and epistemology. (shrink)

Imagination is widely thought to come in two varieties: perception-like and belief-like imagination. What precisely sets them apart, however, is not settled. More needs to be said about the features that make one variety perception-like and the other belief-like. One common, although typically implicit, view is that they mimic their counterparts along the conceptuality dimension: while the content of belief-like imagination is fully conceptual, the content of perception-like imagination is fully non-conceptual. Such a view, however, is not sufficiently motivated in (...) the literature. I will show that there are good reasons to reject it and I will argue that both varieties of imagination involve fully conceptual contents. I will suggest an alternative way to draw the distinction between perception-like and belief-like imagination along the conceptuality dimension, according to which only perception-like imagination requires observational concepts. (shrink)

Mental imagery has often been taken to be equivalent to “sensory imagination”, the perception‐like type of imagination at play when, for example, one visually imagines a flower when none is there, or auditorily imagines a music passage while wearing earplugs. I contend that the equation of mental imagery with sensory imagination stems from a confusion between two senses of mental imagery. In the first sense, mental imagery is used to refer to a psychological attitude, which is perception‐like in nature. In (...) the second sense, mental imagery refers to a mental content, which can be grasped via different attitudes. I will show that failure to acknowledge the distinction between these senses of mental imagery has muddled philosophical discussion. This distinction brings much needed clarity to debates where sensory imagination and mental imagery are invoked, shedding light on issues such as the nature of imagistic mental states, and the representational powers and limits of mental imagery. I will conclude by sketching a general attitudinal account of imagination that does justice to both senses of mental imagery, outlining a promising framework for understanding imagination. (shrink)

Here I critically assess an argument put forward by Kuorikoski et al. (Br J Philos Sci, 61(3):541–567, 2010) for the epistemic import of model-based robustness analysis. I show that this argument is not sound since the sort of probabilistic independence on which it relies is unfeasible. By revising the notion of probabilistic independence imposed on the models’ results, I introduce a prima-facie more plausible argument. However, despite this prima-facie plausibility, I show that even this new argument is unsound in most (...) if not all cases of model-based robustness analysis. This I do to demonstrate that the epistemic import of model-based robust analysis cannot be satisfactorily defended on the basis of probabilistic independence. (shrink)

The scientist’s toolkit counts at least three practices: real, thought and numerical experiments. Although a deep investigation of the relationships between these types of experiments should shed light on the nature of scientific enquiry, I argue that it has been compromised by at least four factors: (i) a bias for the epistemological superiority of real experiments; (ii) an almost exclusive focus on the links between either thought or numerical experiments, and real experiments; (iii) a tendency to try and reduce one (...) kind to another; and (iv) an excessive attention to the outputs of these types of experiments, more than to their processes. In this paper I support an unbiased triangular comparative analysis that focuses on the processes involved in real, thought and numerical experiments, and claim that all three types of experimentation are fundamental to scientific research. I do so by clarifying different notions of experimental processes, and by introducing a distinction between two varieties of mental simulation that play a role in them (i.e., mental models and imaginings). I then compare real, thought and numerical experiments in light of this distinction, showing their similarities, but also fundamental differences, which suggest that none of them is dispensable. (shrink)

This chapter carries out an analysis of the manner in which dialectics is reappropriated and transformed by Hans‐Georg Gadamer and Theodor W. Adorno. If hermeneutics and critical theory can be seen as legitimate successors of Hegel's dialectical tradition, it is precisely thanks to the efforts of Adorno and Gadamer. Both Adorno's and Gadamer's reappraisals of Hegel's philosophy take the form of a drawing out of Hegelian dialectics what is implicit in its own premises. By examining the intellectual experience that the (...) principle of contradiction expresses, Adorno demonstrates that nonidentity is precisely the driving force behind Hegel's idealistic dialectics. The abandonment of the oppositional‐critical character of dialectics that marks Gadamer's fundamental difference from Adorno's negative dialectics, and makes it necessary for Gadamer to rebrand his method as hermeneutic: no longer critique, but rather understanding and interpretation in the shared and open‐ended dialogical process. (shrink)

Dans le domaine de l’analyse des données textuelles (ADT), les chercheurs s’intéressent à la relation entre le texte et son support d’exploration. Ces dernières années, l’évolution de l’informatique a profondément modifié notre rapport au texte induisant le développement de nouveaux outils d’étude et critères d’analyse. Dans ce contexte théorique, le concept de lecture polyangulaire permet de compléter les notions de lectures linéaire, réticulaire ou matricielle. Cette approche du texte est devenue possible grâce aux outils d’édition de corpus toujours plus performants (...) proposés par les logiciels de traitement automatique des textes, tel Hyperbase Web Édition. Les fondements de la lecture polyangulaire reposent à fois sur les techniques de corpus based et de corpus driven. Elle vise à multiplier les partitionnements de corpus afin de faire émerger aussi précisément que possible la trame du tissu textuel. Cette nouvelle méthode est ensuite illustrée par deux exemples issus des bases latines diffusées par le LASLA de l’Université de Liège. (shrink)

After a consideration of Reichenbach's and Winnie's axiomatizations of Special Relativity, three synchrony-free axioms which can be used to simultaneously axiomatize Special Relativity, Classical Aether Theory, and a threefold continuum of theories in between are suggested. The specific theory obtained from the axioms depends on the value of a parameter in each axiom. It is shown that the values of the three parameters are empirically determined by the Michelson-Morley, Kennedy-Thorndike, and Ives-Stilwell experiments.

Nearly 400 million adults have been vaccinated against COVID-19. Children have been excluded from the vaccination programmes owing to their lower vulnerability to COVID-19 and to the special protections that apply to children’s exposure to new biological products. WHO guidelines and national laws focus on medical safety in the process of vaccine approval, and on national security in the process of emergency authorisation. Because children suffer much from social distancing, it is argued that the harms from containment measures should be (...) factored in a broader perspective on the good of the child. Considering the available knowledge on the disease, vaccine, and coping strategies, the decision about vaccine access to children is a public responsibility. The ultimate choice is a matter of paediatric informed consent. Moreover, jurisdictions that permit non-participation in established childhood vaccination programmes should also permit choice of vaccines outside of the approved programmes. Even if vaccine supply is too short to cover the paediatric population, the a priori exclusion of children is unjust. It may also exacerbate local and global inequalities. The second part of the paper delineates a prudent and ethical scheme for gradual incorporation of minors in vaccination programmes that includes a rigorous postvaccination monitoring. This is a theoretical paper in ethics that uses the Pfizer vaccine as a stock example, without discussing possible differences among existing vaccines. The key purpose is reflection on the good of the child in emergencies and vaccine policymaking. All data relevant to the study are included in the article and in its refernces. (shrink)

Among the attempts to oppose tobacco control legislation, the tobacco industry has alleged violations of its right to commercial speech. While the disputes that took place in some jurisdictions like the United States (US), Canada, or the European Union (EU) have been already analyzed, much less is known about how, globally, this doctrine has influenced the adoption of tobacco control measures. This article contributes to filling this gap by illustrating how the commercial speech doctrine influenced the negotiations of the Framework (...) Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Moreover, using the Tobacco Control Database of Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, it shows that arguments on commercial speech have been used to challenge tobacco control measures in an increasing number of countries. (shrink)

Awe seems to be a complex emotion or emotional construct characterized by a mix of positive (contentment, happiness), and negative affective components (fear and a sense of being smaller, humbler or insignificant). It is striking that the elicitors of awe correspond closely to what philosophical aesthetics, and especially Burke and Kant, have called “the sublime.” As a matter of fact, awe is almost absent from the philosophical agenda, while there are very few studies on the experience of the sublime as (...) such in the psychological literature. The aim of this paper is to throw light on the complex relationship between awe (as understood by psychologists) and the experience of the sublime (as discussed by philosophers). We distinguish seven ways of conceiving this relationship and highlight those that seem more promising to us. Once we have a clearer picture of how awe and the experience of the sublime are related, we can use it to enhance collaboration between these domains. We would be able to use empirical results about awe in a philosophical analysis of the experience of the sublime, which in turn can help us to design novel experimental hypotheses about the contexts in which we experience awe. (shrink)

No detailed description available for "Conventionalism in logic".

In his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā (BASK), “Verses on the Establishment of the External Object”—extant only in Tibetan translation—Śubhagupta (720–780 CE), a philosopher connected with the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism, argues the reality of external objects of cognitions. In this article, I shall provide an account of Śubhagupta's theory of the cognitive process, as expressed in BASK 35–44, particularly in light of his view that the images (ākāra) of those objects do not appear in cognition. BASK is part of an internal Buddhist debate (...) over the reality of external supports of perceptions, wherein Śubhagupta disproves the views of thinkers like Diṅnāga and Vasubandhu. On the other hand, he is one of the main opponents addressed in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā (BAP) of the Tattvasaṅgraha (TS) by Śāntarakṣita (725–788 CE) and the Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (TSP) by Kamalaśīla (740–795 CE). Therein, the two authors, while demonstrating the absence of the characteristics of apprehended (grāhya) and apprehender (grāhaka) with regard to cognition, keenly refute his ideas and quote selected Sanskrit verses that can be identified as the original Sanskrit of stanzas in BASK. Accordingly, I shall examine Śubhagupta’s theory of the cognitive process in two steps: (i) analyzing the arguments that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla advance against him based on their interpretation of Śubhagupta’s views; and (ii) analyzing the arguments that he brings forward against his opponents (namely, Diṅnāga and Vasubandhu), by means of the investigation of BASK 35–44 in their original context. (shrink)

Background Providing understandable information to patients is necessary to achieve the aims of the Informed Consent process: respecting and promoting patients’ autonomy and protecting patients from harm. In recent decades, new, primarily digital technologies have been used to apply and test innovative formats of Informed Consent. We conducted a systematic review to explore the impact of using digital tools for Informed Consent in both clinical research and in clinical practice. Understanding, satisfaction and participation were compared for digital tools versus the (...) non-digital Informed Consent process. Methods We searched for studies on available electronic databases, including Pubmed, EMBASE, and Cochrane. Studies were identified using specific Mesh-terms/keywords. We included studies, published from January 2012 to October 2020, that focused on the use of digital Informed Consent tools for clinical research, or clinical procedures. Digital interventions were defined as interventions that used multimedia or audio–video to provide information to patients. We classified the interventions into 3 different categories: video only, non-interactive multimedia, and interactive multimedia. Results Our search yielded 19,579 publications. After title and abstract screening 100 studies were retained for full-text analysis, of which 73 publications were included. Studies examined interactive multimedia, non-interactive multimedia, and videos, and most studies were conducted on adults. Innovations in consent were tested for clinical/surgical procedures and clinical research. For research IC, 21 outcomes were explored, with a positive effect on at least one of the studied outcomes being observed in 8/12 studies. For clinical/surgical procedures 49 outcomes were explored, and 21/26 studies reported a positive effect on at least one of the studied outcomes. Conclusions Digital technologies for informed consent were not found to negatively affect any of the outcomes, and overall, multimedia tools seem desirable. Multimedia tools indicated a higher impact than videos only. Presence of a researcher may potentially enhance efficacy of different outcomes in research IC processes. Studies were heterogeneous in design, making evaluation of impact challenging. Robust study design including standardization is needed to conclusively assess impact. (shrink)

Over the past twenty years the expression “thought experiment” (Gedankenexperiment) has become part of the philosophical vocabulary. Galileo’s thought experiment on the fall of bodies is an example that shows how thought experimentation might be an important scientific tool in order to acquire new knowledge. Nonetheless, the epistemological validity of thought experiments is still questioned in the domains different from physics. The paper aims to investigate whether the thought experimentation is really proper to physics. For this sake, biology will be (...) our testbed. The skeptical view on biological thought experiments, e.g. Snooks, implies that the thought experiment is not an experiment; it is just the copy of a real one. We adopt a more positive view, inspired by Bokulich and Lennox, and we apply it to some Darwinian thought experiments. This analysis points to the fact that, much alike thought experiments in physics, Darwin’s ones in biology test the non-empirical criteria of a theory. Therefore, we advance the hypothesis that even biological thought experiments participate to such a re-ordering of processes and mechanisms, as to push a theory beyond its time. (shrink)

This article assesses the exploration of the utopian paradigm within the context of technological advancement and its implications for human labor. It engages in this reflection, beginning with John Danaher’s reading of utopian perspectives related to the evolution of the labor domain, and then focusing on the significance of the social element and its dynamics in redefining labor and productive structures. It focuses on utopia as a regulatory ideal, valuing the conjectural contributions from theories throughout the history of utopian thought. (...) The analysis aims to understand how utopian theories arise in contexts of social dissatisfaction, prompting internal reflection on the structure. The article is organized into three sections: the first introduces the concept of utopia, tracing its historical and philosophical roots, with a focus on influential figures such as Henri de Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier. Through the study of nineteenth-century social theories, the article explores their radical proposals for societal restructuring in response to the socio-economic upheavals of their time. The second section examines utopia as a form of social critique, emphasizing its critical function in assessing and guiding societal development, by engaging with Norbert Elias’s definitions of utopia. The third section evaluates the relevance of utopia in contemporary discourse on social change, emphasizing the critical examination of utopian visions in relation to the concept of the end of work and aiming to articulate clear parameters defining a utopian model as a social regulatory ideal. (shrink)

A widespread claim, which I call ‘the Emotionality Claim’, is that imagination but not supposition is intimately linked to emotion. In more cognitive jargon, imagination is connected to the affect system, whereas supposition is not. EC is open to several interpretations which yield very different views about the nature of supposition. The literature lacks an in-depth analysis of EC which sorts out these different readings and ways to carve supposition and imagination at their joints. The aim of this paper is (...) to fill this gap. I shall argue that existing readings of EC fail to properly account for the emotional asymmetry between imagination and supposition. The tendency is to start from narrow conceptions of both imagination and supposition. I shall argue for a novel interpretation of EC pivoting on different ways a mental state can connect to the affect system. (shrink)

_Abstract_: This paper aims to propose a relational approach to the study of cognition that can offer a perspective on the cognitive behaviours of plants – sessile organisms without a nervous system – when considered in the reciprocal interrogation of philosophy and the cognitive and ecological sciences. When leveraging the inspiring, clarifying, and occasionally heuristic potential of different epistemic tools, plant cognition can be understood as the result of processes constantly shaped by multiple co-constructive relationships between organisms and their ecological (...) niches. Organisms and niches are conceivable as dense multi-functional systems of resources and information interchange. The concepts of network and ramification are fruitful keys to frame forms of dynamic relationships between elements. In their alternatively iconical, metaphorical, and conceptual-modelling potentialities, networks and ramifications have been used to identify different types of relationships and transmitted information. The explanatory and heuristic scope of these two concepts needs to be further investigated when linked to cognitive aspects, especially with regard the concept of ramification. Looking at the plant world, whilst much has been written about networks, relatively little has been said explicitly about ramifications (branching capacity, branching characteristics and habits) and their relationship with aspects related to plant behaviour and cognition. _Keywords_: Plant Cognition; Ramifications; Networks; Ecology; Cognitive Science _Reti e ramificazioni: prospettive relazionali nello studio della cognizione vegetale _ _Riassunto_: Questo lavoro intende proporre un approccio relazionale allo studio della cognizione che possa offrire una prospettiva sui comportamenti cognitivi delle piante – organismi sessili privi di sistema nervoso – considerati dalla prospettiva filosofica e delle scienze cognitive ed ecologiche. Dato il potenziale ispiratore, chiarificatore e a volte euristico dei diversi strumenti epistemici, la cognizione delle piante può essere vista come risultato di processi costantemente plasmati da molteplici relazioni co-costruttive tra gli organismi e le loro nicchie ecologiche. Organismi e nicchie sono infatti concepibili come un denso sistema multi-funzionale di scambio di risorse e informazioni. I concetti di rete e ramificazione sono utili chiavi di lettura per inquadrare forme di relazione dinamica tra elementi. Nelle loro potenzialità iconiche, metaforiche e concettuali, le reti e le ramificazioni sono state usate per identificare diversi tipi di relazioni e informazioni trasmesse. Lo scopo esplicativo ed euristico di questi due concetti necessita di essere ulteriormente indagato, quando legato agli aspetti cognitivi, specialmente per quanto riguarda il concetto di ramificazione. Guardando il mondo vegetale, mentre molto è stato scritto sulle reti relativamente poco si è detto esplicitamente sulle ramificazioni (capacità di ramificazione, caratteristiche e abitudini di ramificazione) e sulle loro relazioni con aspetti legati al comportamento e alla cognizione. _Parole chiave_: Cognizione vegetale; Ramificazioni; Reti; Ecologia; Scienza cognitiva. (shrink)

We challenge Binz et al.'s claim of meta-learned model superiority over Bayesian inference for large world problems. While comparing Bayesian priors to model-training decisions, we question meta-learning feature exclusivity. We assert no special justification for rational Bayesian solutions to large world problems, advocating exploring diverse theoretical frameworks beyond rational analysis of cognition for research advancement.

The aim of this thesis is to improve our understanding of how to assess and communicate uncertainty in areas of research deeply afflicted by it, the assessment and communication of which are made more fraught still by the studies’ immediate policy implications. The IPCC is my case study throughout the thesis, which consists of three parts. In Part 1, I offer a thorough diagnosis of conceptual problems faced by the IPCC uncertainty framework. The main problem I discuss is the persistent (...) ambiguity surrounding the concepts of ‘confidence’ and ‘likelihood’; I argue that the lack of a conceptually valid interpretation of these concepts compatible with the IPCC uncertainty guide’s recommendations has worrying implications for both the IPCC authors’ treatment of uncertainties and the interpretability of the information provided in the AR5. Finally, I show that an understanding of the reasons behind the IPCC’s decision to include two uncertainty scales can offer insights into the nature of this problem. In Part 2, I review what philosophers have said about model-based robustness analysis. I assess several arguments that have been offered for its epistemic import and relate this discussion to the context of climate model ensembles. I also discuss various measures of independence in the climate literature, and assess the extent to which these measures can help evaluate the epistemic import of model robustness. In Part 3, I explore the notion of the ‘weight of evidence’ typically associated with Keynes. I argue that the Bayesian is bound to struggle with this notion, and draw some lessons from this fact. Finally, I critically assess some recent proposals for a new IPCC uncertainty framework that significantly depart from the current one. (shrink)