In the current era, robots and artificial agents can do jobs that could only be achieved with human creativity in the past, therefore successfully stepped into the sacred territory that once considered exclusive to human. Given this situation, Mark Amerika made two significant contributions with his new book, “My life as an Artificial Creative Intelligence”. This book added to the emerging literary genre collaborated by human artists and AI, telling the story about the advanced ACI developed in the (...) project FATAL ERROR and its relationship with Amerika as its co-author and creator. Moreover, this book documented an in-depth investigation into the nature of creativity and its processes, asking whether creativity is exclusive to the human mind. (shrink)

Anderson beschrijft het kosmopolitisme als een omstreden kwestie in 'de culturele oorlogen van het hedendaagse Amerika' en gaat in op het 'niet-hegemonistische' begrip van het kosmopolitisme.

Geach's problem, the problem of accounting for the fact that judgements expressed using moral terms function logically like other judgements, stands in the way of most noncognitive analyses of moral judgements. The non-cognitivist must offer a plausible interpretation of such terms when they appear in conditionals that also explains their logical interaction with straightforward moral assertions. Blackburn and Gibbard have offered a series of accounts each of which interprets such conditionals as expressing higher order commitments. Each then invokes norms for (...) the coherent acceptance of attitudes to explain why we hold certain combinations inconsistent. Against these accounts the paper presses two related objections: (1) The norms needed to do the explanatory work cannot be strong enough to do that work without also ruling clearly consistent attitudes inconsistent. And (2), the norms of rational attitude acceptance do not neatly track the distinction between consistent and inconsistent attitudes. (shrink)

A Clearly argued and easy to read defense of Karl Popper's philosophy.

AuBerdem hat mich hier eine ebenso ehrenvolle Anfrage der Fundacion Nacional para Investigaciones Cientificas y Ensayos de Reformas in Madrid erreicht, ob ich bereit ware, durch mehrere Jahre am Instituto de Estudios Internacio- nales y Economicos in Madrid Universitatsseminariibungen nach deutschem Muster zu leiten, eineEinladung, der ich vielleicht spater fiir eine heute noch nicht bestimmbare Zeit nachkommen zu konnen hoffen darf. Diese Umstande haben fiir mich die schon vordem erwogene Frage abermals aufgerollt, ob es sich nicht empfohlen batte, im fiinften (...) und sechsten Abschnitt Beispiele aus auBerdeutschem Recht heranzuziehen. So hatte es neuestens ganz besonders nahe gelegen, der Gleichung Mark gleich Mark des Reichsgerichtes die Gleichung Dollar gleich Dollar der Goldklauselentscheidung des Supreme Court der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika vom 18. Fe- bruar 1935, vielleicht auch Judikate aus anderen Landern iiber derartige Wahrungsfragen zur Seite zu stellen. A.uBere Griinde notigen mich jedoch, den Text unberiihrt zu lassen. Sachlich andert sich j a nichts, gleichgiiltig, aus welcher Rechtsordnung man die Beispiele wahlt. Aus den erwahnten Griinden der Riicksichtnahme auf den Text habe ich auch darauf verzichten miissen, noch nachtraglich auf verschiedene AuBerungen aus letzter Zeit zu meinen Lehren einzu- gehen, wie zum Beispiel auf jene von Toyowo Ohgushi in der Zeitschrift des Kaiserlichen Instituts fiir nationale Kultur, Tokyo, 1934, Heft 5, S. 38 ff., oder von Lea Meriggi in der Revue de Droit international et de Legislation comparee, 1934, Nr.3, S. 13ff. Ann Arbor Michigan, im Marz 1935. Der Verfasser. Vorwort zur zweiten AuDage. (shrink)

NATURAL LAW ARGUMENTS CONCERNING the political order characteristically appeal, at some point or other, to the common good of the political community. To take the clearest example: Aquinas, perhaps the paradigmatic natural law theorist, appeals to the common good in his accounts of the definition of law, of the need for political authority, of the moral requirement to adhere to the dictates issued by political authority, and of the form political authority should take. But while united on the point that (...) arguments for normative political conclusions must take the common good as a principle, natural law theorists have not been united in their understanding of the nature of the common good. The differences among natural law views on the character of the common good are not trivial: they concern such deep issues as whether the common good should be understood as an intrinsic or an instrumental good, and whether the common good should be understood in relation to the good of individuals of that community or solely in relation to the good of the community as a whole. If one aims to develop a natural law account of the political order, then, one cannot remain neutral with respect to the various natural law understandings of the common good, for these various understandings are almost certain to yield differing conclusions on the source, functions, and limits of political authority. (shrink)

It has been argued in the conservation literature that giving conservation absolute priority over competing interests would best protect the environment. Attributing infinite value to the environment or claiming it is ‘priceless’ are two ways of ensuring this priority (e.g. Hargrove 1989; Bulte and van Kooten 2000; Ackerman and Heinzerling 2002; McCauley 2006; Halsing and Moore 2008). But such proposals would paralyse conservation efforts. We describe the serious problems with these proposals and what they mean for practical applications, and we (...) diagnose and resolve some conceptual confusions permeating the literature on this topic. (shrink)

For fifty years Hubert Dreyfus has done pioneering work which brings phenomenology and existentialism to bear on the philosophical and scientific study of the mind. This is a selection of his most influential essays, developing his critique of the representational model of the mind in analytical philosophy of mind and mainstream cognitive science.

Philosophers from Plato and Augustine to Heidegger, Nozick, and Baudrillard have warned us of the dangers of living on too heavy a diet of illusion and make-believe. But contemporary cultural life provides broader, more attractive opportunities to do so than have existed at any other point in history. The gentle forms of self-deceit that such experiences require of us, and that so many have regarded as ethically unwholesome or psychologically self-destructive, can in fact serve as vital means to political reconciliation, (...) cultural enrichment, and even (a kind of) utopia. -/- The first half of the book provides a highly schematic definition of simulated experience and compares it with some claims about the nature of simulation made by other philosophers about what it is for one thing to be a simulation of another. The author then provides a critical survey of the views of some major authors about the value of certain specific types of simulated experience, mainly in order to point out the many puzzling inconsistencies and ambiguities that their thoughts upon the topic often exhibit. In the second half of the book, the author defends an account of the positive social value of simulated experience and compares his own position to the ideas of a number of utopian political thinkers, as well as to Plato's famous doctrine of the "noble lie." He then makes some tentative practical suggestions about how a proper appreciation of the value of simulated experience might influence public policy decisions about such matters as the justification of taxation, paternalistic "choice management," and governmental transparency. (shrink)

This volume of new essays provides a comprehensive and structured examination of Kant's justification of norms, a crucial but neglected theme in Kantian practical philosophy.

This article argues that claims of divine kinship play a central role in the Bacchic gold tablets of the late classical period. While many scholars have interpreted these tablets in reference to the Orphic Zagreus myth, I contend that key details of their texts are better understood as assertions of a familial link with the gods that assured postmortem happiness. The tablets develop the Hesiodic idea of human-divine fellowship, expanding this theme to include claims of identity or kinship with the (...) gods through a variety of narrative strategies. This aspect of the tablets finds a parallel in Empedocles, who (under Orphic-Pythagorean influence) elaborates traditional human-divine fellowship into a claim that humans are exiled gods who can hope to rejoin divine society. Following this interpretive approach, I suggest that the puzzling expression “I/you fell into milk” in some tablets expresses a symbolic relation to the gods via divine breast milk. (shrink)

Many academics and world leaders have declared that there is a moral imperative to address climate change. But such claims often fall on deaf ears because the nature of the threat posed by global warming lacks many of the features of a paradigmatic moral transgression [Jamieson, Dale. 2007. The moral and political challenges of climate change. Working Paper, New York University, New York]. This paper explores these psychological obstacles to moral engagement about climate change. I argue that the temporal and (...) psychosocial distance of the threat of global warming undermines the kind of affective response that motivates moral concern. I conclude by suggesting that images focusing more on the personal and short-term consequences of global warming will generate stronger moral reactions. (shrink)

If we want to be autonomous, what do we want? The author shows that contemporary value-neutral and metaphysically economical conceptions of autonomy, such as that of Harry Frankfurt, face a serious problem. Drawing on Plato, Augustine, and Kant, this book provides a sketch of how "ancient" and "modern" can be reconciled to solve it. But at what expense? It turns out that the dominant modern ideal of autonomy cannot do without a costly metaphysics if it is to be coherent.

Recently, several states in the US have made it more difficult to receive nonmedical exemptions to school vaccine mandates in the hope of better orienting parents towards vaccination. However, little is known about how public-facing school staff implement and enforce mandate policies, including why or how often they steer parents towards nonmedical exemptions. This study focused on Michigan, which has recently added an additional burden for families seeking nonmedical exemptions. We used an anonymous online survey to assess Michigan public-school employees (...) (n = 157) about their knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors regarding Michigan's school enrollment vaccine mandate policy. Our main conclusions are that frontline school staff are generally knowledgeable about vaccines and immunization policy, but are at best ambivalent about their role in immunization governance, believing that other agents should be responsible for ensuring that children are vaccinated. Furthermore, some respondents indicated low vaccine confidence, which was associated with increased ambivalence about, or opposition to, their role in immunization governance. As more jurisdictions within and beyond the US consider introducing or tightening childhood vaccine mandates, it is increasingly important to understand how these policies can be improved by attending to the attitudes and roles of relevant frontline actors. (shrink)

Function emerges in certain kinds of far-from-equilibrium systems. One important kind of function is that of interactive anticipation, an adaptedness to temporal complexity. Interactive anticipation is the locus of the emergence of normative representational content, and, thus, of representation in general: interactive anticipation is the naturalistic core of the evolution of cognition. Higher forms of such anticipation are involved in the subsequent macro-evolutionary sequence of learning, emotions, and reflexive consciousness.

This is one of those cases to which Dr. 8 oodhouse's remark applies with all its force, that a method which leads to true results must have its logic — H.S Smith (" On Some of the Methods at Present in Use in Pure Geometry," p. 6) A goodly amount of modern metaphysics has concerned itself, in one form or another, with the question: what attitude should we take in regard to a language whose semantic underpinnings seem less than certain? (...) Since much of standard English is surely of this type, many philosophers have felt driven to extreme and unpalatable resolutions — wholesale rejection of attractive logical rules, radical "antirealism", "minimalism" about truth, and so forth, Scientists, however, have long dealt with analogous foundational insecurities and, under the duress of practicality, have framed a set of shifting attitudes towards language and reasoning that seem far more commonsensical than the extreme positions to which pure philosophy has often been led. Following this lead, this essay will recommend a more nuanced approach to linguistic insecurity that is neither naively optimistic nor mired in the gloomy sloughs of antirealism. (shrink)

This book is an introductory narrative of the foundational educational history and philosophy of the American system. The author presents the history of education as a part of the larger picture of the development of civilization. Therefore, the historic and philosophical antecedents of our current education system are explained.

Also included is a detailed reproduction of Bosse's rare landmark map of the river, first published in 1887-88."--BOOK JACKET.

Human life history incorporates childhood, a lengthy post-weaning period of dependency. This species-specific period provides an opportunity for extensive learning and for sophisticated cultural behaviors to develop, including crucial tool use skills. Although I agree that no individual cognitive trait singularly differentiates humans from other animals, I suggest here that without childhood, the traits that are key to human tool use would not emerge.

Guminski’s critical assessment of my version of the KCA (the “N-KCA”) is unfounded because he (1) fails to identify what is distinctive in the argument, (2) overlooks the importance of modality within KCA thought experiments, (3) does not recognize that the central arguments of the N-KCA are independent of specific mathematical accounts, and (4) overlooks key metaphysical distinctions, including that between infinite multitude and infinite magnitude. I also argue against Guminski’s “Alternative Version” of interpreting KCA thought experiments. Finally, I clarify (...) what is meant by “temporal marks” and offer some thoughts on future research directions for the KCA. (shrink)

Recently there has been a revival of philosophic interest in, and discussion of, ‘relativism’. Debates concerning relativism, however, tend to have an odd air of unreality. It is odd that while most everyone wants to refute relativism, just about no one wants to be identified as a relativist. There is even a tendency to use ‘relativist’ as an epithet of abuse. But, if relativism is universally acknowledged to be refuted, even self-refuting, then why is there so much discussion of it, (...) and why is there such a temptation to accuse opponents of this sin? The answer to this question which I wish to propose in this paper is that there are two sources for this situation. First, the fact that while no one sees themselves as relativists, many are seen as relativists suggests that there is a fair amount of current confusion in regard to what precisely ‘relativism’ is. Whenever there is a high degree of disagreement about the extension of a term, especially a term used to describe a philosophical position, it is reasonable to investigate whether there is some equivocation in the use of that term. Such an equivocation by itself, however, would not account for the present state of affairs. That ‘relativism’ is only applied to opponents suggests that there is some similarity between ‘relativist* positions, in at least some senses of that word, and some other positions that people are interested in defending. (shrink)

The contemporary canon of what constitutes ancient political thought was fixed in the course of the nineteenth century by the then newly reigning discipline of the philosophy of history. It made little difference whether this discipline was positivistically or dialectically inclined. Whatever the methodological commitment there was general agreement that the sources of ancient wisdom on the nature and ends of social and political life were to be found in the political and ethical writings of Plato and Aristotle and, to (...) a lesser extent, Cicero. Here Cicero was read, in part, as a repository of a Stoic political wisdom that had not survived in the original texts. According to this tradition, genuine, if not final, political wisdom is to be found in the reflections of these ancient thinkers -- not a totally unexpected conclusion to come from philosophers. For these nineteenth-century practitioners of Geistesgeschichte the essence of ancient experience is distilled in its inner life, its art, literature, religion, and above all in its philosophical speculation, but not, for instance, in its political experience as recorded in its history. (shrink)

Lottery puzzles involve an ordinary piece of knowledge which seems to imply knowledge of a so-called “lottery proposition,” which itself seems unknown: I might be said to know that I won’t be going on safari next year. But if I were to win the lottery, I would go, and I don’t know that I won’t win the lottery. Examples can be multiplied. Thus we seem left either with the paradoxical position of knowing certain ordinary propositions, but failing to know the (...) lottery propositions they imply, or else conceding to the skeptic. I present a version of reliabilism according to which empirical knowledge is true belief produced by a reliable process causally connecting belief and fact. According to this theory, if my ordinary belief and my belief in the lottery proposition are suitably connected to the facts that render them true, both count as knowledge. In cases where my ordinary belief and my belief in the lottery proposition are not suitably connected to the relevant facts, neither count as knowledge. Thus the paradoxical air of lottery puzzles is removed, and skepticism is avoided. (shrink)