We examine the degree structure $\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {ER}}}$ of equivalence relations on $\omega $ under computable reducibility. We examine when pairs of degrees have a least upper bound. In particular, we show that sufficiently incomparable pairs of degrees do not have a least upper bound but that some incomparable degrees do, and we characterize the degrees which have a least upper bound with every finite equivalence relation. We show that the natural classes of finite, light, and dark degrees are (...) definable in $\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {ER}}}$. We show that every equivalence relation has continuum many self-full strong minimal covers, and that $\mathbf {d}\oplus \mathbf {\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {Id}}}_1}$ needn’t be a strong minimal cover of a self-full degree $\mathbf {d}$. Finally, we show that the theory of the degree structure $\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {ER}}}$ as well as the theories of the substructures of light degrees and of dark degrees are each computably isomorphic with second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

After leading to a new axiomatic derivation of quantum theory, the new informational paradigm is entering the domain of quantum field theory, suggesting a quantum automata framework that can be regarded as an extension of quantum field theory to including an hypothetical Planck scale, and with the usual quantum field theory recovered in the relativistic limit of small wave-vectors. Being derived from simple principles, the automata theory is quantum ab-initio, and does not assume Lorentz covariance and mechanical notions. Being discrete (...) it can describe localized states and measurements, solving all the issues plaguing field theory originated from the continuum. These features make the theory an ideal framework for quantum gravity, with relativistic covariance and space-time emergent solely from the interactions, and not assumed a priori. The paper presents a synthetic derivation of the automata theory, showing how the principles lead to a description in terms of a quantum automaton over a Cayley graph of a group. Restricting to Abelian groups we show how the automata recover the Weyl, Dirac and Maxwell dynamics in the relativistic limit. We conclude with some new routes about the more general scenario of non-Abelian Cayley graphs. The phenomenology arising from the automata theory in the ultra-relativistic domain and the analysis of corresponding distorted Lorentz covariance is reviewed in Bisio et al. (shrink)

A perspectiva de Jacques Rancière sobre o “momento qualquer” tem sido um dos conceitos mais frutíferos para compreender a elaboração contemporânea de cenas políticas de dissenso de um ponto de vista estético. Mas o que exatamente seria um “tempo qualquer”? Como se relaciona com a criação de narrativas políticas? Este texto descreve algumas relações entre tempo e comunicação a partir da visão de Rancière acerca das temporalidades intervalares que coexistem na construção de narrativas contra-hegemônicas sobre a existência de formas de (...) vida heterogêneas. Argumenta que (1) o conceito de "momento qualquer" se refere a uma categoria política, não apenas temporal; (2) a formação de cenas de dissenso está relacionada à definição dos significados de “tempos desmedidos” em cada ocasião, pois (3) opera na liminaridade dos tempos hegemônicos que enquadram a comunicação. (shrink)

_Logic and Pragmatism_ features a number of the key writings of Giovanni Vailati, the Italian mathematician and philosopher renowned for his work in mechanics, geometry, logic, and epistemology. The selections in this book—many of which are available here for the first time in English—focus on Vailati’s significant contributions to the field of pragmatism. Accompanying these pieces are introductory essays by the volume’s editors that outline the traits of Vailati’s pragmatism and provide insights into the scholar’s life.

Computability theorists have introduced multiple hierarchies to measure the complexity of sets of natural numbers. The Kleene Hierarchy classifies sets according to the first-order complexity of their defining formulas. The Ershov Hierarchy classifies limit computable sets with respect to the number of mistakes that are needed to approximate them. Biacino and Gerla extended the Kleene Hierarchy to the realm of fuzzy sets, whose membership functions range in a complete lattice. In this paper, we combine the Ershov Hierarchy and fuzzy set (...) theory, by introducing and investigating the Fuzzy Ershov Hierarchy. (shrink)

Mechanisms are a way of explaining how biological phenomena work rather than why single elements of biological systems are there. However, mechanisms are usually described as physiological entities, and little or no attention is paid to malfunction as an independent theoretical concept. On the other hand, malfunction is the main focus of interest of applied sciences such as medicine. In this paper I argue that malfunctions are parts of pathological mechanisms, which should be considered separate theoretical entities, conceptually having a (...) priority over physiological sequences. While pathological mechanisms can be described in terms of a Cummins-like mechanistic explanation, they show some unnoticed peculiarities when compared to physiological ones. Some features of pathological mechanisms are considered, such as outcome variability, ambivalence and dependence on a range. (shrink)

Between Leopold Ranke and Eduard Gans - Certain circumstances and stylistic considerations lead us to believe that the manuscript MS. 114 in the Mendelssohn Archive at the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin is evidence of a course in "Contemporary History" held by Leopold Ranke at the city’s university in the summer term of 1827. The course was on the chronological history of the French Revolution. Ranke had already dealt with the same subject the year before, though in a less detailed manner. And (...) it was not until 1875 that he published a work on the period of the Revolution, but focussing solely on the war between the European powers in 1791-1792. Hence the importance of the new manuscript - in Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy’s own hand - which, previously, had been mistakenly connected with the teaching of the Hegelian jurist Eduard Gans. Mendelssohn attended his course on the French Revolution in the summer of 1828. (shrink)

In a reply to Nicholas Maxwell, Stein has proved that Minkowski spacetime can leave room for the kind of indeterminateness required both by certain interpretations of quantum mechanics and by objective becoming. By examining the consequences of outcome dependence in Bell-type experiments for the co-determinateness of spacelike-related events, I argue that the only becoming relation that is compatible with both causal and noncausal readings of the quantum correlations is the universal relation. This result might also undermine interpretations of quantum mechanics (...) requiring non-epistemically indeterminate states before measurement and hyperplane-dependent wave collapse. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the debate between the so-called “presentists” – according to whom only the present is real – and the “eternalists”, according to whom past present and future are equally real, has no ontological significance. In particular, once we carefully distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of existence, it is difficult to find a single ontological claim on which the two parties could disagree. Since the choice of using a tense or a tenseless language (...) is dictated by purely pragmatic reasons, we should abstain from bringing to bear pseudo-debates generated by the “tensed” or the “tenseless theories” of time on the question of understanding the philosophical implications of contemporary spacetime theories, or notions like becoming, change and persistence in time. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the role of dispositional properties in the most frequently discussed interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. After offering some motivation for this project, I briefly characterize the distinction between non-dispositional and dispositional properties in the context of quantum mechanics by suggesting a necessary condition for dispositionality – namely contextuality – and, consequently, a sufficient condition for non-dispositionality, namely non-contextuality. Having made sure that the distinction is conceptually sound, I then analyze the plausibility of the widespread, monistic (...) ontological thesis about the reducibility of dispositional properties to categorical properties in the context of the philosophy of quantum mechanics. I conclude that with the exception of Bohmian mechanics, the other “minimally realist” views of quantum mechanics require essential dispositions, i.e., dispositions of a non-reducible kind. Interestingly, seen behind the lenses of dispositionalism, Bohr’s and Bohm’s interpretations of quantum mechanics are much closer than it is usually recognized, a fact that could teach us something about the way the quantum world is. (shrink)

1.: In this paper I discuss Putnam’s view on time and the special theory of relativity. I first locate Putnam’s philosophical approach within a more general framework, essentially making reference to Sellar’s distinction between the scientific image and the manifest image of the world. I then reconstruct Putnam’s argument in favour of the reality of the future and the determinateness of truth-value for future tense sentences by showing that it is based on three premises that generate a contradiction. In the (...) second part of the paper I discuss Putnam’s argument both by using later results belonging to the foundations of STR and quantum mechanics, and by invoking some conceptual analysis on the pseudo-predicate “is real”. Since I will show that the presentists/eternalists debate is ill-founded if regarded as ontological, I will conclude that it boils down to our different practical attitudes towards past, present and future. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that if physics is to become a coherent metaphysics of nature it needs an “interpretation”. As I understand it, an interpretation of a physical theory amounts to offering a precise formulation of its ontological claims and a clear account of how such claims are related to the world of our experience. Notably, metaphysics enters importantly in both tasks: in, because interpreting our best physical theories requires going beyond a merely instrumentalist view of science and (...) therefore using our best metaphysical theories; in, because a philosophical elaboration of the theories of the world that are implicit in our experience is one of the tasks of analytic metaphysics, and bridging possible explanatory gaps or even conflicts between the physical image and the manifest image of the world is a typical philosophical task that involves science and metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper, we evaluate some proposals that have been put forward to clarify the ontological consequences of relational quantum mechanics. We first focus on priority monism and ontic structural realism and argue that these views are not suitable for providing an ontological interpretation of the theory. Then, we discuss an alternative interpretation that we regard as more promising, based on so-called ‘metaphysical coherentism’, which we also connect to the idea of an event-based, or ‘flash’, ontology.

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

A proof is given that the set of maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property and the set of maximal intermediate predicate logics with the disjunction property and the explicit definability property have the power of continuum. To prove our results, we introduce various notions which might be interesting by themselves. In particular, we illustrate a method to generate wide sets of pairwise "constructively incompatible constructive logics". We use a notion of "semiconstructive" logic and define wide sets of "constructive" (...) logics by representing the "constructive" logics as "limits" of decreasing sequences of "semiconstructive" logics. Also, we introduce some generalizations of the usual filtration techniques for propositional logics. For instance, "filtrations over rank formulas" are used to show that any two different logics belonging to a suitable uncountable set of "constructive" logics are "constructively incompatible". (shrink)

We discuss the three dominant models of the phenomenological literature pertaining to temporal consciousness, namely the cinematic, the retentional, and the extensional model. This is first done by presenting the distinction between acts and contents of consciousness and the assumptions underlying the different models concerning both the extendedness and duration of these two components. Secondly, we elaborate on the consequences related to whether a perspective of direct or indirect realism about temporal perceptions is assumed. Finally, we review some relevant findings (...) from the psychology and neuroscience of temporality in order to decide which of the three models of time consciousness is better confirmed from an empirical viewpoint. Depending on the time scale, all three models of temporal consciousness might apply. We specifically argue in favor of an extensional model of time consciousness for the experienced present where the acts and contents of consciousness are both extended. The retentional model might apply to longer time intervals covered by working memory. In addition, a predictive component is highlighted as decisive for an understanding of temporality. (shrink)

After some suggestions about how to clarify the confused metaphysical distinctions between dispositional and non-dispositional or categorical properties, I review some of the main interpretations of QM in order to show that – with the relevant exception of Bohm’s minimalist interpretation – quantum ontology is irreducibly dispositional. Such an irreducible character of dispositions must be explained differently in different interpretations, but the reducibility of the contextual properties in the case of Bohmian mechanics is guaranteed by the fact that the positions (...) of particles play the role of the categorical basis, a role that in other interpretations cannot be filled by anything else. In Bohr’s and Everett-type interpretations, dispositionalism is instrumentalism in disguise. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that quantum mechanics provides a genuine kind of structural explanations of quantum phenomena. Since structural explanations only rely on the formal properties of the theory, they have the advantage of being independent of interpretative questions. As such, they can be used to claim that, even in the current absence of one agreed-upon interpretation, quantum mechanics is capable of providing satisfactory explanations of physical phenomena. While our proposal clearly cannot be taken to solve all interpretive issues (...) raised by quantum theory, we will argue that it can be successfully applied to some of its most puzzling phenomena, such Heisenberg's uncertainty relations and quantum non-locality. The discussion of these two case studies will also serve to illustrate the main properties of structural explanations and compare them to the DN and the unificationist models. Finally, we briefly discuss how structural explanations might relate to structural realism. (shrink)

The first comprehensive account of Platonism in Antiquity, from the foundation of Plato's Academy in the fourth century BC to Late Antiquity. Written in a clear language, the book shows that Platonism is philosophically engaging and very influential in the history of philosophy. Useful for both students and scholars.

(2007). Relativity Theory between Structural and Dynamical Explanations. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 95-102.

Mauro Dorato charts pressing debates within the philosophy of science that centre around scientific expertise, access to knowledge, consensus, debate, and decision-making. This English-language translation of Disinformazione Scientifica e Democrazia argues that the advancement of science depends on an exponential process of specialization, accompanied by the creation of technical languages that are less and less accessible to the general public. Dorato reveals how such a process must align with representative forms of democracies, in which knowledge and decision-making ought to (...) aim at the society's general interest. Given the importance of the principle of competence, however, the role of experts as mediators of knowledge threatens the citizens' autonomy of choice. Consequently, the risk of technocratic regimes calls for new ways to increase literacy about science and its philosophical and probabilistic foundations. Stressing the conceptual conflict between pluralism and conformism, Science and Representative Democracyreveals the obstacles to the functioning of both science and democracy. (shrink)

I reconsider the monism/pluralism debate about natural kinds. Monism claims that there is a privileged division of reality into natural kinds, while pluralism states that there are many ways of classifying objects according to different purposes. I compare three different monistic accounts of natural kinds with the pluralism advocated by promiscuous realism. The analysis of some examples of the classification of celestial objects suggest that there are indeed different legitimate ways of classifying things according to different purposes; contrary to monism, (...) the boundaries between kinds are not fixed. These results show that promiscuous realism is a better account of natural kind. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

I aim to present a solution to the apparent paradox of the Tractatus by means of a minimalist reading grounded in the idea that the correct logical symbolism alone “finally solves” in essentials the philosophical problems. I argue that although the sentences of the Tractatus are nonsensical, rules presented in its symbolism are not. The symbolism itself expresses only a priori rules of logic through schematic variables that do not say anything. I argue that this reading correctly expresses the ladder (...) structure of the book, and that it can account for Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatus in Some Remarks on Logical Form. (shrink)

Este livro procura ilustrar que o ser professor não resulta de um evolucionismo natural do qual a vocação ou o dom seriam consequências lógicas. Ao contrário, a presença do docente e a presença do discente são buscadas no campo historiográfico seja pela memória individual e coletiva deles em seus escritos, seja pelos novos enfrentamentos suscitados não só pela sociedade de classes, mas também pelas diversidades que aí se aninham. Sumário - Prefácio - Carlos Roberto Jamil Cury; Apresentação - Mauro (...) Passos; Parte I - Teoria e confrontos temáticos; Parte II - História e condições de trabalho; Sobre os autores. (shrink)