Max Weber: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus Edition Holzinger. Taschenbuch Berliner Ausgabe, 2016, 4. Auflage Vollständiger, durchgesehener Neusatz bearbeitet und eingerichtet von Michael Holzinger In: Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 20. Bd., Heft 1, S. 1-54, 1904; 21. Bd., Heft 1, S. 1-110, 1905. Erstdruck der vorliegenden, umgearbeiteten Fassung in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I, Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 1920, S. 17-206. Textgrundlage ist die Ausgabe: Max Weber: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie. 8., photomechanisch gedruckte Auflage; Band 1, (...) Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1986 (1. Auflage 1920) Herausgeber der Reihe: Michael Holzinger Reihengestaltung: Viktor Harvion Gesetzt aus der Minion Pro, 11 pt. (shrink)

This article examines the first-century c.e.Laus Pisonis, an anonymous panegyric for a certain Piso that lays particular emphasis on his skill at lyre-playing, ball games and the board game, the ludus latrunculorum. Whereas this focus has often been a cause of consternation among critics, this article argues that play is a crucial element of the poem's poetic and political operations. The first section shows that the poem employs images of poetic maturity and of temporality in order to justify a light (...) or ludic topic for an allegedly young poet. The second section identifies a hitherto unobserved telestich in the passage describing the ludus latrunculorum and argues that this letter game defines a positive period of play within the poem. The third section further demonstrates that this letter game is aimed specifically at the patron Piso as he is represented within the poem. That is, the poet parallels Piso's potential to uncover the telestich in the text and his ability to uncover the poet's hidden talent. The concluding fourth section explores the wider impact of this reinterpretation of the Laus Pisonis for the literary history of the Early Principate. It proposes that the poem's playfulness should not be seen as reflecting the progressive disempowerment of the political elite. Rather, the poem is an early case of Roman political discourse encroaching on the value of the trivial and the boundaries of otium. The Laus Pisonis makes play political. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism claims ethical goodness is a kind of human natural goodness, where natural goodness is a function of human nature. Call this the core thesis. The normativity objection claims the core thesis fails because ethical goodness is normative and natural goodness is not. In this study I aim to cast new light on this objection and propose a new strategy of response. My argument divides into two main moves. In the first, I side with critics in arguing that (...) Aristotelian naturalism has a serious problem that concerns the normativity of human nature, although standard formulations of the normativity objection do not quite capture it. The problem is that there is an explanatory gap in Aristotelian naturalism’s account of ethical goodness. I argue that although facts about human nature and natural goodness are irreducibly normative in the evaluative sense, they are not necessarily normative in the practical sense. Hence, Aristotelians need to explain what makes such facts practically normative. They have not successfully done this. This explanatory gap threatens the viability of Aristotelian naturalism, for it leaves a central feature of ethical experience—viz. the practical normativity of ethical facts—unexplained. I call this the normativity problem. In the second main move of my argument I propose a two-part solution to the normativity problem. The first part consists in a new metanormative account of the source of normativity I call Aristotelian constructivism. It yields an objectivist, species-relative and naturalistic account of practical normativity. The second part of the solution is an account of practical reason that connects human final ends with human nature. Aristotelian constructivism explains the practical normativity of those final ends, and thus of facts about human nature, without reference to the evaluative status of those facts. Aristotelian constructivism thereby enables Aristotelian naturalists to retain their core thesis. (shrink)

This essay situates the protest actions of the German environmentalist group Die letzte Generation (LG) within an environmental critique of digital capitalism. It specifically examines the temporality of LG’s activism at the intersection of the affective ecology of digital capital and certain aspects of an apocalyptic imagination. I propose a Spinozist approach to the media environment in which LG operates that may open a path toward an immanent critique of LG’s publicity-oriented practices.

The commentary is presented in three sections. Section 1 presents a brief summary of the main theses in Cummins' paper. In section 2, I argue that this analysis is not peculiar to cognition, and that in fact, a similar, more general analysis has been given [3] in fundamental areas of inquiry, hitherto independent of cognitive science. Finally, in section 3, it is argued that, if this general form of Cummins' analysis is correct, it calls for a profound re‐evaluation of our (...) conception of science. (shrink)

The emerging epistemic community of ecosemioticians and the multidisciplinary field of inquiry known as ecosemiotics offer a radical and relevant approach to so-called global environmental crisis. There are no environmental fixes within the dominant code, since that code overdetermines the future, thereby perpetuating ecologically untenable cultural forms. The possibility of a sustainability transition (the attempt to overcome destitution and avoid ecocatastrophe) becomes real when mediated by and through ecosemiotics. In short, reflexive awareness of humankind's linguisticality is a necessary condition for (...) transforming ecologically maladaptive cultural forms. As a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary research program integrating the human and natural sciences, ecosemiotic inquiry closes the gap between biophysical ecology and human ecology. A provisional outline of a pragmatic theory of ecoserniotics attempts to describe the processes by which adaptive cultural changes might be facilitated and points toward substantive content areas that constitute sites for further research. Ecosemiotic inquiry frames cultural codes as these shape and reproduce the ongoing stream of individual and societal choices that shape distinctively human existence in a larger context of biophysical realities that drive natural selection. However, while ecosemiotics is a necessary condition for the sustainability transition, it is not a sufficient condition. (shrink)

As evidence that cultural group selection has occurred, Richerson et al. simply retrodict that humans use language, punish each other, and have religion. This is a meager empirical haul after 30 years. This contrasts sharply with the adaptationist approach to human behavior – evolutionary psychology – which has produced scores of novel, specific, and empirically confirmed predictions.

Reproduktion auf Grundlage der Ausgabe: Verlag von Friedrich Cohen; Bonn 1929. - Die hier gesammelten Aufsätze aus der letzten Schaffensperiode Max Schelers sind zwar unabhängig voneinander entstanden und veröffentlicht worden - Näheres sagen die Anmerkungen am Schluß des Bandes -, aber sie schließen sich doch zur Einheit zusammen durch die metaphysische Haltung, die der kurze, an die Spitze gestellte und für den Gesamttitel maßgebende Aufsatz mit großer Deutlichkeit offenbart. Er ist auch die letzte von Max Scheler selbst abgeschlossene Schrift. Die (...) wenigen an dem Text der Erstveröffentlichungen vorgenommenen inhaltlichen Änderungen gehen auf eigenhändige Notizen des Verfassers zurück. (shrink)

A growing number of philosophers are defending what can be understood as Right Reason Accounts of the norm of assertion. According to these accounts, an agent’s asserting that _p_ is epistemically permissible only if that agent asserts that _p_ for a right (normative) reason, i.e., a reason that at least contributes to making it epistemically permissible to assert that _p_. In this paper, I argue that Right Reason Accounts do not allow for the possibility of asserting epistemically permissibly only for (...) the wrong reason(s). However, it is a commonplace in all normative domains (e.g., morality, prudence, and aesthetics) that an agent can—at least sometimes—φ rightly (or permissibly) only for the wrong reason(s). (shrink)

Bd. 2. Erkenntnislehre und Metaphysik -- Bd. 3. Philosophische Anthropologie -- Bd. 4. Philosophie und Geschichte -- Bd. 5. Varia I -- Bd. 6. Varia II.

n + 1 nested k-ary fixed point operators are more expressive than n. This holds on finite structures for all sublogics of partial fixed point logic PFP that can express conjunction, existential quantification and deterministic transitive closure of binary relations using at most k-ary fixed point operators and that are closed against subformulas. Among those are a lot of popular fixed point logics.

In his famous work on the stranger, Alfred Schutz focuses on the interpretative discrepancies between in-groups and out-groups from the per­spective of a stranger approaching a new group. In doing so, Schutz emphasizes that strangers can overcome their strangeness within a social group by adapting to the prevalent cultural patterns. Shifting the perspective from the stranger to the in-group this essay aims to argue that the experience of the Other’s strangeness due to a discrepancy of interpretative schemes is only one (...) dimension of how the stranger is perceived in everyday life. A second dimension can be derived from Schutz’ work on appresentation. This essay will follow four analytical steps. First, this essay summarizes the Schutzian approach on perceiving the Other as a taken-for-granted part of everyday life within an assumed intersubjective understanding based on an assumed reciprocity of perspectives. Referring to Eberle’s description of an irreciprocity of perspectives, the second section analyzes the Schutzian stranger based on an intersubjective understanding. The third section then focuses on the appresentational pro­cesses of perceiving the stranger in everyday life. By using Goffman’s distinction between virtual and actual social identity, the interplay of categorizing and experiencing the Other in everyday life can be described. Finally, considering the question of how it comes that people can find themselves strangers in their own society, this paper closes by merging the argumentation with a description of the Schutzian perspective on the processes of stigmatization. (shrink)