With the 1989 eclipse of communist ideology and power in Central and Eastern Europe, the political order of democracy has, on the one hand, proved to be the superior way of organizing a society where in politics the pluralist interests of the people can be articulated and represented freely without fear of repression through competitive elections and otherwise, and where particularly through the operation of market mechanisms citizens are furnished with reasonably satisfactory economic circumstances to conduct their everyday lives. On (...) the other hand, quite different from what many contemporary observers had anticipated, liberal democracy has been subjected to closer and closer critical internal scrutiny, and with this also alternate conceptions of how to organize a democratic polity are now more than before a matter of debate and controversy. (shrink)

Within psychology and the brain sciences, the study of consciousness and its relation to human information processing is once more a focus for productive research. However, some ancient puzzles about the nature of consciousness appear to be resistant to current empirical investigations, suggesting the need for a fundamentally different approach. In Velmans I have argued that functional accounts of the mind do not `contain' consciousness within their workings. Investigations of information processing are not investigations of consciousness as such. Given this, (...) first-person investigations of experience need to be related nonreductively to third-person investigations of processing. For example, conscious contents may be related to neural/physical representations via a dual-aspect theory of information. Chalmers arrives at similar conclusions. But there are also theoretical differences. Unlike Chalmers I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional accounts rather than the term `awareness'. I do not agree that functionalctional equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest a hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight. I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce a different form of dual-aspect theory involving `psychological complementarity'. I also suggest that the hard problem posed by `qualia' has its origin in a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism claims ethical goodness is a kind of human natural goodness, where natural goodness is a function of human nature. Call this the core thesis. The normativity objection claims the core thesis fails because ethical goodness is normative and natural goodness is not. In this study I aim to cast new light on this objection and propose a new strategy of response. My argument divides into two main moves. In the first, I side with critics in arguing that (...) Aristotelian naturalism has a serious problem that concerns the normativity of human nature, although standard formulations of the normativity objection do not quite capture it. The problem is that there is an explanatory gap in Aristotelian naturalism’s account of ethical goodness. I argue that although facts about human nature and natural goodness are irreducibly normative in the evaluative sense, they are not necessarily normative in the practical sense. Hence, Aristotelians need to explain what makes such facts practically normative. They have not successfully done this. This explanatory gap threatens the viability of Aristotelian naturalism, for it leaves a central feature of ethical experience—viz. the practical normativity of ethical facts—unexplained. I call this the normativity problem. In the second main move of my argument I propose a two-part solution to the normativity problem. The first part consists in a new metanormative account of the source of normativity I call Aristotelian constructivism. It yields an objectivist, species-relative and naturalistic account of practical normativity. The second part of the solution is an account of practical reason that connects human final ends with human nature. Aristotelian constructivism explains the practical normativity of those final ends, and thus of facts about human nature, without reference to the evaluative status of those facts. Aristotelian constructivism thereby enables Aristotelian naturalists to retain their core thesis. (shrink)

Moral problems often prompt emotional responses that invoke intuitive judgments of right and wrong. While emotions inform judgment across many domains, they can also lead to ethical failures that could be avoided by using a more deliberative, analytical decision-making process. In this article, we describe joint evaluation as an effective tool to help decision makers manage their emotional assessments of morality.

The emerging epistemic community of ecosemioticians and the multidisciplinary field of inquiry known as ecosemiotics offer a radical and relevant approach to so-called global environmental crisis. There are no environmental fixes within the dominant code, since that code overdetermines the future, thereby perpetuating ecologically untenable cultural forms. The possibility of a sustainability transition (the attempt to overcome destitution and avoid ecocatastrophe) becomes real when mediated by and through ecosemiotics. In short, reflexive awareness of humankind's linguisticality is a necessary condition for (...) transforming ecologically maladaptive cultural forms. As a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary research program integrating the human and natural sciences, ecosemiotic inquiry closes the gap between biophysical ecology and human ecology. A provisional outline of a pragmatic theory of ecoserniotics attempts to describe the processes by which adaptive cultural changes might be facilitated and points toward substantive content areas that constitute sites for further research. Ecosemiotic inquiry frames cultural codes as these shape and reproduce the ongoing stream of individual and societal choices that shape distinctively human existence in a larger context of biophysical realities that drive natural selection. However, while ecosemiotics is a necessary condition for the sustainability transition, it is not a sufficient condition. (shrink)

Reproduktion auf Grundlage der Ausgabe: Verlag von Friedrich Cohen; Bonn 1929. - Die hier gesammelten Aufsätze aus der letzten Schaffensperiode Max Schelers sind zwar unabhängig voneinander entstanden und veröffentlicht worden - Näheres sagen die Anmerkungen am Schluß des Bandes -, aber sie schließen sich doch zur Einheit zusammen durch die metaphysische Haltung, die der kurze, an die Spitze gestellte und für den Gesamttitel maßgebende Aufsatz mit großer Deutlichkeit offenbart. Er ist auch die letzte von Max Scheler selbst abgeschlossene Schrift. Die (...) wenigen an dem Text der Erstveröffentlichungen vorgenommenen inhaltlichen Änderungen gehen auf eigenhändige Notizen des Verfassers zurück. (shrink)

In his famous work on the stranger, Alfred Schutz focuses on the interpretative discrepancies between in-groups and out-groups from the per­spective of a stranger approaching a new group. In doing so, Schutz emphasizes that strangers can overcome their strangeness within a social group by adapting to the prevalent cultural patterns. Shifting the perspective from the stranger to the in-group this essay aims to argue that the experience of the Other’s strangeness due to a discrepancy of interpretative schemes is only one (...) dimension of how the stranger is perceived in everyday life. A second dimension can be derived from Schutz’ work on appresentation. This essay will follow four analytical steps. First, this essay summarizes the Schutzian approach on perceiving the Other as a taken-for-granted part of everyday life within an assumed intersubjective understanding based on an assumed reciprocity of perspectives. Referring to Eberle’s description of an irreciprocity of perspectives, the second section analyzes the Schutzian stranger based on an intersubjective understanding. The third section then focuses on the appresentational pro­cesses of perceiving the stranger in everyday life. By using Goffman’s distinction between virtual and actual social identity, the interplay of categorizing and experiencing the Other in everyday life can be described. Finally, considering the question of how it comes that people can find themselves strangers in their own society, this paper closes by merging the argumentation with a description of the Schutzian perspective on the processes of stigmatization. (shrink)

If Haecker's book on History and the Attitude of the Christian be considered as an index, there seems to be a strong humanistic current in present day Catholicism. Haecker develops in his book the Christian belief that history manifests the will of God, and that all wars, upheavals and revolutions really occur for the salvation of the soul of the individual. He opposes the modern trend to deify nation and race, and presents the elevation of man from his fall, and (...) his return to God, as the eternal goal of all that ever happens. Because Haecker insists upon the intrinsic value of each single man, because he refuses to accept the ruling totalitarian ideology of the day, even the non-Catholic can go a long way with him in his humanism.Horkheimer, however, demonstrates that the connection between this kind of humanism and Catholicism is a very loose one. The deep understanding of human misery that is evident in Haecker's pages fits other convictions and persuasions just as well as it does a Catholic philosophy. Haecker's contention that to reject a sense and a meaning transcending the temporal world is to drive man to despair, does not invalidate the rejection of a supernatural significance. Despair is no argument against truth. Grief over the present is well justified ; nevertheless an attitude is possible which permits of a positive cooperation in the historical tasks of the day.Le livre de Haecker sur la philosophie chrétienne de l'histoire donne à Horkheimer l'occasion de présenter quelques remarques de principe au sujet du courant humaniste dans le catholicisme contemporain. Haecker développe Vidée chrétienne que l'histoire est soumise à la volonté de Dieu, et que dans toutes les guerres, les crises et les révolutions, c'est en vérité le salut de l'âme individuelle qui est en jeu. Il s'oppose à la divinisation moderne du peuple et de la race, et montre dans le relèvement de l'homme après la chute et dans son retour à Dieu le but éternel du devenir. Dans cette affirmation de la valeur de chaque personne, dans la négation des idéologies totalitaires régnantes, s’exprime un humanisme que le philosophe non-catholique peut reconnaître et approuver.Cependant, Horkheimer indique que le lien de cet humanisme et du catholicisme est — logiquement — très lâche. La compréhension de la misère humaine, qui apparaît dans le livre de Haecker, ne peut nullement confirmer la vision catholique du monde, elle s'adapte aussi bien à d'autres convictions. Certes, on comprend l'affirmation de Haecker que le refus de la transcendance doit mener l'homme au désespoir ; mais la négation d'une signification supranaturelle n'est pas ainsi réfutée : le désespoir n'est pas un argument contre la vérité. La tristesse légitime que nous inspire le présent, appelle, bien loin de l'exclure, la décision de travailler aux tâches que l'histoire nous assigne. (shrink)

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