What should we make of the apocalyptic tone taken up by politicians, journalists, scientists, and activists? Some environmental thinkers such as Michael Shellenberger contend that alarming rhetoric distracts us from the technological and governance challenges presented by climate change. In the article, it is argued that retrieving a practical apocalyptic political theology from the Christian tradition can both clarify conceptual contradictions within this discourse as well as offer a practical orientation toward living within ecological endings. Amid the cascade (...) of environmental crises we are living through, apocalyptic practices of renunciation of the world offer a guide and discipline for living in the end. (shrink)

Este texto propõe uma crítica da tecnologia conforme abordada na narrativa pós-natureza do antropoceno. Para essa narrativa, também chamada de pós-ambientalismo, o antropoceno é o momento histórico em que fica clara a impossibilidade de uma noção idealizada da natureza, distinta da intervenção humana. Neste texto, argumenta-se que, embora tenha méritos no questionamento de aspectos cruciais do pensamento moderno, essa narrativa tem também problemas teórico-conceituais significativos derivados da centralidade atribuída à mediação técnica, que acaba convertendo-a em uma espécie de metafísica. A (...) exposição das teses da narrativa pós-natureza do antropoceno se dá a partir do diálogo com textos de ativistas do pós-ambientalismo, como Michael Shellenberger e Ted Nordhaus, e de pensadores que fornecem a essa corrente o fundamento teórico-conceitual, como Bruno Latour e Peter Sloterdijk. A crítica se ampara na argumentação dos filósofos contemporâneos Dieter Mersch e Andreas Luckner, que desdobram ideias já sinalizadas por Martin Heidegger e indicam caminhos para compreender os limites de perspectivas metafísicas sobre tecnologia. (shrink)

Twenty scholars from around the world assembled at the Werner Reimer Stiftung in Bad Homburg from June 29 to July 1, 1995, to discuss the life and work of Eduard Gans. There has been a surge of interest in Gans in the past few years, and the authors of all recent work on Gans attended. Books circulated at the conference included Gans’ Chroniques françaises: Un hégélien juif à Paris, trans. by Myriam Bienenstock, ed. by Norbert Waszek ; Eduard Gans : (...) Hegelianer, Jude, Europäer: Text und Dokumente, ed. by Norbert Waszek ; Gans’ Rückblicke auf Personen und Zuständ: Berlin 1836, ed. by Norbert Waszek, and my own Eduard Gans and the Hegelian Philosophy of Law. An important recent article is Reinhard Blänkner, “‘Der Absolutismus war ein Glück der doch nicht zu den Absolutisten gehört’: Eduard Gans und die hegelianischen Ursprünge der Absolutismusforschung in Deutschland,” Historische Zeitschrift, 256 : 31–66. (shrink)

Neste artigo o autor pretende mostrar como as reflexões filosóficas de Giordano Bruno sobre a Retórica foram fortemente influenciadas pelas concepções metafísicas e metodológicas de Raimundo Lúlio. Para tanto, são analisados especialmente os Escritos de Wittenberg, Artificium perorandi e De lampade combinatoria, onde Bruno discute a aplicação dos princípios do lulismo através da utilização da metáfora dos caracteres e da hierarquização do cosmos, bem como da operacionalização de um processo combinatório na construção de proposições e argumentos.

Alle klagen ständig darüber, dass sie keine Zeit hätten. Keine Zeit für dies, keine Zeit für jenes. Gewöhnlich ist das, weil wir mit anderen Dingen beschäftigt sind, die unsere ganze Zeit ausfüllen. Daran ließe sich im Prinzip etwas ändern. Wir bräuchten nur unsere Prioritäten zu ändern.

Albert of Saxony was one of the great logicians of the Middle Ages, on a par with William Ockham and John Buridan. The Twenty-Five Disputed Questions on Logic treat of central issues in logic, both then and now, such as the nature of meaning, of universals, of truth, and of tense and modality; and the quality and quantity of propositions, the role of negation, and the relations of contradiction and equivalence between them. Dr. Fitzgerald has studied Albert's work extensively, and (...) previously edited the Twenty-Five Disputed Questions from the original manuscripts. This translation makes available for the first time in English this careful and exemplary examination of logical notions by an outstanding medieval thinker.-Stephen Read, University of St. Andrews. (shrink)

The concept of equipoise is considered by many to be part of the ethical justification for using human subjects in clinical research. In general, equipoise indicates some uncertainty about the relative merits of the experimental intervention compared to existing treatments. Relieving this uncertainty gives scientific value to an experiment, thereby making the risks to human subjects in the trial acceptable, other considerations notwithstanding. But characterizing equipoise remains controversial since Freedman’s groundbreaking publication on the subject. We offer a new account of (...) equipoise that draws on and extends an option Freedman discarded. After establishing the importance of some account of equipoise as part of ethically justified clinical trials, we revisit Freedman’s distinction between clinical and theoretical equipoise. We raise concerns about Freedman’s preferred clinical equipoise and then rehabilitate theoretical equipoise. In particular, we use a variety of arguments from epistemology to show how Freedman was too hasty in rejecting theoretical equipoise. In addition, we argue that theoretical equipoise is a subspecies of epistemic equipoise, which we characterize as a form of uncertainty that is the result of the possibility of error. This type of uncertainty can best be alleviated by research, which produces beliefs supported by strong statistical evidence, which is a key aim of clinical trials. Further, this type of uncertainty can explain why even clinicians with more firsthand experience with an intervention than their peers, and who may not be in theoretical equipoise, could still justifiably support a trial designed to ameliorate the possibility of error due to cognitive bias. (shrink)

Few clinical situations arouse more emotion and drama and lead to more conflict in decision-making than cardio-pulmonary resuscitation . The procedure was described as potentially beneficial more than 40 years ago. However, its efficacy and place in the care of the frail elderly have taken a long time to be established. In the world of secular medical practice, there are many situations when CPR may be provided to elderly, frail and cognitively compromised individuals for whom its clinical benefit is questionable. (...) In those patients suffering from dementia, surrogates are responsible for decision-making, which complicates the process. When the clinical uncertainty is coupled with strong cultural and religious influences, as within Orthodox Judaism, the development of an acceptable approach to cardiac arrest is more challenging. A clinically sound, ethically defensible and religiously sensitive approach to CPR requires a deep understanding of all the factors involved in the decision-making process and may require periodic re-evaluation not only by clinicians but by religious scholars and leaders. (shrink)

Imagine we are at a murder trial. Randy Smith is accused of killing his Aunt Millie. The defense admits that on the night of the murder, Smith had an argument with his Aunt, that he took a pistol out of his jacket and shot her. She died of the gunshot wound. Smith knew that the gun was loaded, that Millie was directly in front of it, and that he was pulling the trigger. He was not insane at the time, there (...) were no abnormal chemicals in his brain, and he was not acting in self-defense. He killed her knowingly, intentionally, and unjustifiably. (shrink)

The concepts of autonomy and subjectivity are crucial not only for modern philosophy of law but also for its practice. Nevertheless, postmodern philosophy and postmodern theory of law claim to suspend these concepts, interpreting them as hypostatized narratives. The article argues that contrary to the postmodern reading, already the early modern concept of subjectivity is very fragile: It has no reality outside of a historical process in which the principle of subjectivity is connected to its external objective conditions of existence. (...) These conditions are both theoretical and practical; the former are acquired by science, the latter by social, political, and legal history. This history has not been the pure realization of rationality. The development of the state of law from the state of nature, including the original appropriation and legalization of private property, has been a history of violence. This violence has not simply been overcome but is preserved in modern legal systems, too. It takes a materialistic social theory to tell this story in opposition to the narrative of modern law as a pure triumph of human freedom. This also entails that the subjectivity that stands at the end of this story is not only fragile but also fragmented. (shrink)

Eighteen essays re examine Ficino's life and work focusing on three essential aspects: his significance in his own times, his spreading influence throughout Europe and over subsequent centuries in many areas of thought and creativity, and his enduring relevance today. Translation of his major works from Latin enables a new generation to rediscover and share Ficino's vision of human potential.

In his critique of my views on supererogation, Rodney Roberts (Philosophia, 2014) claims that I treat care ethics as having a more general moral validity than other care ethicists do. He also claims that the kind of sentimentalism I espouse doesn’t sufficiently emphasize sentiment and then goes on to question what I say about supererogation. But in fact other care ethicists also think care ethics can cover the whole of morality, and my sentimentalism emphasizes sentiment just as much and as (...) little as that paradigm sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson does. Further, the critique Roberts makes of my view on supererogation doesn’t allow for the full range of possible cases of supererogation. (shrink)

where, according to Schiffer, the concept of an F is pleonastic just in case the concept itself licenses entailments of the form: S ⇒ ∃xFx. These are what he calls "somethingfrom-nothing" entailments and the various practices in which such entailments are made are what he calls "hypostatisizing practices" (p.57). The concept of a proposition is pleonastic, according to this definition, because it licenses the move from a claim like 'Fido is a dog,' a claim containing only the singular term 'Fido' (...) referring to Fido, to the claim 'It is true that Fido is a dog,' which is a claim that contains the singular term 'that Fido is a dog' referring to the proposition that Fido is a dog. (iv) Propositions are pleonastic entities, as anything that falls under a pleonastic concept is, by definition, a pleonastic entity. And (v) The nature of propositions, as pleonastic entities, is fully determined by the hypostatizing practices that are constitutive of the concept of a proposition together with those necessary a priori truths that are applicable to things of any kind. Schiffer's idea is thus that propositions are entities, but that they are entities of a particularly insubstantial kind, as they have no hidden nature waiting to be discovered by.. (shrink)

Situating the concept of recognition -- Emmanuel Lévinas: recognition as pure sensation -- Emmanuel Lévinas: a Jewish perspective on recognition -- Paul Ricœur: recognition as pure and empirical will -- Paul Ricœur: a Christian perspective on recognition -- The good of recognition.

Al-Farabi saw himself as inheriting from Aristotle the problem of limits to political responsibility for virtue. If the state possesses the authority to habituate citizens to virtue, what are the limits to that responsibility? Aristotle establishes two main limits: the family and the size of the state. Al-Farabi rejects both. Thomas Aquinas’s view of marriage as a sacrament, on the other hand, reinforces the Aristotelian position that the family is the most basic limit to public responsibility for virtue. In fact, (...) Aquinas expands the notion of subsidiarity beyond the family. Moreover, Aquinas and Aristotle agree that political life is not only limited from “below” by the family but also from “above.” Thus, in spite of Aquinas’ views on punishing heretics and apostates, it is not the case, as Leo Strauss’ claims, that Aquinas’ Christian faith led him to increase and exaggerate political responsibility for virtue. (shrink)

In this article, I locate the Critical Theoretic and Republican themes of misrecognition and domination in transnational democracy, viewed as an emancipatory project. Contrary to John Dryzek, I argue that transnational democracy requires an appropriate account of mutual recognition and personal integrity in order to ground the emancipatory dimension of this project, especially given Dryzek's analysis of transnational contests in forming personal identifications. Beyond this, I argue that the same themes are needed to supplement James Bohman's account of the normative (...) powers of dominated persons to initiate deliberation in circumstances of injustice. Primarily, my claim has been that the idea of personal integrity remains essential not only to motivating the project of transnational democracy, but also modifying the appeal to normative powers in the interest of enabling dominated persons to enter into communicative relationships and engage in public processes of critical self-examination. (shrink)