S'il est vrai que l'auteur des Actes des Apôtres peut être en un sens considéré comme le premier historien du christianisme, s'il est également vrai que les Ile et Ille siècles ont vu naître des écrits qui ont entre autres une portées historique , c'est avec Eusèbe de Césarée que surgit la conscience de produire, avec son Histoire ecclésiastique, quelque chose de nouveau : « Je suis, en effet, le premier, écrira-t-il, à m'avancer pour ainsi dire sur un chemin désert (...) et inviolé. » Après avoir étudié l'oeuvre d'Eusèbe, M. Fédou présente ses continuateurs en Orient et en Occident avant d'examiner sa position par rapport à l'historiographie païenne et la manière dont les historiens plus tardifs ont interprété l'histoire de l'Eglise pendant et après la crise de l'arianisme.If it is true that the author of the Acts of the Apostles can be considered in a sense the first historian of Christianity, and if it is also true that the 2rd and 3rd centuries saw the birth of writings that, among others, have a historical importance, , it is, nevertheless, Eusebius of Caesarea who gave rise to an awareness of producing something new with his Ecclesiastical History. He wrote: “I am, indeed, the first to go forward, as it were, on a deserted and inviolate road.” After studying the work of Eusebius, M. Fédou presents his commentaries on East and West before examining his position as regards pagan historiography and the manner in which later historians had interpreted the history of the Church during and after the crisis of Arianism. (shrink)

Puisque l’ouvrage de Meier s’intéresse au Jésus historique et qu’il s’efforce d’en préciser peu à peu le « portrait », il est légitime de se demander si les enquêtes ainsi menées permettent d’envisager aujourd’hui une nouvelle théologie de la vie de Jésus, et, si oui, à quelles conditions. Les trois séries de réflexions ici proposées – sur la position de Jésus dans le monde juif, sur ses miracles, et finalement sur la question de son identité – permettent d’apporter une première (...) réponse à cette question.Since Meier’s work deals with the historical Jesus and aims at gradually drawing up a ‘portrait’ of him, it seems legitimate to ask whether such an inquiry today enables us to envisage a new theology of the life of Jesus, and if so, under what conditions. The three series of reflections proposed here – on the position of Jesus within the Jewish world, on his miracles, and finally on the question of his identity – allow us to propose a tentative answer to this question. (shrink)

En conclusion de deux dossiers, et faute de pouvoir traiter le sujet sous tous ses aspects, M. Fédou l'aborde ici sous l'angle suivant : qu'est-ce qui, dans la situation de notre temps, aurait chance de féconder une réflexion de théologie fondamentale et dogmatique sur « le christianisme et les autres religions » ? Ainsi formulé, le questionnement a au moins deux implications. D'une part, malgré la grande diversité des religions et de leurs contextes sociaux, politiques ou culturels, il doit y (...) avoir encore place pour une réflexion théologique qui ne considère pas seulement telle religion en particulier mais l'ensemble des religions. D'autre part, nous avons moins à proposer une « théologie des religions » qu'une réflexion théologique sur « le christianisme et les autres religions » : cette dernière formule suggère que le regard des chrétiens sur les religions ne saurait être indépendant de leur confession de foi ; elle attire en outre l'attention sur les rapports mêmes entre le christianisme et les diverses religions du monde.To sum up two endeavours and, without any claim at dealing with the subject comprehensively, M. Fédou takes it up here from the following angle: given the situation of our times, what might have a good chance of making reflexion about fundamental and dogmatic theology concerning “Christianity and other religions” fruitful? Formulated in this way, this reasoning has at least two implications. On the one hand, in spite of the diversity of religions and their social, political or cultural contexts, there must still be room for a theological reflexion that does not limit itself to considering just one particular religion, but that takes the ensemble of religions into account. On the other hand, it behooves us to propose, not a “theology of religions”, but rather a theological reflexion on “Christianity and other religions”: this latter formulation suggests that the view Christians have of other religions could not be independent of their own confession of faith; it likewise focuses on the relations between Christianity and the various religions of the world. (shrink)

À la faveur d’une étude fondamentale sur la mission chrétienne, J. Moingt montre les déficiences des «théologies du pluralisme religieux» qui se sont développées depuis quelques décennies, et souligne que l’avenir du christianisme doit d’abord se jouer sur sa confrontation avec l’humanisme séculier; une coopération avec les religions n’en est pas moins légitime et souhaitable, mais à condition d’être seulement orientée vers la tâche de «l’humanisation» de l’homme et de la société. L’article rend compte de la thèse ainsi soutenue par (...) J. Moingt. Il montre la portée des critiques adressées aux théologies du pluralisme religieux, tout en apportant quelques compléments ou précisions. Il invite surtout à dépasser l’opposition entre l’horizon de l’altérité religieuse et celui de l’humanisme séculier, moyennant une réflexion sur «Évangile et cultures» dans le contexte de l’Asie comme dans celui de l’Europe. (shrink)

Les études sur les élaborations christologiques des premiers siècles ne manquent pas et M. Fédou, dans son introduction, en retient trois afin de définir par contraste l'apport de sa propre approche : celle de L. Capéran, Le Problème du salut des infidèles, d'abord édité à Toulouse en 1912 (nouvelle édition revue et mise à jour en 1934) ; trois œuvres marquantes de J. Daniélou (Théologie du judéo-christianisme, 1958 ; Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux IIe et IIIe siècles, 1961 ..

This book is an English-language translation of a bestselling book in France that explores the relationship between humans and new technologies.

As I am not at all a specialist on Gottlob Frege’s work, my comments intended initially to be focused on an aspect that emerges in the last part of Peter Clark’s paper “Frege, neo-logicism and applied mathematics” 1, where he treats the question of “applied mathematics” — an aspect that appealed to me and that was triggered by Frege’s relationship between numbers and concepts, and reasoning. Starting with this concern, I have been led by my subject to propose some considerations (...) about foundations and rationality which will go — briefly — in two directions. The first direction is that of a distinction between logical and rational foundations, whilst the second direction is that of taking into account as a fact the historical development of mathematics among the sciences, which modifies the terms of any foundational program. In delineating these considerations, I found that what I had in mind could apply to mathematics itself as well as to “applied mathematics”, thus deviating somewhat from my first explicit intention. In conclusion I shall consider the possibility of a rational foundation programme for mathematical and physico-mathematical sciences which would take into account the changes in the scientific contents and the widenings of the forms of rationality that, in my view, make these changes possible. Such foundations for knowledge would not be any more static, but dynamical and would be possibly considered only retrospectively: they would be “forward foundations”, in a sense that will be discussed in detail elsewhere. (shrink)

This article tries to demonstrate that the promise made to Nathanael through Gen 38:12-19 in Jn 1:51, foretells the glorification of the Son of Man at the end of his terrestrial journey, described as a descent and an ascent. But this glorification will be carried out by means of the crucifixion ; hence the recourse to two other texts of the O.T. to prove, first in Jn 3:14-15, that the crucifixion of Jesus would be a salvific elevation prefigurated by the (...) serpent raised by Moses on a stake (Nm 21:4-9). But the crucifixion of Jesus is also the ultimate step of the descent of the Son of Man, its salvific value is then proven by the gift of manna, bread descended from heaven (Ex 16:4.15.35 ; Ps 78:24). Jesus, as the true bread of life, transmits the life he continuously receives from his Father to those who remain faithful to him unto the foot of the cross (6:48-58). (shrink)

This chapter introduces a novel account of fake news and explains how it differs from other definitions on the market. The account locates the fakeness of an alleged news report in two main aspects related to its production, namely that its creators do not think to have sufficient evidence in favor of what they divulge and they fail to display the appropriate attitude towards the truth of the information they share. A key feature of our analysis is that it does (...) not require that fake news must be circulated with the intention to deceive one’s audience. In this way, our account overcomes a potential limitation of the current philosophical discussion about fake news, which appears to individuate the main problem with this phenomenon in the fact that fake news consumers are misled and misinformed. In contrast, the proposed analysis shows that an additional (and perhaps equally fundamental) problem uncovered by the spread of fake news is a widespread pathological relationship with information, one on which we consume information not to satisfy our interest in the truth but to strengthen our social identities and quench our hunger for social recognition. (shrink)

Toute science, admet-on, commence par détacher un objet en le rendant indépendant des sujets et des situations. Mais cette conception étroite de la connaissance scientifique laisse subsister des zones d'ombre. La conscience n'est pas un objet. Elle est ce sans quoi rien ne pourrait être pris pour objet. La conscience n'est pas détachable des sujets, car elle s'identifie à ce qui est vécu par un sujet. De façon analogue, en physique quantique, un phénomène n'est pas dissociable de son contexte expérimental, (...) car il s'identifie à ce qui se manifeste à grande échelle au laboratoire. Que faire pour ne pas laisser ces cas extrêmes de côté? Généraliser la méthode scientifique. Ne plus la borner à définir et à caractériser des objets, mais l'étendre à la coordination directe des expériences. Telle est la révolution de pensée qu'il faut accomplir pour résoudre, ou plutôt dissoudre, deux questions-limites de la science : le problème de l'origine de la conscience et le paradoxe du "chat de Schrödinger" en physique quantique. (shrink)

The debate about the nature of the representational format of concepts seems to have reached an impasse. The debate faces two fundamental problems. Firstly, amodalists (i.e., those who argue that concepts are represented by amodal symbols) and modalists (i.e., those who see concepts as involving crucially representations including sensorimotor information) claim that the same empirical evidence is compatible with their views. Secondly, there is no shared understanding of what a modal or amodal format amounts to. Both camps recognize that the (...) two formats play essential roles in higher cognition, leading to an increasing number of hybrid proposals. In this paper, I argue that the existence of those fundamental problems should make us suspicious about a modal/amodal dichotomy. Also, I suggest that hybrid approaches, as they currently stand, do not provide suitable solutions to the impasse. Instead, we should overcome the dichotomy and treat the modal/amodal distinction as a graded phenomenon. I illustrate this hypothesis with an example of a cognitive-computational model of concepts based on the Predictive Processing framework. (shrink)

The focus of this article is a question that has been neglected in debates about digitalization: Could machines replace human scientists? To provide an intelligible answer to it, we need to answer a further question: What is it that makes (or constitutes) a scientist? I offer an answer to this question by proposing a new demarcation criterion for science which I call “the discoverability criterion”. I proceed as follows: (1) I explain why the target question of this article is important, (...) and (2) show that it leads to a variant of the demarcation problem of science. (3) By arguing that it is probably an essential feature of science that we can make scientific discoveries, I suggest a novel way of dealing with this problem by proposing a new demarcation criterion. Before introducing it, (4) I analyze an exemplary case of a real scientific discovery, and (5) argue that scientific discovery processes have a general underlying structure. (6) I introduce my discoverability criterion for science and present my master argument that helps us understand which criteria have to be fulfilled in order to decide whether machines can replace human scientists or not. (7) I conclude by answering the article’s target question and bringing forward a take-home message. (shrink)

A concept of the ‘actual now’ is introduced. The ‘actual now’ is negatively characterized by the fact that it is absent from the time-series. This does not mean that the ‘actual now’ is outside the time-series. For saying so would wrongly suggest the existence of an ‘outside’ where the ‘actual now’ could be located. Instead, one considers that the ‘actual now’ is just the name of ‘that with respect to which’ any event can be said to be past or future, (...) yet being no event by itself. It holds the same role with respect to time as Husserl’s transcendental ego with respect to the empirical self. McTaggart’s celebrated refutation of the reality of time is reinterpreted accordingly. To express this argument, one no longer needs to use the notions of ‘change’ or ‘time flow’, but only to point out the in-principle impossibility to refer to the ‘actual now’. (shrink)

Having established why and how, he, a sociologist of “social work in action” has sometimes become a historian, or more exactly a social historian, the author presents to us the ins and outs of two research programmes conducted in contrasting and methodological conditions. These involve, on the one hand, studies on the emergence of the maladjusted children sector and the profession of special needs teacher, both quite traditional in their approach, and, on the other hand, an investigation conducted over a (...) long period of time, and even published with the actors concerned, which sought to explore the history of certain family associations founded on the Social Catholicism model. He concludes by emphasising why it is necessary to update his problematisation on a regular basis and by reiterating the need for favourable institutional and professional conditions, to ensure that research does not slide towards a mere exchange of points of view. (shrink)

According to the traditional view, meaning presents itself under the form of some kind of identity.

In Kant, remarkably, and for the first time perhaps in the history of philosophy, the problem of the Ego receives an ontological signification. The critique of the paralogisms of rational psychology concerns, explicitly, this fundamental problem of the being of the ego. Kant’s examination of this problem constitutes an essential moment of the history of modern philosophy. This examination results finally in the complete failure to determine such a being, a failure that Kant attempts to pass off ultimately as a (...) metaphysical impossibility. This is affirmed constantly through the labyrinthine analysis of the Transcendental Dialectic: what emerges from its difficulties, and obscurities, is that the being of the Ego can be neither determined, nor posited, metaphysically. The conclusion is unquestionably the following: the ego cogito does not contain in itself any sum, at least if, by the latter, one intends, as does rational psychology, the metaphysical and, in some way, absolute being of the ‘I’. (shrink)

Political participation in Belgium is analysed according to two types of political participation : conventional participation and protestation, measured by a Guttman scale. The study describes the two types of political participation in the different regions in Belgium: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. A comparaison with some western countries is made. Political participation in Belgium is weak. It depends on the regional division and the sociological characteristics. Moreover, political participation is linked to the Belgian traditionnal clivages.