Si les maux qui frappent l'ensemble de la biosphère ne font que s'aggraver, ce n'est pas que l'effet de l'empire de la marchandise et de l'avidité du capitalisme. La volonté de toute-puissance - et le cortège de destructions qu'elle engendre - est plus ancienne et plus tenace : elle commence avec les monuments géants que conçurent des civilisations au Ille millénaire avant notre ère, pour y loger des dieux inventés pour justifier leurs ambitions. Si nous voulons faire exister un humanisme (...) écologique, au lieu de nous leurrer avec la croissance verte et autres trompe-l'oeil, nous devons combattre les idéologies de "l'exception humaine" - spiritualistes ou matérialistes - et la rage de posséder et de spolier qui se répand comme une épidémie mondiale. Si nous voulons protéger et mettre en valeur notre bien commun - la Terre et tous ses habitants -, nous devons engager une profonde réforme de nos croyances, de nos institutions et de nos modes de vie, en commençant par trouver notre véritable place au sein de la Nature. (shrink)

Ce livre, composé de douze épisodes, qui peuvent être lus chacun pour soi, a été conçu – et en bonne partie « test頻 en groupe – pour aider le lecteur à entrer dans le cercle des amis de Spinoza.

Context: Varela’s neurophenomenology was conceived from the outset as a criticism and dissolution of the “hard problem” of the physical origin of consciousness. Indeed, the standard (….

This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, I (...) defend the thesis that cognitive experts should be identified by their ability to perform the latter function rather than the former, as novice-oriented accounts, unlike research-oriented ones, fail to comply with the rules of a functionalist approach to expertise. (shrink)

As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development, measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, i.e., the problem of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically misinterpreted.

ABSTRACT This article aims to add an important new dimension to the historical scholarship on early socialism by analysing the Saint-Simonian encounter with Owenism during the first decades of the nineteenth century. The article shows how the Saint-Simonian interpretation of Owenism was shaped by the manner by which the Saint-Simonians disseminated their doctrine. It draws on a number of neglected texts to show what the Saint-Simonians drew from Owen’s work and how they set out to distinguish themselves from Owen and (...) his French followers. The article focuses on key Saint-Simonian publications, including Le Globe and those edited by women members of the movement, Jeanne-Désirée Veret and Marie-Reine Guindorf’s La Tribune des femmes, and its early iterations. The article shows in detail the extent to which the Saint-Simonians saw Owen’s work as threatening to their cause, and how they formulated a thoroughgoing critique of it. (shrink)

Nous publions une inscription connue à Délos depuis le début des années 1990, à la suite de travaux menés par l’École française d’Athènes dans la zone du Portique des Naxiens. La pierre, mise au jour par Alexandre Farnoux, et connue des spécialistes d’épigraphie délienne, est restée inédite jusqu’à ce jour, malgré des mentions ponctuelles dans la bibliographie. Le décret pour Apollônidès de Chersonèsos rejoint le corpus des décrets de la cité indépendante et réactive la question des relations entre Délos et (...) les cités du Pont-Euxin, déjà bien représentées dans le paysage des honneurs déliens. (shrink)

With this profound final work, completed in the days leading up to his death, Michel Serres presents a vivid picture of his thinking about religion—a constant preoccupation since childhood—thereby completing Le Grand Récit, the comprehensive explanation of the world and of humanity to which he devoted the last twenty years of his life. Themes from Serres's earlier writings—energy and information, the role of the media in modern society, the anthropological function of sacrifice, the role of scientific knowledge, the problem (...) of evil—are reinterpreted here in the light of the Old Testament accounts of Isaac and Jonah and a variety of Gospel episodes, including the Three Wise Men of the Epiphany, the Transfiguration, Peter's denying Christ, the Crucifixion, Emmaus, and the Pentecost. Monotheistic religion, Serres argues, resembles mathematical abstraction in its dazzling power to bring together the real and the virtual, the natural and the transcendent; but only in its Christian embodiment is it capable of binding together human beings in such a way that partisan attachments are dissolved and a new era of history, free for once of the lethal repetition of collective violence, can be entered into. (shrink)

Etrange parcours que celui du Logos qui, de Heraclite a nos jours, tend a s'effacer, dans ce monde actuel, tout entier voue a la science, au tout numerique. Cette vision heracliteenne de la totalite s'est estompee, transformee qu'elle fut deja des les premiers siecles de notre ere dans sa postulation religieuse, puis dans la modernite, et s'est perdue dans un monde ou, science et technique prenant leur envol, l'homme avait comme horizon de " devenir comme maitre et possesseur de la (...) Nature ". Michel Blay analyse cet etat qui nous laisse de plus en plus en desherence ; et dans un monde ou " Dieu est mort, et c'est nous qui l'avons tue ", comment ne pas sombrer dans cette illusion d'un homme tout-puissant, dans lequel meme le psychique est traite a l'aune des neuro-sciences ou l'homme a perdu sa completude et ne pense meme plus a la chercher? Ne serait-ce pas la poesie, elle seule, " dans ces temps de detresse " qui offrirait une voie pour retrouver sa voix? Certes " Il n'y a pas de paradis " nous dit Andre Frenaud. " Etait-ce l'aube, ou le soir deja perce? Qu'avions-nous espere que nous allons cherchant? ". (shrink)

These thirteen lectures on the 'punitive society,' delivered at the Collège de France in the first three months of 1973, examine the way in which the relations between justice and truth that govern modern penal law were forged, and question what links them to the emergence of a new punitive regime that still dominates contemporary society. Praise for Foucault's Lectures at the Collège de France Series “Ideas spark off nearly every page...The words may have been spoken in [the 1970s], but (...) they seem as alive and relevant as if they had been written yesterday.”—Bookforum “Foucault is quite central to our sense of where we are...[He] is carrying out, in the noblest way, the promiscuous aim of true culture.”—The Nation “[Foucault] has an alert and sensitive mind that can ignore the familiar surfaces of established intellectual coded and ask new questions...[He] gives dramatic quality to the movement of culture.”—The New York Review of Books. (shrink)

More or less explicitly inspired by the Aristotelian classification of arguments, a wide tradition makes a sharp distinction between argument and proof. Ch. Perelman and R. Johnson, among others, share this view based on the principle that the conclusion of an argument is uncertain while the conclusion of a proof is certain. Producing proof is certainly a major part of mathematical activity. Yet, in practice, mathematicians, expert or beginner, argue about mathematical proofs. This happens during the search for a proof, (...) then when the proof is presented and discussed by experts, and finally when it is taught or used in didactical contexts. (shrink)

Art historians and philosophers often talk about the interpretive significance of titles, but few have bothered with their historical origins. This omission has led to the assumption that an artwork's title is its proper name, since names and titles share the essential function of facilitating reference to their bearers. But a closer look at the development of our titling practices shows a significant point of divergence from standard analyses of proper names: the semantic content of a title is often crucial (...) to the identification, individuation, and interpretation of its associated artwork. This paper represents a first step towards an empirically centred study of our titling practices. I argue that, in order to accept titles as proper names, we must first recognize the social, rather than the referential, function of naming. (shrink)

In the course of his work on optics and electrodynamics in systems moving through the ether, the 19th-century medium for light waves and electric and magnetic fields, Lorentz discovered and exploited the invariance of the free-field Maxwell equations under what Poincaré later proposed to call Lorentz transformations. To account for the negative results of optical experiments aimed at detecting the earth’s motion through the ether, Lorentz, in effect, assumed that the laws governing matter interacting with light waves are Lorentz invariant (...) as well. Like Lorentz, Einstein first encountered the Lorentz transformations in electrodynamics. Unlike Lorentz, for whom the transformation merely provided convenient mathematical substitutions, but like Poincaré, Einstein recognized that the Lorentz-transformed quantities are the measured quantities for the moving observer. More importantly, Einstein recognized that the Lorentz invariance of all physical laws had nothing to do with electrodynamics per se, but reflected the kinematics in a new relativistic space-time, to be named after Minkowski who worked out its geometry a few years later. (shrink)

En contrepoint à son œuvre mathématique et physique — et en relation avec elle — d'Alembert a développé une théorie de la connaissance influencée par Locke et le sensualisme de Condillac, mais centrée avant tout sur une épistémologie de la physique newtonienne. Réaliste, prônant le recours à l'expérience, il est en même temps profondément rationaliste, et même précisément, quoiqu'il s'en défende plutôt, dans la lignée de Descartes, Mais, bien que la Raison soit sa référence fondamentale, à tel point qu'il voudrait (...) fonder sur ses principes les plus évidents toute la science physico-mathématique — c'est-à-dire par excellence la Mécanique —, son programme ne peut être dit cartésien : non seulement il rejette les idées innées, mais il accepte la critique d'une rationalité apparente requise par la considération de faits irréductibles (l'attraction par exemple). Son épistémologie est un réalisme rationnel référé à l'être même de la Nature (la Raison et la Nature se rejoignent en profondeur). C'est en fonction de ces conceptions qu'il accepte ou rejette certaines notions physiques soit ambiguës, soit incertaines. Son rejet du concept de force comme celui de la considération d'une texture intime des corps semblent en faire, par le refus de ce qui ne serait pas directement mesurable, l'annonciateur du positivisme de Laplace et de Comte : une telle interprétation serait inexacte, et d'Alembert considère que la pensée peut parvenir à la connaissance du réel. Si ses conceptions s'élaborent en contrepoint de son activité scientifique, c'est en même temps en lutte et polémique contre la métaphysique, au sein de son engagement philosophique — il est tête de file, avec Voltaire, du « parti philosophique » — et notamment dans l'Encyclopédie. Bien qu'il se réfère, comme Newton, à une Intelligence suprême à l'œuvre dans l'Univers, il n'est pas déiste et affiche bientôt une position sceptique. Sa recherche et son affirmation de l'autonomie des lois de la Nature sont a-thées au sens privatif qui annonce Laplace. Il s'oppose au matérialisme de d'Holbach ou Helvétius, mais il se rapproche peu à peu — et notamment vers 1765, sans doute sous l'influence de Diderot qui rédigea vers cette époque Le rêve de d'Alembert et avec qui il venait de renouer — d'un matérialisme dynamique : mais, ce matérialisme, il ne le professe qu'en privé (essentiellement dans sa correspondance avec Frédéric de Prusse). L'âme est matérielle, et si « le plus simple raisonnement prouve qu'il y a un être éternel » , ce Dieu est matériel, il « n'est que la matière en tant qu'intelligente » , ce qui rejoint la définition du matérialisme donnée par Diderot dans l'Encyclopédie. Toutefois, refusant de se prononcer sur l'en-soi des choses, et sur la nature de la matière elle-même, comme de se définir métaphysiquement, son matérialisme tardif est encore marqué de scepticisme. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the constitutive problems and other several aspects of what a research entitled 'formal epistemology' should be. The interest in this subject has to do with the possibility of reaching a privileged point of view or axis of research - i.e., the 'formal' one - that would allow, a better grasp of the richness and variety of the facts and problems tackled by precise (local) epistemology of theories (for example, in physics). This approach is likely to (...) enable one to hold the main structural lines that organize those theories according to a more com prehensive, unifying and synthetic intelligibilit. By the same token, it would eventually allow a better handling of the changes required in the organization of knowledge, putting emphasis on its main directions, drawing up a rational inventory of this knowledge, and perhaps anticipating others. At first, we deal with the `thought of changes' that no approach of the 'form' can afford to leave aside, since the meaning of this concept is inseparable from the contents that come with constructions and modifications. We examine then the notion of 'epistemic operation' as an instrument to create new forms on the theoretical as well as on the meta-theoretical levels. ln the wake of it, we analyze the characteristics of the form and of the formal, as well as their relationship with the contents of knowledge. We also take the notion of object into account, since it depends upon the decision of a subject and upon conventional choices. We finally inquire about the link between `epistemic operations' as specified above and algorithmic functions for knowledge statements, and emphasize the risk of reductionism that might follow from a naturalistic conception of representation. (shrink)

À travers le cas clinique d’un jeune homme violent, radicalisé politiquement aux thèses de l’ultra-droite et suivi en psychothérapie à raison de deux fois par semaine pendant près de deux ans, l’article aborde les questions de la radicalisation à travers le prisme de l’effondrement du sentiment de continuité d’être. Ce sentiment s’effondre plus particulièrement au moment de son adolescence du fait d’une histoire traumatique démaillante affectant ses contenants individuels, familiaux et collectifs réactivant ainsi ses angoisses primitives de désunification corporelle. Ce (...) jeune trouvera dans le modèle de la filiation narcissique un « maillage » de substitution pour faire face à ces angoisses primitives. (shrink)

Most states are multination states, and most peoples are stateless peoples. Just as collectives can behave as sovereign states only if they are recognized by the international community, liberal multination states must recognize stateless peoples in order to determine their political status within that state. There is, however, no agreement on the kind of principles that should be considered, especially under classical liberalism, which gives individuals preeminence over groups. Liberal theories that attempt to accommodate collective rights are often based on (...) a comprehensive version of liberalism that subscribes to moral individualism. Within such a framework, they develop a watered-down concept of collective rights. In A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour explores the theoretical resources of John Rawls’s political liberalism and shows that this particular approach can accommodate genuine collective rights. By Rawls’s account, Seymour explains, peoples are moral agents and sources of valid moral claims and are therefore entitled to collective rights. These kinds of rights translate, in the constitution of the multination state, to a true political recognition for stateless peoples. Ultimately, A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights answers three important questions: Who is the subject of collective rights? What is the object of collective rights? And can they be institutionalized in real politics? (shrink)

According to the traditional view, meaning presents itself under the form of some kind of identity.

Rather than opposing hermeneutics and pragmatism, this contribution, without denying their differences, aims to lay the foundations of a pragmatist hermeneutics by taking the relationship between meaning and experience as a common thread. The challenge is to analyze this relationship from three distinct angles: immediate experience (and spontaneous understanding), acquired experience (and pre-understanding) and creative experience (and interpretation). From each of these perspectives, the aim is to grant a meaningful place to non-verbal – and specifically bodily – experience, which calls (...) for a somahermeneutics. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraassen’s views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation. Secondly, I argue that the so-called “semantic” or “model-theoretic” construal of theories does not give proper due to the (...) role played by true propositions in successful representing practices. Thirdly, I attempt to show that the force of van Fraassen’s pragmatic - and antirealist - “dissolution” of the “loss of reality objection” loses its bite when we realize that our cognitive contact with real phenomena is achieved not by representing but by expressing true propositions about them. (shrink)