It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

In his 1935 treatise on divine sovereignty, the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber introduced the idea of an 'anarchic soul of theocracy.' A decade before, the German jurist Carl Schmitt had coined the term 'political theology' in order to designate the Christian theological foundations of modern sovereignty and legal order. In a specular and opposite gesture, Buber argued that the covenant at Sinai established YHWH as the King of the Israelites and simultaneously promulgated the principle that no human being could become (...) sovereign over this people. In so doing, Buber offered an interpretation of Jewish theocracy that is both republican and anarchic. Republican because, by pivoting on the idea that democracy is a function of a people's fidelity to a prophetic higher law, theocracy displaces the central role of the human sovereign. Anarchic because this divine law is saturated with the messianic aim to put an end to relations of domination between peoples. In this book I show that this republican and anarchic articulation of the discourse of political theology characterises the development of Jewish political theology in the 20th century from Hermann Cohen to Hannah Arendt. (shrink)

The paper argues that the large extent of disinformation has increased the number of deaths from coronavirus due to the proliferation of hoaxes spread via digital tools and media. It is noted that this problem could worsen in the post-COVID society and as such should be understood as having significant political import. Moreover, the phenomenon of disinformation has raised ethical questions around how to actively prevent deaths indirectly caused by hoaxes, as well as epistemological questions around maintaining criteria of truthfulness.

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can result only from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behaviour but its stable (...) fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers’ fading qualia argument falls into it. (shrink)

Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...) theories in the first section. Section 2 offers empirical evidence to the effect that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report depends on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: dlPFC is the neural correlate of HOTs. Section 3 shows the evidence we have of the deactivation of this brain area during dreams and, in section 4, I present my argument. Finally, I consider and rejoin two possible replies that my opponent can offer: the possibility of an alternative neural correlate of HOTs during dreams and the denial that we have phenomenally conscious experiences during sleep. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

Selon l'opinion du jour, Hannah Arendt serait connue et reconnue pour avoir élaboré sur des grandes philosophies politiques du temps présent. Cette appréciation a pour défaut d'occulter l'hostilité déterminée d'Hannah Arendt à ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler "philosophie politique". Hannah Arendt a explicitement avoué qu'elle prenait toujours soin de mentionner l'opposition qui existe entre philosophie et politique. De là, sinon l'ouverture d'un réquisitoire, tout au moins la mise en lumière de ce qui fait obstacle à une fusion harmonieuse entre philosophie (...) et politique. (shrink)

This essay proposes a new reading of Cohen’s polemical text, Germanism and Judaism. It argues that the development of Cohen’s late philosophy reveals him not as a helpless philosopher overwhelmed by the maelstrom of a world war, but as an “engaged” thinker who carries forward what he takes to be philosophy’s duty to struggle against war by going to “war” in the space of theory and culture. Cohen’s text needs to be placed in the context of his other wartime writings (...) which, on the one hand, assigned a new and more radical function to messianic Judaism within his ethics, and simultaneously transplanted his neo-Kantianism into the more “realistic” political philosophies of Plato and of Spinoza, respectively. This essay argues that the thought of the later Cohen does not break with his previous commitments to cosmopolitanism and social democracy, as much as it tries to confront the harsh realities of European nationalist and anti-Semitic politics by articulating the roles of philosophy and of Judaism in modernity no longer through a strictly idealistic and cosmopolitan optic. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se aborda la discusión acerca de la influencia de Nietzsche en el pensamiento transhumanista. El artículo sostendrá la tesis que no hay semejanzas estructurales entre ambas líneas de pensamiento. El principal argumento que respalda esta idea radica en que Nietzsche, a diferencia del transhumanismo, que plantea una mejora de la condición humana por medios tecnológicos con fines hedonistas, propone una superación del hombre de carácter moral por medio del superhombre y del pensamiento del eterno retorno.

We show that certain type of tree forcings, including Sacks forcing, increases the covering of the strong measure zero ideal \. As a consequence, in Sacks model, such covering number is equal to the size of the continuum, which indicates that this covering number is consistently larger than any other classical cardinal invariant of the continuum. Even more, Sacks forcing can be used to force that \<\mathrm {cov}<\mathrm {cof}\), which is the first consistency result where more than two cardinal invariants (...) associated with \ are pairwise different. Another consequence is that \ in ZFC where \ denotes Marczewski’s ideal. (shrink)

Rawls and Schmitt are often discussed in the literature as if their conceptions of the political had nothing in common, or even referred to entirely different phenomena. In this essay, I show how these conceptions share a common space of reasons, traceable back to the idea of public reason and its development since the Middle Ages. By analysing the idea of public reason in Rawls and in Schmitt, as well as its relation to their theories of political representation, I show (...) in what way Schmitt's concept of the political cannot be divorced from an idea of justice, while, conversely, Rawls' conception of justice cannot be divorced from a theory of the political. In that way this paper thematizes the internal relation that each theory establishes between justice and power, deliberation and decision, and consensus and disagreement. (shrink)

This essay suggests that atheists endorse a range of naturalistic beliefs, such as belief in progress and in science. Social-psychological evidence for this belief replacement hypothesis, where naturalistic beliefs take the place of supernatural ones, is reviewed. Atheists seem to implicitly use their naturalistic beliefs to alleviate feelings of uncertainty, anxiety and stress, a psychological function which, until recently, had only been reported for religious beliefs. The second part of the essay focuses on motivational implications of being an atheist. Here, (...) it is argued that atheists are particularly driven by a desire for self-mastery and, secondarily, by a sensation seeking need to engage in intense and pleasurable activities. A number of sociological, social-psychological, narrative, and sexual-behavioural studies are reviewed to support this idea. The essay concludes by highlighting the human need to believe and the importance of studying the process, rather than the content, of beliefs. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explore the foundations of a general theory of technical culture, based on the notion of technical system and on the scientific concept of culture. To this end, several basic notions of the philosophy of technique, as technique, technology and technical system, are defined. Then, a distinction is proposed between cultural elements embodied in technical systems, and elements of technical culture which are not embodied in technical systems. Finally, a general view of the impact (...) of cultural factors in technical change is drawn. (shrink)

As the contemporary heirs of popular music or cinema, computer games are gradually taking over the mar-kets of entertainment. Much like cinema and music, computer games are taking the spotlight in another front – that which blames them for encouraging unethical behaviors. Apparently, computer games turn their users into blood thirsty zombies with a computer game learnt ability of aiming with deadly precision. The goal of this paper is to pay attention to the ethical nature of computer games, in order (...) to understand better the ways we can evaluate their morality in western cultures providing a framework to understand some of these concerns. This paper poses questions about the ontology of games and their ethical meaning, in an attempt to give ethical theory a word in the analysis of computer games. (shrink)

El estudio acerca de la influencia de las pasiones en el voluntario libre ha sido recurrente en la tradición tomista. Sin embargo, las causas de los dos efectos psicológicos de la intentio volitiva mencionados por Tomás de Aquino, la redundantia y la distractio, pasaron desapercibidas, y podrían aclarar algunos comportamientos consecuencia de la dinámica de las pasiones del hombre. La acción de la intentio volitiva originada por los afectos, al alcanzar cierto grado de intensidad, puede llegar a sobrepasar el control (...) de la voluntad y la inteligencia. Además, otro punto original de esta temática es que, a la par que el influjo de “abajo hacia arriba” (pasiones hacia la voluntad) —algo ya mencionado por Aristóteles cuando habla de la intemperancia y por los medievales en el estudio de la voluntad—, también puede detectarse otro de “arriba hacia abajo” (influjos afectivos superiores que influyen en la inteligencia —conocimiento afectivo⎯ y ésta sobre la voluntad), de tal manera que cierto tipo de concentraciones psicológicas hacen que la persona deje de tener sensaciones somáticas hasta producirse en él evasiones temporales, trances inconscientes y efectos extremos similares. Finalmente, desde el punto de vista de la Historia de la Filosofía, este trabajo también muestra que ha habido un olvido en el estudio de esta faceta volitiva de la intentio, ya que se ha estudiado sobre todo su aspecto ético, pero sin relación con la intentio cognoscitiva (“intencionalidad”). En cualquier caso, las tesis sobre la intentio y sus efectos muestran cómo es preciso rebasar el estudio del ámbito natural-biológico para completarlo con el ámbito personal-cultural. (shrink)

Donald Davidson suggested that, in attempting to give meaning theories, we should proceed via giving truth theories. For the programme of truth-theoretic semantics to be successful, two tasks need to be accomplished. First, it has to be shown that natural languages are actually amendable to truth theoretic treatment. The second task is to show how we can bridge the gap between a truth theory and a genuine meaning theory. This second task is necessitated by the simple fact that truth theories (...) by themselves are too weak to satisfy the central desideratum for a meaning theory. In a recent paper, Greg Ray suggests that the goal of giving meaning theories can easily be achieved, not by supplementing the truth-theoretic apparatus, but by doing away with it altogether. In particular, he proposes that what he calls means-that theories meet all the desiderata on meaning theories, and that ‘anyone with basically Davidsonian commitments must accept the means-that approach as viable and that it has certain evident virtues’. This paper argues that theories along Ray's lines do not satisfy the central desideratum for meaning theories. Ray's belief to the contrary rests on a common misunderstanding of what this desideratum amounts to. As I indicate in the final section of the paper, there perhaps is a way of substantially amending Ray's approach in order to meet the central desideratum. However, in an ironic twist, this will require giving a full-fledged truth theory for the metalanguage, including its intensional constructions like ‘means that’ – precisely the project Ray attempted to avoid. (shrink)

En 1968 Raquel Carson comenzaba una revolución en el pensamiento, quizá una de las de mayor peso en la actualidad. En su libro "La primavera silenciosa" acusaba del deterioro ambiental al poder ilimitado del ser humano. La creencia surgida en la modernidad de que todo lo que el hombre decidía era en sí mismo lo mejor por haber sido fruto de una voluntad libérrima, daba primacía y legitimidad absoluta a su acción sobre la naturaleza. Surgieron con gran fuerza numerosos grupos (...) ecologistas que adoptaron un pensamiento que responde al nombre de "ecología profunda" o "Deep Ecology" descrito por primera vez por Arme Naess en un artículo publicado por la revista Inquiry y titulado "The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement". Los principios que proponía este movimiento (Naess 1984) pueden ser resumidos en ocho grandes puntos: 1) la vida de los seres no humanos es un valor en sí: 2) la riqueza y la diversidad de estas formas de vida son también valores en sí; 3) los seres humanos no pueden intervenir de manera destructiva en la vida; 4) a este respecto, la intervención humana actual es eminentemente excesiva; 5) por consiguiente, las reglas de juego deben ser radicalmente modificadas; 6) esta modificación radical debe hacerse tanto a nivel de las estructuras económicas como de las estructuras ideológicas y culturales; 7) a nivel ideológico, el cambio principal consiste en apreciar más la calidad de la vida que el goce de los bienes materiales; 8) las personas que acepten estos principios tienen la obligación de contribuir, directa o indirectamente a la realización de los cambios fundamentales que aquellos implican. (shrink)

Many Christian thinkers have embraced the notion “art for art’s sake.” Chesterton did not. To the contrary, he saw such an idea as deeply problematic for a Christian aesthetic. In the following article, I will explore some philosophical aspects of the “art for art’s sake” movement and then explain why Chesterton parted company with it.

Should we be allowed to refuse any involvement of artificial intelligence technology in diagnosis and treatment planning? This is the relevant question posed by Ploug and Holm in a recent article in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy. In this article, I adhere to their conclusions, but not necessarily to the rationale that supports them. First, I argue that the idea that we should recognize this right on the basis of a rational interest defence is not plausible, unless we are willing (...) to judge each patient’s ideology or religion. Instead, I consider that the right must be recognized by virtue of values such as social pluralism or individual autonomy. Second, I point out that the scope of such a right should be limited at least under three circumstances: if it is against a physician’s obligation to not cause unnecessary harm to a patient or to not provide futile treatment, in cases where the costs of implementing this right are too high, or if recognizing the right would deprive other patients of their own rights to adequate health care. (shrink)

It has been widely acknowledged that indexical thought poses a problem for traditional theories of mental content. However, recent work in philosophy has defied this received view and challenged its defenders not to rely on intuitions but rather to clearly articulate what the problem is supposed to be. For example, in “The Inessential Indexical”, Cappelen and Dever claim that there are no philosophically interesting or important roles played by essential indexical representations. This paper assesses the role of essential indexicality in (...) understanding the content of perception and argues that, if the perceptual experiences of different subjects can have the same phenomenology, and thus share a representational content (phenomenal content)—assumptions shared by a well-established research project, including a wide variety of theories—, then phenomenal content exhibit a particular kind of essential indexicality (perspectival). I also discuss how the argument is immune to Cappelen and Dever’s objections to the idea that the content of perceptual experiences is essentially indexical. (shrink)

Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the principles (...) to give up on the other. (shrink)

La presente nota crítica del libro de Juan Comesaña Being Rational and Being Right se divide en tres secciones. La sección I describe las caracteristicas fundamentales del “Experiencialismo”, que es la teoría de la racionalidad básica desarrollada y defendida a lo largo del libro; la sección II indica brevemente el contenido de los capítulos; y la sección III articula y discute una cuestión problemática acerca de cómo el Experiencialismo interactúa con el debate liberalismo/conservadurismo en la teoría de la justificación.

Donald Davidson contributed to the discussion of logical form in two ways. On the one hand, he made several influential suggestions on how to give the logical forms of certain constructions of natural language. His account of adverbial modification and so called action-sentences is nowadays, in some form or other, widely employed in linguistics (Harman (forthcoming) calls it "the standard view"). Davidson's approaches to indirect discourse and quotation, while not as influential, also still attract attention today. On the other hand, (...) Davidson provided a general account of what logical form is. This paper is concerned with this general account. Its foremost aim is to give a faithful and detailed picture of what, according to Davidson, it means to give the logical form of a sentence. The structure of the paper is as follows. (1) I will first informally introduce a notion of logical form as the form that matters in certain kinds of entailments, and indicate why philosophers have taken an interest in such a notion. (2) The second section develops constraints that we should arguably abide by in giving an account of logical form. (3) I then turn to Davidson’s view of what is involved in giving such an account. To this end, I will try to reconstruct Davidson’s view of the connection between an assignment of logical forms, a truth theory and a meaning theory. (4) Finally, I will briefly discuss possible problems of Davidson’s account as developed in this paper. (shrink)

En la Ciencia de la lógica, Hegel toma distancia del sistema axiomático por diversas razones. En el presente trabajo, me propongo estudiar dichas razones y evaluar qué podemos aprender sobre la Lógica en función de esta discusión con la axiomática. Mostraré que Hegel toma distancia de la axiomática por (1) el carácter relativo de sus axiomas; (2) el carácter unidireccional de su inferencia; (3) el carácter limitado de la forma judicativa; (4) la arbitrariedad de sus definiciones y la suposición de (...) la dicotomía forma y contenido. Todo esto mostrará la inadecuación del método axiomático para la Lógica y revelará que la autoindagación de la razón exige suponer un condicionamiento multidireccional que evite el regreso al infinito y que permita pensar lo absoluto bajo una dinámica no lineal; además se advertirá la necesidad de recurrir a la forma del silogismo así como admitir una codeterminación de forma y contenido. (shrink)

El Autor diseña una posible cartografía del pensamiento del filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein; para ello parte de una posición en el espacio, la que le sitúa en medio de dos tradiciones perfectamente diferenciadas en el interior de una biblioteca (la acreditada, grandiosa y divertida librería Macmillan de la ciudad de Londres): Estantes de Filosofía Analítica (del entorno Anglosajón), de Filosofía Continental (la de la Vieja Europa) y, en medio de ambos, las obras de Wittgenstein.

The different “postmodern” philosophies that arose from the 1970s to the 1990s have often been considered as a kind of irrationalist-skeptical-relativist “ideology” or assorted amalgam, which in our time would dangerously take over the philosophical academy and western cultures, with grave risk for universalist or simply rationalist projects. Nevertheless, as the title of this article shows, a closer examination of some trends of postmodern thought would be able to perceive that they not only are uncomfortable with the label “relativist,” “irrationalist” (...) or “skeptical,” but also that they offer substantial arguments against, for example, the main theses of relativism. Naturally, none of these trends has any qualms about abominating universalism as well (the presumed mortal enemy of the relativists). Thus the most sensible conclusion would be that what really seems erroneous to authors such as those we shall approach here is the presumed dilemma (presented as inevitable) between relativism and universalism (it is curious that, at least as far as faith in the existence of such a dichotomy is concerned, these presumed irreconcilable enemies, which both the relativists and the universalists believe themselves to be, are plainly in agreement). Only if they subscribe to such a rejection of this dilemma could it be explained that important thinkers of the heterogeneous postmodern group (such as those whom I propose to have a dialogue with in this article) have scorned, on the one hand, any and all universal project of rationality, but have also strongly disallowed relativist proposals (just as, naturally, they have likewise taken advantage of the issue to deny their presumed adherence to relativism as such). This idea, however, has not been understood by a large part of the scholars involved today in epistemology and practical philosophy (the two philosophical specialties in which one most frequently faces the question of relativism). To approach this understanding, therefore, perhaps it would not be amiss to review the different arguments that some postmodern thinkers use against relativism. Specifically, we shall tale a look at the reasoning in this sense that has come from Gianni Vattimo (1936), Paul K. Feyerabend (1924-1994), and Richard Rorty (1931). All of them have too often had to suffer from the suspicion of being considered as relativists. To absolve philosophers such as these from such an accusation seems to be a sine qua non condition for understanding their true position towards the universalism versus relativism dilemma. (shrink)

Relativamente al margen de los debates filosóficos de la ética contemporánea, ha ido imponiéndose paulatinamente en el lenguaje y el corpus jurídico internacionales una visión intuitiva y genérica del concepto de «humanitarismo» con pretensiones de normatividad. El artículo procura descifrar las presuposiciones teóricas de este nuevo ideal moral intuitivo analizando la noción de «humanidad» que hace allí las veces de instancia de apelación moral y discutiendo el problema concerniente a la tipificación de ciertos actos como «crímenes contra la humanidad». Proyecta (...) finalmente el análisis hacia la posibilidad de incluir entre estos actos lesivos a la humanidad la existencia de la pobreza extrema en el mundo. (shrink)

En este artículo me propongo revisar en qué medida cabría atribuir a Wittgenstein la responsabilidad de haber propiciado un «giro retórico» con sus inquisiciones filosóficas, correlativo al giro más general, en el mismo sentido, que, según recientemente se ha venido reconociendo, habría sufrido nuestra cultura en los últimos tiempos. Dado que cabe leer la obra de Wittgenstein como si una de sus más pujantes preocupaciones consistiese en dilucidar qué debemos entender hoy por racionalidad, el mentado «giro retórico», de haberse cumplido (...) en él, podría leerse como algo que atañe cardinalmente a tal cuestión. Explicaremos primeramente, pues, en qué consiste efectuar un giro retórico en la filosofía acerca de la racionalidad; para trasladarnos posteriormente a sopesar la presencia de tal giro en Wittgenstein (y de Wittgenstein en tal giro). (shrink)

It has been traditionally considered that Quantum Mechanics has two conceptual kinds of problems, namely, those related with local-realism and the so-called measurement problem. That is, the uniqueness of the result when we make a measurement. With the development of what is called generically Quantum Information Theory, a new form of the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism has taken shape.(1) In this paper, we will analyse if this information interpretation is able to clarify these old problems. Although this interpretation seems (...) to be the most promising approach we have, we have reached the conclusion that the answer cannot be given in a positive and clear way yet. (shrink)

Language is an essential tool that shapes human interactions and understanding from birth, blending innate abilities with environmental factors. Oral language is the first form of communication, while written language develops through structured learning. Piaget's theory suggests a strong connection between language development and cognitive growth, with cultural context playing a significant role. Sociolinguistic theory also emphasizes how social and cultural factors influence linguistic interactions, shaping expression in different settings. This study examined the relationship between reading comprehension and cultural identity. (...) A reading test, featuring texts reflecting diverse linguistic and cultural realities, was administered to 120 students in Barranquilla. The test included informal, informational, and literary readings, each tied to specific contexts. The results demonstrated that students more easily understood culturally familiar texts, while unfamiliar contexts posed greater challenges. This suggests that cultural familiarity significantly enhances reading comprehension, while cultural distance can hinder interpretation. The findings highlight the critical role of cultural and linguistic context in reading comprehension. Texts aligned with a reader's cultural experiences improve understanding and retention, pointing to the need for educational approaches that integrate students' cultural backgrounds to enhance learning and motivation. (shrink)

El mundo digital pone en cuestión los conceptos y las categorías fundamentales de la antropología filosófica. Los aspectos definitorios y exclusivos de los seres humanos pierden su vigencia con la aparición de entidades sintéticas que comparten dichas características. En este artículo nos hemos propuesto realizar un análisis filosófico de la antropología digital. Primero, hemos examinado las cuatro estrategias seguidas hasta el momento para dar cuenta de las continuidades ontológicas entre seres humanos y tecnologías. Defendemos que ninguna de ellas resulta convincente (...) por dos razones: las tres primeras reducen la antropología a ontología y la última descarta completamente la dimensión ontológica. Por ello, nos hemos ocupado, en segundo lugar, de desarrollar un nuevo enfoque antropológico que dé cuenta de forma más exitosa del mundo digital, a saber, una concepción estructurista que entienda al ser humano como un ser biopsicosocial abierto a entablar relaciones con otras entidades. Esto nos ha llevado, en tercer lugar, a desarrollar los aspectos relacionales del mundo digital a través del concepto de mediación tecnológica. La noción de información que introducen las nuevas tecnologías media de un modo cualitativamente novedoso nuestra acción y percepción: produce entornos digitales cerrados, inclina a la igualdad informacional e induce dinámicas de descontextualización. Por último, hemos desarrollado las implicaciones epistémicas, la posverdad, y éticas, los cambios tecnomorales, de la mediación tecnológica digital. (shrink)