The debate between the Better and the Worse Argument, between the old and the new education, in Aristophanes’ Clouds, is a scene full of caustic humour and exquisite irony. In this paper we will try to provide a detailed analysis of the linguistic features that characterize these two characters, in order to confront how two clearly opposite linguistic registers are outlined, in line with their confrontation of ideas. In general terms, the Better Argument exhibits a stronger conversational tone than his (...) adversary, a greater inclination to the use of asyndeton in his syntax, more vulgar and abusive terms, a virtual absence of both poetic and paratragic words and certain linguistic innovations and variants of a lesser literary quality. In contrast, the Worse Argument does just the opposite. (shrink)

Is it absurd to believe that, in the absence of bodily continuity, personal identity could be retained? Bernard Williams argued for an affirmative answer to this question partly on the basis of a well-known thought experiment. Some other philosophers, including D. Z. Phillips, have accepted, or appear to have accepted, Williams' conclusion.Yet the argument has the consequence of dismissing as absurd the sorts of reincarnation beliefs which, within their proper contexts, have a meaningful role in the lives of many millions (...) of people. Drawing upon philosophical work by David Cockburn, and also on anthropological studies concerning reincarnation beliefs, this paper questions the extent to which ostensibly meaningful beliefs can be deemed unintelligible in the absence of careful attention to their cultural contexts. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the long-running debate over Thomas Nagel’s claim that, although we cannot conceive of what it is like to be another type of conscious organism , there most certainly is something it is like. Peter Hacker has examined Nagel’s claim from the perspective of Wittgensteinian analysis, and has argued that the claim is conceptually confused: it makes no sense to say there is ‘something it is like’ to be a person, or a bat, or to be oneself, (...) and hence there can be no place for such expressions in our language. While taking seriously Wittgenstein’s approach to the investigation of language, I propose that Hacker has been too hasty in declaring the phrase ‘something it is like’ to be nonsensical. I put forward three distinct, but mutually supportive, arguments to substantiate my proposal. (shrink)

This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought to deny that the B-theory is a (...) (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly should be rejected. (shrink)

Este artículo describe la evolución de los recursos de acogimiento residencial en el contexto del Estado Español, comenzando por la época de la dictadura franquista hasta la actualidad. Explicamos cómo fueron financiados los recursos mediante los cuales se daba ayuda a las personas menores de edad en situación de vulnerabilidad. Asimismo, se analiza la evolución de dichos recursos hasta hoy en día. Estos recursos se han ido profesionalizando a lo largo del tiempo y, hoy en día, dan respuestas especificas a (...) diferentes necesidades de los niños, niñas, adolescentes y jóvenes del territorio histórico de Bizkaia.Recibido. (shrink)

Mikel Burley also responds to Michael Levin's article, (Think 10).

the aim of this paper is to prove that secession is inherently undemocratic. We will review the secessionist arguments: the one that starts from a wrong idea of selfgovernment and the one that starts from liberalism. then, we will oppose objections to both: defending the value of equality; rejecting internal homogeneity claims; picking up Buchanan’s classic objections; and finally, reformulating, with Habermas and Pogge, a concept of self-government in order to deduce that it is not legitimate to draw more boundaries (...) because an ideal democracy would require to eliminate the current borders. (shrink)

The study we report in this article addresses the results of comparing the rhetorical trees from two different languages carried out by two annotators starting from the Rhetorical Structure Theory. Furthermore, we investigate the methodology for a suitable evaluation, both quantitative and qualitative, of these trees. Our corpus contains abstracts of medical research articles written both in Spanish and Basque, and extracted from Gaceta Médica de Bilbao. The results demonstrate that almost half of the annotator disagreement is due to the (...) use of translation strategies that notably affect rhetorical structures. (shrink)

A pesar de ser una de las principales teorías de la justicia, el enfoque de las capacidades no ha abordado las cuestiones de las obligaciones hacia el medio ambiente y las generaciones futuras. Para corregir este problema, Gómez ha presentado ideas valiosas sobre cómo el enfoque podría incorporar estas obligaciones. Aunque las ideas de Gómez representan una meritoria aportación a la literatura sobre el enfoque de las capacidades, en este artículo defiendo que deben completarse con argumentos a favor de la (...) obligación de reducir el sufrimiento extremo. En particular, el enfoque de las capacidades debe defender el veganismo/vegetarianismo, la ayuda a los animales en la naturaleza y la reducción de la superpoblación humana. (shrink)

The recent article “The Prospects of Artificial Consciousness: Ethical Dimensions and Concerns” by Elisabeth Hildt (2023) in the AJOB Neuroscience presents a thorough examination of the ethical imp...

The Dempster–Shafer approach to expressing beliefabout a parameter in a statistical model is notconsistent with the likelihood principle. Thisinconsistency has been recognized for some time, andmanifests itself as a non-commutativity, in which theorder of operations (combining belief, combininglikelihood) makes a difference. It is proposed herethat requiring the expression of belief to be committed to the model (and to certain of itssubmodels) makes likelihood inference very nearly aspecial case of the Dempster–Shafer theory.

The great problem in writing a theory of everything is that it may turn out to be a theory of nothing. Here is how it works. If you develop a theory that only explains some small, simple Thing, then the theory is very strong. It is precise, understandable, and it always works. As you expand the theory to encompass another Thing, it becomes weaker. It may still be precise and understandable, but it is now more complicated, and because it involves (...) two things rather than one, it starts to become conditional. This means that in order for it to work with regard to the second Thing, we may have to take into account something about the first Thing. And so it goes. As the theory covers more and more Things, it becomes less precise, less understandable, and parts need to be added on in order cover multiple contingencies. People who go down this path inevitably come to a critical point, at which their theory has become so precisely complicated that it can barely be understood, and gargantuan efforts become necessary to make it work at all. To resolve this impasse, they have a terminological epiphany. They suddenly find a language (that is, an arcane vocabulary) which confers the appearance of simplicity to the morass they have created. Precision is replaced by undefined terms and relationships, described in forceful but impenetrable prose. Argumentation becomes not an activity of rational thought, but a magical experience in which a swirling array of undefined concepts assembles itself in just the right way to come to whatever conclusion is desired. In the mouth of its inventor the theory does indeed explain everything, but in the ears of the audience it explains nothing. (shrink)

Richard Beardsmore once argued that, although it is possible for atheists and religious believers alike to regard life as a gift, the regarding of one's own death as a gift is open only to the (Christian) believer. I discuss this interesting contention, and argue that, notwithstanding some important differences between the attitudinal possibilities available to atheists and believers in God, there are at least three senses in which an atheist could regard death as a gift. Two of these involve death's (...) being conceived as serving some particular purpose, whereas the third derives from a more pervasive affirmatory attitude to life as a whole. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00852-6.

Should publishing decisions be influenced by the potential for violent reactions?

In this paper, we explore the concept of bearing witness in nursing practice. We examine the description of bearing witness in the nursing literature, particularly that offered by William Cody who suggests that bearing witness results in the limited moral obligation of “true presence.” We then turn to Lorraine Code's work on testimony, drawing parallels between the concepts of testimony and bearing witness. Code suggests that receiving testimony results in a responsibility to respond, and that this is an ethico‐political obligation. (...) We discuss these ideas in relation to a Canadian exemplar of witnessing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada's work to understand and address the historical injustices done to Indigenous peoples in Canada. Here, we focus on the Commission's definition of witnessing and highlight the experience of Shelagh Rogers who served as an honorary witness. As an outcome of our analysis, we suggest that bearing witness in nursing practice is most usefully conceptualized as both a moral and a political obligation. Implications for nursing practice are suggested, including first, the need to critically examine our own understandings of power and privilege in order to authentically bear witness and avoid being complicit in injustice, and second, the concomitant responsibility to take action to challenge injustice once we have borne witness to it. (shrink)

El cine es producto y agente de su tiempo, y los filmes sobre ETA y sus víctimas no son una excepción. Las películas pueden ser una fuente de conocimiento de la realidad social y política presente o pasada: algunas aspiran a recrear un hecho histórico o una época, pero pueden mostrar además –de manera intencionada o no– rasgos del momento histórico de la producción o de la ideología de sus creadores. Al mismo tiempo, los filmes transmiten ideas, valores y representaciones (...) del mundo que pueden influir en el imaginario colectivo. Este artículo explora y muestra esas relaciones a través del análisis de la representación de las víctimas en los primeros largometrajes cinematográficos españoles sobre ETA que vieron la luz entre 1977 y 1981, años de plomo de la organización y de profundo cambio político y social en España. (shrink)

This paper responds to Severin Schroeder's recent charge that Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion contains an ‘unresolved tension’ between three propositions, namely: (1) ‘As a hypothesis, God's existence (&c) is extremely implausible’; (2) ‘Christian faith is not unreasonable’; and (3) ‘Christian faith does involve belief in God's existence (&c)’. I argue as follows: that the first of these propositions has no place in Wittgenstein's thinking on religion; that the second is ill-phrased and should be re-worded as the proposition that ‘Christian faith (...) is neither unreasonable nor reasonable’; and that the third proposition (contrary to what Schroeder seems to assume) tells us nothing about the nature of the objects of religious belief. It follows from my argument that Schroeder has not exposed a tension in Wittgenstein's thoughts on religion. I end with some positive remarks about Wittgenstein's method. (shrink)

Rebirth and the Stream of Life explores the diversity as well as the ethical and religious significance of rebirth beliefs, focusing especially on Hindu and Buddhist traditions but also discussing indigenous religions and ancient Greek thought. Utilizing resources from religious studies, anthropology and theology, an expanded conception of philosophy of religion is exemplified, which takes seriously lived experience rather than treating religious beliefs in isolation from their place in believers' lives. Drawing upon his expertise in interdisciplinary working and Wittgenstein-influenced approaches, (...) Mikel Burley examines several interrelated phenomena, including purported past-life memories, the relationship between metaphysics and ethics, efforts to 'demythologize' rebirth, and moral critiques of the doctrine of karma. This range of topics, with rebirth as a unifying theme, makes the book of value to anyone interested in philosophy, the study of religions, and what it means to believe that we undergo multiple lives. (shrink)

Pour l'homme, initialement publie en 1968, marque un moment important dans l'uvre de Mikel Dufrenne (1910-1995). Reconnu jusqu'alors comme un des grands representants de l'esthetique francaise, le philosophe ouvre avec cet "essai" un nouveau sillon, dans lequel s'inscriront ensuite Art et politique (1974) et Subversion, perversion (1977). Il s'agit pour lui de se tourner vers ses contemporains et de s'expliquer avec eux, de prendre acte de l'avenement du concept de structure dans les sciences humaines et la philosophie, et de (...) contester que cet avenement doive s'accompagner de l'effacement de la figure de l'homme, comme si la mort de l'homme devait succeder a celle de Dieu. Pour l'homme ne represente pas pour autant la defense d'un humanisme belant, car Dufrenne entend temoigner de l'appartenance de l'homme a la Nature. Il propose, selon ses propres termes, "les elements d'une philosophie qui joigne au souci de l'etre le souci de l'homme". (shrink)

Samkhya and Yoga are two of the oldest and most influential systems of classical Indian philosophy. This book provides a thorough analysis of the systems in order to fully understand Indian philosophy. Placing particular emphasis on the metaphysical schema which underlies both concepts, the author aptly develops a new interpretation of the standard views on Samkhya and Yoga. Drawing upon existing sources and using insights from both eastern and western philosophy and religious practice, this comprehensive interpretation is respectful to the (...) underlying spiritual purpose of the Indian systems. It serves to illuminate the relation between the theoretical and practical dimensions of Samkhya and Yoga. The book fills a gap in current scholarship. It will be of interest to those concerned with Indology as well as philosophies in general and their similarities and differences with other traditions. (shrink)

The received wisdom among welfare state scholars is that policy feedbacks render social insurance programs durable. Yet, in the case of Detroit’s municipal bankruptcy, a voting majority of retired city workers accepted a settlement that asked them to waive key legal protections, formally accept gutted medical benefits, trimmed pension benefits, and a new public-private pension financing mechanism. This article synthesizes interactionist theories of loss to introduce the concept of “collective cooling.” I argue that collective cooling helps to establish the limits (...) of policy feedbacks by explaining how a group of retirees’ collective self-understandings were adjusted from that of contractual rights holders to charitable dependents. Key components of this process included: First, seeking to adjust understandings of how pensioners were perceived by powerful outsiders; And, second, seeking to adjust the loss from one that reflected poorly on pensioners to one that did not. Implications are discussed for how people accept unexpected economic losses, especially those imposed by a trusted institution such as an employer or government organization. (shrink)

Con este artículo pretendemos esbozar los fundamentos onto-lógicos esenciales de la propuesta metafísica de Alain Badiou; así como identificar los nexos dialécticos imprescindibles para la elaboración de lo que podemos considerar una metafísica contemporánea de lo múltiple infinito –frente a las clásicas metafísicas dogmáticas de lo Uno y las filosofías de la finitud– que incorpora de un modo dialécticamente inclusivo la matemática de la teoría de conjuntos, en _L’être et l’événement_, y la lógica matematizada de la teoría de categorías, en (...) _Logiques des mondes_. Sin adentrarnos en los pormenores de los conceptos vehiculares necesarios para pensar los procedimientos de verdad de la propuesta de Badiou, veremos cómo las relaciones dialécticas que se establecen a nivel onto-lógico en el interior de esta nueva metafísica concentran toda la historicidad del pensamiento de las correlaciones clásicas ser/aparecer, o ser/ser-ahí, univocidad/equivocidad, objeto/relación, extrínseco/intrínseco, lógica binaria/lógica trascendental y matemática/lógica en el pensamiento filosófico de la relación dialéctica contemporánea entre la teoría de conjuntos y la teoría de categorías. (shrink)

This paper discusses Robin Le Poidevin’s proposal that a commitment to the B-theory of time provides a reason to relinquish the fear of death. After outlining Le Poidevin’s views on time and death, I analyze the specific passages in which he makes his proposal, giving close attention to the claim that, for the B-theorist, one’s life is “eternally real.” I distinguish two possible interpretations of this claim, which I call alethic eternalism and ontic eternalism respectively, and argue, with reference to (...) statements by other B-theroists, that alethic eternalism is the only viable option. I highlight two problems for Le Poidevin’s proposal: firstly, even if alethic eternalism does provide a reason not to fear death, this same reason is available to A-theorists; and secondly, alethic eternalism does not in fact provide such a reason. Having critically assessed possible responses to these problems, I conclude that Le Poidevin’s proposal is unfounded. (shrink)

Recent decades have witnessed a growing interest in narrative both in certain areas of philosophy and in the study of religion. The philosophy of religion has not itself been at the forefront of this narrative turn, but exceptions exist—most notably Eleonore Stump’s work on biblical stories and the problem of suffering. Characterizing Stump’s approach as an apologetic orientation, this article contrasts it with pluralistic orientations that, rather than seeking to defend religious faith, are concerned with doing conceptual justice to the (...) range of possible human perspectives, both religious and nonreligious. By discussing various examples, the article makes a case for narrative philosophy of religion, especially in its pluralistic form. (shrink)

An increasingly common complaint about philosophy of religion—especially, though not exclusively, as it is pursued in the “analytic tradition”—is that its preoccupation with questions of rationality and justification in relation to “theism” has deflected attention from the diversity of forms that religious life takes. Among measures proposed for ameliorating this condition has been the deployment of “thick description” that facilitates more richly contextualized understandings of religious phenomena. Endorsing and elaborating this proposal, I provide an overview of different but related notions (...) of thick description before turning to two specific examples, which illustrate the potential for engagement with ethnography to contribute to an expanded conception of philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Who owns nature? The question could be less important than reducing animal sufferings in nature. It does not matter if nature does not belong to anyone or if it belongs to someone, because in both cases there are limitations, linked with animal welfare, regarding what we should do in nature. Sentient beings have interests that we must take into account when designing environmental policies. Since neither ecosystems nor plants have interests, preserving nature is less important than reducing animal sufferings. The (...) relevant moral issue is, therefore, knowing what happens to sentient animals in nature and developing policies to reduce their sufferings. This implies that we have the moral obligation of intervening in nature with the aim of reducing animal sufferings, so conservationist environmental policies defended by ecologists are morally unacceptable. (shrink)

Calls for decolonization are on the rise in social and academic life, but ‘decolonization’ can mean various things. This article expounds and critically evaluates the programme of conceptual decolonization, chiefly as promulgated in relation to African philosophy by Kwasi Wiredu. The programme involves both resisting the unreflective acceptance of non-indigenous concepts and constructively utilizing indigenous conceptual resources to address philosophical questions. Examining recent objections from Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò and giving particular attention to Wiredu’s treatment of religious concepts, I concur with Wiredu (...) that conceptual decolonization can encourage conceptual enlargement but argue that care is needed to avoid oversimplifying the non-indigenous concepts that are subjected to scrutiny. (shrink)

This article reflects upon the debate, initiated by Bernard Williams in 1973, concerning the desirability of immortality, where the latter expression is taken to mean endless bodily life as a human or humanoid being. Williams contends that it cannot be desirable; others have disputed this contention. I discuss a recent response from Timothy Chappell and attempt to pinpoint the central disagreement between Chappell and Williams. I propose that neither side in the debate has firm grounds for its claims, and then (...) proceed to consider four reasons for suspecting that the whole debate has yet to be placed on a conceptually coherent footing. (shrink)

Pour l'homme, initialement publie en 1968, marque un moment important dans l'uvre de Mikel Dufrenne (1910-1995). Reconnu jusqu'alors comme un des grands representants de l'esthetique francaise, le philosophe ouvre avec cet "essai" un nouveau sillon, dans lequel s'inscriront ensuite Art et politique (1974) et Subversion, perversion (1977). Il s'agit pour lui de se tourner vers ses contemporains et de s'expliquer avec eux, de prendre acte de l'avenement du concept de structure dans les sciences humaines et la philosophie, et de (...) contester que cet avenement doive s'accompagner de l'effacement de la figure de l'homme, comme si la mort de l'homme devait succeder a celle de Dieu. Pour l'homme ne represente pas pour autant la defense d'un humanisme belant, car Dufrenne entend temoigner de l'appartenance de l'homme a la Nature. Il propose, selon ses propres termes, "les elements d'une philosophie qui joigne au souci de l'etre le souci de l'homme". (shrink)

(2013). Andrew Gleeson, A Frightening Love: Recasting the Problem of Evil (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) Philosophical Papers: Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 127-131. doi: 10.1080/05568641.2013.774726.

As with most great works of art, great films are typically amenable to multiple interpretations, and there need be no determinate answer to which interpretation is ‘right’ or even the ‘best’. Yet some interpretations can render a work more compelling—perhaps more morally or religiously deep—than others. And that might be one reason for preferring the interpretation in question. This article focuses on Woody Allen’s "Crimes and Misdemeanors", which has often been construed as an attempt to illustrate the thesis that crime (...) sometimes pays. I call this the unjust reading of the film and contrast it with the just reading. I argue, however, that both these readings presuppose a consequentialist conception of justice that is not the only conception available. Reinterpreted from a perspective of intrinsic justice, the film gains a depth that is unavailable in the light of the other interpretations. (shrink)