Bell inequalities, understood as constraints between classical conditional probabilities, can be derived from a set of assumptions representing a common causal explanation of classical correlations. A similar derivation, however, is not known for Bell inequalities in algebraic quantum field theories establishing constraints for the expectation of specific linear combinations of projections in a quantum state. In the paper we address the question as to whether a ‘common causal justification’ of these non-classical Bell inequalities is possible. We will show that although (...) the classical notion of common causal explanation can readily be generalized for the non-classical case, the Bell inequalities used in quantum theories cannot be derived from these non-classical common causes. Just the opposite is true: for a set of correlations there can be given a non-classical common causal explanation even if they violate the Bell inequalities. This shows that the range of common causal explanations in the non-classical case is wider than that restricted by the Bell inequalities. (shrink)

In the paper it will be shown that Reichenbach’s Weak Common Cause Principle is not valid in algebraic quantum field theory with locally finite degrees of freedom in general. Namely, for any pair of projections A, B supported in spacelike separated double cones ${\mathcal{O}}_{a}$ and ${\mathcal{O}}_{b}$ , respectively, a correlating state can be given for which there is no nontrivial common cause (system) located in the union of the backward light cones of ${\mathcal{O}}_{a}$ and ${\mathcal{O}}_{b}$ and commuting with the both (...) A and B. Since noncommuting common cause solutions are presented in these states the abandonment of commutativity can modulate this result: noncommutative Common Cause Principles might survive in these models. (shrink)

If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical facts of the world. The aim of this paper is to clarify what logical/mathematical facts actually are and how these facts can be accommodated in a purely physical world.

In 2007, a debate took place between Hungarian representatives of the analytic and continental schools of philosophy. Boldizsár Eszes and János T?zsér concluded their article about the history of analytic philosophy by the claim that the only possible method of philosophising is analytic. Answering on behalf of continental philosophers, Tibor Schwendtner approached the topic from the points of view of the sociology of knowledge and academic politics. Tamás Ullmann also defended continental philosophy, emphasizing that it is not vague or unscientific. (...) István Faragó-Szabó, in opposition to the continental position, represented a third, independent point of view. In their answer to Scwendtner, Eszes and T?zsér reject his charges, providing extensive evidence against them. (shrink)

Felicitous underspecification—apparently flawless use of context-sensitive words in contexts where they cannot be assigned unique semantic values—is rather common in ordinary speech. King presents a hypothesis about the mechanism conversational participants employ handling felicitous underspecification, one that fits the rich data he surveys well. I will begin by illustrating how King’s account could be put to use in making sense of what happens in a real life conversation. Then I will point out certain shortcomings of the explanation and offer suggestions (...) about how they might be overcome. (shrink)

Many firms are striving to improve their environmental positions by presenting their environmental efforts to the public. To do so, they are applying green marketing strategies to help gain competitive advantage and appeal to ecologically conscious consumers. However, not all green marketing claims accurately reflect firms’ environmental conduct, and can be viewed as ‘greenwashing’. Greenwashing may not only affect a company’s profitability, but more importantly, result in ethical harm. Therefore, this research extends past greenwashing studies by examining additional influences on (...) and outcomes of perceived greenwashing. To do so, we conducted two studies, an interview study with consumer product and consulting firms, as well as an experiment examining consumers interacting with a company website. For these studies, we used multiple methods, including interviews, questionnaires, and neurophysiological techniques. We found that perceived greenwashing relates not only to environmental and product perceptions, but also to consumers’ happiness while interacting with the website. We also found that website interactivity relates to perceived greenwashing, environmental and product perceptions, and to the amount of interaction with the website. We conclude by discussing managerial and ethical implications for research and practice. (shrink)

A partition $\{C_i\}_{i\in I}$ of a Boolean algebra Ω in a probability measure space (Ω, p) is called a Reichenbachian common cause system for the correlation between a pair A,B of events in Ω if any two elements in the partition behave like a Reichenbachian common cause and its complement; the cardinality of the index set I is called the size of the common cause system. It is shown that given any non-strict correlation in (Ω, p), and given any finite (...) natural number n > 2, the probability space (Ω,p) can be embedded into a larger probability space in such a manner that the larger space contains a Reichenbachian common cause system of size n for the correlation. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Cabbolet argues that the PBR theorem is nonreal since in the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics the entangled measurement used in the derivation of the PBR theorem is nonexisting. However, Cabbolet (1) does not provide any argument for the nonexistence of entangled measurements beyond the incompatibility of the existence of entangled measurements and the existence of $$\psi$$ -epistemic models which we already know from the PBR theorem; and (2) he does not show why it is more (...) reasonable to abandon entangled measurements instead of $$\psi$$ -epistemic models. Hence, the PBR theorem remains intact. (shrink)

I will argue that Kochen-Specker arguments do not provide an algebraic proof for quantum contextuality since, for the argument to be effective, operators must be uniquely associated with measur...

I will argue that the Peres-Mermin square does not necessarily rule out a value-definite (deterministic) noncontextual hidden variable model if the operators are not given a physical interpretation satisfying the following two requirements: (i) each operator is uniquely realized by a single physical measurement; (ii) commuting operators are realized by simultaneous measurements. To underpin this claim, I will construct three hidden variable models for three different physical realizations of the Peres-Mermin square: one violating (i), another violating (ii), and a third (...) one violating both (i) and (ii). (shrink)

Leading scholars in the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics present brand-new papers on a major topic at the intersection of the two fields, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Anyone engaged with this issue in either discipline will find much to reward their attention here. Contributors: Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Michael Glanzberg, Jeffrey C. King, Ernie Lepore, Stephen Neale, F. Recanati, Nathan Salmon, Mandy Simons, Scott Soames, Robert J. Stainton, Jason Stanley, Zoltan Gendler Szabo.

A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition (...) of common-cause. The significance of the difference between common-causes and common common-causes is emphasized from the perspective of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. (shrink)

Let $L = \langle, +, h_q, 1\rangle_{q \in \mathbb{Q}}$ where $\mathbb{Q}$ is the set of rational numbers and $h_q$ is a one-place function symbol corresponding to multiplication by $q$. Then the $L$-theory of Scott's model for intuitionistic analysis is decidable.

Semantic and pragmatic theories tend to deal with context-change in two radically opposing ways. Some view it as theoretically irrelevant, interpreting each sentence relative to the context as it happens to be at the moment of its utterance. Others view it as theoretically fundamental, proposing to view context-change as the very subject-matter of the theory of interpretation. Robert Stalnaker’s book Context steers a middle course between the extremes–to keep the semantics mostly static while letting the pragmatics go mostly dynamic. Within (...) his framework, context-change matters because interpretation is sometimes prospective, relying not on the context as it is at the time of utterance but on the context as it is anticipated to be somewhat later. This paper critically examines how Stalnaker makes use of prospective interpretation in accounting for accommodation and in capturing the insights of expressivism. (shrink)

To what extent and how is conceivability a guide to possibility? This essay explores general philosophical issues raised by this question, and critically surveys responses to it by Descartes, Hume, Kripke and "two-dimensionalists.".

On one standard reading, Plato's works contain at least two distinct views about the structure of the human soul. According to the first, there is a crucial unity to human psychology: there is a dominant faculty that is capable of controlling attention and behaviour in a way that not only produces right action, but also ‘silences’ inclinations to the contrary—at least in idealized circumstances. According to the second, the human soul contains multiple autonomous parts, and although one of them, reason, (...) normatively dominates the others, it may fail to do so descriptively: even in the face of full, explicit, well‐reasoned, conscious awareness of the truth of a claim, a person may continue to feel residual inclinations towards disavowed, inappropriate and misguided experiences and courses of action. In this paper, I will argue that even the second of these views does not fully capture the ways in which reflective commitment fails to guide human action. Whereas the traditional multi‐part soul view is well suited to explaining phenomena that involve a cognitive conflict between our reflective attitudes and our non‐reflective endorsements, it falls short when we turn to the full array of human patterns of response, because it neglects a further source of challenge to reason's rule, namely, the mediation of associative and heuristic processes. These processes introduce complications for which the simple faculty psychology view cannot adequately account. Because they produce challenges to reason's rule that are phenomenologically invisible, traditional strategies for self‐regulation cannot be straightforwardly applied to their management. (shrink)

Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory ‘Russellian’ just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in ‘On Denoting’. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of ‘On Denoting’ are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two (...) claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that ‘The F is G’ entails ‘There is at most one F’; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. I outline an argument against this claim, and I argue that by holding on to uniqueness contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give a sharp definition of Bell's notion of local causality. To this end, first we unfold a framework, called local physical theory, integrating probabilistic and spatiotemporal concepts. Formulating local causality within this framework and classifying local physical theories by whether they obey local primitive causality---a property rendering the dynamics of the theory causal, we then investigate what is needed for a local physical theory, with or without local primitive causality, to be locally causal. (...) Finally, comparing Bell's local causality with the Common Cause Principles and relating both to the Bell inequalities we find a nice parallelism: Bell inequalities cannot be derived neither from local causality nor from a common cause unless the local physical theory is classical or the common cause is commuting, respectively. (shrink)

It is shown that, given any finite set of pairs of random events in a Boolean algebra which are correlated with respect to a fixed probability measure on the algebra, the algebra can be extended in such a way that the extension contains events that can be regarded as common causes of the correlations in the sense of Reichenbach's definition of common cause. It is shown, further, that, given any quantum probability space and any set of commuting events in it (...) which are correlated with respect to a fixed quantum state, the quantum probability space can be extended in such a way that the extension contains common causes of all the selected correlations, where common cause is again taken in the sense of Reichenbach's definition. It is argued that these results very strongly restrict the possible ways of disproving Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. (shrink)

In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called a “Reality Criterion” imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. They concluded that there must be a more complete description of physical reality involving some hidden variables that can characterize the state of affairs in the world in (...) more detail than the quantum mechanical state. This conclusion leads to paradoxical results. -/- As Bell proved in 1964, under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion that there are hidden variables implies that, in some spin-correlation experiments, the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments since the 1970s. -/- Some researchers have interpreted this result as showing that quantum mechanics is telling us nature is non-local, that is, that particles can affect each other across great distances in a time too brief for the effect to have been due to ordinary causal interaction. Others object to this interpretation, and the problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will. (shrink)

A recent analysis by de Barros and Suppes of experimentally realizable GHZ correlations supports the conclusion that these correlations cannot be explained by introducing local hidden variables. We show, nevertheless, that their analysis does not exclude local hidden variable models in which the inefficiency in the experiment is an effect not only of random errors in the detector equipment, but is also the manifestation of a pre-set, hidden property of the particles ("prism models"). Indeed, we present an explicit prism model (...) for the GHZ scenario; that is, a local hidden variable model entirely compatible with recent GHZ experiments. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an introduction to Fine's interpretation of quantum mechanics and to show how it can solve the EPR-Bell problem. In the real spin-correlation experiments the detection/emission inefficiency is usually ascribed to independent random detection errors, and treated by the “enhancement hypothesis.” In Fine's interpretation the detection inefficiency is an effect not only of the random errors in the analyzer + detector equipment, but is also the manifestation of a pre-settled (hidden) property of the (...) particles. I present one of Fine's 2×2 prism models for the EPR experiment and compare it with the recent experimental results. In the second part of the paper I prove the existence of a wide class of n×n prism models with reasonable detection/emission efficiencies, satisfying the usually required symmetries. Contrary to the common persuasion, the efficiencies in these models do not necessarily tend to zero if n→∞. (shrink)

It is a well known fact that a common common causal explanation of the EPR scenario which consists in providing a local, non-conspiratorial common common cause system for a set of EPR correlations is excluded by various Bell inequalities. But what if we replace the assumption of a common common cause system by the requirement that each correlation of the set has a local, non-conspiratorial separate common cause system? In the paper we show that this move does not yield a (...) solution by providing a general recipe how to derive any Bell(δ) inequality—that is an inequality differing from some Bell inequality in a term of order of δ—from the assumption that an appropriate set of almost perfect anticorrelations has a separate common causal explanation. (shrink)

We show that true first-order arithmetic is interpretable over the real-algebraic structure of models of intuitionistic analysis built upon a certain class of complete Heyting algebras. From this the undecidability of the structures follows. We also show that Scott's model is equivalent to true second-order arithmetic. In the appendix we argue that undecidability on the language of ordered rings follows from intuitionistically plausible properties of the real numbers.

We show that true first-order arithmetic of the positive integers is interpretable over the real-algebraic structure of Scott's topological model for intuitionistic analysis. From this the undecidability of the structure follows.

…entities? 2. How to be a nominalist 2.1. “Speak with the vulgar …” 2.2. “…think with the learned” 3. Arguments for nominalism 3.1. Intelligibility, physicalism, and economy 3.2. Causal..

The story of quantum probability theory and quantum logic begins with von Neumann’s recognition1, that quantum mechanics can be regarded as a kind of “probability theory”, if the subspace lattice L of the system’s Hilbert space H plays the role of event algebra and the ‘tr’-s play the role of probability distributions over these events. This idea had been completed in the Gleason theorem 2.

I will argue that the ontological doctrine of physicalism inevitably entails the denial that there is anything conceptual in logic and mathematics. The elements of a formal system, even if they are tagged by suggestive names, are merely meaningless parts of a physically existing machinery, which have nothing to do with concepts, because they have nothing to do with the actual things. The only situation in which they can become meaning-carriers is when they are involved in a physical theory. But (...) in this role they refer to elements of the physical reality, i.e. they represent a physical concept. “Mathematical concepts” are just idols, that philosophy can completely deny and physics can completely ignore. (shrink)

Semantics is the study of linguistic meaning, or more precisely, the study of the relation between linguistic expressions and their meanings. This article gives a sketch of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics; it is the intention of the rest of this article to make it more precise. It starts by considering three alternative characterizations and explain what the article finds problematic about each of them. This leads to the discussion of utterance interpretation, which situates semantics and pragmatics in a (...) larger enterprise. But the characterization of their contrast remains sketchy until the final section, where the article discusses how truth-conditions and the notion of what is said fit into the picture. (shrink)

Over the past decade, Hungary has become a noteworthy example of democratic backsliding, marked by a pronounced shift towards conservative values and traditional gender roles within government policies. This trend, centred around Christian principles, has manifested in political campaigns actively opposing LGBTQ+ rights and the challenging of normative family structure. The resultant media campaigns and policy implementations have ignited extensive public discourse on gender and sexuality, prominently visible on social media platforms. This study conducts a qualitative analysis of the online (...) discussion surrounding the LGBTQ+ children’s book, Fairyland Is for Everyone, to explore the contemporary gender discourse in Hungary. By examining social media comments under Hungarian online news articles, the research identifies three prevailing discursive lenses—heteronormative familism, neocolonialism, and diversity and inclusion—illustrating both the concurrent rise of anti-gender movements and the fortification of LGBTQ+ allyship in Hungary, while also considering broader transnational trends in LGBTQ+ rights and visibility. (shrink)

It will be shown that the Peres–Mermin square admits value-definite noncontextual hidden-variable models if the observables associated with the operators can be measured only sequentially but not simultaneously. Namely, sequential measurements allow for noncontextual models in which hidden states update between consecutive measurements. Two recent experiments realizing the Peres–Mermin square by sequential measurements will also be analyzed along with other hidden-variable models accounting for these experiments.

Standard derivations of the Bell inequalities assume a common-commoncause-system that is a common screener-off for all correlations and some additional assumptions concerning locality and no-conspiracy. In a recent paper Graßhoff et al., "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science", 56, 663–680 ) Bell inequalities have been derived via separate common causes assuming perfect correlations between the events. In the paper it will be shown that the assumptions of this separate-common-cause-type derivation of the Bell inequalities in the case of perfect (...) correlations can be reduced to the assumptions of a common-common-cause-system-type derivation. However, in the case of non-perfect correlations a non-reducible separate-common-cause-type derivation of some Bell-like inequalities can be given. The violation of these Bell-like inequalities proves Szabo's ) conjecture concerning the non-existence of a local, non-conspiratorial, separate-common-cause-model for a δ-neighborhood of perfect EPR correlations. (shrink)

The paper sets out to offer an alternative to the function/argument approach to the most essential aspects of natural language meanings. That is, we question the assumption that semantic completeness (of, e.g., propositions) or incompleteness (of, e.g., predicates) exactly replicate the corresponding grammatical concepts (of, e.g., sentences and verbs, respectively). We argue that even if one gives up this assumption, it is still possible to keep the compositionality of the semantic interpretation of simple predicate/argument structures. In our opinion, compositionality presupposes (...) that we are able to compare arbitrary meanings in term of information content. This is why our proposal relies on an ‘intrinsically’ type free algebraic semantic theory. The basic entities in our models are neither individuals, nor eventualities, nor their properties, but ‘pieces of evidence’ for believing in the ‘truth’ or ‘existence’ or ‘identity’ of any kind of phenomenon. Our formal language contains a single binary non-associative constructor used for creating structured complex terms representing arbitrary phenomena. We give a finite Hilbert-style axiomatisation and a decision algorithm for the entailment problem of the suggested system. (shrink)

In the paper we compare three principles accounting for correlations, namely Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle, Bell's Local Causality Principle, and Einstein's Reality Criterion and relate them to the Bell inequalities. We show that there are two routes connecting the principles to the Bell inequalities. In case of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle and Bell's Local Causality Principle one assumes a non-conspiratorial joint common cause for a set of correlations. In case of Einstein's Reality Criterion one assumes strongly non-conspiratorial separate common causes (...) for a set of perfect correlations. Strongly non-conspiratorial separate common causes for perfect correlations, however, form a non-conspiratorial joint common cause. Hence the two routes leading the Bell inequalities meet. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of an alphabetic trace of a cut-free intuitionistic prepositional proof and show that it serves to characterize the equality of arrows in cartesian closed categories. We also show that alphabetic traces improve on the notion of the generality of proofs proposed in the literature. The main theorem of the paper yields a new and considerably simpler solution of the coherence problem for cartesian closed categories than those in [11, 14].