This symposium on Monique Deveaux’s Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements includes commentaries by Sally Matthews, Renante D. Pilapil, Violetta Igneski, and Wouter Peeters, with a reply from Deveaux. The book makes the case that normative thinking about poverty should engage closely with the aims, insights, and actions of poor-led organizations and social movements. Challenging conventional framings of poverty by moral philosophers, Deveaux argues that chronic poverty is centrally about the subordination and dispossession of the poor – not mere (...) needs scarcity. To exclude people living in poverty from shaping antipoverty solutions is therefore to perpetuate their social-political domination and epistemic oppression. Deveaux’s book explains what a political reframing of poverty looks like from the vantage point of several poor-led organizations and social movements, using concrete examples from across the globe, and argues for political responsibility for solidarity with those movements. (shrink)

Objectives: Recent legislative changes within the United Kingdom have stimulated professional debate about access to patient data within research. However, there is currently little awareness of public views about such research. The authors sought to explore attitudes of the public, and their lay representatives, towards the use of primary care medical record data for research when patient consent was not being sought.Methods: 49 members of the public and four non-medical members of local community health councils in South Wales, UK gave (...) their views on the value and acceptability of three current research scenarios, each describing access to data without patient consent.Results: Among focus group participants, awareness of research in primary care was low, and the appropriateness of general practitioners as researchers was questioned. There was general support for research but also concerns expressed about data collection without consent. These included lack of respect and patient control over the process. Unauthorised access to data by external agencies was a common fear. Current data collection practices, including population based disease registers elicited much anxiety. The key informants were equally critical of the scenarios and generally less accepting.Conclusions: This exploratory study has highlighted a number of areas of public concern when medical records are accessed for research without patient consent. Public acceptability regarding the use of medical records in research cannot simply be assumed. Further work is required to determine how widespread such views are and to inform those advising on confidentiality issues. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic Ł3 is often understood as the set of all valid formulas according to Łukasiewicz 3-valued matrices MŁ3. Following Wojcicki, in addition, we shall consider two alternative interpretations of Ł3: ‘truth-preserving’ Ł3a and ‘well-determined’ Ł3b defined by two different consequence relations on the 3-valued matrices MŁ3. The aim of this article is to provide a Routley–Meyer ternary semantics for each one of these three versions of Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic: Ł3, Ł3a and Ł3b.

Routley-Meyer Ternary Relational Semantics for Intuitionistic-type Negations examines how to introduce intuitionistic-type negations into RM-semantics. RM-semantics is highly malleable and capable of modeling families of logics which are very different from each other. This semantics was introduced in the early 1970s, and was devised for interpreting relevance logics. In RM-semantics, negation is interpreted by means of the Routley operator, which has been almost exclusively used for modeling De Morgan negations. This book provides research on particular features of intuitionistic-type of negations (...) in RM-semantics, while also defining the basic systems and many of their extensions by using models with or without a set of designated points. (shrink)

Theorists often conceive of forgiveness as “wiping the slate clean” or something of the sort with respect to the offender’s moral infraction. This raises a puzzle concerning how (or whether) the relevant wrongdoing can continue to play a role in the forgiver’s deliberations, attitudes, and practical orientation toward the offender once forgiveness has taken place. For example, consider an agent who forgives her offender for an act of wrongdoing only to later blame her again for that very same act. Is (...) the relevant agent morally criticizable for breaching a commitment internal to her earlier forgiveness? When, if ever, is “un- forgiving,” justified? In brief, I argue that sometimes, we can genuinely forgive a wrongdoer for a particular transgression and at some later time, justifiably un-forgive her for it. Though the act of un-forgiving is underexplored, I argue that attending to this phenomenon will not only illuminate an important, often overlooked aspect of moral life, but it will also help to inform extant accounts of the nature and ethics of forgiveness. (shrink)

Increasing privacy concerns are arising from expanding use of aggregated personal information in health practices. Conversely, in light of the promising benefits of data driven healthcare, privacy...

Despite the recent explosion of philosophical literature on forgiveness, relatively few theorists have addressed the possibility of un-forgiving someone for a moral violation. And among those who have addressed the question, “Can we un-forgive?” we find little consensus. In this paper, I consider whether and in what sense forgiveness is rescindable, retractable, or otherwise reversible. In other words, I consider what it might mean to say that a victim who forgave her offender for a particular act of wrongdoing later un-forgave (...) that individual for the very same act. Examining the possibility of un-forgiving positions us to gain richer understandings of both forgiveness and the complexity of navigating moral relationships more broadly. (shrink)

A restriction of R-Mingle with the variable-sharing property and the Ackermann properties is defined. From an intuitive semantical point of view, this restriction is an alternative to Anderson and Belnap’s logic of entailment E.

The role of demographic terminology in the fields of medicine and public health is critical in the identification and allocation of resources to the communities that most benefit from intervention...

(2013). Introduction. Journal of Global Ethics: Vol. 9, Critical Approaches to Global Justice: At the Frontier, pp. 111-114. doi: 10.1080/17449626.2013.818467.

In 2017 and 2018, the English courts were asked to decide whether continued life‐sustaining treatment was in the best interests of three infants: Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans and Isaiah Haastrup. Each infant had sustained catastrophic, irrecoverable brain damage. Dignity played an important role in the best interests assessments reached by the Family division of the High Court in each case. Multiple conceptions of dignity circulate, with potentially conflicting implications for infants such as Charlie, Alfie and Isaiah. The judgements do not (...) explicate the conceptions of dignity upon which they rely. This article reconstructs the conceptions of dignity invoked in these judgements, finding that a broadly Kantian, agential conception dominates, under which human dignity requires the prospect of agency. This conception is situated within the broader body of thought on dignity, and the potentially adverse implications of applying the reconstructed conception in best interests assessments for infants with severely restricted consciousness are discussed. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz three-valued logic Ł3 is often understood as the set of all 3-valued valid formulas according to Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued matrices. Following Wojcicki, in addition, we shall consider two alternative interpretations of Ł3: “well-determined” Ł3a and “truth-preserving” Ł3b defined by two different consequence relations on the 3-valued matrices. The aim of this paper is to provide dual equivalent two-valued under-determined and over-determined interpretations for Ł3, Ł3a and Ł3b. The logic Ł3 is axiomatized as an extension of Routley and Meyer’s basic positive (...) logic following Brady’s strategy for axiomatizing many-valued logics by employing two-valued under-determined or over-determined interpretations. Finally, it is proved that “well determined” Łukasiewicz logics are paraconsistent. (shrink)

A classical result by Słupecki states that a logic L is functionally complete for the 3-element set of truth-values THREE if, in addition to functionally including Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued logic Ł3, what he names the ‘$T$-function’ is definable in L. By leaning upon this classical result, we prove a general theorem for defining binary expansions of Kleene’s strong logic that are functionally complete for THREE.

In this paper, consistency is understood as the absence of the negation of a theorem, and not, in general, as the absence of any contradiction. We define the basic constructive logic BKc1 adequate to this sense of consistency in the ternary relational semantics without a set of designated points. Then we show how to define a series of logics extending BKc1 within the spectrum delimited by contractionless minimal intuitionistic logic. All logics defined in the paper are paraconsistent logics.

La Enciclopedia IberoAmericana de Filosofía es un proyecto de investigación y edición coordinado por el Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Madrid), el Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma (México) y el Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas (Buenos Aires), en el que han colaborado más de 500 especialistas de todos los países pertenecientes a la comunidad filosófica hispanoparlante. El proyecto consta de 35 volúmenes, cada uno de los cuales gira en torno a un tema monográfico, (...) tratado de modo diversificado e interdisciplinar. (shrink)

In a standard sense, consistency and paraconsistency are understood as the absence of any contradiction and as the absence of the ECQ (‘E contradictione quodlibet’) rule, respectively. The concepts of weak consistency (in two different senses) as well as that of F -consistency have been defined by the authors. The aim of this paper is (a) to define alternative (to the standard one) concepts of paraconsistency in respect of the aforementioned notions of weak consistency and F -consistency; (b) to define (...) the concept of strong paraconsistency; (c) to build up a series of strongly paraconsistent logics; (d) to define the basic constructive logic adequate to a rather weak sense of consistency. All logics treated in this paper are strongly paraconsistent. All of them are sound and complete in respect a modification of Routley and Meyer’s ternary relational semantics for relevant logics (no logic in this paper is relevant). (shrink)

As is well known, the variable-sharing property (vsp) is, according to Anderson and Belnap, a necessary property of any relevant logic. In this paper, we shall consider two versions of the vsp, what we label the "weak vsp" (wvsp) and the "strong vsp" (svsp). In addition, the "no loose pieces property," a property related to the wvsp and the svsp, will be defined. Each one of these properties shall generally be characterized by means of a class of logical matrices. In (...) this way, any logic verified by an actual matrix in one of these classes has the property the class generally represents. Particular matrices (and so, logics) in each class are provided. (shrink)

This book offers a persuasive new argument for reconciling the tensions that arise when liberal democratic states try to protect two important kinds of equality: sexual equality and cultural equality.

The logic BN4 can be considered as the 4-valued logic of the relevant conditional and the logic E4, as the 4-valued logic of entailment. The aim of this paper is to endow E4 with a 2-set-up Routley-Meyer semantics. It is proved that E4 is strongly sound and complete w.r.t. this semantics.

This book, now open-access from OUP, develops a normative theory of political responsibility for solidarity with poor populations by engaging closely with empirical studies of poor-led social movements in the Global South. Monique Deveaux rejects familiar ethical framings of problems of poverty and inequality by arguing that normative thinking about antipoverty remedies needs to engage closely with the aims, insights, and actions of “pro-poor,” poor-led social movements. Defending the idea of a political responsibility for solidarity, nonpoor outsiders—individuals, institutions, and (...) states—can help to advance a transformative anti-poverty agenda only by supporting the efforts of these movements. (shrink)

This paper is a sequel to ‘Belnap-Dunn semantics for natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong three-valued matrix with two designated values’, where a ‘bivalent’ Belnap-Dunn semantics is provided for all the expansions referred to in its title. The aim of the present paper is to carry out a parallel investigation for all natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix now with only one designated value.

This article introduces the special issue on questions, questioning, and institutional practices. We begin by considering how questioning as a discursive practice is a central vehicle for constructing social worlds and reflecting existing ones. Then we describe the different ways questions and question have been defined, typologized, and critiqued, in general and within seven institutions including policing, the courts, medicine, therapy, research interviews, education, and mediated political exchanges. The introduction concludes with a preview of the articles in the special issue.

A simple Henkin-style completeness proof for Gödel 3-valued propositional logic G3 is provided. The idea is to endow G3 with an under-determined semantics of the type defined by Dunn. The key concept in u-semantics is that of “under-determined interpretation”. It is shown that consistent prime theories built upon G3 can be understood as u-interpretations. In order to prove this fact we follow Brady by defining G3 as an extension of Anderson and Belnap’s positive fragment of First Degree Entailment Logic.

Xenotransplantation is defined as “any procedure that involves the transplantation, implantation, or infusion into a human recipient of either live cells, tissues, or organs from a nonhuman animal source, or human body fluids, cells, tissues or organs that have had ex vivo contact with live nonhuman animal cells, tissues, or organs.” Xenotransplantation has been viewed by desperate patients and their surgeons as a solution to the problem of the paucity of human organs available for transplantation. Foes of xenotransplantation argue that (...) the use of animal organs degrades the human race and should be avoided.In this paper, we briefly review the cultural context of xenotransplantation and explore the infectious disease risk of xenotransplantation. The United States Code of Federal Regulations requires life-long surveillance of a xenotransplantation recipient due to the largely unknown risk of novel infectious disease transmitted across species, known as xenogeneic infectious disease. We argue that despite being in the interest of protecting the public health, the imposition of lifelong surveillance requirements on xenotransplant recipients effectively abrogates the right to withdraw from a clinical trial after the transplantation has taken place. Moreover, we argue that a waiver of the right to withdraw should be made explicit in the interest of full disclosure, out of respect for the research subject’s right of self-determination. (shrink)

The present paper is a sequel to Robles et al. :349–374, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-019-09306-2). A class of implicative expansions of Kleene’s 3-valued logic functionally including Łukasiewicz’s logic Ł3 is defined. Several properties of this class and/or some of its subclasses are investigated. Properties contemplated include functional completeness for the 3-element set of truth-values, presence of natural conditionals, variable-sharing property and vsp-related properties.

In this paper, consistency is understood in the standard way, i.e. as the absence of a contradiction. The basic constructive logic BKc4, which is adequate to this sense of consistency in the ternary relational semantics without a set of designated points, is defined. Then, it is shown how to define a series of logics by extending BKc4 up to minimal intuitionistic logic. All logics defined in this paper are paraconsistent logics.

In our paper “A general characterization of the variable-sharing property by means of logical matrices”, a general class of so-called “Relevant logical matrices”, RMLs, is defined. The aim of this paper is to define a class of simpler Relevant logical matrices RMLs′serving the same purpose that RMLs, to wit: any logic verified by an RML′has the variable-sharing property and related properties predicable of the logic of entailment E and of the logic of relevance R.

The logic BN4 was defined by R.T. Brady in 1982. It can be considered as the 4-valued logic of the relevant conditional. E4 is a variant of BN4 that can be considered as the 4-valued logic of entailment. The aim of this paper is to define reduced general Routley-Meyer semantics for BN4 and E4. It is proved that BN4 and E4 are strongly sound and complete w.r.t. their respective semantics.

The logic E4 is related to Brady’s BN4 in a similar way to which Anderson and Belnap’s logic of entailment E is related to their logic of the relevant implication R. In ‘A companion to Brady’s 4-valued relevant logic: the 4-valued logic of entailment E4’, quoted in this paper, three alternatives to BN4 and another three to E4 are summarily introduced in a couple of pages as the only alternatives containing Routley and Meyer’s basic logic B, provided some conditions are (...) fulfilled. The aim of this note is to prove BN4 and its three alternatives are the same logic up to some point, since they are functionally equivalent to each other, as it is the case with E4 and its three alternatives, which are also functionally equivalent to each other; to some extent, E4 is superior to BN4, since the latter is functionally included in the former, but not conversely. (shrink)

O artigo aborda o tema da escuta como eixo central de uma abertura existencial que promove a compreensão do outro. É uma questão relevante, uma vez que é amplamente refletida sobre a linguagem e suas possibilidades; no entanto, a escuta tem sido pouco abordada, de modo que permanece em um silêncio discreto que é importante esclarecer. O principal objetivo dessa proposta é ressaltar o valor que a escuta tem para alcançar a compreensão do outro e a construção de relações dialógicas (...) entre os seres humanos. Para isso, faz-se uma jornada descritiva sobre a linguagem e suas características, enfatizando seus dois componentes: a fala e a escuta como um processo inter-relacionado para compreender seu papel na construção da articulação das narrativas entre os seres humanos. Uma parte essencial desse processo é o tempo em que algumas reflexões sobre o tema são feitas para concluir com a questão da escuta, que proporciona a possibilidade de uma abertura existencial que facilita a compreensão do outro. A descrição é feita de forma descritiva, reflexiva e hermenêutica, com o apoio das ideias dos principais autores da Filosofia e de outras disciplinas. As idéias e seus argumentos foram organizados em três temas essenciais: linguagem, tempo e escuta, para concluir, destacando os principais argumentos de cada um dos aspectos considerados na reflexão. (shrink)

Two versions of minimal intuitionism are defined restricting Contraction. Both are defined by means of a falsity constant F. The first one follows the historical trend, the second is the result of imposing specialconstraints on F. RelationaI ternary semantics are provided.

“Weak relevant model structures” (wr-ms) are defined on “weak relevant matrices” by generalizing Brady’s model structure ${\mathcal{M}_{\rm CL}}$ built upon Meyer’s Crystal matrix CL. It is shown how to falsify in any wr-ms the Generalized Modus Ponens axiom and similar schemes used to derive Curry’s Paradox. In the last section of the paper we discuss how to extend this method of falsification to more general schemes that could also be used in deriving Curry’s Paradox.

ABSTRACTA conditional is natural if it fulfils the three following conditions. It coincides with the classical conditional when restricted to the classical values T and F; it satisfies the Modus Ponens; and it is assigned a designated value whenever the value assigned to its antecedent is less than or equal to the value assigned to its consequent. The aim of this paper is to provide a ‘bivalent’ Belnap-Dunn semantics for all natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix with two (...) designated elements. (shrink)

It is not uncommon for philosophers to name disinterestedness, or some like feature, as an essential characteristic of love. Such theorists claim that in genuine love, one’s concern for her beloved must be non-instrumental, non-egocentric, or even selfless. These views prompt the question, “What, if any, positive role might self-interestedness play in genuine love?” In this paper, I argue that attachment, an attitude marked primarily by self-focused emotions and emotional predispositions, helps constitute the meaning and import of at least some (...) kinds of adult reciprocal love. In this way, attachment represents a type of self-interestedness that not only contributes positively to such relationships but is also essential to them. (shrink)

In this dissertation I provide a novel logic of the ordinary-language conditional. First, however, I endeavor to make clearer and more precise just what the objects of the study of the conditional are, as a lack of clarity as to what counts as an instance of a given category of conditional has resulted in deep and significant confusions in subsequent analysis. I motivate for a factual/counterfactual distinction, though not at the level of particular instances of the conditional. Instead, I argue (...) that each individual instance of the conditional may be interpreted either factually or counterfactually, rather than these instances dividing into distinct types. I examine the classic Oswald–Kennedy pair of sentences, typically taken to be the quintessential example of how conditionals must be split into two different categories, to show that they in fact do not demonstrate this. I then present my account of the logic underlying the ordinary-language conditional, the system C3, and a justification of the form it takes. This logic provides distinct interpretations of the conditional as it concerns what is factual or what is counterfactual, respectively. The factual interpretation is true when both antecedent and consequent are true at the actual world, false when the antecedent is true and consequent false, and not truth-apt otherwise. The counterfactual interpretation incorporates a ceteris paribus clause, ensuring that it is not falsified by extraordinary, unforeseeable occurrences, and is true when, at all worlds at which the antecedent is ceteris paribus true, the consequent too is true. It is false when, at any of these worlds the consequent is false; and not truth-apt otherwise. I go on to examine alternative theories of the conditional—from the suppositionalist approach to evaluating the putative indicative conditional, to Stalnaker’s combined indicative and counterfactual account, and Lewis’s analysis of the counterfactual; among a number of others—and offer comparison to my own theory. Finally, I look at various challenges to my account of the conditional. Being a strict conditional (albeit variably so), that of C3 is open to the objection that it fails to match ordinary speakers’ intuitions as regards its truth-value assignments to, for instance, conditionals with necessarily true consequents. I address these so- called paradoxes of the strict conditional, and also discussion the question of truth-preservation in the C3 system in the case of such inferences as those relying on transitivity and that of modus ponens. I maintain that these inferences are indeed truth-preserving under certain, specifiable, conditions, and I close by offering possible avenues for further research. (shrink)

Routley-Meyer ternary relational semantics was introduced in the early seventies of the past century. RM-semantics was intended to model classical relevant logics such as the logic of the relevant conditional R and the logic of Entailment E. But, ever since Routley and Meyer’s first papers on the topic, this essentially malleable semantics has been used for characterizing more general relevant logics or even non-relevant logics. The aim of this paper is to provide an RM-semantics with respect to which Łukasiewicz 3-valued (...) logic Ł3 is sound and complete. Ł3 is understood as the set of all valid formulas in Łukasiewicz 3-valued matrices MŁ3. In this sense, leaning on previous work by us, Ł3 is axiomatized as an extension of Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic B+, labelled Ł3. And the RM-semantics for Ł3 is actually defined for this particular axiomatization of Ł3. The result presented in the paper is interesting from the Universal Logic perspective, in the sense that it connects Łukasiewicz many-valued logics and similar systems to relevant logics from the point of view of the latter, the 3-termed relational point of view, in particular. (shrink)