My thesis is that, although medicine is scientific, it is not and can not become a science. After rejecting as flawed an argument attempting to show that medicine is already a science, I argue that a comparison of such basic, defining features as internal aims, criteria of success, and principles regulating the enterprises demonstrate that medicine and science are inherently different. I then argue that while it may be possible to reduce the cognitive content of medicine to biology, medicine itself (...) cannot be reduced, for as an enterprise it possesses features that make it an inappropriate subject of reduction. I conclude by indicating four results that emerge from recognizing that medicine and science are basically distinct. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

My thesis is that biology is most plausibly regarded as a universal, as distinct from a provincial, science. First, I develop the general notion of a provincial science, formulate three criteria for applying the concept, and present brief examples illustrating their use. Second, I argue that a consideration of population genetics as a characteristic example of a basic biological theory strengthens the prior presumption that biology is not a provincial science. Finally, I examine two arguments to the effect that biology (...) is a provincial science. The first concerns biology's exclusively terrestrial evidence base, the second the logical character of its laws. I introduce considerations that weaken the persuasiveness of the first argument and then show that the second one rests upon a false premise and so should be rejected. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to show that adaptational sentences (i.e. sentences containing the terms "adaptive", "adapted", etc.) in evolutionary biology are best interpreted as equivalent to sentences about Darwinian or genetical selection. Thus, the use of adaptational languages does not introduce final purposes or other nonempirical notions into biology. I also try to demonstrate that adaptational sentences and functional sentences are not equivalent in an evolutionary context so that an analysis of function does not dispense with the need for (...) an analysis of adaptation. Finally, it is argued that, although some adaptational sentences might be construed as teleological explanations, given an empirical content, they do not serve as explanations. Rather, they express the outcome of selection, regarded in one way, and regarded in another, they express data for which a theory of evolution must account. (shrink)

This combination textbook and anthology provides coverage of the fundamental topics in current medical ethics adn familiarizes the reader with the basic moreal and social issues confronting the medical profession today.

Somatic cell gene therapy has yielded promising results. If germ cell gene therapy can be developed, the promise is even greater: hundreds of genetic diseases might be virtually eliminated. But some claim the procedure is morally unacceptable. We thoroughly and sympathetically examine several possible reasons for this claim but find them inadequate. There is no moral reason, then, not to develop and employ germ-line gene therapy. Taking the offensive, we argue next that medicine has a prima facie moral obligation to (...) do so. (shrink)

This text is not only perfect for a college course in argument analysis, but also as a reference tool when confronted with arguments outside the classroom experience.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 125.3 (2004) 456-459 [Access article in PDF] Jon D. Mikalson. Herodotus and Religion in the Persian Wars. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. xiv + 269 pp. 5 maps. Cloth, $45. One should pay attention to the title of this book. It is not primarily intended as a study of religion in Herodotus, like Lachenaud (1978), Harrison (2000), and others, to whom Mikalson (...) gives due credit throughout, but rather as an exploration of Greek religious practices and attitudes in a specific historical context. Herodotus is, evidently, our main source and an especially illuminating one because, says Mikalson, his approach to religion is less bound to the conventions of a particular genre than that of epic poets, tragedians, or even, for different reasons, Thucydides, who tends to exclude religion from his account. At the same time, Herodotus' religious views are in great part not peculiar to him but probably shared by many of his contemporaries.On this last point Mikalson agrees with Harrison, as he also does when he maintains that scholars have frequently underestimated the importance of religion in Herodotus' history. Religious causes and motivations represent, to be sure, only one level of explanation among several others that Herodotus uses. But they are important, and the supplementary sources on the topic (especially the later authors Plutarch, Pausanias, and Diodorus Siculus) uncover no evidence that Herodotus exaggerated general Greek notions about the role of the gods in the Persian Wars or the number and prominence of cultic acts connected with these events.The book is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 is entitled "A Religious account of the Persian Invasions." Chapter 2, "Greek Gods, Heroes and the Divine in the Persian Invasions," discusses the role of individual divine figures. With chapter 3, "Some Religious Beliefs and Attitudes of Herodotus," the focus shifts from Herodotus as a major source for Greek religion to Herodotus' own views about the gods and their cult. This approach continues in the Appendix, "Herodotus on the Origins of Greek Religion," which provides a welcome and lucid examination of the more scholarly side of Herodotus' religious thought.There is a considerable degree of overlap among the three chapters, and more space is devoted to summary and compilation than to analysis. The first and longest chapter (ninety-five pages, almost half the text of the book) is a history from the fall of the Pisistratids in Athens to the aftermath of the battle of Mycale that foregrounds all attested religious actions and events as well as the character utterances and authorial comments that mention the gods or the divine. It follows for the most part a chronological order (or, sometimes, the order of Herodotus' narrative), with an abundance of direct quotations and frequent spacing between paragraphs. The overall effect is somewhat fragmentary, and there is very little discussion of individual items. We would like to hear more, for example, about the earthquake of Delos, with Herodotus' extraordinary interpretation (and Thucydides' conflicting report), or the role of the Aeacidae, who were ineffectual allies of the Thebans against the Athenians in 506 but helped the Greek coalition at Salamis (22-23, 77, 129-30). [End Page 456]Neither does Mikalson impose a logical order on the string of events, although his occasional syntheses along the way touch upon a number of general points. Most importantly, he argues that Herodotus treats religion in two different ways: in popular/cultic terms or, less frequently, according to the literary conventions of epic or tragedy (45-47). The latter form of discourse includes words such as atasthalos, "rash" (which Herodotus notably uses in lieu of the popular term anosios, "impious," to describe Xerxes' whipping of the Hellespont), dreams and monstrous omens as signs of misfortunes (41-44), pious prayers that are normally answered (47-49), and oracles that always come true. Conversely, the rejection of the literary conventions of epic helps to account for the fact that in Herodotus and other prose authors, as in artistic representations of battles of the Persian wars, divine intervention may feature the occasional epiphany of... (shrink)

With the Reformation, philosophers sought to establish a new way of thinking independent of religion. Borrowing principles popularized religious reformers: the right of conscience, the utter transcendence of God, the sinfulness of the world, they constructed a new metaphysics that highlighted the mystery of God and the complete intelligibility of 'rational man.' From this history an understanding of our religious situation is distilled. The chapters of this work develop for the reader the intellectual structure of religion and show how its (...) language, imagery and ritual function. They argue that if religion no longer presents a challenge, it is because we think of it in terms of the 'new metaphysics.' To recapture the reality, we must join our contemporaries who are attacking the premises of classical modern philosophy and so experience ourselves afresh. (shrink)

Michael Ruse [3] has criticized the distinction between biological function and evolutionary adaptation that I argued for in my article “Biological Adaptation” [2]. I shall show below that Ruse's criticisms are not, for the most part, well taken and that the distinction remains as I made it.

Laudan's normative naturalism' claims to account for the success of science by construing theories and other claims as methodological rules interpreted as defeasible hypothetical imperatives for securing cognitive ends. We ask two questions regarding the adequacy for medicine of Laudan's meta- methodology. First, although Laudan denies that general aims can be assigned to a science, we show that this is not the case for medicine. Second, we argue that Laudan's account yields mixed results as a tool for evaluating methodological rules (...) in medicine. These shortcomings call into question the adequacy of normative naturalism as a meta-methodology for science. (shrink)

The ethical and social issues raised by transplants are so interrelated that the thread of any problem eventually leads to the whole tangled ball. This article, however, limits discussion to topics involving living donors in the United States. This restriction is not dictated solely by space constraints. Rather, the rise in the number of living donors gives a particular urgency to questions about informed consent, donor protection, and recipient needs. How we resolve conflicts of interest, address issues of consent, and (...) define the scope of autonomy will shape the policies and practices that determine whether donors are protected and whether lives are lost or saved. (shrink)

Selections from the writings of George Santayana.

The woman who decided to die -- Like leaving a note -- The agents -- Unsuitable -- Nothing personal -- "He's had enough" -- Not more equal -- The last thing you can do for him -- The boy who was addicted to pain -- It seemed like a good idea.

This publication addresses the issue of mental health of teachers and staff as a key to education reform. Many teachers suffer from the crippling effects of isolation, cynicism, and discouragement. In order to be personally effective, teachers must demonstrate initiative, commitment, compassion, and dedication to children, positive characteristics that depend upon how teachers feel about themselves. Materials are offered for the teaching professional including: practical ideas, suggestions, and prescriptions for developing teacher self-esteem; and suggestions for learning to work with others (...) in more productive ways. Following a foreword by Robert W. Reasoner, a former superintendent of schools in San Jose, California, the book is organized into seven chapters: (1) Integrity with a Capital I; (2) Life's Decisions--Chance or Choice? (3) The Three Ts--Tell the Truth, Tell the Truth, Tell the Truth; (4) If It's To Be, It's Up to Me! (5) You and Me and Them; (6) Working Relationships Take Work; and (7) What Works, Works. (LL). (shrink)

This paper examines Herodotus¿ use of words of the ananke family in order to determine which external or internal constraints the historian represents as affecting the causality of events. M. Ostwald¿s Anangke in Thucydides (1988) provides a foundation for examining the more restricted application of these terms in Herodotus (85 occurrences vs. 161 in Thucydides). In Herodotus, divine necessity (absent in Thucydides) refers to the predictable results of human wrongdoings more often than to a force constraining human choices. This represents (...) an especially ambiguous Herodotean category, however, and is expressed by a wider range of terms than those with ananke -stems. The analysis of natural ananke yields more clear-cut results. (1) In Herodotus (and not in Thucydides) ananke often qualifies an aggressive compulsion applied by a personal agent. (2) Victims of this despotic ananke are partially excused, but those who resist it earn Herodotus¿ praise. (3) Most importantly, Herodotus (unlike Thucydides) never in turn applies ananke words to circumstances that motivate imperialistic actions, especially starting a war. (4) Whereas in Thucydides agents are ¿compelled¿ to act also by fear and other internal impulses, the only psychological factor to which Herodotus applies ananke words (and this time mostly in a positive sense) is moral obligation. Herodotus¿ concept of ananke is moralistic, and consistent with his unwillingness to justify imperialism, his practice of assigning responsibility, and his high regard for nomos, on the one hand, and freedom on the other. The narrator¿s involvement in these principles is reflected in Herodotus¿ use of ananke terms in self-referential statements of the type ¿I am compelled/not compelled to say x.¿ These statements represent the narrator as the opposite of an imperial subject and analogous to the most admirable of his characters on the receiving end of compulsion. He is a free agent, who disregards political pressure and is exclusively compelled by the rules that apply to him as researcher and truthful recorder. (shrink)

An exploration of the problems and methods of modern biology and their impact on man's changing view of science and himself.

It is one of the ironies of our times that, as the practise of religion wanes, a theoretical interest in it on the part of many anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists and philosophers waxes. Among these, only philosophers bring to their task a long history of theological and reli gious relations. Hence their renewed interest has been hailed as a break down of isolationism, heralding, perhaps, a new era of interdisciplinary peace. To celebrate this new ecumenism, a Chicago seminary, consis tently with (...) its purpose, sponsored a colloquium to explore the future of philosophical theology. If some of its participating professional philosophers initially felt a twinge of embarrassment over their presence at an ostensibly theological meeting, they soon were at ease. No one was called upon to define the topic, or even to suggest its relationship to a philosophy of religion. Conveniently, everyone could role up his sleeves and get to work on a job he personally felt needed doing. Can we wonder that the lay observer appeared somewhat confused? Was the purpose to analyze "God talk," or to find a place for 'God' in a metaphysical scheme? Or if not these, something else? It soon became evident that the participants in the colloquium ranged from the free swinger to the severely inhibited, depending upon the role each assigned to dogma and creed. (shrink)