Murray Robertson tells how in an initially small Baptist Church in Christchurch, New Zealand, charismatic renewal brought about local outreach and expansion and the formation of community help centres and a kingdom bank, followed by mission to Asia as well as within the local neighbourhood. He describes the progress as a journey in three stages of seven years each, but looks forward to the challenge yet to come.

When infertility clinics offer money-back guarantees, they prefer to give them more delicate names such as “shared risk,” “warranty,” or “outcome” programs. We should not allow such daintiness to distract us from the bottom line of these programs which are all about the bottom line.John Robertson and Theodore Schneyer defend such programs as special forms of insurance, what they call “risk-of-failure insurance.” They argue, in “Professional Self-Regulation and Shared-Risk Programs for In Vitro Fertilization,” that the criticisms of in vitro (...) fertilization shared-risk programs by the American Medical Association and others are off the mark. It would be sufficient, Robertson and Schneyer contend, to develop guidelines for informed consent or protocols that discourage risky clinical procedures. They acknowledge that shared risk plans “present problems if not offered with full disclosure and attention to patient interests,” but they insist that “there is no reason why they cannot be implemented in an ethically sound way.”. (shrink)

Modern, science-centered naturalisms can be charged with a certain moral laxity, according to S. T. Coleridge. This fault reflectsnbsp; a devitalizing, materialistic metaphysics informed by a narrow and self-serving conception of reason. Thus seeking a remedy that can bring justice to the spiritual as well as the physical aspects of experience, Coleridge envisages a lsquo;true naturalismrsquo; that will not only address the question lsquo;What is Life?rsquo; but also frame a lsquo;true realismrsquo; that includes what might be called a lsquo;true moralismrsquo;. (...) This calls, however, for a Heraclitean metaphysics capable of linking lsquo;goodnessrsquo; in both thinking and acting to a *Logos*mdash;that is, an essentially nonmodern theory of actuality that can do justice at once to the quicknesses and the uniformities of both Life and Thought. Coleridgersquo;s thus presents an outline of how one might respond to a challenge that can be best met, I argue, with the help of certain insights of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, A. N. Whitehead, Gilles Deleuze, and C. S. Peirce. By enlisting Hannah Arendtrsquo;s individual-centered conception of morality, which ties ethics to public concerns, it is also possible to sketch a metaphysically grounded response to Friedrich Nietzschersquo;s call for a lsquo;healthy moralityrsquo; capable of overturning the nihilistic values entrenched in modern thought. br /. (shrink)

The analytic method by which Descartes discovered the first principle of his philosophy—cogito, ergo sum—is a unique cognitive process of direct insight and nonlogical inference. It differs markedly from inductive as well as deductive procedures, but also from older models of the direct noetic apprehension of first principles, notably those of Plato and Aristotle. However, a critical examination of Descartes’s argument for the innateness of the idea of God shows that there are serious obstacles in the way of his employment (...) of the analytic method of discovery to reach this or any other conclusion about ideas that do not fall within the scope of ordinary human experience. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 6, June 2019, Page 44-46.

The author argues that Michael Polanyi’s philosophy of science can be understood as an (unconscious) attempt to recapture elements of experience largely forgotten or repressed in modernity. Specifically, the author argues that Polanyi’s epistemology appears to draw on elements of oral—aural experience that have been relatively ignored by the heavily visual sensory orientation typical of modern Western societies. The author does this by first deriving the primary features of the modern objectivist conception of knowledge from Polanyi’s critique of objectivism and (...) then using the anthropological literature on the differences between oral and literate cultures to demonstrate that these same aspects of the objectivist paradigm correspond closely to typical features of literate, visual consciousness while Polanyi’s alternative formulations correspond to a more oral—aural orientation. (shrink)

This book presents stipulated definitions, essays, ontological arguments and logic used to determine necessary basic assumptions of right and wrong, culminating in a practical procedure based upon the Universal Law that can permit everyone to eliminate misconceptions, avoid destructive interpretations, and develop an ethical conscience.

A new approach to the ancient world is only too often a wrong approach, unless it is based on some concrete discovery. But I think it fair to talk of newperspectives, at least, in the study of Greek mythology. Certainly the old and familiar ones are no longer adequate. Indeed it is surprising, in the light of fresh intuitions about society, literacy, the pre-Homeric world, and relations with the ancient Near East, that myth—one of the most pervasive aspects of Greek (...) culture—has been left in its old and rather cobwebby pigeon-hole. Rose's simple paraphrases are accepted as adequate for students; Nilsson's sparse pages in his history of religion are rightly respected, though some of them are too simple; the Murray-Cook-Harrison-Cornford reconstruction of religion, ritual and myth is regarded as a little excessive, but perhaps not too far out; Kerényi and Eliade are roughly tolerated, if not widely read by Classicists, and their books are ordered in profusion for the library; the psychological side is adequately taken care of, or so it is supposed, by what is left from Freud and Jung, with Cassirer as sufficient authority for the sources of mythical imagination.Many of these critics had their moments of brilliant insight, but most were misleading in their theories taken as a whole. We can now accept that many myths have ritual counterparts, and some have ritual origins, without having to adopt Cornford's belief, developed after Harrison, Frazer and Robertson Smith, that all myths are such. (shrink)

Volume: v. 1 General Books publication date: 2009 Original publication date: 1835 Original Publisher: Saunders and Otley Subjects: History History / General ...

The essential nature of legislative power is to make the laws; that of executive power is to execute those law. The difference between the two is both substantial and significant; it is the difference between the rule of arbitrary power and the rule of law. This paper will seek to trace the genesis of an independent judicial power, in both theory and practice, through an examination of sections of The Constitutions of Clarendon, The Assize of Clarendon, Hobbes’ Leviathan, Locke’s Second (...) Treatise, Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, as well as The Federalist Papers. Moreover, it will seek to establish its executive nature and to explain why it is so often (at least presently) misunderstood to be akin to the legislative power. (shrink)

Résumé: Dans ce dialogue, deux personnages principaux, Philopolis et Éleuthérios, proposent la position communautarienne et la position contractualiste libérale comme fondements de la théorie politique. Le débat se déroule, comme tout bon débat devrait le faire, autour d’une bouteille de Chardonnay.

People v. Strauss-Kahn is an ideal lens through which to examine the operation of a criminal justice system that privileges the presumption of guilt, or, to use the words of the US Supreme Court in the 2012 decisions Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, has become “a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” It is both an excellent example of a transparent and objective invocation of the criminal sanction, and a sharp counterpoint to the vast majority of (...) cases where law enforcement conclusions are privileged and rarely second-guessed. As analyses of wrongful convictions have sadly but inevitably demonstrated, the screening methods of police and prosecutors are fallible. Moreover, the prevalence of “tunnel vision” once the decision to charge has been made means that few cases experience the kind of post-indictment investigation and reevaluation seen in the prosecution of Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Stage by stage, the Strauss-Kahn case illustrates how to counterbalance the presumption of guilt and give expression to the presumption of innocence in the pretrial period through vigilantly-invoked and enforced due process protections. Drawing from this examination, the paper will then explore how to approach this model process in the more standard cases, which typically see a fraction of the judicial, law enforcement, and defense resources afforded Dominique Strauss-Kahn. The Strauss-Kahn prosecution offers several insights, three of which will be sketched at the paper’s conclusion: a requirement that prosecutorial decision-making be subject to a reasonable doubt standard; vigilant and early enforcement of the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose information that is favorable to the accused; and finally, a requirement that a prosecutor explain in writing any decision to dismiss the felony charges in indicted felony cases, so that the factual, legal and policy bases of these decisions (numbering almost one quarter of New York’s superior court felony cases annually) can be analyzed and publicized. (shrink)

It is necessary to distinguish between civilization as a sociocultural complex on the one hand, and civilization as a process, on the other. This is illustrated by invoking the work of Norbert Elias. For Elias, the civilizing process consisted in the way in which what were, historically, constraints on human behaviour became internalized, and is a process that takes different forms in different cultures. On the other hand, at the centre of civilization as sociocultural complex was the question concerning the (...) attributes of a human being, crystallizing as clear-cut criteria for adjudging the degree to which the people occupying a particular territory were or were not civilized. The conception of civilization as a complex has become contemporary via Huntington's ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, and is indicative of the way in which the very word ‘civilization’ now carries with it a considerable ideological baggage. This article argues that the ideological use of civilization and the wider discourse of the war against terror involves the fusion, or conflation, of civilization as process and civilization as complex. (shrink)