Realists about fictional characters posit a certain theoretical role and a candidate to fill this role. I will delineate the role realists take fictional characters like Emma Woodhouse to fill, and I will argue that it is better filled by what I will call ‘characterisations’. In explaining what I mean by ‘characterisations’, I will show that the existence of these entities is comparatively uncontroversial. Realists should acknowledge their existence, but doing so, I will argue, obviates the need to acknowledge the (...) existence of Emma and other fictional individuals. (shrink)

What is the Bare Particular Theory? Is it committed, like the Bundle Theory, to a constituent ontology: according to which a substance’s qualities—and according to the Bare Particular Theory, its substratum also—are proper parts of the substance? I argue that Bare Particularists need not, should not, and—if a recent objection to ‘the Bare Particular Theory’ succeeds—cannot endorse a constituent ontology. There is nothing, I show, in the motivations for Bare Particularism or the principles that distinguish Bare Particularism from rival views (...) that entails a constituent ontology. I outline a version of Bare Particularism that in rejecting a constituent ontology avoids the New Objection. I argue against Theodore Sider that this really is a distinct theory to the version of Bare Particularism that endorses a constituent ontology, and not a mere terminological variant. I show that this, the best version of the Bare Particular Theory, is also defensible against the old objections. (shrink)

This paper maintains (following Yougrau 1987; 2000 and Hinchliff 1996) that the dead and other former existents count as examples of non-existent objects. If the dead number among the things there are, a further question arises: what is it to be dead—how should the state of being dead be characterised? It is argued that this state should be characterised negatively: the dead are not persons, philosophers etc. They lack any of the (intrinsic) qualities they had while they lived. The only (...) facts involving the dead are facts about the relations they stand in—including the relations they bear to the qualities they formerly instantiated, and the intentional relations they stand in to us. Given an appropriate conception of qualities the dead can be said to be quality-less objects: bare particulars. The ‘Bare Particular Theory’ of individuals, it is argued, is coherent if and only if it concedes that the bare particulars it allows for don’t exist. The account of the dead and other former existents as bare particulars does justice to the misfortune of death, and points the way to a general theory of nonexistent objects. (shrink)

This paper outlines a solution to the puzzle of imaginative resistance that makes—and if successful helps to vindicate—two assumptions. The solution first assumes a relationship between moral judgements and affective states of the subject. It also assumes the correctness of accounts of imaginative engagement with fiction—like Kendall Walton’s account—that treat engagement with fiction as prop-based make-believe in which works of fiction, but also appreciators of those works, figure as props. The key to understanding imaginative resistance, it maintains, is understanding how (...) real feelings become part of fictional worlds. (shrink)

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 135-147, February 2012.

Meinongianism takes non-existent objects to actually possess the qualities they are characterised as possessing. But many of these qualities are existence entailing. Priest and Berto’s modal Meinongianism tries to circumvent this problem by taking Pegasus to possess the property of being winged in some nonactual world. I argue that modal Meingongianism’s individuation criterion for fictional and imaginary entities doesn’t allow us to rule out that Emma Woodhouse and Batman are identical. I further argue that depending on the status of the (...) ‘other worlds’ it posits, modal Meinongianism either trivialises Meinongianism’s ‘characterisation principle’ or replaces it with something no less objectionable. Priest and Berto’s view, I conclude, if it is tenable, is not a form of Meinongianism; but arguably it is something better: a structuralist account of non-existent objects. (shrink)

Connolly, Noel Pope Francis in Evangelii Gaudium defines the church as a 'community of missionary disciples'. We have to be missionary to be called disciples. He dreams of 'a missionary option' that will transform everything. For Francis, mission is clearly essential to the church. He is continuing a movement that began with Ad Gentes, the missionary document of Vatican II. The fathers at the council insisted, 'The pilgrim Church is missionary by her very nature. For it is from the mission (...) of the Son and the mission of the Holy Spirit that she takes her origin, in accordance with the decree of God the Father'. This was reiterated by Paul VI in Evangelii Nuntiandi: 'Evangelizing is in fact the grace and vocation proper to the Church, her deepest identity. She exists in order to evangelize'; and by John Paul II in Redemptoris Missio: 'the Church is missionary by her very nature'. (shrink)

At the beginning of his message for World Mission Sunday 2019 Pope Francis wrote: For the month of October 2019, I have asked that the whole Church revive her missionary awareness and commitment as we commemorate the centenary of the Apostolic Letter Maximum Illud of Pope Benedict XV. Its farsighted and prophetic vision of the apostolate has made me realize once again the importance of renewing the Church's missionary commitment and giving fresh evangelical impulse to her work of preaching and (...) bringing to the world the salvation of Jesus Christ, who died and rose again. (shrink)

Answering machine messages allegedly refute Kaplan's ‘classical account’ of the semantics of ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’. The classical account doesn’t allow that a token of ‘I am not here now’ can be true; but these words in an answering machine message can communicate something true. In this paper I argue that the true content communicated by an answering machine message is extra-semantic content conveyed via the mechanism of ‘externally-oriented make-believe’. An answering machine message is associated with a game of make-believe (...) whose rules prescribe making believe that the agent who recorded the message is speaking there and then; and it thereby conveys that the circumstance that would make the message fictionally true obtains. (shrink)

Dixon, Robert; Reid, Stephen; Connolly, Noel Since the Australian Catholic Bishops Conference established a pastoral research capability in 1996, a great deal of research has been carried out on various aspects of the Catholic community in Australia. This research has been carried out either directly by the Bishops Conference's research staff, or in association with other bodies such as NCLS Research, the Christian Research Association, Australian Catholic University and, most recently, Catholic Religious Australia.