This article proposes complementing actor-network theory (ANT) with Niklas Luhmann’s communication theory, in order to overcome one of ANT’s major shortcomings, namely, the lack of a conceptual repertoire to describe virtual processes such as sense-making. A highly problematic consequence of ANT’s actualism is that it cannot explain the differentiation of economic, legal, scientific, touristic, religious, medical, artistic, political and other qualities of actual entities, assemblages and relationships. By recasting Luhmann’s theory of functionally differentiated communication forms and sense-making as dealing with (...) different types of virtual attractors calling for actualizations in concrete assemblages, I propose a symmetrical understanding of societal differentiation processes as based on the co-production of virtual attractors and actual assemblages. (shrink)

Hayek’s social theory of evolution suggests that market liberal morality is adaptive for social groups. He justified the evolutionary superiority of market liberalism by asserting that groups operating under a market liberal morality would have a higher capacity to expand and reproduce than groups with alternative tribal moralities. Thus, market liberal groups would be favoured through cultural and genetic group selection. But in fact, market liberal morality reveals maladaptive tendencies and remains insufficiently powerful to create adaptive social groups. Hayek’s dismissal (...) of moral tribalism in favour of market liberal morality is found to underestimate the importance of tribal goals in the evolutionary system. (shrink)

Dissertação: FARIA, Thiago Hot Pereira de. Mishná e Belo Horizonte: A influência da cultura oral na comunidade judaica belo-horizontina. 2014. Dissertação – Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Belo Horizonte.

Ideology and self-interest are often in tension. If positive political theorists assume broad self-interest as the standard of human behaviour, they can accommodate people’s ideological motivation to act for the common good. Yet, their theories may become tautological and empirically untestable. Conversely, if these theorists assume narrow self-interest, they increase testability. But because ideology seems incompatible with narrow self-interest, they often rule ideology out as a motivational driver. Positive political theorists can, however, combine ideology with narrow self-interest by assuming broad (...) egoism. And in so doing, they should assume that ideology motivates political agents until it becomes too costly for these agents’ material interests. (shrink)

In his 1903 Syllabus, Charles S. Peirce makes a distinction between icons and iconic signs, or hypoicons, and briefly introduces a division of the latter into images, diagrams, and metaphors. Peirce scholars have tried to make better sense of those concepts by understanding iconic signs in the context of the ten classes of signs described in the same Syllabus. We will argue, however, that the three kinds of hypoicons can better be understood in the context of Peirce's sixty-six classes of (...) signs. We analyze examples of hypoicons taken from the field of information design, describing them in the framework of the sixty-six classes, and discuss the consequences of those descriptions to the debate about the order of determination of the 10 trichotomies that form those classes. (shrink)

Parenting is a transforming experience for the life of parents that brings joy and satisfaction as well as challenges, frustration, and demands. The aim of this study was to determine the relationship between “parental stress and satisfaction” and work-home conflict, perceived social support, and global satisfaction with life, and to determine the moderating role of the parent's gender. A sample of 244 participants was studied: 49.6% (121) mothers and 50.4% (123) fathers with children between 2 and 12 years of age. (...) The data was analysed by means of multiple linear regression models and Beta regression for stress and parental satisfaction, respectively, and they were complemented with general and conditional dominance analyses to estimate the relevance of the predictors. Mothers presented higher levels of parental stress and satisfaction than fathers. Being female, having two children, and home-work conflict were predictors of a higher parental stress. Age was also a predictor, as younger parents and also those older than 37 years of age showed more parental stress. Having no partner and being male was associated to lower parental satisfaction. In conclusion, parental stress and satisfaction emerge as clearly differentiated dimensions of parenting experience. The gender gap in parental stress could be linked to the persistence of traditional roles regarding the care of the children, in agreement with the findings in other research. (shrink)

O tema da substituição é o coração da filosofia levinasiana. O desejo do infinito, a questão que move o pensamento, expressa-se na fórmula: tero-outro-em-sua-pele. Segundo Levinas é isso o que explica o fato de sermos tão numerosos no mundo. A substituição é a sustentação do mundo. Mas não significa isso uma idéia de fundamento. A metafísica levinasiana aborda o ser como questão que excede o princípio de uma fundamentação filosófica ou condição de possibilidade. O ser em questão é anterior ao (...) princípio como o outro-em-sua-pele não é uma condição subjetiva, mas a incondição do pensamento, o desde sempre da responsabilidade: anarquia imemorial do tempo e do mundo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Ética. Substituição. Subjetividade. Anarquia imemorial. Desejo do infinito. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é modesto. Trata-se apenas de caracterizar as perspectivas reducionistas e emergentistas, apontando as distinções entre ambas as posturas, bem como ressaltar que embora haja uma aproximação quanto à possibilidade de se aceitar uma emergência de tipo “fraco”, há um distanciamento dessas posturas filosóficas no que concerne à emergência de tipo “forte”.

Stroke is one of the most common causes of acquired disability, leaving numerous adults with cognitive and motor impairments, and affecting patients’ capability to live independently. Virtual Reality (VR) based methods for stroke rehabilitation have mainly focused on motor rehabilitation but there is increasing interest toward the integration of cognitive training for providing more effective solutions. Here we investigate the feasibility for stroke recovery of a virtual cognitive-motor task, the Reh@Task, which combines adapted arm reaching, and attention and memory training. (...) 24 participants in the chronic stage of stroke, with cognitive and motor deficits, were allocated to one of two groups (VR, Control). Both groups were enrolled in conventional occupational therapy, which mostly involves motor training. Additionally, the VR group underwent training with the Reh@Task and the control group performed time-matched conventional occupational therapy. Motor and cognitive competences were assessed at baseline, end of treatment (1 month) and at a 1-month follow-up through the Montreal Cognitive Assessment, Single Letter Cancelation, Digit Cancelation, Bells Test, Fugl-Meyer Assessment Test, Chedoke Arm and Hand Activity Inventory, Modified Ashworth Scale, and Barthel Index. Our results show that both groups improved in motor function over time, but the Reh@Task group displayed significantly higher between-group outcomes in the arm subpart of the Fugl-Meyer Assessment Test. Improvements in cognitive function were significant and similar in both groups. Overall, these results are supportive of the viability of VR tools that combine motor and cognitive training, such as the Reh@Task. Trial Registration: This trial was not registered because it is a small clinical study that addresses the feasibility of a prototype device. (shrink)

Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance (...) with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell’s requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge – a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory. (shrink)

Construo esta pesquisa para dar visibilidade ao corpo estranho como produtor de arte, cultura e conhecimentos, quando esse encontra sua casa, o “seu corpo”, na escola. Esta se desenvolve epistemologicamente em Arte-educação descolonial a partir da condição na qual sempre fui colocado, de corpo estranho, por ser imperfeito ao modelo de corpo colonial imposto no ocidente, sempre em relação a um Outro. Continuamente, por isso, vivo sendo posto na categoria de “Ser menos”, na cultura, na vida, no aprendizado, como outros (...) tantos corpos estranhos também vivem: ocupando o fundo da cena para deixar a coreografia em dança bonita ou as apresentações teatrais ou musicais harmônicas. (shrink)

In this paper, following the taxonomy developed by Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds of different sources and states of vulnerability, I claim that wild animals are inherently and situationally vulnerable. This is because they can experience suffering as a response to certain internal and external states and have a high exposure to, and a low capacity to cope with, harmful natural processes. From this it follows that we have a moral obligation to support and assist individuals who are occurrently vulnerable and (...) to reduce the risk of dispositional vulnerabilities becoming occurrent in the future, by endorsing some form of what I call ‘environmental enhancement’. Finally, I pay critical attention to how to prevent interventions aimed at ameliorating vulnerability from paradoxically generating pathogenic vulnerabilities. (shrink)

BARROZO, Victor Breno Farias. Memória, Transmissão e emoção: estudo sobre a modernidade religiosa no pensamento de Danièle Hervieu-Léger. 2014. Dissertação (Mestrado), Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte. Palavras-Chave: Danièle Hervieu-Léger. Modernidade religiosa. Senso religioso contemporâneo. Memória. Transmissão. Emoção. Keywords : Danièle Hervieu-Léger. Religious modernity. Contemporary religious sense. Memory. Transmission. Emotion.

Cuando apareció Heidegger y el nazismo el mundo intelectual internacional habló de una «bomba», pese al tono mesurado y exacto del texto. El descubrimiento innegable de su vínculo con el nazi-fascismo, comprometía no sólo a su propio país, sino a toda la cultura del siglo XX. Esta discusión sigue viva. Por eso, Heidegger y su herencia: el neonazismo, el neofascismo y el fundamentalismo islámico compromete de modo sorprendente la proyección del pensamiento heideggeriano en el presente y el futuro. Con su (...) metodología estricta y sobria, su exposición clara, fundada siempre en hechos y textos, Víctor Farías pone de manifiesto la función vitalizadora que Heidegger tiene en las formas totalitarias y extremistas de la actualidad. Para todo lector será una sorpresa mayor descubrir su pensamiento en relación a la polémica antisemita y revisionista iniciada por su alumno Ernst Nolte, la función central de la filosofía heideggeriana en el programa y la praxis del NPD —el mayor partido neonazi alemán— y en el discurso teórico de los neofascistas más relevantes de Francia, Italia y Bélgica, fundamentando en él la xenofobia extrema y el antisemitismo. Aun los ecologistas fundamentalistas heideggerianos, con Rudolf Bahro a la cabeza, anhelan el advenimiento de un «Adolf verde». Sorprende también que los fundamentalistas islámicos vean en Martin Heidegger una suerte de icono en su lucha contra los «infieles», la modernidad y la democracia, se revela que Khomeini formó un grupo autodenominado «los heideggerianos» que recibieron la misión de articular la cultura y la legalidad islámica en Irán. Uno de sus miembros era Ahmadinezhad. El neomarxista populista Hugo Chávez, primitivo pero antisemita radical, tuvo como su asesor más importante a Norberto Ceresole, el neonazi heideggeriano más relevante de Argentina. Incluso los neoracistas indigenistas del Perú acuden a Heidegger para fundamentar su «lucha por su sangre inca y su suelo» en la autenticidad del «Ser-ahí» heideggeriano. (shrink)

Animals, like humans, suffer and die from natural causes. This is particularly true of animals living in the wild, given their high exposure to, and low capacity to cope with, harmful natural processes. Most wild animals likely have short lives, full of suffering, usually ending in terrible deaths. This book argues that on the assumption that we have reasons to assist others in need, we should intervene in nature to prevent or reduce the harms wild animals suffer, provided that it (...) is feasible and that the expected result is positive overall. It is of the utmost importance that academics from different disciplines as well as animal advocates begin to confront this issue. The more people are concerned with wild animal suffering, the more probable it is that safe and effective solutions to the plight of wild animals will be implemented in the future. (shrink)

Our main question in this paper is as follow: (Q) What are the epistemic norms governing our responses in the face of disagreement? In order to answer it, we begin with some clarification. First, following McHugh (2012), if we employ a useful distinction in normativity theory between evaluative and prescriptive norms, there are two readings of (Q)––we explore such distinction in section 2. And secondly, we accept gnosticism, that is, the account that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It is (...) with this assumption that we want to answer (Q). So, if gnosticism is true, what is the plausible answer to (Q)? In section 3 we argue for gnostic disagreement norms as response to (Q) and in section 4 we apply such norms to particular cases of disagreement. (shrink)

In this paper I present a proposal to reformulate the argument of Alvin Plantinga (2011) against metaphysical naturalism. Contrary to Plantinga’s argument, in this new version I propose to consider the probability of the reliability of cognitive faculties, not with regard to any kind of beliefs, but only with respect to metaphysical beliefs. I claim that those who accept naturalism have a defeater for the belief that their cognitive faculties are reliable with respect to metaphysical beliefs and, thus, they have (...) a defeater for any of their metaphysical beliefs, including the belief in metaphysical naturalism. Therefore, those who accept naturalism have a defeater for naturalism; in other words, metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating. (shrink)

O trabalho pretende abordar as relações entre a doutrina coerentista da verdade tal como concebida por Leibniz e os limites que esta aparentemente impõe à possibilidade de se dizerem contingentes os eventos que têm lugar no universo e o próprio mundo enquanto sistema geral de fenômenos. Nosso principal objetivo será analisar como é possível compatibilizar esses dois aspectos capitais da filosofia leibniziana a partir da teoria da expressão, uma vez que precisamente nesta teoria reside a principal condição de constituição das (...) noções completas às quais inerem os acontecimentos, e, por conseguinte, o mundo. Com efeito, muito embora seja tributária da concepção de verdade como inclusão, a teoria dos conceitos individuais completos não se deixa explicar exaustivamente pela doutrina coerentista, uma vez que a própria completude de tais conceitos depende de sua pertença a um conjunto de compossíveis em relação aos quais mantém uma série de relações de expressão. E é precisamente dessas relações de entre-expressão que acreditamos derivar a infinidade de circunstâncias integrantes das noções individuais, as quais tornam esses seres inexplicáveis em termos estritamente lógicos, e as quais, portanto, são a raiz da natureza contingente da maior parte das predicações relativas a indivíduos. (shrink)

As understood today, political correctness aims at preventing social discrimination by curtailing offensive speech and behaviour towards underprivileged groups of individuals. The core proponents of political correctness often draw on post-modernism and critical theory and are notorious for their scepticism about objective truth and scientific rationality. Conversely, the critics of post-modern political correctness uphold Enlightenment liberal principles of scientific reasoning, rational truth-seeking and open discourse against claims of relativism and oppression. Yet, both the post-modern proponents and their Enlightenment liberal critics (...) make up two sides of the same phenomenon of political correctness. Both sides intend to protect a liberal value system from illiberal truth-claims, which is the function of politically correct regulation. While post-modern advocates attempt to promote liberating tolerance, Enlightenment liberals place liberal values above the open-ended search for truth. Despite appearances to the contrary, this socio-academic debate is not about two sides favouring and opposing political correctness. In fact, it is a debate about the type of politically correct regulation that can better guard liberal values. (shrink)

Se discuten las nociones de filosofía y espiritualidad, tratadas por M. Foucault en La hermenéutica del sujeto, que relacionan el sujeto con la verdad. Si la filosofía del conócete a ti mismo trata la relación cognoscitiva del sujeto con la verdad a la que tiene derecho, entonces la espiritualidad del cuidado de sí trata de la transformación experiencial que requiere la verdad para que el sujeto acceda a ella. Este es el contexto en el que M. Foucault se refiere a (...) M. Heidegger y J. Lacan como los autores que pensaron la relación entre el sujeto y la verdad. Se discute en ambos casos la distinción entre la filosofía y la espiritualidad: en Lacan, porque la experiencia psicoanalítica aparece como vivencia espiritual del cuidado de sí; en Heidegger, porque el Dasein y la verdad como desocultamiento muestran la filosofía como actividad espiritual por excelencia. (shrink)

Resumo O meu objetivo neste artigo é examinar criticamente o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Assumindo a tese da necessidade da identidade, bem como a tese da designação rígida, Kripke sustenta que se a dor é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C, então a dor é necessariamente idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. No entanto, precisamente porque a proposição expressa pela frase “a dor não é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C” é uma possibilidade metafísica, Kripke (...) conclui, por modus tollens, que não há identidade entre dor e estimulação das fibras C. Por isso, a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo não é uma solução bemsucedida para o problema da mente-corpo. Este artigo tem duas partes. Na primeira parte, que é expositiva, apresento o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Subsequentemente, ponho em causa o argumento de Kripke, argumentando que não é procedente, pois a nossa situação epistémica atual não nos permite determinar se é metafisicamente possível a dor não ser idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. Assim, Kripke não refuta a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Palavras-chave : designação rígida, filosofia da mente, identidade tipo-tipo, Kripke, necessidade da identidadeMy aim in this paper is to critically assess Kripke’s argument against the type-type identity theory. Assuming the thesis of the necessity of identity, as well as the thesis of rigid designation, Kripke holds that if pain is identical with C-fibre firing, then pain is necessarily identical with C-fibre firing. However, precisely because the proposition expressed by the sentence “pain is not identical with C-fibre firing” is a metaphysical possibility, Kripke concludes, by modus tollens, that pain and C-fibre firing are not identical. Therefore, the type-type identity theory is not a successful solution to the mind-body problem. So this paper has two parts. In the first part, which is expositive, I present Kripke’s argument against the type-type identity theory. After that, I will dispute Kripke’s argument, arguing that it is not sound, for our current epistemic situation does not allow us to determine whether it is a metaphysical possibility that pain is not identical with C-fibre firing. Thus, Kripke does not refute the type-type identity theory. Keywords : Kripke, necessity of identity, philosophy of mind, rigid designation, type-type identity. (shrink)

Our main aim in this paper is to develop two solutions or exorcisms to ward off the new evil demon problem against epistemic reliabilism. The first solution is designated as “indexical reliabilism” and the second as “normal-conditions reliabilism”. We will argue that the second solution is more plausible than the first. We will also argue that this second solution, if properly developed, can respond well to several recent objections. Therefore, reliabilism has good ways of dealing with the new evil demon (...) problem. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The Nature of Necessity”. Plantinga tries to show that this argument is valid and it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. On the one hand, I want to show that this argument is logically valid in both systems B and S5 of (...) modal logic. On the other hand, I think that this argument is not a good argument to show that God exists or that it is rational to believe in God. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the Business Ethics literature by unpacking the multimodal construction of moral narratives in popular culture and its portrayals of organizations and organizational roles. Understanding such portrayals and their construction is crucial to Business Ethics scholarship because they shape organizational imaginaries, influencing understandings and expectations of the ethical/moral responsibilities of organizations and the actors within them. In particular, we study the construction of moral narratives within a reality TV show that focuses on immigration and border control at (...) an airport. We find that the immigration officers are depicted as rational and heroic figures whilst the travellers are presented as emotional and potentially dangerous characters. Our analysis highlights how this is achieved via five multimodal editing dimensions—the structure of interactional scenes, the ability to address the camera, the narrator’s comments, the visual and music effects—that are key in constructing clearly defined personae. We show how, through the intersubjective construction of clear-cut characters, the show downplays the moral complexity of its content. Portraying immigration officers as heroic, while presenting travellers as potentially dangerous, allows for a silencing of any ethical questioning of immigration officers’ organizational practices. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the 'a priority of our logical abilities'. In reply, Boghossian argued that Pérez Otero's criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular terms. I elaborate on Boghossian's reply by showing that even taken on its own terms Pérez Otero's paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic (...) account of the semantics of singular terms should be. (shrink)

Naturalist theories of representation have been attacked on the grounds of being too liberal on the minimal conditions for intentionality: they treat several states that are not representational as genuine representations. Behind this attack lies the problem of demarcation: what are the minimal conditions for intentionality that a state should satisfy to be genuinely representational? What are the limits of intentionality? This paper develops a dual proposal to solve this problem. First, I defend the explanatory role criterion in order to (...) assess proposals of minimal conditions for intentionality. I start by proposing the success pattern condition: a state represents a given external feature provided that there is a success pattern present in the behavioural output, and the system uses this state as a proxy for the presence of this external feature. However, this condition is not sufficient for minimal intentionality – there are both intentional and non-intentional success patterns. Another minimal condition is, hence, required to draw this distinction. I propose the constancy mechanism condition: a state is representational provided that the system employs a constancy mechanism in its production. The success pattern and constancy mechanism conditions jointly constitute the dual proposal for minimal intentionality. I argue that this proposal is explanatorily justified and, so, properly demarcates the limits of intentionality. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epistemology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis is plausibly false, because (...) belief in God is not just like a scientific hypothesis, and the second thesis is likely true if epistemic externalism is the correct view. However, even if the second thesis is true, I argue that to work on good arguments for God’s existence is unavoidable in order to cope with a new version of the Great Pumpkin objection, as well as to achieve other relevant purposes such as to convince rational observers outside the theistic community that belief in God is likely justified or warranted. (shrink)

The Weatherall Report claims that research on non-human primates is permitted and morally required. The argument rests on the following thought experiment: > The hospital fire : A hospital is on fire. Some of the residents are humans and others are non-human animals. You can only save one group. What do you do? Some people have the intuition that we should rescue the humans. According to the report, if we accept that human lives have priority over non-human lives in this (...) case, consistency requires us to support the use of non-human animals in research. This is because both cases are about saving human lives at the expense of the lives of non-human animals. Two critical replies appeared in the literature, by E J Moore1 and Muireann Quigley.2 In a recent paper3 Gardar Arnason claims that such objections fail. I will argue, however, that his assessment is unconvincing. The first objection pressed by Moore is that there are fundamental disanalogies between The hospital fire and biomedical research. In that scenario we face a life-or-death emergency situation whereas in biomedical research we do not. In such situations it may be justified to prioritise those closest to us (eg, species …. (shrink)

Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B (...) even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages (...) of the reductionist approach to explaining the phenomenon of group testimony. (shrink)