Current EEG research emphasizes gamma band coherence as a signature of functional integration, that is, the solution to the binding problem. We note that spatial patterns of coherent neural activity are also observed at other EEG frequencies. If these oscillations reflect Nunez's resonant modes, they offer a solution to the binding problem that emerges naturally from the architecture of cortical connections.

Mipam on Buddha-Nature: The Ground of the Nying-ma Tradition. By Douglas S. Duckworth. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008. Pp. xxxiv + 292. $80 ; $27.95.

This article proposes a model for the project of integrating the field of clinical psychology with Catholic intellectual tradition. “Integration” here is understood as the project by which psychology’s understanding of the human person is illuminated and perfected by drawing on anthropological knowledge from outside psychology, specifically from Catholic philosophy and divine revelation. The article sets forth a definition of integration in the form of six principles. Ratherthan formulating the principles as descriptive premises, they are formulated as habits of mind, (...) intellectual qualities that one possesses, and when possessed, capacitate one to do Christian scholarly integration. The model is flexible enough to be adapted for use in integrating other social sciences, as well as, to some degree, the hard sciences. (shrink)

English summary: The contributions to this volume discuss the philosophical development of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) in the first half of the 19th century. In 1801, Schelling presented a broad concept for a systematic philosophy in which all of Nature and the whole spiritual world are understood as phenomena of one and the same principle. In 1809, he presented his Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom, a conception that appears to contradict the system drafted in 1801. (...) Schelling scholars fiercely dispute over this phase between his philosophy of identity and his treatise on freedom. The contributions to this volume clearly show for the first time the development of Schelling's philosophy leading up to his treatise on freedom as a continuation of his earlier work. In this way, important issues concerning the development of Schelling's philosophy are clarified, and are of interest far beyond the narrower field of Schelling scholarship. German text. German description: Die Beitrage thematisieren die philosophische Entwicklung Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schellings (1775-1854) im ersten Jahrzehnt des 19. Jahrhunderts. Schelling hatte 1801 einen umfassenden Entwurf einer systematischen Philosophie vorgelegt, in dem die gesamte Natur und die gesamte Geisteswelt als Erscheinungen ein und desselben Prinzips verstanden werden. Im Jahre 1809 legte er mit der Schrift Philosophische Untersuchungen uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit eine Konzeption vor, die dem Systementwurf von 1801 scheinbar widerspricht. In der Schelling-Forschung ist diese Entwicklungsphase zwischen Identitatsphilosophie und Freiheitsschrift heftig umstritten. Die Beitrage des Bandes machen nun erstmals die Entwicklung der Philosophie Schellings hin zur Freiheitsschrift als eine kontinuierliche Weiterentwicklung seines Ansatzes von 1801 deutlich. Damit kommt es zu einer Klarung wichtiger werkgeschichtlicher Entwicklungsprobleme in der Philosophie Schellings, die weit uber den engeren Bereich der Schelling-Forschung von Interesse sind. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant's Fourth Piece Religion has two main parts that further develop the distinction between two “experiments”. Part One titled “On the Service of God in a Religion Generally” has sections dealing with natural religion and scholarly religion, and the four sections of Part Two titled “On the Pseudoservice of God in a Statutory Religion” focus on themes that alternate between the first and second experiments. Given the importance of immortality to Kant's conception of the highest good, one should not (...) be surprised that, after he interprets Jesus’ gospel as being thoroughly consistent with his moral theory, he devotes a new paragraph to demonstrating that Jesus also acknowledged the “natural” (rational) need for moral persons who have lived this life in a way that requires numerous “sacrifices of happiness” to be able to look forward to a better situation in the afterlife. (shrink)

Kripke and Putnam have convinced most philosophers that we cannot do metaphysics of nature by analysing the senses of natural kind terms -- simply because natural kind terms do not have senses. Neo-descriptivists, especially Frank Jackson and David Chalmers, believe that this view is mistaken. Merging classical descriptivism with a Kaplan-inspired two-dimensional framework, neo-descriptivists devise a semantics for natural kind terms that assigns natural kind terms so-called 'primary intensions'. Since primary intensions are senses by other names, Jackson and Chalmers (...) conclude that we can and should do metaphysics of nature by analysing the natural kind concepts competent speakers possess. I argue that neo-descriptivism does not provide a suitable basis for doing this kind of metaphysics. I first of all give a detailed account of the neo-descriptivist semantics and deflate the intuitive support neo-descriptivists try to draw from their case of the XYZ-world. I then present three arguments -- the Argument from Ignorance, the Argument from Conceptual Analysis, and the Argument from Laziness. Taken together, these arguments undermine the neo-descriptivist analysis of natural kind terms. I conclude that natural kind terms do not have senses, that we cannot do metaphysics of nature by analysing the senses of our kind terms, and that the Kripke-Putnam account still provides the best semantics for natural kind terms we have. (shrink)

Christian Leduc | : Dans le présent article, je montre que Maupertuis et Euler proposent une conception contrastée de la métaphysique de la nature. Il s’agit principalement pour eux de repositionner la cosmologie par rapport aux sciences de la nature. Au lieu de considérer la métaphysique comme étant au fondement des théories scientifiques, comme le supposent Descartes, Wolff et, d’une certaine manière, Kant, ou simplement d’interdire l’idée même d’une cosmologie, comme le stipulerait à la même époque d’Alembert, Maupertuis (...) et Euler, renversent l’ordre des disciplines pour donner aux sciences physiques une primauté sur la métaphysique. Ce repositionnement entraîne évidemment plusieurs questions : d’abord, de quelle manière les théories scientifiques peuvent-elles valider ou infirmer un principe métaphysique? Plus important encore, quel rôle incombe à la métaphysique de la nature, étant donné que les sciences possèdent non seulement une autonomie théorique, mais même une priorité sur les réflexions ontologiques. Il semblerait d’ailleurs que la métaphysique se réduise, pour ces deux philosophes, au seul domaine du cosmologique, en particulier aux questions qui concernent la force et le principe de moindre action, au statut ontologique de l’espace et du temps et aux déterminations de la matière que sont l’étendue, l’inertie, l’impénétrabilité et le mouvement. | : In this paper, I show that Maupertuis and Euler offer a contrasting conception of metaphysics of nature. It consists mainly for them in repositioning cosmology in relation to natural sciences. Instead of considering metaphysics to be at the foundation of scientific theories, as was assumed by Descartes, Wolff, and, in a certain way, Kant, or simply prohibiting the very idea of a cosmology, as d’Alembert would stipulate at the same period, Maupertuis and Euler invert the order of disciplines to give priority to physical sciences over metaphysics. This repositioning leads of course to several questions : first, how does scientific theories validate or deny metaphysical principles? Even more important, which role falls to metaphysics of nature given that sciences not only possess a theoretical autonomy, but also a priority over ontological reflections? Besides, it seems that metaphysics would be reduced, for these two philosophers, to the realm of cosmology alone, in particular to questions concerning force and the principle of least action, the ontological status of space and time, and the first constituents of matter, such as extension, inertia, impenetrability, and motion. (shrink)

Christian Pfeiffer explores an important, but neglected topic in Aristotle's theoretical philosophy: the theory of bodies. A body is a three-dimensionally extended and continuous magnitude bounded by surfaces. This notion is distinct from the notion of a perceptible or physical substance. Substances have bodies, that is to say, they are extended, their parts are continuous with each other and they have boundaries, which demarcate them from their surroundings. Pfeiffer argues that body, thus understood, has a pivotal role in Aristotle's natural (...) philosophy. A theory of body is a presupposed in, e.g., Aristotle's account of the infinite, place, or action and passion, because their being bodies explains why things have a location or how they can act upon each other. The notion of body can be ranked among the central concepts for natural science which are discussed in Physics III-IV. (shrink)

Chapter I. The Origin of Value. The popular impression is that value originates in utility, but certain well-k nown phenomena seem to contradict this. The duty of the value theorist is not to ignore either side, but to interpret the actual valuations of men in economic life: and the test of the theory is that his value is their value.

This essay examines the relationship between Marti Kheel’s ecofeminism, particularly as articulated in her recent book Nature Ethics, and holistic eco-philosophy. It begins by arguing that while Kheel’s view shares some common ground with holistic thinkers, her position is best understood as one that re-conceives the meaning of holism. Next, her comments on species preservation are discussed both to show her individualism, and to highlight a weakness in her approach to issues involving at-risk species. It is then suggested that (...) one could develop a more holistic answer to questions about species that is consonant with Kheel’s overall philosophical approach. (shrink)

Was wir inhaltlich unter der Natur des Menschen verstehen sollten, ist ebenso umstritten wie ihr ontologischer Status, also ob es sie überhaupt gibt. Nach einer Klärung des Begriffsfeldes mit Blick auf Aristoteles wird auf die Neudeutung des Begriffs durch die christliche Philosophie eingegangen, aus der sich die zentralen Konfliktlinien der Gegenwart erklären: Eine naturalisierende Deutung unserer Natur steht gegen eine sozial-konstruktivistische, nach der die Natur ein kulturelles Produkt ist. Dazu kommen anti-essenzialistische (nominalistische) Weltbilder, die eine allgemeine „Natur des Menschen“ zurückweisen. (...) Die verschiedenen Positionen und Diskussionen werden skizziert und abschließend argumentiert, dass viel dafür spricht, an einer Natur des Menschen festzuhalten, auch wenn dies metaphysisch einen Preis hat. Aber der Preis dafür, den Mensch in der dünnen Luft der Wesenslosigkeit verwehen zu lassen, wäre höher. (shrink)

Book synopsis: The five volumes contain the main papers and lectures of invited speakers that were presented at the X. International Kant Congress in Sao Paolo in 2005.

This book explores human-nature connectedness through deep ecological philosophy and conservation social science. Emphasizing ecologically-inclusive identities, it argues that connection to nature is more important than many environmental advocates realize and that deep ecology contributes much to the increasingly pressing conversations about it.

This groundbreaking book proposes that the universe around us is literally alive and conscious. This worldview restores a sense of the sacred to modern lives that have too long insisted that mind, spirit, and consciousness must be divorced from body, nature, and matter. Going back to the earliest days of Western philosophy, this book illustrates how the notion of intrinsically sentient matter is thousands of years old and has only recently been challenged by the currently dominant paradigm of materialism. (...) By recognizing that matter feels, one can more closely relate to our bodies, planet, and cosmic environment as magnificent creations brimming with spirit and meaning. (shrink)

›Natur‹ ist von natura, und damit durch das zusammengesetzte Suffix -tu-ra von dem lateinischen Verb nasci abgeleitet. Solche Suffixe drücken in der Regel eine Tätigkeit oder ein Ergebnis aus. Sie sind nicht wörtlich zu übersetzen; ›natura‹ ließe sich vielleicht noch am besten als das ewig Tätige, Produzierende oder Entstandene umschreiben.

Malcolm Jeeves, ed., Rethinking Human Nature: A Multidisciplinary Approach Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 269-270 Authors Christian Smith, Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA Journal Journal of Critical Realism Online ISSN 1572-5138 Print ISSN 1476-7430 Journal Volume Volume 11 Journal Issue Volume 11, Number 2 / 2012.

Dewey’s influence is seldom mentioned in the literature when the relationships between Wittgenstein and pragmatism are addressed. Yet, it should be known that Dewey’s philosophy is clearly echoed in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, as it is expressed in his Philosophical Investigations. In particular, Dewey’s Experience and Nature develops many creeds also taken up by Wittgenstein: for instance, the critic attitude towards artificial notions that break with primary experience (e.g., the “Self”), the will to bring philosophy back to the ordinary, or (...) the emphasis laid on the necessity to pay attention to what lies open to the view. Consequently, the influence of pragmatism on Wittgenstein is far from being limited to the influence of C. S. Peirce or of W. James. (shrink)

In his introductions to the encyclopaedic Philosophy of Nature and to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel distinguishes between three ‘attitudes’ (Verhaltensweisen, Einstellungen) towards nature—the theoretical, the practical and the philosophical attitude. According to him there is a certain ‘contradiction’ or tension between our theoretical attitude towards nature, which makes it an object of scientific inquiry, and the practical attitude that we assume as living rational beings who intervene in nature and shape it (...) according to our purposes. This article focuses on how exactly to pinpoint that tension and on how it is resolved in what Hegel calls the ‘philosophical’ or ‘comprehending’ attitude towards nature. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the central issue of philosophical anthropology: the relation between nature and culture. Although Rousseau was the first thinker to introduce this topic within the modern discourse of philosophy and the cultural sciences, it has its origin in Diogenes the Cynic, who was a disciple of Socrates. In my essay I (1) historically introduce a few aspects of philosophical anthropology, (2) deal with the nature–culture exchange, as introduced in Kant, then I (3) relate this (...) topic to the Ancient Cynic Diogenes. Surprisingly, although we usually identify Critical Theory and Freudian psychoanalysis as theories that have shown that cultural progress should not be comprehended as a development from nature to culture, and that instead it should be conceived as a development from culture against (external as well as internal) nature, I show that Cynicism can be conceived as a vivid example within the history of our culture that reveals a double sense of repression and alienation, which is part of human civilization and mankind. (shrink)

Aristotle's theory of intellect is notoriously difficult, due basically to the scarcity of textual evidence. It has therefore always been controversial and often subject to the systematic biases of its interpretators. In order to provide a fresh and objective perspective on the text itself this book offers a detailed study of the fundamental text, Aristotle's De anima III 4-5, by giving an improved Greek text, extensive commentary, and discussion. An examination of several other important Aristotelian passages on the intellect is (...) also included. The analysis shows that Aristotle distinguishes clearly between the active and the passive intellect, but that the active intellect is not actively involved in cognitive processes, such as abstraction, but the pure principle of actuality in the soul. On this basis ancient and medieval commentators identified the human and divine intellects. (shrink)

This essay critically engages the concept of transcendence in Charles Taylor's A Secular Age. I explore his definition of transcendence, its role in holding a modernity-inspired nihilism at bay, and how it is crucial to the Christian antihumanist argument that he makes. In the process, I show how the critical power of this analysis depends heavily and paradoxically on the Nietzschean antihumanism that he otherwise rejects. Through an account of what I describe as naturalistic Christianity, I argue that transcendence need (...) not be construed as supernatural, that all of the resources necessary for a meaningful life are immanent in the natural process, which includes the semiotic capacities of Homo sapiens. Finally, I triangulate Taylor's supernatural account of transcendence, naturalistic Christianity, and Dreyfus and Kelly's physis-based account of “going beyond” our normal normality in All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics for Meaning in a Secular Age. (shrink)

Standard arguments for essentialism with respect to natural kinds such as gold, star, water or tiger enlist essentialist principles or essentialist intuitions. I argue that we need neither. All it takes to establish essentialism for the kinds in question are insights from science and semantics. Semantics establishes that natural kind predicates such as “is gold” or “is a star” are paradigm terms whose application conditions are relationally determined, object involving, and actuality dependent. Science assures us that a posteriori hypotheses such (...) as “∀x” are deeply explanatory, as well as true. Taken together, these results establish essentialism for kinds such as gold, star, water or tiger. I consider this a deflationary result. When it comes to natural kind essentialism, there is no need for substantial metaphysics, be it essentialist or otherwise. (shrink)

The contributions in this volume focus on the Bayesian interpretation of natural languages, which is widely used in areas of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and computational linguistics. This is the first volume to take up topics in Bayesian Natural Language Interpretation and make proposals based on information theory, probability theory, and related fields. The methodologies offered here extend to the target semantic and pragmatic analyses of computational natural language interpretation. Bayesian approaches to natural language semantics and pragmatics are based on (...) methods from signal processing and the causal Bayesian models pioneered by especially Pearl. In signal processing, the Bayesian method finds the most probable interpretation by finding the one that maximizes the product of the prior probability and the likelihood of the interpretation. It thus stresses the importance of a production model for interpretation as in Grice’s contributions to pragmatics or in interpretation by abduction. (shrink)

This essay explores doctrinal issues in the philosophical and theological debates on human nature and self-love in the early 18th century. It focuses on the arguments between the Scottish philosopher and theologian Archibald Campbell and the Committee for Purity of Doctrine concerning Campbell’s Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue (1733). These centre in particular on Campbell’s supposedly unorthodox account of self-love as a virtuous principle and the connected more general view of human nature as tending towards virtue. (...) A comparison with the situation in Geneva shows that similar views were held by influential theologians such as Jean-Alphonse Turrettini and Jacob Vernet. (shrink)

It has been claimed that Val Plumwood’s work is vulnerable to the same charge of “assimi­lationism” that she has leveled against moral extensionist viewpoints. It is argued that while one might regard Plumwood’s position as suspect because of its emphasis on human-nature continuity, associating claims of continuity with assimilationism could lead one to seek a mode of relating to nature as absolutely other, a move which is claimed to be problematic for several reasons. Because the extensionist error is (...) not simply that of acknowledging human-nature continuity, Plumwood’s position is not extensionist in any objectionable sense. This issue is connected up with the ongoing debate about “perspectival anthropocentrism” in environmental ethics; however, allowing for human epistemic locatedness does not force the conclusion that all environmental ethics is ultimately assimilationist. (shrink)

Der Essay zur Natur der Sprache entwickelt eine neue und unvoreingenommene Sicht auf Sprache, die die wichtigsten Sprachbegriffe zunachst dekonstruiert, um daraufhin nach moglichen Rekonstruktionen zu suchen. Dabei werden nicht nur die aktuellen Diskurse der Bewusstseinsphilosophie, Sprachphilosophie und Allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft, sondern auch der evolutionaren Anthropologie und Kognitionspsychologie neu bewertet und zusammengefuhrt. Denn den einen Sprachbegriff gibt es nicht und ihn stets schon vorauszusetzen, wenn wir uber Sprache diskutieren, bedeutet, bei der Suche nach der Sprache und den Antworten auf die Fragen, (...) die von ihr abhangen, im Kreis zu gehen.". (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article presents two letters from the Glaswegian theologian John Simson (1667–1740) to his former student Archibald Campbell (1691–1756), professor of ecclesiastical history at St. Andrews as of 1733. After Simson’s condemnation for heresy in 1727–1728, Simson was in regular contact with Campbell, who also came to be scrutinised by a Committee for Purity of Doctrine in 1735–1736. The two letters by Simson address Campbell’s claim that without the support of divine revelation, natural reason is unable to discover any (...) essential religious truths. Campbell presented this claim as directed against the Deists, but was accused by conservatively orthodox theologians of undermining the tenet of postlapsarian mankind’s inexcusability. In his letters, Simson argues for a stronger conception of natural reason – however not to protect inexcusability, but to argue for God’s goodness. In different ways, Simson and Campbell may thus both be seen to make elbow room for justification by works, and to encourage religious tolerance. (shrink)

Rohwer & Marris claim that “many conservation biologists” believe that there is a prima facie duty to preserve the genetic integrity of species. (A prima facie duty is a necessary pro tanto moral reason.) They describe three possible arguments for that belief and reject them all. They conclude that the biologists they cite are mistaken, and that there is no such duty: duties to preserve genetic integrity are merely instrumental: we ought act to preserve genetic integrity only because doing so (...) is required by some other duty, such as the duty to preserve taxonomic biodiversity, or the duty to preserve the reproductive fitness of existing species. In permitting for instance the introgression of cattle genes into the genome of Bison bison we therefore do not necessarily fail in any respect ethically. I criticize the paper on three fronts. (shrink)

The classification-cum-explanation Kripke assigns to rigidity requires the notion to apply to singular and general terms alike. But Kripke's own notion of rigidity is tailor-made for singular terms, and an extensive debate has not secured a general notion of rigidity apt to provide the classification-cum-explanation Kripke aims for. I propose that we look for a Kripkean alternative to generalized rigidity. I argue that on Kripkean premises, natural kind terms and proper names belong to the meta-semantic category of paradigm terms. I (...) also argue that the property of being a paradigm term effects precisely the classification-cum-explanation Kripke attributes to rigidity. I conclude that Kripkeans should acknowledge that being a paradigm term, rather than designating rigidly, plays the role Kripke delineates, and that we can stop worrying about generalizing rigidity. Kripke's notion works fine for singular terms. And there is no need for rigidity to apply beyond these. (shrink)

The doctrine of creation and the knowledge of nature have come into tension in modernity. Against this background, the article discusses the basic problems of a theology of nature starting from a systematic theology of religious communication. Dogmatic statements about the world as God’s creation are not about a description of nature and reality but about a reflexive account of Christian–religious communication. The object of the doctrine of creation is thus the world-related contents of the Christian religion (...) as well as the function these have in it. Thus, both the critique of the representational version of the doctrinal tradition’s conception of creation and its reflexive turn in 20th-century Protestant theology are taken up and carried forward in such a way that the belief in creation is not understood as a general qualification of the world but is related to the concrete contents of religious communication. Contribution: The article proposes a new formulation of the traditional doctrine of creation on the basis of a systematic theology of religious communication. This approach is intended to avoid a coexistence of religious belief in creation and scientific explanation of the world, as well as their being pushed into one another. By transferring the belief in creation to Christian–religious communication, the latter thematises how religious contents are created in the Christian religion. (shrink)

Suppose that the members of a group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, and imagine that the group itself has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that (...) difficulty illustrates. Our paper describes this impossibility result and provides an exploration of its significance. The result naturally invites comparison with Kenneth Arrow's famous theorem (Arrow, 1963 and 1984; Sen, 1970) and we elaborate that comparison in a companion paper (List and Pettit, 2002). The paper is in four sections. The first section documents the need for various groups to aggregate its members' judgments; the second presents the discursive paradox; the third gives an informal statement of the more general impossibility result; the formal proof is presented in an appendix. The fourth section, finally, discusses some escape routes from that impossibility. (shrink)

Steve Paulson, executive producer and host of To the Best of Our Knowledge, moderated a discussion with philosopher Christian Miller, neuroscientist Heather Berlin, and historian of science Michael Shermer to examine our moral ecology and its influence on our underlying assumptions about human nature.

Zusammenfassung: Bis zu welchem Grad ist eine mit dem Lebens- und Gesundheitsschutz begründete Einschränkung von Grundrechten und des gesellschaftlichen Lebens, wie bei der gegenwärtigen Covid-19-Pandemie, aus ethischer und rechtsphilosophischer Sicht legitim? Ethik und Recht und nicht die Medizin sind es, die in diesen Fragen letztlich den normativen Orientierungsrahmen geben müssen – was nicht ausschließt, dass auch medizinische Argumente bei der Deliberation eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Es stellen sich deshalb Fragen nach diesem normativen Orientierungsrahmen und danach, wie die Berufung auf das (...) „Recht auf Leben und körperliche Unversehrtheit“ und eine davon abgeleitete staatliche Aufgabe des Lebensschutzes gegenüber diesem einzuordnen sind. Hierfür ist zunächst auf die Begriffe der „Person“ und der „Menschenwürde“ einzugehen, wobei ich mich insbesondere an Kant orientiere. Es stellen sich hierbei Fragen sowohl nach dem Recht als auch nach dem Verhältnis der menschlichen Person zur Natur bzw. zum Leben. Hier ist dann über Kants Dualismus hinaus zu einer in zweifacher Hinsicht stärker „integrativen“ Perspektive überzugehen, die den Menschen als personal-leibliche Einheit bzw. als personales Naturwesen begreift und auch methodisch eine Vielfalt relevanter Perspektiven einbezieht und von der her sich auch Konsequenzen für das Verhältnis zu Viren und für den Begriff der Gesundheit ergeben. Die hiermit angesprochenen naturphilosophischen und anthropologischen Aspekte sind dennoch zugleich vor dem Hintergrund Kants normativ einzubinden. Als absoluter Selbstzweck können dabei nicht das Leben und die Gesundheit gelten, sondern nur die menschliche Würde. Vor diesem Hintergrund betrachte ich einige zentrale Argumente der gesellschaftlichen und juristischen Debatten, die im Zuge des ersten Lockdowns im Frühjahr 2020 geführt wurden, speziell zum Verhältnis von Würde und Leben und zur Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung in Bezug auf die Einschränkung von Grundrechten. Dass es hierbei eines differen-zierten Umgangs mit verschiedenen Gruppen von Betroffenen bedarf, zeige ich an den Beispielen von Senior:innen in Pflegeheimen sowie Kindern und Jugendlichen. Als Ergebnis halte ich fest: Der Schutz des Lebens ist der Würde des Einzelnen im Zweifel unterzuordnen; es bedarf einer integrativen Perspektive und eines differenzierten Vorgehens, das verschiedene Personengruppen auch hinsichtlich ihrer jeweiligen besonderen Situation entsprechend berücksichtigt. (shrink)