To integrate social robots in real-life contexts, it is crucial that they are accepted by the users. Acceptance is not only related to the functionality of the robot but also strongly depends on how the user experiences the interaction. Established design principles from usability and user experience research can be applied to the realm of human–robot interaction, to design robot behavior for the comfort and well-being of the user. Focusing the design on these aspects alone, however, comes with certain ethical (...) challenges, especially regarding the user’s privacy and autonomy. Based on an example scenario of human–robot interaction in elder care, this paper discusses how established design principles can be used in social robotic design. It then juxtaposes these with ethical considerations such as privacy and user autonomy. Combining user experience and ethical perspectives, we propose adjustments to the original design principles and canvass our own design recommendations for a positive and ethically acceptable social human–robot interaction design. In doing so, we show that positive user experience and ethical design may be sometimes at odds, but can be reconciled in many cases, if designers are willing to adjust and amend time-tested design principles. (shrink)

While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, (...) we discuss how to adapt these traditionally sociological methods to empirically inform philosophical questions. Our aim is to normalize and legitimize qualitative methods for philosophical purposes and discuss how they can elucidate descriptive and normative components of scientific practice in a more generalizable non-idealized manner. We contend that qualitative methods are particularly well suited to philosophical interest in the social norms of science, their achievability, and their mutability. Furthermore, unlike more historical case studies in philosophy, qualitative methods enable more confidence in generalizability, albeit limited, from a concrete sample to a larger class. We conclude by addressing anxieties about the distinctness of empirical philosophy of science from social epistemology and from sociology of science. (shrink)

Analysis and comparison of genetic screening programs shows that the extent of development of programs varies widely across Europe. Regional variations are due not only to genetic disease patterns but also reflect the novelty of genetic services. In most countries, the focus for genetic screening programs has been pregnant women and newborn children. Newborn children are screened only for disorders which are treatable. Prenatal screening when provided is for conditions for which termination may be offered. The only population screening programs (...) for adults are those for thalassaemia carrier status in Cyprus, Greece and Italy. Social responses to genetic screening range from acceptance to hostility. There is a fundamental tension between individual and communi ty in the debates in various European countries about implementation of screening programs. Opposition to genetic screening is frequently expressed in terms of arguments about "eugenics" with insufficient regard to the meaning of the term and its implications. Only a few countries have introduced explicit legislation on genetic screening. Legislation to address discrimination may provide more safeguards than legislation protecting genetic information itself. (shrink)

Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to educate them about the nature of their oppression. I argue that epistemic exploitation is marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor. The coercive and exploitative aspects of the phenomenon are exemplified by the unpaid nature of the educational labor and its associated opportunity costs, the double bind that marginalized persons must navigate when faced with the demand to educate, and the need for additional labor created by the default (...) skepticism of the privileged. I explore the connections between epistemic exploitation and the two varieties of epistemic injustice that Fricker (2007) identifies, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. I situate epistemic exploitation within Dotson’s (2012; 2014) framework of epistemic oppression, and I address the role that epistemic exploitation plays in maintaining active ignorance and upholding dominant epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

Four detailed cases of delusions of misidentification (DM) are presented: two cases of misidentification of the reflected self, one of reverse intermetamorphosis, and one of reduplicative paramnesia. The cases are discussed in the context of three levels of interpretation: neurological, cognitive and phenomenological. The findings are compared to previous work with DM patients, particularly the work of Ellis and Young (1990; Young, 1998) who found that loss of the normal affective response to familiar faces was a contributing factor in the (...) Capgras delusion. The four cases presented suggest that this particular deficit is not a critical factor in the development of other forms of DM. (shrink)

The demand for bodily parts such as organs is increasing, and individuals in certain circumstances are responding by offering parts of their bodies for sale. Is there anything wrong in this? Kant had arguments to suggest that there is, namely that we have duties towards our own bodies, among which is the duty not to sell parts of them. Kant's reasons for holding this view are examined, and found to depend on a notion of what is intrinsically degrading. Rom Harré's (...) recent revision of Kant's argument, in terms of an obligation to preserve the body's organic integrity, is considered. Harré's view does not rule out all acts of selling, but he too ultimately depends on a test of what is intrinsically degrading. Both his view and Kant's are rejected in favour of a view which argues that it does make sense to speak of duties towards our own bodies, grounded in the duty to promote the flourishing of human beings, including ourselves. This provides a reason for opposing the sale of bodily parts, and the current trend towards the market ethic in health care provision. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.4 (2004) 299-301 [Access article in PDF] The Right Not to Know: A Challenge for Accurate Self-Assessment Ruth F. Chadwick Anderson and Lux present a very interesting and thought-provoking argument for the view that accurate self-assessment is a requirement for personal autonomy. What I want to suggest is that although this may be helpful in the context with which these authors are primarily concerned, (...) namely psychiatry and brain dysfunction, it is of less value to an account of autonomy more widely construed. I want to look at a possible counterexample, taken from another area of medicine, namely genetics.Toward the end of their article Anderson and Lux consider three objections to their position. I shall not discuss them all. My concern is with the third, that inaccurate self-assessment sometimes promotes autonomy, because knowing the truth about one's weaknesses is sometimes very debilitating. It is commonly argued that "you can if you think you can" and vice versa. As they point out, there are some complex issues involved here, in that if the result of the positive thinking is the ability to do the thing in question, then how can the self-assessment be deemed to have been inaccurate in the first place? They go on, however, to say that "it is unclear that inflated self-assessments yield benefits in contexts where what is required is not just effort but competence" (290).Now it has been argued, by some, in the context of genetics, that the proper understanding of autonomy may imply a "right not to know" facts about oneself. In other words, this is not just a matter of accurate or inaccurate assessment of the relevant facts about oneself; rather, what may be involved is a deliberate decision not to have access to facts that may be relevant to that assessment. There are clearly cases in which genetic information appears to be pertinent to an accurate self-assessment, as the following example suggests. Suppose there is information "available", through genetic testing, that would affect one's chances of having children, or of having children without a particular genetic disorder, and, knowing that such information is available, a couple decides not to avail themselves of this. This is clearly an inaccurate self-assessment, but is their autonomy compromised?It might be thought that the reasons for this decision not to know could be relevant. If they have no family history of any particular genetic disorder, it could be regarded as subjectively reasonable to decline such testing as might be offered. Anderson and Lux, however, argue that whether or not a self-assessment is accurate depends on externalities. In other words, A's self-assessment is not to be assessed as accurate, or [End Page 299] not, according to what it is subjectively reasonable to believe; it has to be measured against the facts. The more that the possibilities of genetic testing increase, the more that "facts" of this nature will be available, including in the context of psychiatry.It might be objected that genetic information is not the type of information that is relevant in this context. In so far as it is predictive and probabilistic it is, arguably, different from the type of diagnostic information involved in the cases discussed by Anderson and Lux. It is not the place here, however, to discuss in general terms the thesis of "genetic exceptionalism" with regard to medical information. The important point is refusal of access to information that may be relevant to an accurate self-assessment. Historically, people have been mistaken in their self-assessment because of lack of information—for example, lack of understanding of facts about the reproduction process has led individuals automatically to blame the woman partner of a couple for infertility. And, as Anderson and Lux rightly point out, being autonomous is compatible with making mistakes, and indeed requires the freedom to make mistakes, it would look rather different if a person continued to hold this without any attempt to avail himself of the relevant—and now available—information... (shrink)

Background: Nurses need moral courage to ensure ethically good care. Moral courage is an individual characteristic and therefore it is relevant to examine its association with nurses’ socio-demographic factors. Objective: To describe nurses’ self-assessed level of moral courage and its association with their socio-demographic factors. Research design: Quantitative descriptive cross-sectional study. The data were collected with Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale and analyzed statistically. Participants and research context: A total of 482 registered nurses from a major university hospital in Southern Finland (...) completed the Finnish language version of Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale in autumn 2017. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval was obtained from the university ethics committee and permission for the data collection from the participating hospital. Ethical principles and scientific guidelines were followed throughout the research process. Findings: Nurses’ self-assessed level of moral courage was rather high. On Visual Analogy Scale (0–10), the mean value was 8.20 and the mean score of the four dimensional, 21-item Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale was 4.09 on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents’ gender, present work role, ethical knowledge base, additional ethics education, self-study as a means to acquire ethical knowledge, and frequency of work situations needing moral courage were statistically significantly associated with nurses’ moral courage. Discussion: Strongest association was found between nurses’ higher moral courage level and formal and informal ethics education. Honesty and patient’s humane and dignified encounter received the highest scores indicating respondents’ internalization of the core values of nursing. Conclusion: Although nurses were fairly morally courageous, moral courage should be a part of nurses’ basic and continuing education thus covering its theoretical and practical learning. Since moral courage is a virtue that can be taught, learnt, and practiced, education is a relevant way to maintain and further strengthen nurses’ moral courage. (shrink)

In a recent editorial published in Nature, the journal's editors comment on a new automated software that has been used to check findings in psychology publications. The editors express concern with the way in which the anonymous fact-checkers have proceeded, but at the same time, they underscore the crucial role of peer criticism for scientific progress and insist: "self-correction is at the heart of science." Brief as it is, the editorial showcases that peer criticism and the application of norms of (...) good research practice are very thorny issues indeed.It is essential for the functioning of science that empirical findings, arguments, as well as methodological approaches are scrutinized... (shrink)

The paper assesses current rising reparations claims for the Maafa/ Maangamizi from two angles. First, it explores the connectivity of reparations and global justice, peace and security. Second, it discusses how the claim is justified in international law. The concept of reparations in international law is also explored, revealing that reparations cannot be limited to financial compensation due to the nature of the damage and international law prescriptions. Comprehensive reparations based in international law require the removal of structures built on (...) centuries of illegal acts and aggression, in the forms of transatlantic slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Reparations must also lead to the restitution of sovereignty to African and indigenous peoples globally. They are indispensable to halt the destruction of the earth as human habitat, caused by the violent European cultural, political, socio-economic system known as capitalism that is rooted in transatlantic slavery. (shrink)

The so-called “conciliatory” norm in epistemology and meta-ethics requires that an agent, upon encountering peer disagreement with her judgment, lower her confidence about that judgment. But whether agents actually abide by this norm is unclear. Although confidence is excessively researched in the empirical sciences, possible effects of disagreement on confidence have been understudied. Here, we target this lacuna, reporting a study that measured confidence about moral beliefs before and after exposure to moral discourse about a controversial issue. Our findings indicate (...) that participants do not abide by the conciliatory norm. Neither do they conform to a rival “steadfast” norm that demands their confidence to remain the same. Instead, moral discourse seems to boost confidence. Interestingly, we also find a confidence boost for factual beliefs, and a correlation between the extremity of moral views and confidence. One possible explanation of our findings is that when engaging in moral discourse participants become more extreme in their opinions, which leads them to become more confident about them, or vice versa: they become more confident and in turn more extreme. Although our work provides initial evidence for the former mechanism, further research is needed for a better understanding of confidence and moral discourse. (shrink)

Genetic research has moved from Mendelian genetics to sequence maps to the study of natural human genetic variation at the level of the genome. This past decade of discovery has been accompanied by a shift in emphasis towards the ethical principles of reciprocity, mutuality, solidarity, citizenry and universality.

The term “industrial action” includes any noncooperation with management, such as strict “working to rule,” refusal of certain duties, going slow, and ultimately withdrawal of labor. The latter form of action, striking, has posed particular problems for professional ethics, especially in those professions that provide healthcare, because of the potential impact on patients' well-being. Examination of the issues, however, displays a difference in response between the healthcare professions, in particular between doctors and nurses. In considering the ethics of industrial (especially (...) strike) action there are various aspects of professional ethics to consider: (1) whether there is a tension between industrial action and the very notion of professional ethics; (2) what specific issues arise in the case of healthcare professions; (3) what, if anything, can explain and/or justify different responses from the medical and nursing professions? (shrink)

The privacy concerns discussed in the 1990s in relation to the New Genetics failed to anticipate the relevant issues for individuals, families, geneticists and society. Consumers, for example, can now buy their personal genetic information and share it online. The challenges facing genetic privacy have evolved as new biotechnologies have developed, and personal privacy is increasingly challenged by the irrepressible flow of electronic data between the personal and public spheres and by surveillance for terrorism and security risks. This book considers (...) the right to know and the right not to know about your own and others’ genomes. It discusses new privacy concerns and developments in ethical thinking, with the greater emphasis on solidarity and equity. The multidisciplinary approach covers current topics such as biobanks and forensic databases, DIY testing, group rights and accountability, the food we eat and the role of the press and the new digital media. (shrink)

There is good reason to believe that scientific realism requires a commitment to the objective modal structure of the physical world. Causality, equilibrium, laws of nature, and probability all feature prominently in scientific theory and explanation, and each one is a modal notion. If we are committed to the content of our best scientific theories, we must accept the modal nature of the physical world. But what does the scientific realist’s commitment to physical modality require? We consider whether scientific realism (...) is compatible with Humeanism about the laws of nature, and we conclude that it is not. We specifically identify three major problems for the best-systems account of lawhood: its central concept of strength cannot be formulated non-circularly, it cannot offer a satisfactory account of the laws of the special sciences, and it can offer no explanation of the success of inductive inference. In addition, Humeanism fails to be naturalistically motivated. For these reasons, we conclude that the scientific realist must embrace natural necessity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay argues that there was a sense in which Shelley actively approved of “jingling verse.” His poetic energy was sustained by a substratum of popular and tuneful versifying, such as impromptus, bouts-rimés, anagrams, enigmas, ballads, Mother Goose rhymes, proverbs, hymns, and drinking songs. He hybridizes the registers and meters of these humble forms with elevated, sublime, and erudite ones. This hybridization is, arguably, connected to the characteristic coexistence of the direct and clear with the knotty and puzzling in his (...) poetry. After a brief account of Shelley’s submerged youthful reading, noting in passing that Shelley’s lyrics proved amenable during the early twentieth century to recycling as Shelleyesque jingles, the essay illustrates its thesis from unfamiliar fragments in Shelley’s notebooks, such as the late lyric fragment “Time is flying,” and from more familiar matter such as “Dirge for the Year,” “Mont Blanc,” “The Cloud,” “On the Medusa of Leonardo da Vinci,” “The Sensitive... (shrink)

Despite the recent increased emphasis on ethics in health care, the subject of community health care is rarely specifically addressed. Yet it is in the community that many ethical issues arise, both in the particular practice situation and in the wider social issues connected with changes in government policy. This edited text discusses these questions and looks at the whole range of community health nursing in the UK. The multidisciplinary group of contributors explore the issues of theory and practice that (...) arise in community health care. They encourage critical reflection on the differences between hospital-based care and community care. Everyday issues are addressed that confront health practitioners working in the community, such as discrimination, mental health, standard setting, rationing in health care, public health, health promotion and discharge decision making. This book will be essential reading for practitioners on post-registration courses in community health and students following courses in health care ethics and nursing studies. (shrink)

Psychiatric disorders share an excess of seasonal birth in winter and spring, suggesting an increase of neurodevelopmental risks. Evidence suggests season of birth can serve as a proxy of harmful environmental factors. Given that prenatal exposure of these factors may trigger pathologic processes in the neurodevelopment, they may consequently lead to brain volume alterations. Here we tested the effects of season of birth on gray matter volume in a transdiagnostic sample of patients with schizophrenia and depression compared to healthy controls. (...) We found a significant effect of season of birth on gray matter volume with reduced right hippocampal volume in summer-born compared to winter-born patients with depression. In addition, the volume of the right hippocampus was reduced independent from season of birth in schizophrenia. Our results support the potential impact of season of birth on hippocampal volume in depression. (shrink)

In this landmark work of economic sociology, Lucien Karpik introduces the theory and practical tools needed to analyze markets for singularities. Singularities are goods and services that cannot be studied by standard methods because they are multidimensional, incommensurable, and of uncertain quality. Examples include movies, novels, music, artwork, fine wine, lawyers, and doctors. Valuing the Unique provides a theoretical framework to explain this important class of products and markets that for so long have eluded neoclassical economics. With this innovative theory--called (...) the economics of singularities--Karpik shows that, because of the uncertainty and the highly subjective valuation of singularities, these markets are necessarily equipped with what he calls "judgment devices"--such as labels, brands, guides, critics, and rankings--which provide consumers with the credible knowledge needed to make reasonable choices. He explains why these markets are characterized by the primacy of competition by qualities over competition by prices, and he identifies the conditions under which singularities are constructed or are in danger of losing their uniqueness. After demonstrating how combinations of the numerous and multiform judgment devices can be used to identify different market models, Karpik applies his analytical tools to the functioning of a large number of actual markets, including fine wines, movies, luxury goods, pop music, and legal services. (shrink)

This book critically reflects upon how images are mobilised within certain knowledge traditions, beyond the established categories of art, scientific visualisations and religious images. Thinking through and with images across ages, the authors seek to expand our understanding of the relationship between the visual and the epistemic.

This volume contains essays which cover a range of aspects in the debate over genetic testing. It looks at both the advantages and disadvantages involved in knowing or not knowing whether one is a carrier of certain genetic traits.

Augustine was arguably the greatest early Christian philosopher. His teachings had a profound effect on Medieval scholarship, Renaissance humanism, and the religious controversies of both the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. Here, Henry Chadwick places Augustine in his philosophical and religious context and traces the history of his influence on Western thlught, both within and beyond the Christian tradition. -- PUBLISHER DESCRIPTION.

A biography of Augustine's thought life, as interpreted by the acclaimed church historian, the late Professor Henry Chadwick. Augustine's intellectual development is recounted with clarity and warmth, providing a characteristically rigorous yet sympathetic narrative of this central figure in the history of Christian thought.

Social studies of science and technology are dominated by action and macro approaches. This has led to a neglect of institutions and institutional arrangements at the meso level, which are important, in particular to the student of technology. The transfer of concepts and methods from social studies of science to technology studies has conserved this lack of concern with the meso level. This article suggests a more critical evaluation of this transfer, along with a review of the now popular assumption (...) of a high degree of similarity between science and technology. Two case studies show how meso-level considerations are important to an understanding of the nature of technological innovation and illustrate the lack of similarity between scientific and technological development. (shrink)

This article engages the politics of discomfort as a critical but neglected dimension of feminist methodologies and research praxis. Discomfort is explored as a ‘sweaty concept’ that opens space for transformative praxis and the emergence of feminist forms of knowing, being and resisting. I theorise discomfort as an epistemic and interpretive resource and a lively actant in research encounters, fieldwork and analytic and theory-praxis spaces. Building on the work of Clare Hemmings and Sara Ahmed, I trace discomfort as an affective (...) intensity that matters for opening up resistant and anti-colonial feminist research practices and modes of knowledge production. Starting, and staying, with discomfortis theorised as a form of resistance to the reiteration of comfortable and normative truths and ‘wilful ignorances’. Weaving together the work of postqualitative and postcolonial feminist theorists, the sticky praxis of discomfort is conceptualised as involving a number of research strategies, including: engaging with ‘gut feelings’ and embracing interpretive hesitancy. In moving beyond an idealisation of empathy as the central affective principle underlying feminist research praxis, this article explores the epistemic and political salience of discomfort as affective intensity, ‘sweaty concept’ and potentially transformative interpretive resource. (shrink)

Traditionally, empiricism has relied on the specialness of human observation, yet science is rife with sophisticated instrumentation and techniques. The present article advances a conception of empirical evidence applicable to actual scientific practice. I argue that this conception elucidates how the results of scientific research can be repurposed across diverse epistemic contexts: it helps to make sense of how evidence accumulates across theory change, how different evidence can be amalgamated and used jointly, and how the same evidence can be used (...) to constrain competing theories in the service of breaking local underdetermination. (shrink)

Organized by major philosophical subjects, Tables for Students of Philosophy offers a broad view of a challenging field of study for the undergraduate student. Chadwick presents and explains various philosophical paradigms and movements using brief descriptions and diagrams.

This Element introduces major issues in the epistemology of experimental physics through discussion of canonical physics experiments and some that have not yet received much philosophical attention. The primary challenge is to make sense of how physicists justify crucial decisions made in the course of empirical research. Judging a result as epistemically significant or as calling for further technical scrutiny of the equipment is one important context of such decisions. Judging whether the instrument has been calibrated, and which data should (...) be included in the analysis are others. To what extent is it possible to offer philosophical analysis, systematization, and prescriptions regarding such decisions? To what extent can there be explicit epistemic justification for them? The primary aim of this Element is to show how a nuanced understanding of science in practice informs an epistemology of experimental physics that avoids strong social constructivism. (shrink)

Structural gaslighting arises when conceptual work functions to obscure the non-accidental connections between structures of oppression and the patterns of harm they produce and license. This paper examines the role that structural gaslighting plays in white feminist methodology and epistemology using Fricker’s (2007) discussion of hermeneutical injustice as an illustration. Fricker’s work produces structural gaslighting through several methods: i) the outright denial of the role that structural oppression plays in producing interpretive harm, ii) the use of single-axis conceptual resources to (...) understand intersectional oppression, and iii) the failure to recognize the legacy of women of color’s epistemic resistance work surrounding the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. I argue that Fricker’s whitewashed discussion of epistemic resistance to sexual harassment in the United States is a form of structural gaslighting that fails to treat women of color as knowers and exemplifies the strategic forgetting that is a central methodological tactic of white feminism. (shrink)

How can it be that some acts of very high moral value are not morally required? This is the problem of supererogation. I do not argue in favor of a particular answer. Instead, I analyze two opposing moral intuitions the problem involves. First, that one should always do one’s best. Second, that sometimes we are morally allowed not to do our best. To think that one always has to do one’s best is less plausible, as it makes every morally best (...) act obligatory. I argue that, despite its implausibility, this is the main ingredient in a traditional outlook I call ‘morality of law,’ which conceives of morality as impartial, impersonal, rule-based and obligation-based. My main point is that supererogation will always be seen as problematic if the background theory is a morality of law. This is because supererogation encapsulates a view of morality-outside-obligation, whereas morality of law centers upon obligation as its main instrument of curbing a supposedly natural human selfishness. (shrink)

This paper argues that scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between the mathematical entities that are indispensible to scientific explanation and the modal structure of the empirical phenomena those entities explain. The argument presupposes that scientific realism commits us to the indispensability argument. The viewpresented here is that the indispensability of mathematics commits us not only to the existence of mathematical structures and entities but to a metaphysical determination relation between those entities and the modal structure of (...) the physical world. The no-miracles argument is the primary motivation for scientific realism. It is a presupposition of this argument that unobservable entities are explanatory only when they determine the empirical phenomena they explain. I argue that mathematical entities should also be seen as explanatory only when they determine the empirical facts they explain, namely, the modal structure of the physical world. Thus, scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between mathematics and physical modality that has not been previously recognized. The requirement to account for the metaphysical dependence of modal physical structure on mathematics limits the class of acceptable solutions to the applicability problem that are available to the scientific realist. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 4, Page 347-347, May 2022.

This chapter contains sections titled: Promise and Disappointment Ethical Issues Resource Allocation References.