“Normal science” is a concept introduced by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In Kuhn’s view, normal science means “puzzle solving”, solving problems within the paradigm—framework most successful in solving current major scientific problems—rather than producing major novelties. This paper examines Kuhnian and Popperian accounts of normal science and their criticisms to assess if normal science is good. The advantage of normal science according to Kuhn was “psychological”: subjective (...) satisfaction from successful “puzzle solving”. Popper argues for an “intellectual” science, one that consistently refutes conjectures and offers new ideas rather than focus on personal advantages. His account is criticized as too impersonal and idealistic. Feyerabend’s perspective seems more balanced; he argues for a community that would introduce new ideas, defend old ones, and enable scientists to develop in line with their subjective preferences. The paper concludes that normal science has no one clear-cut set of criteria encompassing its meaning and enabling clear assessment. (shrink)

When Kuhn first published his _Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ he was accused of promoting an “irrationalist” account of science. Although it has since been argued that this charge is unfair in one aspect or another, the early criticism still exerts an influence on our understanding of Kuhn. In particular, normal science is often characterized as dogmatic and uncritical, even by commentators sympathetic to Kuhn. I argue not only that there is no textual evidence for this view but (...) also that normal science is much better understood as being based on _epistemically justified_ commitment to a paradigm and as _pragmatic_ in its handling of anomalies. I also argue that normal science is an example of what I call Kuhn’s program of _revisionary rational reconstruction_. (shrink)

Present laws and regulations even in democratic countries are not sufficient to prevent the grave environmental threats we face. Further, even environmental ethics, when they remain anthropocentric cannot propose a better approach. I argue that, taking in considerations the precautionary principle, and adopting the perspective of post-normal science, the ethics of integrity suggest a better way to reduce ecological threats and promote the human good globally.

The norms and values of Post-Normal Science (PNS) are instrumental in guiding science advice practices. In this article, we report work in progress to systematically investigate the norms and values of PNS through a structured review. An archive of 397 documents was collected, including documents that contribute to the endeavour of ameliorating science advice practices from a PNS perspective. Action and structure-oriented viewpoints are used as complementing perspectives in the analysis of the ethos of PNS. From (...) the action-perspective we study how prototypes of norms and values are reflected upon in negotiations of normative issues relating to science advice. From the structural perspective we study how interrelated prototypes of norms and values are presupposed in prescriptions, proscriptions, and goals for science advice practices. Through this analysis we identify a plurality of interrelated prototypes of norms and values. Finally, we propose an acronym that integrates the analysed plurality of norms and values. As a mnemonic and communicative devise we call this ethos TRUST (Transparency, Robustness, Uncertainty management, Sustainability, and Transdisciplinarity) and propose TRUST as a nexus for future reflective negotiations of ambivalences in post-normal practices of science advice. (shrink)

This paper considers the relevance of a class of hermeneutic concepts to the philosophical reading of normal scientific research. The author opposes the view that the notion of "normal science" can only be read in socio-psychological, sociological or ethnomethodological terms. By drawing parallels between Kuhn's original reading of puzzle-solving enterprise and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, a context of "Continental theories" for interpreting the dynamics of research practices is delineated. The rereading of normal science provides the opportunity (...) for developing a hermeneutic alternative to the analytic philosophy of science. /// Este trabajo examina la relevancia de cierta clase de conceptos hermenéuticos para la lectura filosófica de la investigación cientifica normal. El autor se opone a la idea de que la noción de "ciencia normal" sólo se puede entender en términos socio-psicológicos, sociológicos o etnometodológicos. Trazando paralelos entre la lectura original kuhniana de la empresa de solutión de enigmas y la hermenéutica filosófica de Gadamer, se delinea un contexto de "teorias de Europa continental" para interpreter la dinámica de las prácticas de investigación. La relectura de la ciencia normal da la oportunidad de desarrollar una alternativa hermenéutica a la filosofia analitica de la ciencia. (shrink)

Petrovich provides an insightful study on analytic philosophy (AP) with the intention of determining whether this sub-field of philosophy has been operating within what Kuhn calls a normal science framework. Through a citation analysis, Petrovich concludes that AP does not exhibit the sort of pattern that we would expect of a field operating in a normal science phase. I take issue with Petrovich’s way of measuring normal science. I provide some insight into how we (...) might better measure normal science in future studies. (shrink)

About a decade ago, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency unwittingly embarked on a transition from a technocratic model of science advising to the paradigm of ‘‘post-normal science’’. In response to a scandal around uncertainty management in 1999, a Guidance for ‘‘Uncertainty Assessment and Communication’’ was developed with advice from the initiators of the PNS concept and was introduced in 2003. This was followed in 2007 by a ‘‘Stakeholder Participation’’ Guidance. In this article, the authors provide a combined (...) insider/outsider perspective on the transition process. The authors assess the extent to which the PNS paradigm has delivered new approaches in the agency’s practice and analyze two projects—on long-term options for Dutch sustainable development policy and for urban development policy—the latter in somewhat more detail. The authors identify several paradoxes PBL encounters when putting the PNS concept into practice. It is concluded that an openness to other styles of work than the technocratic model has become visible, but that the introduction of the PNS paradigm is still in its early stage. (shrink)

Why are there so many controversies in evolutionary psychology? Using a couple of concepts from philosophy of science, this paper argues that evolutionary psychology has not reached the stage of mature, normal science, since it does not currently have a unifying research program that guides individual scientists working in the discipline. The argument goes against claims made by certain proponents and opponents of evolutionary psychology, and it is supported by discussion of several examples. The paper notes that (...) just because evolutionary psychology has not reached the stage of normal science, the discipline is nevertheless a source of many progressive theoretical developments and interesting empirical discoveries. (shrink)

Post-normal science is presented by its proponents as a new way of doing science that deals with uncertainties, value diversity or antagonism, and high decision stakes and urgency, with the ultimate goal of remedying the pathologies of the global industrial system for which, according to Funtowicz and Ravetz, existing science forms the basis. The authors critically examine whether PNS can fulfill this claim in the light of empirical and theoretical work on politics and policy making. The (...) authors credit PNS as an innovative frontrunner in raising important issues regarding the limited problem-solving capacity of ‘‘normal science’’ and ‘‘professional consultancy.’’ Yet, the authors notice that PNS lacks important considerations about the governance of problems and aspects of participatory and deliberative democracy. PNS in effect implies that methodological ‘‘ratiocination’’ would prevail over political deliberation and democratic interaction and that merely changing scientific input in public policy making would have the power to change its outcomes. This scientistic hubris can be traced back to PNS’s origin in concerned scientists’ activism, which in effect accessed the political arena through the scientific entrance. The authors conclude that the art of politics needs to come back into the discussion on environmental problems if societal change is to occur. (shrink)

‘‘Post-normal science’’ has received much attention in recent years, but like many iconic concepts, it has attracted differing conceptualizations, applications, and implications, ranging from being a ‘‘cure-all’’ for democratic deficit to the key to achieving more sustainable futures. This editorial article introduces a Special Issue that takes stock of research on PNS and critically explores how such research may develop. Through reviewing the history and evolution of PNS, the authors seek to clarify the extant definitions, conceptualizations, and uses (...) of PNS. The authors identify five broad areas of research on, or using, PNS which have developed over four decades. Their analysis suggests that the 1990s represent a symbolic watershed in the use of PNS terminology, when the concept was further developed and applied to highly complicated issues such as climate change. The authors particularly distinguish between uses of PNS as a normative prescription and as a practical method. Through this classification, they set out gaps and research questions arising. They then briefly summarize the Special Issue articles and consider their relationship to each other and the research questions raised by their analysis. They conclude by considering what the articles in this issue suggest for future theory building in PNS and related scholarship. (shrink)

That Kuhn is mistaken in drawing a sharp line between normal and revolutionary phases of science is shown by re-examining the role of models in extending theories to new phenomenal domains. In the light of this revision of the role of models, theory extension, which Kuhn includes in normal science, is shown to be continuous with theory replacement, which Kuhn includes in revolutionary science. Both involve language changes and the 'gestalt switches' associated with revolutionary (...) class='Hi'>science. These characteristics cannot be used to demarcate the two phases as Kuhn seems to think. (shrink)

Thomas S. Kuhn’s theory of normal science (NS), aside from being a provocative philosophical reconstruction of the relatively conservative phase of scientific research, contains useful ideas for systematic analysis of specific episodes in the history of science. Therefore, although the theory has been looked at from different angles since the first edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (TSSR) was published in 1962, its detailed exploration of the cumulative phase of research in mature science is of (...) abiding relevance in the philosophy of science. This is because NS provides a compelling account of how and why members of scientific communities succeed, largely, to produce reliable knowledge about an incompletely known phenomenal world. Again, the theory elucidates special features of scientific research that differentiate it from other creative enterprises. In that regard, this paper reconstructs Arthur Compton’s research into x-ray scattering as a good instantiation of NS. Discussion of Compton’s convincing demonstration of the particulate properties of electromagnetic radiation within the framework of NS showcases the elucidatory power of Kuhn’s theory with respect to selected episodes in science, and corroborates the notion that the bulk of scientific work is a conservative puzzle-solving activity with the potential for precipitating scientific revolutions. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that Compton’s groundbreaking work on x-ray scattering has been analysed within the framework of Kuhn’s philosophy of science. (shrink)

What is post-normal science? What are the reasons for, and consequences of, encountering it in one’s professional life? Here I share my own experience of readings, practices and discussions with the fathers, supporters and detractors of PNS. After a short description of PNS and of my own experience with it, I review some common criticism levelled to PNS from different authors and conclude reflecting on how PNS—difficult to explain and translate into formulae or checklists—provides its practitioners with useful (...) keys to open relevant doors to understanding, and might be especially suited to face the present intersecting crises befalling the use of science for policy. (shrink)

1962 marked an important point in intellectual history not only for historians, philosophers, sociologists and scientists but also for educated laymen. After a long and productive decade Thomas Kuhn published his “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” as Volume 2 Issue 2 of the “International Encyclopedia of Unified Science”, edited (after the death of Otto Neurath) by Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris. 2012 marked another important date—it was the 50th anniversary of Structure’s first edition. The many conferences, workshops and presentations were (...) documented in special issues and collections; one of them is Kuhn’s “Structure of Scientific Revolutions – 50 Years On”, edited by William J. Devlin and Alisa Bokulich. The review aims to shed light on the collections relevance for current interdisciplinary studies. (shrink)

Post-Normal Science as a theory links epistemology and governance. It not only focuses on problem situations where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent, but also tries to develop epistemic approaches that allow for sound scientific answers. The following article addresses major epistemological challenges within a typical ‘‘wicked-problem situation’’, i.e., risk assessment of emerging technologies. Such challenges include epistemological problems intrinsic to the task of proving the absence of risk, problems related to the multi-sited (...) production of evidence and the multitude of epistemic cultures involved, the incompatibility of the various implicit objectives and the complex actor-constellations, that shape not only the way scientific knowledge is translated into action, but also which kind of knowledge is produced and which experts are listened to. To illustrate and discuss these characteristics, the article draws on an empirical study of risk research in the fields of agri-biotechnology and telecommunication technology in Germany. It concludes that although some aspects of PNS are already part of current epistemic practices in these fields, a state of ‘‘functional post-normality’’ depends upon a meaningful co-evolution between post-normal science and post-normal governance that has not yet been achieved. (shrink)

Volume 51, Issue 13, December 2019, Page 1293-1303.

Kuhn maintains that what marks the transition to a science is the ability to carry out ‘normal’ science—a practice he characterizes as abandoning the kind of testing that Popper lauds as the hallmark of science. Examining Kuhn's own contrast with Popper, I propose to recast Kuhnian normal science. Thus recast, it is seen to consist of severe and reliable tests of low-level experimental hypotheses (normal tests) and is, indeed, the place to look to (...) demarcate science. While thereby vindicating Kuhn on demarcation, my recasting of normal science is seen to tell against Kuhn's view of revolutionary science. (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: To study and describe how a group of senior researchers and a group of postgraduate students perceived the so-called "grey zone" between normal scientific practice and obvious misconduct. DESIGN: A questionnaire concerning various practices including dishonesty and obvious misconduct. The answers were obtained by means of a visual analogue scale (VAS). The central (two quarters) of the VAS were designated as a grey zone. SETTING: A Swedish medical faculty. SURVEY SAMPLE: 30 senior researchers and 30 postgraduate students. RESULTS: (...) Twenty of the senior researchers and 25 of the postgraduate students answered the questionnaire. In five cases out of 14 the senior researchers' median was found to be clearly within the interval of the grey zone, compared with three cases for the postgraduate students. Three examples of experienced misconduct were provided. Compared with postgraduate students, established researchers do not call for more research ethical guidelines and restrictions. CONCLUSION: Although the results indicate that consensus exists regarding certain obvious types of misconduct the response pattern also indicates that there is no general consensus on several procedures. (shrink)

In this essay I share some of the lessons I have learned over the last 25 years studying how the vascular endothelium via nitric oxide contributes to the regulation of the cardiovascular system in humans. My motivation for this effort is that in an era of molecular reductionism in biomedical research I believe that the lessons from the vascular endothelium and NO are instructive in a larger sense. These discoveries might also be among the "last" big biomedical discoveries made by (...) traditional physiology and pharmacology using primarily organ baths, pharmacological blockers, and in... (shrink)

: This paper first discusses the current historical and philosophical framework forged during the last century to account for both the history and the epistemic status of Newton's theory of general gravitation. It then examines the conflict surrounding this theory at the close of the seventeenth century and the first steps towards the revolutionary shift in rational mechanics in the eighteenth century. From a historical point of view, it shows the crucial contribution of the Cartesian mechanistic philosophy and Leibnizian analytic (...) methods to the emergence of so-called Newtonian mechanics which can also be fairly characterized as a synthetic theory of attraction. From a philosophical standpoint, the paper suggests that the reworking of Newton's theory in the 18th century is better understood in a theoretical framework that reconciles Kuhn's notion of "invisible revolution" rather than his notion of "normal science" with Whewell's ascription of the completion of dynamical studies to the post Newtonian period. (shrink)

Many controversies within philosophy of science have been attempted to be explained in terms of the metaphilosophical prescription/description distinction over the goal of philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to show that the controversy between Popper and Kuhn about the ir/rationality of Normal Science cannot be fully explained in these terms, not even if we also take the truth/problem-solving distinction over the goal of science into account. It is argued that, to gain (...) full understanding of this controversy, it is necessary to take into account their differences regarding a topic apparently not involved in it, namely the structure of scientific theories. The conclusion is that both Popper and Kuhn were descriptive/prescriptive at the same time in their attempt to make the rules of scientific practice explicit, yet Kuhn did it better because he had a richer and more accurate idea of what scientific theories are. Although this work is mainly a piece of history of philosophy of science, it also aims at shedding some light on epistemological issues. If the conclusion is sound, it also shows how structural aspects of scientific theories may be relevant to the epistemology of science.Keywords: Falsificationism; Normal science; Rationality; Theories; Thomas Kuhn; Karl Popper. (shrink)

The author starts from the contemporary image of “post-normal science”, which implies the openness of science to policy. She considers the idea of post-normal science as a normative basis for the scientists’ demand for the politicization of science, as a conceptual condition for grasping crises and the role of scientific expertise in their resolution, and as a designation of a special phenomenon of contemporary science with the ambiguous status of a scientist-expert. Based on (...) the analysis of the concept, the author emphasizes the problem of combining scientific validity and political relevance, inherent in post-normal science. The elements of this problem are the danger of including science in politics, the violation of objectivity and the lack of demarcating scientific and non-scientific knowledge. The author argues that the solution of the problem becomes possible if the political relevance of science is interpreted as interaction, and scientific validity as objectivity are revealed through attention to the concept of “knowing-how”. (shrink)

Cosmological models that invoke a multiverse - a collection of unobservable regions of space where conditions are very different from the region around us - are controversial, on the grounds that unobservable phenomena shouldn't play a crucial role in legitimate scientific theories. I argue that the way we evaluate multiverse models is precisely the same as the way we evaluate any other models, on the basis of abduction, Bayesian inference, and empirical success. There is no scientifically respectable way to do (...) cosmology without taking into account different possibilities for what the universe might be like outside our horizon. Multiverse theories are utterly conventionally scientific, even if evaluating them can be difficult in practice. (shrink)

The article questions the concept of post-normal science and emphasizes that despite the declarative detachment from social practice and freedom from politics, de facto science has always been social. On the one hand, the scientific community has always been aristocratic. The “classical ethos” of science presupposes openness and equality on conditions that require enormous efforts and self-sacrifice, this equality is beyond the norm, because a “normal” scientist is, as K. Popper noted, mediocrity. On the other (...) hand, scientists at all times have taken an active social position, and the development of science has always been closely intertwined with social practices and the political process, as is well shown by T. Porter, L. Pinto, S. Shapin and S. Schaffer. From this point of view, science has always been post-normal – the “solutions” are always “urgent”, and the corresponding “stakes” are invariably “high”. However, the aristocracy of the scientific ethos and the declarative isolation of the scientific community from policy and politics are of fundamental importance for the reproduction of science, which practically cannot, but is morally obliged to remain outside of them. To help practice, the scientist must be impractical; to create a norm, a scientist must be abnormal. (shrink)

Technology assessment (TA) is a paradigmatic case for the manifold and, at times, ambiguous processes of identity formation of researchers in inter- and transdisciplinary settings. TA combines the natural, technical, and social sciences and follows the multiple missions of scientific analysis, public outreach, and policy advice. However, despite this diversity, it also constitutes a genuine community with its own discourses, conferences, and publications. To which extent “being a TA practitioner” also provides for a genuine scholarly identity is still unclear. Building (...) on interviews with technology assessment practitioners at an academic TA institute, we ask what inter/trans/disciplinary identification patterns emerge in this field. Our analysis shows that TA practitioners adopt multiple identities, from “enthusiastic TA practitioner” to “strong interdisciplinarian” or “disciplinarian” – with distinct identity troubles inherent in all these options. We find that generational affiliation plays a vital role in identity formation. It relates to different primary orientations (towards research or advisory practices), inter/disciplinary backgrounds, contracting modes, and lengths of time spent at the TA institute. We conclude firstly, that disciplinary categories figure strongly in transdisciplinary identities; secondly, that the relation of _chronos_ and identity warrants more substantial consideration: as time spent at a transdisciplinary institute as or as perceived options for “futuring one’s identity”; thirdly, that our understanding of academic generations could profit from a more sociological conception; and, fourthly, that TA’s multidisciplinary setup and threefold orientation towards science, society, and policy result in multiplying possible identities and thus making it difficult to form a stable community. (shrink)

The underutilization of base rates is a consistent finding. The strong claim that base rates are ignored has been rejected and this needs no further emphasis. Following the path of “normal science,” research examines the conditions predicting changes in the degree of underutilization. A scientific revolution that might dethrone the heuristics and biases paradigm is not in sight.

The idea that there exists a natural relationship between intellectual freedom, legitimate political authority and enjoyment of a dignified life was central to the European Enlightenment and to the...

Objective Apeiron was founded in 1966 and has developed into one of the oldest and most distinguished journals dedicated to the study of ancient philosophy, ancient science, and, in particular, of problems that concern both fields. Apeiron is committed to publishing high-quality research papers in these areas of ancient Greco-Roman intellectual history; it also welcomes submission of articles dealing with the reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition. The journal appears quarterly. Articles are peer-reviewed (...) on a double-blind basis. Topics ancient philosophy ancient science reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition Article formats Original Articles. (shrink)

A consistent claim from governments around the world during the Coronavirus pandemic has been that they were following the science. This raises the question, central to this paper, of what and whose knowledge is or should be sought, which is being side-lined through the choice of particular framings and discourses, and with what consequences for the creation and implementation of evidence-based policy to tackle wicked problems. Through the lens of Fricker’s epistemic injustice, I problematise the expertise that has guided (...) the COVID-19 response as epistemically narrow and argue that counteracting a monolithic culture of expertise requires tackling the structural inequalities in the systems of knowledge production to diversify the social and epistemological foundations of science. Drawing on Post-normal Science (PNS) theory, I suggest that the expertise needed to respond to the challenges of a post-COVID world is one that embraces greater pluralism, avoids groupthink, challenges the accepted orthodoxy and helps us revert old models and rigid path dependencies that so often neglect the lived realities and demands of those left behind. This can only be realised by overcoming epistemic injustice and embracing epistemic democracy in the practice of evidence-based policy. (shrink)

Within contemporary science, it is common practice to compare data points to the average, i.e., to the statistical mean. Because this practice is so familiar, it might at first appear not to be the sort of thing that requires explanation. But recent research in cognitive science and in the history of science gives us reason to adopt the opposite perspective. Cognitive science research on the ways people ordinarily make sense of the world suggests that, instead of (...) using a purely statistical notion of the average, people tend to use a value-laden notion of the normal. Similarly, historical research on the scientific practices used in other time periods indicates that, prior to the nineteenth century, scientists tended to make use of a notion of the normal that was overtly value-laden. These findings give us reason to rethink certain familiar facts about scientific practice. In particular, they suggest that the fact that scientists so often make use of the statistical average should be seen as a highly surprising fact, the sort of thing that calls out for explanation. (shrink)

Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health: The Need to Look Elsewhere for Standards of Good Mental Health is the first book to question the equation of psychological normality and mental health. It is also the first book to take contemporary psychiatry and clinical psychology to task for deeply flawed thinking when they accept the diagnostic system propounded by the DSM, which reifies syndromes into alleged “mental disorders.” Where Thomas Szasz argued that “mental disorders” are myths, Bartlett makes the much more (...) damaging charge that reifying mental disorders involves a provable form of fallacious thinking, producing a variety of epistemological nonsense. /// -/- -/- The author weighs the evidence, and with strict logic, compelling evidence, and careful analysis, challenges the current paradigm of mental health theorists and practitioners. Never has the case against the standard of psychological normality and against the non-scientific creation of “mental disorders” been made with such boldness, multidisciplinary knowledge, solid scholarship, and clarity of language. /// -/- -/- Normality Does Not Equal Mental HealthAlthough the need to question psychological normality as a satisfactory standard of good mental health has been staring us in the face for a long time, no one, clinical professional or scholar, has had the courage or the intellectual willingness to face with unflinching honesty the shortcomings and disappointments of psychological normality and to propose that we should look elsewhere for standards of good psychological health. /// -/- -/- Contemporary psychiatry and clinical psychology, on the contrary, base their conception of mental health on the standard of psychological normality. This supposition has come to be accepted uncritically and without question, and yet it has become fundamental to current clinical theory and practice, and forms the core of the psychiatric classification system of the DSM, which has become today’s diagnostic authority. /// -/- -/- While touting today’s scientific gold standard of “evidence-based” research, DSM’s authoritative classification of “mental disorders” is itself hardly “evidence-based,” for it is recognized, but seldom emphasized, that the majority of DSM’s “mental disorders” have no known empirical, organic basis. /// -/- -/- Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health takes DSM to task not only for its failure to adhere to today’s evidence-based standard, but for its failure to rein in its highly speculative diagnostic labeling, in accordance with the modern paradigm of rigorous science, which repudiates metaphorical reifications whose alleged validity rests only on the voting preferences of a professional membership. /// -/- -/- The book is a carefully argued critique of the dominant assumption in current psychiatry and clinical psychology that psychological normality is fundamental to mental health and therefore good. In place of this unsatisfactory presumption, Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health proposes a positive and constructive revision in our understanding of mental health and of our conception of mental disorders. (shrink)