Sounds are audible, and sound sources are audible. What is the audible relation between audible sounds and audible sources? Common talk and philosophy suggest three candidates. The first is that sounds audibly are properties instantiated by their sources. I argue that sounds are audible individuals and thus are not audibly instantiated by audible sources. The second is that sounds audibly are effects of their sources. I argue that auditory experience presents no compelling evidence that sounds audibly are causally related to (...) audible sources. The third is that sounds audibly are related mereologically to their sources. I present and offer a defence of this third candidate. (shrink)

In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, “representation-level” rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brain’s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone unnoticed that connectionism (...) adds to the traditional focus on computational processes, a new focus – one on the vehicles of mental representation, on the entities that carry content through the mind. Indeed, if Horgan and Tienson’s dynamical characterisation of connectionism is on the right track, then so intimate is the relationship between computational processes and representational vehicles, that connectionist cognitive science is committed to a resemblance theory of mental content. (shrink)

Study of Umāsvātī's Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, 2nd century aphoristic work, with autocommentary, on the basic tenets of Jaina philosophy.

In this paper, we propose and defend a theory of concepts. According to Machery (2009), psychologists and philosophers mean different things by ‘concept’. Psychologists mean bodies of knowledge used to categorise and infer; philosophers mean constituent of propositional thought. Machery’s conclusion would drive a wedge between contributions by psychologists and philosophers on concepts. Theories about the former would have no clear role to play in, and cast no light on, the latter, and vice versa. We argue that, on the contrary, (...) ‘concept’ has a single core meaning: a container of stored knowledge pertaining to a single category. This single meaning satisfies both the theories of psychologists and philosophers. The divergence in use of the term ‘concept’ on which Machery focuses arises because words for containers are often used to refer to (a) what is contained by the container and (b) the label of a container. Our account explains what a concept is, and how one might be misled by Machery’s challenge. (shrink)

I propose a theory of freedom of choice on which it is a variable quality of individual conscious choices that has several dimensions that admit of degrees, even though - as many theorists have traditionally supposed - it also has as a necessary condition the possession of a capacity that is all or nothing. I argue that the proposed account better fits the phenomenology of ostensibly free actions, as well as empirical findings in the human sciences.

Under conditions with a low level of available genetic information, mutualistic private insurance markets will often create broadly just outcomes, even if by accident rather than by design. Normatively acceptable outcomes of this kind would come under threat if insurers were to have increased access to genetic information with substantial predictive content.1 As the availability of relevant individual genetic information grows, mutualistic forms of market-based insurance face a dilemma between either sacrificing individuals’ interests in genetic privacy, or creating conditions for (...) market failure due to adverse selection. My view is therefore that we have good reason to shift towards more solidaristic forms of ‘risk-sharing institutions’ with regard to functions such as life insurance and critical illness insurance, as a way of resolving normative tensions between values of equality, privacy, non-discrimination and autonomy. Such a position, I have argued, does not depend on endorsing any particular conception of social justice, but can be defended on the basis of a number of different plausible accounts of what justice demands.1 Jonathan Pugh argues against my endorsement of a shift towards solidaristic, non-market risk-sharing institutions, and instead argues broadly in favour of the status quo. He holds that it counts against my proposals that they ‘have wide-ranging and highly revisionary implications’, and argues that my approach is mistaken in relying on ‘a single contestable theory’. Pugh offers a purportedly less contestable account of the relevant normative considerations underlying insurance regimes, composed of three …. (shrink)

Paradigms in philosophy and cognitive science until recently have treated perception in typical human beings as relatively fixed and unchanging. Recent research instead supports the claim that perception can be altered over time by training, deliberate practice or mere exposure. If so, we do not all bring to a scene the same stock of perceptual capacities, and our differences are not just deficits or superpowers. This paper describes six questions an account of perceptual learning ought to address, which pose difficult (...) challenges to Kevin Connolly’s (2019) groundbreaking Offloading View of perceptual learning. In light of these questions, it sketches an alternative simple view according to which perceptual learning is acquiring a new or enhanced perceptual capacity in a particular way. The relevant capacity is a capacity perceptually to detect and differentiate a feature, where doing so constitutively if not wholly implicates perception. The relevant way is by means of an independently characterized learning process, rather than by adaptation, pure development, or mere accident. The perceptual change thus results from a smart process – one that is flexible, resilient, and responsive to feedback, rather than rigid, fragile and brute. Such a process can yield perceptual know-how. Thanks to perceptual learning, one comes to know how to perceive, in a sense that means being able to do so. Some specialists hone this to develop perceptual skills that are implicated in expert performance. (shrink)

Abstract: The systemic role of corruption and its link to low human development is explored. The extractive resource industry is presented as an arena where conditions for corruption—monopoly and discretion without accountability—are especially intense. Corruption is maintained by a self-reinforcing cycle. Multiple stakeholders are involved in the maintenance of and/or opposition to the cycle: investing corporations, host country regimes and officials, inter-governmental bodies like the OECD, industry associations, non-governmental organization (NGO) watchdogs like Transparency International, and international agencies facilitating global investment (...) like the World Bank. Complementarity of interests between the demand and supply sides provides strong incentives for entrenched players to maintain corruptive relationships, to protect past gains and sustain current ones. Compulsory international regulation, maximum transparency, effective detection, and enforcement are recommended to enhance accountability, thereby reversing the cycle. It is also necessary to create a corporate culture built on integrity, if regulation itself is to succeed. (shrink)

Nemám v úmyslu předložit školsky umný referát o filosofování, o různých filosofických koncepcích a jejich argumentaci, nýbrž pokusím se otevřít otázky, které mě bytostně zaměstnávají. Moje torzovité a fragmentární podněty se budou týkat následujících otázek-problémů: 1. Ontická realita na našem vnímání nezávislého světa a gnoseologické meze ontologie. 2. Co je racionalita, jaké jsou její možnosti a meze? Lze racionalitu kotvit gnoseologicky či již ontologicky? Jaký je vztah mezi racionalitou, přirozeností a přírodou? Je iracionalita předchůdná racionalitě? 3. Lze z racionality odvodit (...) etické jednání? Je racionalita vázána na určitý kulturní kontext a diskurs, či je universálně lidská? 4. Nemožnost objektivity a nezbytnost úsilí o co nejvyšší možnou míru objektivity. 5. Na čem založit humanitu? A proč vůbec humanita? 6. Posléze načrtnu svoji thesi: Skutečnost‚ její poznání a její utváření jako proces komplexity a komplementarity komponent v korelacích v kontinuitě a v kontextech. (Těmito šesti K si z Vás nechci dělat slovíčkářskou srandu, ale je to to nejvážnější, oč mi jde a s co Vám chci sdělit.) 7. Skončím položením radikálního otazníku nad filosofií. (shrink)

What is wealth? -- Looking at the world from God's perspective -- Changing your attitude to bring success -- Suffering caused by desire -- Accumulating beneficial wealth -- Making progress with love and ideals -- Creating "utopian economics" -- The path to progress -- The definition of progress -- The joy of progress -- The driving force of progress -- Realizing hope -- A life filled with light -- Living with optimism -- Living lightheartedly -- Believing tomorrow will be better (...) -- Expanding the circle of happiness -- Walking with God -- A mind that invites happiness -- The laws of the mind -- A mind that brings others happiness -- In tune with God's vibration -- A humble, accepting mind -- The power of prayer -- The true nature of wealth -- Wealth as a foundation -- Wealth and competition -- Good and evil in relation to wealth -- The right way to use wealth -- Accumulating inner wealth -- The study of human nature leads to success -- Gifts and talents -- The quality and period of effort -- Conditions for receiving inspiration -- I) the basis for inspiration -- II) a loving heart -- III) a positive attitude to life -- The person who is admired -- The goal is to soar -- A steady eye -- Making progress with a loving heart -- Confidence and abilities -- The goal is to soar -- The philosophy of progress -- The pledge to God -- The truth from God's perspective -- I) male and female souls -- II) God's ideal -- III) what is death? -- The true right to know -- I) the truth God created -- II) restoring religion -- Wrongdoing without knowing -- Toward the state of Arhat -- Aim for the world of Bodhisattva -- Postscript. (shrink)

This paper is a personal reflection on involvement in the development of the first voluntary assisted dying legislation in Australia. Points of contention are discussed, where plural values were evident, as the legislation progressed towards implementation. Finally, ongoing areas of difficulty with the legislation are listed, where further thought is required to ensure ease of access for those in need.

Fascinating and well-documented in its details of cultural migration and evolution, this book offers a well-balanced perspective on the mutual influence of Arabic and Western worlds during the Middle Ages. It traces the transmission of Greek philosophy and science to the Islamic world, forming a portrait of medieval Muslim thought that illustrates its commonalities with Judaic and Christian teachings as well as its points of divergence. He shows how a particular type of Hellenistic culture made its way through the Syrian (...) Church, the Zoroastrians of Persia, and the pagans of Harran to the Islamic community, attaining its final metamorphosis in northeast Italy, where it constituted an anti-ecclesiastical influence that helped to pave the way for the Renaissance. Bibliography. Chronological Table. Index. (shrink)

Volume 29, Issue 6, September 2024, Page 614-622.

The problem of the place and significance of the phenomena of fear and horror in the world-view of man has a long but unexplored history in science. Since ancient philosophy, these phenomena have been regarded as feelings that depend on the object-subjective perception of the phenomena of the socio-cultural life of society. However, none of the ancient authors put forward the original scientific hypothesis of the phenomenon and its justification. In modern times, fear in scientific circulation and everyday outlook has (...) become purely natural-physiological reaction of the nervous system of man to external danger. From the period of separation of psychology into a separate science and under the influence of the achievements of experimental psychophysiology of the early twentieth century. such a dominant awareness of fear has finally established itself and dominates the contemporary Western European outlook. (shrink)

If we can wrong a work of art, then it has moral status. This paper considers two examples of putative wrongings of works of art, but in both cases, the claim that the work of art itself is wronged cannot be vindicated. The sense that a work of art has been wronged arises when that work has a special meaning for us or has a special standing in a cultural context. There is nothing intrinsic to works of art that can (...) confer moral status upon them, and so they are not moral patients. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Logic of God Incarnate. By THOMAS V. MORRIS. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. Pp. 220. $19.95. Thomas V. Morris, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, has written a technical yet provocative study on the Incarnation. As a faithful Christian he believes in and desires to defend the traditional Christian doctrine of the Incarnation proclaimed in the New Testament and defined by the (...) early councils of the Church, especially Chalcedon, that is, that Jesus is the One eternal Son existing in two natures. He also holds that, while the truth of the Incarnation is revealed, it must nonetheless stand the test of logic and reason. The Incarnation cannot be illogicaJ or meaningless. " If the church has been guided by God in such matters as the formulation of its creeds, conciliar decrees, and catechisms,.... we would not expect glaring logical flaws in its central doctrinal affirmations" (p. 46). The stated purpose of Morris's study is to defend the traditional doctrine against those who would hold it to be logically incoherent and meaningless. "In the course of thinking about the Incarnation for some years now, I have come to see that a few simple metaphysical distinctions and a solid dose of logical care will suffice to explicate and defend the doctrine against all extant criticisms of a philosophical nature" (p. 9). Morris meticulously analyzes and critiques a number of arguments that oppose the possibility of coherence of the Incarnation by attempting to demonstrate that such arguments are.either false and illogical themselves, or that they do not apply to a true understanding of the Incarnation. Moreover, Morris proposes a novel understanding of the Incarnation which he believes is both logical and intelligible, and which conforms to the Christian tradition. This goal of upholding the intelligibility of the Incarnate leads Morris to a three-fold task. He first of all must refute his chief adversaries, those who would deny the sensibleness of saying God became man in Jesus. Such critics deny the validity of the Incarnation on the ground..'! that it is meaning·less, and the'l'efore impossible to juxtapose the incommensurable. attributes of divinity and humanity, e.g., perfection/imperfection, immutability/corruptibility. They hold that Jesus could not have had both these sets of properties at once (cf. p. 20). Morris refuses to capitulate to such arguments. He nevertheless insists that any solution to the issue which would undermine human logic or which would fail to uphold the Christian's belief is no solution at all (cf. p. 32). 367 368 BOOK REVIEWS Secondly, Morris's task leads him to refute any attempts at a " OneNature " solution, which would "squash" together the human and divine natures in Jesus to form a single nature. Such proposals jeopardize either the integrity of Jesus's divinity (Arianism) or his humanity (Docetism, Monophysitism), inevitably composing a mythical tertium quid (cf. pp. 33-38). Morris presents a clear case against such corruptions of the Incarnation. Thirdly, Morris's task brings him to analyze contemporary kenotic Christology. He thoroughly discusses this approach, for the reason that it is directly involved in the issue at hand, namely, the incompatibility between divine and human properties in Christ. Secondarily, however, Morris's interest in kenoticism reflects his own hope that some variation of the approach might posibly arrive at a Christological solution (cf. p. 92). While he ultimately rejects kenoticism, Morris flirts with the various alternatives, and, as we shall see, his own perception of the Incarnation remains tinged with a kenotic flavor. How then is it possible to predicate of one and the same individual divine and human attributes intelligibly and coherentlyT To use contemporary computer jargon, the question might be phrased: is it possible that God and man can he "incarnation-friendly¥" Morris believes so. Morris first of all sets out to define the terms-divine nature and human nature. He believes part of the incompatibility problem lies in attributing to Jesus's humanity unnecessarily hostile aspects. He distinguishes between being "merely human" and being "fully human"· To be " merely human " is to possess not only those properties that narrowly define one's nature or kind, such as rationality, but... (shrink)

This paper discusses the development of self-consciousness in the history of philosophy of the 20th century compared with the same development in the natural sciences. The author characterizes this stage of philosophical historiography as the “revolution of relativity.” This movement of self-consciousness was apparent in not only the humanities but also the natural sciences at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Awareness of probability is a fundamental achievement of non-classic physics, which has since reversed its paradigm. In contrast (...) to the Newtonian scheme, quantum theory introduces the category of probability and insists that we can talk about certain physical phenomena only in a probabilistic mode and that the method of observation affects the phenomena observed. Consequently, any “object-subject” and “subject-subject” interaction involves the experience of the researcher, which thereby affects the results. The same model of interpretation lies at the basis of the turn toward self-consciousness in the history of philosophy of the 20th century. The classical history of philosophy is built on idealization and gives an objective description of the philosophical process. Following the other sciences, the philosophy of the 20th century understood that historical and philosophical reality largely depends on the historians of philosophy; that such reality is constructed by certain means; that there is a certain kind of historical and philosophical work; and that, with different strategies, methods and approaches, we obtain different results that are complementary to each other. The 20th century was a time of competing interpretations rather than gradually progressing historical and philosophical systems. This stimulated the search for own ideal of objectivity. For philosophical historiography, this is the hermeneutic ideal of the structural analysis of text or architectonic reconstruction. The historicalphilosophical revolution of relativity promotes the development of critical historiography and revises the foundations of its classical tradition. (shrink)

This is one of four interrelated action agenda papers resulting from the National Summit on Public Health Legal Preparedness convened in June 2007 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and nineteen multi-disciplinary partner organizations. Each of the action agenda papers deals with one of the four core elements of public health legal preparedness: laws and legal authorities; competency in using those laws; coordination of law-based public health actions; and information. Options presented in this paper are for consideration by (...) policymakers and practitioners — in all jurisdictions and all relevant sectors and disciplines — with responsibilities for all-hazards emergency preparedness.This paper focuses on the fourth core element: information that can be used in shaping and applying law as a public health tool, specifically in the context of public health emergencies. (shrink)

This special issue, entitled “Post-AIDS’ and Global Health Discourses: Interdisciplinary Perspectives,’ emerged from a one day Medical Humanities symposium at the Leeds Centre for Medical Humanities, at the University of Leeds, England, on February 27th 2015. This special issue focusses on the perceived deprioritising of HIV and AIDS in the Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, that were launched in 2015. The SDGs function as policy benchmarks for all entities within the United Nations system and they supersede the Millennium Development Goals, (...) or MDGs, which expired in 2015. As the word millennium indicates, the MDGs were launched in 2000 and 2015 was designated as the benchmark year when the successes and shortcomings of the MDGs would be critically assessed. One key difference between the MDGs and the SDGs, which D’Ambruoso foregrounds, is that the writing process underpinning the SDGs involved lengthy consultations, and feedback, with communities and health care practitioners around the world. By contrast, because the MDGs were mainly written by government officials, policy makers and health care practitioners without consulting wider communities, the processes underpinning the SDGs consultations are more inclusive than the MDGs. What is most critical about the SDGs for this special issue, however, is that they reflect a clear shift away from ‘HIV exceptionalism’ and towards what critics have described as ‘post-AIDS’ rhetoric, specifically when one compares the MDG health goal 6 and the SDG health goal 3. (shrink)

I agree with Richard Vallée that predicates like ‘big’, ‘tall’, etc., are comparatives, and that there are no properties of being big, or tall, etc., simpliciter. I also agree that sentence-types are not the primary carriers of truth, and, with one qualification, I too reject the three main assumptions - critically examined by him.Concordo com Richard Vallée que predicados como ‘grande’, ‘alto’, etc., são comparativos, e que não há propriedades de ser simplesmente grande, ou alto, etc. Concordo também que sentenças-tipo (...) não são os portadores de verdade primários e, com uma qualificação, também rejeito as três suposições principais - examinadas criticamente por ele. (shrink)

In §1 I discuss the pragmatic and semantic objections that Dirk raises against the claim that sentences refer to states of affairs. In §2 I explain in which sense I maintain that true sentences identify states of affairs.

It is well known that the medieval scholastics did not begin their philosophy systematically with an explicit theory of knowledge. Unfortunately many people have concluded from that fact that the very idea of an epistemology, and especially the idea of a critique of knowledge, was completely foreign to them. Within recent years authors such as Professor Van Steenberghen and Father Copleston have done a great deal to spread a correct understanding of St. Thomas’s views on this matter. Much evidence might (...) be adduced from the principal work of John Duns Scotus to show that he also took steps to justify man’s spontaneous conviction that some natural knowledge of truth with certainty can be attained. In this article we will consider some of these elements of Scotus’s philosophy as they are found in the volumes that have so far appeared in the critical edition of his works. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In a recent paper Alan Carter argues that the claim that workers’co‐operatives merely replace exploitation by employers with ‘self‐exploitation’is nonsense: the term ‘self‐exploitation’is self‐contradictory. He maintains that the only form of exploitation to which a workers’co‐operative may be said to be subject is ‘market‐exploitation’by dominant economic actors who are external to the co‐operative. I argue that these conclusions are mistaken. While the concept of ‘market‐exploitation’is not without value, it is difficult to operationalise. While the concept of ‘self‐exploitation’is, understood literally, (...) incoherent, the claims defended by some of the users of this term can be made conceptually respectable. (shrink)