The relationship between being and goodness is one of the most engaging philosophical questions, particularly in light of the new science, which pointsto the interconnectedness of the physical world. The relationship between being and goodness is examined here in the thought of Bonaventure, who maintainsa primacy of the good. Bonaventure’s integration of philosophy and theology provides an understanding of being as goodness and hence an understandingof being as relational and generative. Because being is good, created reality is intrinsically good and (...) bears within it an inner dynamic toward the pleroma oflove. The implications of Bonaventure’s metaphysics of the good for ecology and epistemology are explored. (shrink)

Hay que entender que los cambios súbitos de todo tipo que nos están afectando globalmente, demuestran claramente que los modelos puramente racionales resultan ser insuficientes para dar respuesta a las complejidades de este mundo. Pero también, hay que entender que los modelos no puramente racionales han sido de difícil lectura y de poca aceptación. Pienso que este es el caso de la Crítica del Juicio. La falta de sensibilidad respecto de la apreciación de esta obra puede deberse a que la (...) misma ha sido calificada en nuestros días como el trabajo arquetípico del postmodernismo, revelando las contradicciones inherentes a toda idea de conocimiento, racionalidad, cultura y arte... “Ya no es el paradigma del clasicismo, ni del formalismo, la última del trio de las tres grandes Críticas se ha convertido de pronto, en el símbolo del deconstruccionismo”. También consideraremos a esta obra, como centro del sistema kantiano, un modelo para los sistemas complejos. Así que luego de señalar I- las discrepancias de Bauman con la Crítica del Juicio, veremos II- las correspondencias de esta obra con los axiomas del postmodernismo, y III- con los sistemas complejos. Luego IV- presentaremos un proyecto de rehabilitación de esta obra, y en V- ‘proyecciones sobre el presente’, expondremos el pensamiento de Bauman y Jonas señalando que no es el futuro, sino el presente de las condiciones globales de la vida humana y la existencia misma de la especie lo que está en peligro inminente. La metafísica de la moral de Jonas, aplicada a una ‘Moralidad sin Concepto,’ cierra el circulo de la nueva moralidad propuesta. Incluímos al final un apéndice sobre el supremo bien. (shrink)

La interioridad de lo viviente ha sido ignorada en una descripción científica del comportamiento humano. Hoy en día, sin embargo, la autopoiesis como paradigma de auto-organización, ha continuado incorpo- rando esos primeros atisbos de la interioridad de lo viviente que Kant desarrolló en la tercera Crítica. No hay organismo sin teleología y no hay teleología sin interioridad, nos dice, y sin un segmento teleológico el proyecto total de la moral se vuelve ininteligible. Hay un cambio de una ética basada en (...) el imperativo categórico a una moralidad sin concepto basada en otro aspecto del imperativo categórico presente en la estética kantiana. Con F.Varela surge la convicción de la inminencia de un cambio de paradigma que se trasluce como la primacía de lo concreto y la oposición a todo análisis deliberado e intencional. Estas características ya se habían manifestado en Kant y en Husserl como el cambio de lo exterior a lo interior, donde prima el abandono de toda regla o principio y la contundencia de la evidencia intuitiva. Se han de reconocer la importancia de los impulsos pre-conscientes y los instintos, por lo cual he incluido un Apéndice. Este camino dio lugar a las experiencias límite de lo sublime y de la epojé ética universal, la cual, según N. Depraz, filósofa francesa especializada en Husserl, no tienenada de misterioso o esotérico aunque está lejos de ser autoevidente. (shrink)

Pensamiento atrevido y nuevo, visión abierta, donde el lector hallará cuestiones clave del conocimiento, pero también del confundir y fundir, metafísica, física, antropología, sociedad. Desde la psicología a la reunión de los hombres en ciudades, la política, todo penetrado de la mirada estética, como si el saber fuera una de las bellas artes. Cuestiones como la Orden del Temple, la francmasonería, el ciber-arte, la clonación de obras artísticas o las bibliotecas digitales se convierten en ejemplos para una filosofía alternativa. Ilia (...) Galán, Titular de Estética y Teoría del Arte en la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid y profesor invitado en las universidades de Oxford, Harvard, la Sorbona, New Tork University, etc. Columnista habitual en El País, y otros periódicos. Entre sus libros, editados en varios idiomas, destacan: El Dios de los dioses (Ciencia del Arte) 1993, El romanticismo: Schelling o el arte divino Madrid, 1999, Actualidad del pensamiento de Sem Tob (filosofía hispano-hebrea del siglo XIV), 2003, 2004. Teorías del arte desde el siglo XXI, 2005, Sabiduría oculta en el Camino de Santiago, 2011. (shrink)

Il secondo volume della serie Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina, pubblicata sotto gli auspici dell'Accademia di Atene, presenta l'editio princeps, per le cure di Eleni Pappa, del decimo libro della Φιλοσοφία del poligrafo bizantino Giorgio Pachymeres (1242–dopo il 1307). La Φιλοσοφία conta dodici libri ciascuno dei quali contiene un breve riassunto di un'opera di Aristotele, o a lui attribuita. I dodici libri sono preceduti da un proemio e da un indice dettagliato del contenuto. Lo scritto resta ancora purtroppo in larga misura (...) inedito. (shrink)

To my Oxford Classical Text of Cicero's De Officiis, published in 1994, I add two footnotes. The first is an important citation of Cicero in Augustine, which I missed thanks to my own incompetence. Maurice Testard, in his Saint Augustin et Ciceron remarks in Augustine's Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum not only the passage I note at Off. 1.7, but also 4.43 . Migne's text reads as follows: Sequitur ergo ut uerecundiam deponas, ac manente amicitia cum magistro Cynicis foedereris: quos tamen (...) aliquorum, ut Cicero in Officiis refert, etiam Stoicorum argumenta comitantur. Arguunt quippe communem honestatem, ‘quod ea quae re turpia non sint, uerbo 5 flagitiosa ducamus; ilia autem quae re turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis. Latrocinium perpetrare, fraudem facere, adulterium committere, re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene: liberis operam dare honestum est re, nomine obscenum. Pluraque in earn sententiam ab eisdem’ inquit ‘contra uerecundiam disputantur. Nos autem 10 naturam sequamur, et omne quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione fugiamus.’. (shrink)

We say we can no longer trust our public services, institutions or the people who run them. The professionals we have to rely on - politicians, doctors, scientists, businessmen and many others - are treated with suspicion. Their word is doubted, their motives questioned. Whether real or perceived, this crisis of trust has a debilitating impact on society and democracy. Can trust be restored by making people and institutions more accountable? Or do complex systems of accountability and control themselves damage (...) trust? Onora O'Neill challenges current approaches, investigates sources of deception in our society and re-examines questions of press freedom. 2002's Reith Lectures present a philosopher's view of trust and deception, and ask whether and how trust can be restored in a modern democracy. (shrink)

The republican ideal of non-domination identifies the capacity for arbitrary interference as a fundamental threat to liberty that can generate fearful uncertainty and servility in those dominated. I argue that republican accounts of domination can provide a powerful analysis of the nature of legal and institutional power that is encountered by people with mental disorders or cognitive disabilities. In doing so, I demonstrate that non-domination is an ideal which is pertinent, distinctive, and desirable in thinking through psychological disability. Finally, I (...) evaluate republican strategies for contesting domination, focusing on the limits of contestatory democracy, and proposing a participatory alternative which better addresses problems of political agency in the mentally disordered and cognitively disabled. (shrink)

Entrevista concedida a Linda Alcoff (CUNY) e Gregory Pappas (TAMU), originalmente para o Inter-American Journal of Philosophy, em inglês, aqui traduzida pelo entrevistado, com alguns retoques.

In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—contentless intentionality—is too weak. What’s needed is (...) a species of intentionality distinct from both the industrial-strength version beloved by philosophers and the intentionality lite recommended by Hutto and Satne. We briefly motivate and sketch this alternative, and say a few words about the account of cognition that it spawns. (shrink)

The phenomenon of action in which the mind moves the body has puzzled philosophers over the centuries. In this new edition of a classic work of analytical philosophy, Brian O'Shaughnessy investigates bodily action and attempts to resolve some of the main problems. His expanded and updated discussion examines the scope of the will and the conditions in which it makes contact with the body, and investigates the epistemology of the body. He sheds light upon the strangely intimate relation of awareness (...) in which we stand to our own bodies, doing so partly through appeal to the concept of the body-image. The result is a new and strengthened emphasis on the vitally important function of the bodily will as a transparently intelligible bridge between mind and body, and the proposal of a dual aspect theory of the will. (shrink)

One of the most striking manifestations of schizophrenia is thought insertion. People suffering from this delusion believe they are not the author of thoughts which they nevertheless own as experiences. It seems that a person’s sense of agency and their sense of the boundary between mind and world can come apart. Schizophrenia thus vividly demonstrates that self awareness is a complex construction of the brain. This point is widely appreciated. What is not so widely appreciated is how radically schizophrenia challenges (...) our assumptions about the nature of the self. Most theorists endorse the traditional doctrine of the unity of consciousness, according to which a normal human brain generates a single consciousness at any instant in time. In this paper we argue that phenomenal consciousness at each instant is actually a multiplicity: an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. We then consider how certain aspects of self might emerge from this manifold substrate, and speculate about the origin of thought insertion. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was hailed by Claude Lévi-Strauss as the founder of the sciences of man. This collection of fourteen classic papers devoted to his work addresses the points of intersection between the moral and the political, the personal and the social. The volume is divided into five parts: The Critique of Progress and the Speculative Anthropology, The Naturalizing of Natural Law, The General Will and Totalitarianism, Anticipations of Game Theory and Strategies of Redemption. The articles are accompanied by an extensive, (...) detailed introduction by the editor along with a selective bibliography. (shrink)

First published in 1987. This study is an attempt to distinguish the problem of political obligation as it was formulated in the ancient world from the problem as it has presented itself in the modern world, and assesses the idealist achievement in the philosophical treatment of the problem of political obligation. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy and politics.

In this paper we argue that there are no categories of being⎯at least not in the robust metaphysical sense of something fundamental. Central arguments that metaphysicians provide in support of fundamental categories, such as indispensability and theoretical utility arguments, are not adequate to guarantee their existence. We illustrate this point by examining Jonathan Lowe’s [2006] four-category ontology, and indicating its shortcomings. In contrast, we offer an alternative, no-category ontology, which dispenses with any fundamental categories of being, and provides a deflationary (...) understanding of any categorization in terms of concepts. Concepts, we insist, as opposed to fundamental ontological categories, can always be revised, refined, and recast. A distinctive deflationary, no-category ontology then emerges. (shrink)

There are two main questions in epistemology: What is knowledge? And: Do we have any of it? The first question asks after the nature of a concept; the second involves grappling with the skeptic, who believes that no one knows anything. This collection of original essays addresses the themes of knowledge and skepticism, offering both contemporary epistemological analysis and historical perspectives from leading philosophers and rising scholars. Contributors first consider knowledge: the intrinsic nature of knowledge -- in particular, aspects of (...) what distinguishes knowledge from true belief; the extrinsic examination of knowledge, focusing on contextualist accounts; and types of knowledge, specifically perceptual, introspective, and rational knowledge. The final chapters offer various perspectives on skepticism. Knowledge and Skepticism provides an eclectic yet coherent set of essays by distinguished scholars and important new voices. The cutting-edge nature of its contributions and its interdisciplinary character make it a valuable resource for a wide audience -- for philosophers of language as well as for epistemologists, and for psychologists, decision theorists, historians, and students at both the advanced undergraduate and graduate levels. Contributors: Kent Bach, Joseph Keim Campbell, Joseph Cruz, Fred Dretske, Catherine Z. Elgin, Peter S. Fosl, Peter J. Graham, David Hemp, Michael O'Rourke, George Pappas, John L. Pollock, Duncan Pritchard, Joseph Salerno, Robert J. Stainton, Harry S. Silverstein, Joseph Thomas Tolliver, Leora Weitzman The hardcover edition does not include a dust jacket. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abailard and Non-Things MARTIN M. TWEEDALE On SEVERAL OCCASIONSin his logical writings Abailard extracts himself from embarrassing ontological implications of his analyses of language by resorting to the notion of a something that is not a thing. I shall note here two such occasions and then discuss Abailard's explanations of this procedure based on the grammatical distinction of personal and impersonal constructions. Since the texts on this latter topic (...) are especially confusing, a considerable portion of my effort will be spent on making sense of them as preparation for drawing some conclusions about Abailard's overall approach. My purpose here is to show how Abailard's grammatical analyses are fundamental to his defence of a number of metaphysical positions. I also want to suggest that Abailard's grammatical approach, especially on the question of dicta, contains insights of continuing interest. Not all of Abailard's non-things are particularly associated with analyses of language. For instance, there are the likenesses the mind supposedly constructs for itself in order to think of things that are not being perceived. These Abailard calls fictive things (res ficta), and he refuses to give them the status of real psychological entities. ~ The likenesses are compared to mirror images which Abailard is also willing to treat as non-things. However, I wish to restrict my discussion here to cases which arise from Abailard's analysis of the reference of certain words. One such instance occurs in his discussion of universals. The peculiar nonthing here is the "state" (status), which, Abailard maintains, is "the common cause by which the universal word is imposed"7 Abailard is very careful to dis1Glossae super Porphyrium, in Peter Abelards philosophische,.gchriIten, edited by Geyer (henceforth referred ~o as Geyer), Miinster i. W., 1919 (BGPM, vol. 21), pp. 20-21, ll. 23-32: Intellectus autem sicut nec corporeo indigens instrumento est, ita /nec/ necesse est eum subiectum corpus habere in quod mittatur, sed rei ~dmilitudine contentus est, quam sibi ipse animus conficit, in quam suae intelligentiae actionem dirigit. Unde turr,~ destructa vel remota sensus qui in earn agebat, perit, inteUectus autem permanet rei similitudine auimo retenta. Sigut autem sensus non est res sentita, in quam dirigitur, sic nec intellectus forma est rei quam concipit, sed intellectus actio quaedam est animae, unde intelligens dicitur, forma vero in quam dirigitur, res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualm vult, animus conficit.... 11.9-17: Quaero enim, utrum flla quadratura et ilia altitudo vera forma sit intellectus, qui ad similitudinem quantitatis turris ducatur et compositionis eius. Sed profecto vera quadratura et vera altitudo non nisi corporibus insunt, ficta etiam qualitate nec intellectus nec ulla vera essentia forrnari potest. Restat igitur, ut sicut ficta eat qualitas, ficta substantia sit ei subiecta. Fortasae autem et ea speculi imago, quae visui subiecta apparere videtur, nihil esse vere dici potest, quoniam scilicetin alba speguli superficie contrarii coloris qualitas saepe apparet. Ibid., pp. 19-20,II. 14-16- ~ad nunc ea quae breviter tetigimus, diligenter perquiramus, scilicet quae sit iIla communis causa, secundum quam universale nomen impositum est.... 11. 21-29. Singuli homines discreti ab invicem, gum in propriis differant tam essentiis quam formis, ut supra meminimus rei physicam inquirentes, in eo tamen conveniunt, quod homines aunt. Non dico in homine, gum res nulla sit homo uisi discreta, sed in esse hominem. Esse autem hominem non est homo nec res aliqua, si diligentius consideremus, [329] 330 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tinguish three different questions frequently confused in discussions on universals. The first is "What is 'universal' predicated of?", and the answer is simply words --words not in the sense of mere marks or sounds, but of meaningful marks or sounds. Another is "How do we have an idea associated with universals?" Here the aforementioned likenesses enter as that by which the mind can have an idea applicable to many individuals. But there is also the question of what makes a certain word correctly applicable to many things. Abailard does not make the error of thinking that an idea in the mind or some operation of the mind could possibly be the cause, as some conceptualists seem to think. This would lead to the conclusion that... (shrink)

Nemám v úmyslu předložit školsky umný referát o filosofování, o různých filosofických koncepcích a jejich argumentaci, nýbrž pokusím se otevřít otázky, které mě bytostně zaměstnávají. Moje torzovité a fragmentární podněty se budou týkat následujících otázek-problémů: 1. Ontická realita na našem vnímání nezávislého světa a gnoseologické meze ontologie. 2. Co je racionalita, jaké jsou její možnosti a meze? Lze racionalitu kotvit gnoseologicky či již ontologicky? Jaký je vztah mezi racionalitou, přirozeností a přírodou? Je iracionalita předchůdná racionalitě? 3. Lze z racionality odvodit (...) etické jednání? Je racionalita vázána na určitý kulturní kontext a diskurs, či je universálně lidská? 4. Nemožnost objektivity a nezbytnost úsilí o co nejvyšší možnou míru objektivity. 5. Na čem založit humanitu? A proč vůbec humanita? 6. Posléze načrtnu svoji thesi: Skutečnost‚ její poznání a její utváření jako proces komplexity a komplementarity komponent v korelacích v kontinuitě a v kontextech. (Těmito šesti K si z Vás nechci dělat slovíčkářskou srandu, ale je to to nejvážnější, oč mi jde a s co Vám chci sdělit.) 7. Skončím položením radikálního otazníku nad filosofií. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Political Theology of Climate Change by Michael S. Northcott, and: Restored to Earth: Christianity, Environmental Ethics, and Ecological Restoration by Gretel Van WierenKevin J. O’BrienA Political Theology of Climate Change Michael S. Northcott grand rapids, mi: eerdmans, 2013. 335 pp. $30.00Restored to Earth: Christianity, Environmental Ethics, and Ecological Restoration Gretel Van Wieren washington, dc: georgetown university press, 2013. 208 pp. $29.95These two excellent books, A Political Theology (...) of Climate Change by Michael S. Northcott and Restored to Earth by Gretel Van Wieren, offer distinct directions for Christian environmental ethics: Northcott develops a rigorous analysis of climate change as a failure of enlightenment rationality and politics, while Van Wieren argues that those who care about the earth can connect with it through the practice of ecological restoration. Northcott theologically defines a complex global problem; Van Wieren theologically engages a community-based solution. Each book advances Christian environmental ethics in important ways; considered together, they have much to teach about the content and methods of the field.Northcott’s A Political Theology of Climate Change argues that climate change is a “cosmopolitical crisis” and that Christians should embrace a more ecological and theological politics in response. Theologians and ethicists have long argued that environmental degradation has cosmological roots: The belief that human beings are separate from nature makes global-scale degradation and pollution acceptable. Northcott adds a nuanced political analysis, noting that modern politics is based on a denial “that the weather is political, or that politics influences the climate” (46). Enlightenment thinkers who laid the groundwork for contemporary political structures insisted that storms and floods were not divine responses to human behavior, so modern nation-states are premised on an ideological separation from nature. Climate change reveals the failure of such thinking, so the facts of climate change pose an inherently political challenge.Thus, failures to act on climate change are political failures. Mainstream politics cannot consider that economic growth is unsustainable because it is premised on ignorance about nature. Nations cannot collaborate to solve the problem because they have no common moral agreement “about the ends and goals of human life” (245). Any response to climate change that simply extends [End Page 198] the enlightenment project—by ascribing “rights” to the natural world, or by trusting existing secular political structures—is doomed to failure. Instead, climate change calls for a different cosmology and a different politics.Northcott argues that both can be found in the Christian tradition. Natural law thinking respects the relationship between human beings and external moral standards “set into the structure of the cosmos,” demanding careful accounting for the atmospheric consequences of human action (246). Virtue ethics teaches the ideal of politics as a “community of friendship and love,” nurturing practices of participation in the good life, lived with less consumption and less destructive energy (200).Northcott hopes that small-scale communities inspired by Christian cosmology and Christian politics will transition away from destructive practices and thereby demonstrate a new way of life to the world. His book concludes by reasserting that because climate change is a political problem, it is fundamentally a theological problem, calling human communities to “re-create the historic and customary connections between nature and culture, land and life, love for neighbour and nature which are central to the Jewish and Christian messianism of empire-challenging love” (316).In contrast to Northcott’s focus on political and philosophical failures, Gretel Van Wieren’s Restored to Earth seeks a “more positive, solution-oriented” approach to Christian ethics (viii). The book is about reconnecting humans with the natural world through ecological restoration, “the science and art of repairing ecosystems that have been damaged by human activities” (2), and it argues that restoration models moral life by creating physical, intellectual, emotional, communal, and spiritual connections with the natural world.Van Wieren begins with an interdisciplinary definition of ecological restoration and argues that views on the practice depend upon varied definitions of nature. She then moves to a nuanced account of restoration ecology as a spiritual practice (chapter 3) of community formation (chapter 4). Evocatively recounting a controlled prairie burn in Illinois on Maundy Thursday, Van Wieren... (shrink)

In 1942, replying to a criticism put to him by Langford, G. E. Moore confessed that he was unable to solve the paradox of analysis. But while conceding inability to solve the puzzle Moore offered the following suggestion, which he did not further develop: I think that, in order to explain the fact that, even if ‘To be a brother is the same thing as to be a male sibling’ is true, yet nevertheless this statement is not the same as (...) the statement ‘To be a brother is to be a brother’, one must suppose that both statements are in some sense about the expressions used as well as about the concept of being a brother. But in what sense they are about the expressions used I cannot see clearly; and therefore I cannot give any clear solution to the puzzle. (shrink)

Quons are particles characterized by the parameter q, which permits smooth interpolation between Bose and Fermi statistics; q = 1 gives bosons, q = -1 gives fermions. In this paper we give a heuristic argument for an extension of conservation of statistics to quons with trilinear couplings of the form ffb, where f is fermion-like and b is boson-like. We show that q f 2 = qb. In particular, we relate the bound on qγ for photons to the bound on (...) qe for electrons, allowing the very precise bound for electrons to be carried over to photons. An extension of this argument suggests that all particles are fermions or bosons to a high precision. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In a recent paper Alan Carter argues that the claim that workers’co‐operatives merely replace exploitation by employers with ‘self‐exploitation’is nonsense: the term ‘self‐exploitation’is self‐contradictory. He maintains that the only form of exploitation to which a workers’co‐operative may be said to be subject is ‘market‐exploitation’by dominant economic actors who are external to the co‐operative. I argue that these conclusions are mistaken. While the concept of ‘market‐exploitation’is not without value, it is difficult to operationalise. While the concept of ‘self‐exploitation’is, understood literally, (...) incoherent, the claims defended by some of the users of this term can be made conceptually respectable. (shrink)

In GC I.1 Aristotle criticizes the monists and pluralists for accepting positions that eliminate either generation or alteration, and in GC I.4 he defends the existence of both. Thus, he must believe that his account is immune to those objections he raises against his predecessors, but it is difficult to reconstruct these objections, and so difficult to discern how Aristotle distinguishes his own account from theirs. In this paper, I propose a new reconstruction of these objections, and I show how (...) Aristotle’s own account is immune to them so reconstructed. On my interpretation, Aristotle argues that neither the monists nor the pluralists can explain the generation of a substance. The monists cannot explain how an ultimate subject of predication–one mark of substance–is generated. The pluralists cannot explain how a being that can alter–another mark of substance–is generated. I subsequently show how Aristotle’s own account in GC I.4 sufficiently diverges from his predecessors to allow something that is both generable and alterable. (shrink)