Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.

An observable on a quantum structure is any σ-homomorphism of quantum structures from the Borel σ-algebra of the real line into the quantum structure which is in our case a monotone σ-complete effect algebra with the Riesz Decomposition Property. We show that every observable is a smearing of a sharp observable which takes values from a Boolean σ-subalgebra of the effect algebra, and we prove that for every element of the effect algebra there corresponds a spectral measure.

In the spirit of B. C. van Fraassen's view of science called Constructive Empiricism, we propose a scientific criterion to decide whether a concrete object is observable, as well as a coextensive scientific-philosophical definition of observability, and we sketch a rigorous account of modal language occurring in science. We claim that our account of observability solves three problems to which current accounts of observability, notably van Fraassen's own accounts, give rise. We further claim that our account of (...) modal propositions (subjunctive conditionals included), which proceeds wholly within the framework of the semantic view on scientific theories, grounds his claim that such an account is possible without relying on ‘inflationary metaphysics’, notably without postulating an infinitude of different universes besides the universe we inhabit. We thus claim to solve a fourth problem: how to give a precise nominalist account of modal language in science tailor-made for Constructive Empiricism. Introduction: Rough Guides The semantic view and the wave theory of light A scientific guide and a scientific criterion A New Rough Guide and a definition The Context Problem and Psillos' Problem Musgrave's Problem Modality without inflationary metaphysics Exitum. (shrink)

The paper introduces a new model of telepresence. First, it criticises the standard model of presence as epistemic failure, showing it to be inadequate. It then replaces it with a new model of presence as successful observability. It further provides reasons to distinguish between two types of presence, backward and forward. The new model is then tested against two ethical issues whose nature has been modified by the development of digital information and communication technologies, namely pornography and privacy, and (...) shown to be effective. (shrink)

We ask how to use machine learning to expand observability, which presently depends on human learning that informs conceivability. The issue is engaged by considering the question of correspondence between conceived observability counterfactuals and observable, yet so far unobserved or unconceived, states of affairs. A possible answer lies in importing out of reference frame content which could provide means for conceiving further observability counterfactuals. They allow us to define high-fidelity observability, increasing the level of correspondence in (...) question. To achieve high-fidelity observability, we propose to use generative machine learning models as the providers of the out of reference frame content. From an applied point of view, such a role of generative machine learning models shows an emerging dimension of human-machine cooperation. (shrink)

The concept of observability of entities in physical science is typically analysed in terms of the nature and significance of a dichotomy between observables and unobservables. In the present work, however, this categorization is resisted and observability is analysed in a descriptive way in terms of the information which one can receive through interaction with objects in the world. The account of interaction and the transfer of information is done using applicable scientific theories. In this way, the question (...) of observability of scientific entities is put to science itself. The result is a demonstration that observability has many dimensions, some more epistemically significant than others. (shrink)

Werner Heisenberg's 1925 paper ‘Quantum-theoretical re-interpretation of kinematic and mechanical relations’ marks the beginning of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg famously claims that the paper is based on the idea that the new quantum mechanics should be ‘founded exclusively upon relationships between quantities which in principle are observable’. My paper is an attempt to understand this observability principle, and to see whether its employment is philosophically defensible. Against interpretations of ‘observability’ along empiricist or positivist lines I argue that such readings (...) are philosophically unsatisfying. Moreover, a careful comparison of Heisenberg's reinterpretation of classical kinematics with Einstein's argument against absolute simultaneity reveals that the positivist reading does not fit with Heisenberg's strategy in the paper. Instead the appeal to observability should be understood as a specific criticism of the causal inefficacy of orbital electron motion in Bohr's atomic model. I conclude that the tacit philosophical principle behind Heisenberg's argument is not a positivistic connection between observability and meaning, but the idea that a theory should not contain causally idle wheels. (shrink)

I develop a concept of observability that pertains to qualities rather than objects: a quality is observable if it can be registered by human sensation (possibly with the aid of instruments) without involving optional interpretations. This concept supports a better description of observations in science and everyday life than the object-based observability concepts presupposing causal information-transfer from the object to the observer. It also allows a rehabilitation of the traditional empiricist distinction between observations and their interpretations, but without (...) a presumption that observations are infallible. Using this concept of observability, I also propose a re-formulation of constructive empiricism that is easier to defend against realist attacks, while open to reasonable realist intuitions. (shrink)

The paper explores how, in economics and biology, theoretical models are used as explanatory devices. It focuses on a modelling strategy by which, instead of starting with an unexplained regularity in the world, the modeller begins by creating a credible model world. The model world exhibits a regularity, induced by a mechanism in that world. The modeller concludes that there may be a part of the real world in which a similar regularity occurs and that, were that the case, the (...) model would offer an explanation. Little concrete guidance is given about where such a regularity might be found. Three modelling exercises in evolutionary game theory—one from economics and two from biology—are used as case studies. Two of these (one from each discipline) exemplify ‘explanation in search of observation’. The third goes a step further, analysing a regularity in a model world and treating it as informative about the real world, but without saying anything about real phenomena. The paper argues that if the relation between the model and real worlds is understood in terms of similarity, and if modelling is understood as an ongoing discovery process rather than as the demonstration of empirical truths, there can be value in creating explanations before finding the regularities that are to be explained. (shrink)

I provide a fairly systematic analysis of when quantities that are variant under a dynamical symmetry transformation should be regarded as unobservable, or redundant, or unreal; of when models related by a dynamical symmetry transformation represent the same state of affairs; and of when mathematical structure that is variant under a dynamical symmetry transformation should be regarded as surplus. In most of these cases the answer is `it depends': depends, that is, on the details of the symmetry in question. A (...) central feature of the analysis is that in order to draw any of these conclusions for a dynamical symmetry it needs to be understood in terms of its possible extensions to other physical systems, in particular to measurement devices. (shrink)

Scientists collect evidence in order to confirm or falsify scientific theories. Unfortunately, scientific evidence may sometimes be false or deceiving and as a consequence lead individuals to believe in a false theory. By interaction between scientists, such false beliefs may spread through the entire community. There is currently a debate about the effect of various network configurations on the epistemic reliability of scientific communities. To contribute to this debate from a logical perspective, this paper introduces an epistemic logical framework of (...) observation, interaction and belief revision in scientific communities. The presented sound and complete system provides the formal tools for qualitative analysis of the social dynamics of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, this paper includes detailed suggestions for future applications of the framework. (shrink)

We define two types of convergence for observables on a quantum logic which we call M-weak and uniform M-weak convergence. These convergence modes correspond to weak convergence of probability measures. They are motivated by the idea that two (in general unbounded) observables are “close” if bounded functions of them are “close.” We show that M-weak and uniform M-weak convergence generalize strong resolvent and norm resolvent convergence for self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space. Also, these types of convergence strengthen the weak (...) operator convergence and operator norm convergence of bounded self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space. Finally, we consider spectral perturbation by showing that the spectra of approximating observables approach the spectrum of the limit in a certain sense. (shrink)

Suppose that two theories θ and θ ′ are observationally equivalent, so that any possible evidence for or against one has the same relation to the other. Are these theories then logically equivalent? If not, is rational choice between them possible (on non-empirical grounds), or must we forever suspend judgment? It is argued that these questions are unintelligible, because the required sense of "observationally equivalent" does not exist. An explanation as to why this fact has been long overlooked is attempted (...) by suggesting that the existence of a precisely describable "domain" for θ and θ ′ frequently makes discussion of observational equivalence possible, though not in the sense required by the above questions. (shrink)

A general algebraic system M is considered with two binary operations. The family of all measurable functions with values in the unit interval is a motivating example. A state is a morphism from M to the unit interval, an observable is a morphism from the family of Borel sets to M. A joint distribution of two observables is constructed. It is applied for the construction of the sum of observables and for a representation of conditional probability.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.1 (2004) 65-77 [Access article in PDF] In Defense of Observational Practice in Art and Design Education Howard Cannatella Introduction It is increasingly debatable whether observational drawing and making in nature are still regarded as principal activities of art and design learning. Against this, the aim of this article is to strengthen sympathetically a teacher'sunderstanding of observational creative work from nature and to assert (...) that such an approach should be central to art and design teaching and learning.My reasons for writing this article are to reconsider observational aspects of this approach that are not generally expounded in existing art and design educational practice circles. The reluctance by some to debate theimportance of the observational creative process may be construed as a questionable position to take, for a number of educational practitioners in art and design appear to see observations in nature as irrelevant to current art and design learning, as if it were a fashion item, one that has lost its appeal. Creative poiesis, some would argue, could never extend sufficiently to observations in nature. When observations in nature are seen as trite, not high art, there is the perception that art and design may have lost something precious, unable to nurture, becoming too introverted and sensational at the expense of grappling with common human realistic experiences. A decline in observational visual sensibilities may seem inevitable under these conditions.There is a persistent view in art and design education that seems to me to be a misconception — that observations in nature are restrictive and superficial, an experience that deals only with archaic approaches in learning. In the work of Immanuel Kant, imitation could not be an original factuality. 1 In Kantian terms, to imitate exactly a thing of beauty would be an act considered as "wholly destitute of taste." 2 A similar kind of sentiment is echoed by Georg Hegel, who considers imitation in art as "deceptive" and goes on to say: "the pursuit of imitation is on the same lines as the feat of the man who has taught himself to throw lentils through a small aperture [End Page 65] without missing." 3 More recently, Norman Bryson criticizes the idea of a "natural attitude" toward observations in natureas he denounces any suggestion of the purity of the universal visual image. 4 This backlash may make us feel a little uneasy as to why observations in nature should play a primary role in art and design education.My argument will be that although creative observations in nature do involve mimetic and regulative factors, these factors, when sensitively handled,can enlarge our imagination, touching us deeply in the process. Along these lines, it does not follow that because a work is mimetic in kind that it necessarily fails to produce significant learning. In accepting that there is a degree of control exerted normatively by what is being observed in the nature of such work, these perceptions in art and design become, through the creative process, refined and subtle experiences. Normative features and experiences may spur the artist or designer to create powerful expressions of them in the work.I will try to demonstrate that observational creative work, for all its reality checks, has the capability to be powerfully expressive and make discoveries that seem pertinent and true. As I see it, this encounter involves moral, social, perceptual, cognitive, and aesthetic orchestrations.Of course, some might insist that artistic autonomy could be a problem when having to work from observation in nature but the idea of autonomy relates to self-rule, a condition that is perhaps best understood, as Robert Young states, as being predominately dispositional as opposed to occurrent. 5 Educators like myself may want to argue that art and design teaching and learning requires, apart from other things, an understanding of theworld in which one lives as we come into contact with what actually and candidly stands publicly before us. This position cannot be reached through channelling our efforts exclusively via autonomist means.Certainly, in education, motivation, prior experience, personality, student... (shrink)

My eyes are notoriously bad, so I am not sure whether I have ever seen a meteor. Others have seen them, of course, but it is important to me to observe them first hand. I even go to the trouble to hike at night in the desert mountains so that viewing conditions will be ideal. I scan the sky through my thick glasses, but to no avail. My companions have sighted several, the latest just to the left of that peak. (...) And still I am unsure. Did I really see the meteor, or was it just that my eye twitched? I suspect that this question has no unambiguous answer and that understanding why it lacks such an answer will provide important clues about the role of observation in scientific theorizing. (shrink)

The program of a physical concept of information is outlined in the framework of quantum theory. A proposal is made for how to avoid the intuitive introduction of observables. The conventional and the Everett interpretations in principle may lead to different dynamical consequences. An ensemble description occurs without the introduction of an abstract concept of information.

The temptation to use prospective observational studies (POS) instead of conducting difficult trials (RCTs) has always existed, but with the advent of powerful computers and large databases, it can become almost irresistible. We examine the potential consequences, were this to occur, by comparing two hypothetical studies of a new treatment: one RCT, and one POS. The POS inevitably submits more patients to inferior research methodology. In RCTs, patients are clearly informed of the research context, and 1:1 randomized allocation between experimental (...) and validated treatment balances risks for each patient. In POS, for each patient, the risks of receiving inferior treatment are impossible to estimate. The research context and the uncertainty are down-played, and patients and clinicians are at risk of becoming passive research subjects in studies performed from an outsider’s view, which potentially has extraneous objectives, and is conducted without their explicit, autonomous, and voluntary involvement and consent. (shrink)

Kuhn 's contribution should be viewed as posing a number of important problems, not as a full-fledged theory of the structure of science. Kuhn 's alleged theory-ladenness of observations is examined as a test case in the light of Hintikka's interrogative model of inquiry. A certain superficial theory-ladenness is built into that model. Moreover, the model provides a deeper analysis of theory-ladenness via the two-levelled character of experimental science. A higher-level and a lower-level inquiry rely on different kinds of initial (...) premises and operate with different kinds of "answers" by nature. The model also throws light on the alleged theory-ladenness of meaning. (shrink)

An extended definition of “observation” is developed in order to account for the usage in the physical sciences and in neuropsychology. An observation is initially defined as a perception that has a focus of attention and is guided by theoretical considerations. Since the focus may change, one adopts a pluralist position according to which the object of perception may involve any stage of the causal chain that leads to perception, such as the source of light or sound, the obstructions, the (...) medium or even the receptor. The “neutral” observations of the empiricists are seen as involving only low-level or medium-level theorization. Examples are examined, such as a lunar eclipse, the rainbow, and observations mediated by instruments, whose “artifacts” are considered observations of the instrument itself. One also defines null-effect observations. Observations of photographs and drawings may be considered either the observation of a printed sheet of paper or the observation of the pictured object or people. This causal-pluralist metatheory of observation also accepts that one may “observe light”, observe the retina, and observe parts of the brain which are outside the region of the “sensorium”. Illusions and hallucinations are analyzed within this “observational materialism”, which considers that qualia are self-observations of the brain. Criticisms that the approach is too wide in scope are analyzed in the conclusion. (shrink)

Observables have a dual nature in both classical and quantum kinematics: they are at the same time quantities, allowing to separate states by means of their numerical values, and generators of transformations, establishing relations between different states. In this work, we show how this twofold role of observables constitutes a key feature in the conceptual analysis of classical and quantum kinematics, shedding a new light on the distinguishing feature of the quantum at the kinematical level. We first take a look (...) at the algebraic description of both classical and quantum observables in terms of Jordan–Lie algebras and show how the two algebraic structures are the precise mathematical manifestation of the twofold role of observables. Then, we turn to the geometric reformulation of quantum kinematics in terms of Kähler manifolds. A key achievement of this reformulation is to show that the twofold role of observables is the constitutive ingredient defining what an observable is. Moreover, it points to the fact that, from the restricted point of view of the transformational role of observables, classical and quantum kinematics behave in exactly the same way. Finally, we present Landsman’s general framework of Poisson spaces with transition probability, which highlights with unmatched clarity that the crucial difference between the two kinematics lies in the way the two roles of observables are related to each other. (shrink)

Science is at a cross-roads. For several decades, the Standard Model of particle physics has managed to fit vast amounts of particle scattering data remarkably well, but many questions remain. During those decades, some sophisticated theoretical hypotheses such as string theory, quantum gravity, and quantum cosmology have been proposed and studied intensively, in an effort to break the log-jam of the Standard Model. None of those hypotheses have succeeded to date. Of greater concern is the increasing tendency by some practitioners (...) in those fields to downplay the empirical principles of science. In response, this book is a restatement of those principles, covering numerous aspects of observation. A particular focus is on contextuality versus realism, the two fundamentally contrasting ideologies that underpin modern physics. (shrink)

Feyerabend claims that what is perceived depends upon what is believed ; and he maintains that among really efficient alternative theories "each theory will possess its own experience, and there will be no overlap between these experiences". According to Feyerabend "scientific theories are ways of looking at the world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs and expectations, and thereby also our experiences...". Toulmin, Hanson, and Kuhn concur with this view. Toulmin claims that men who accept different "ideals" and "paradigms" (...) will see different phenomena. He thinks theories not only give significance to facts, but also determine what facts are for us at all. Like Feyerabend, Toulmin asserts that "we see the world through" our fundamental concepts of science "to such an extent that we forget what it would look like without them". Indeed, both Feyerabend and Toulmin would have previous thinkers "live in an observational world very different from our own". Kuhn expresses quite similar views. He feels that. (shrink)

Individuative Realism is the thesis that reality is individuated intrinsically-that is, that reality is divided up into objects that are circumscribed by boundaries that are totally independent of our gerrymandering. One strategy for substantiating the thesis would involve discovering some of reality’s inherent joints by direct observation. This paper critically considers the observational strategy by examining a number of proposals for how reality might be individuated intrinsically, and demonstrating case-by-case that the individuation in question is likely imposed by us, rather (...) than inherent in nature. It is additionally suggested that even if objects with crisply unambiguous boundaries were discovered, it would still not be enough to vindicate Individuative Realism. (shrink)

In this paper, aspects of observable and non-observable based models are discussed. A survey of recent literature was done to show how using non-observable-based language carelessly may cause disagreement, even in professional research programs and incorrect assertions, even in prestigious journals. The relation between physical measurements and observables is discussed and it is shown that, in contrast to general belief, this relation may be complicated and not always straightforward. The decomposition of the system into basic subsystems (physical or conceptual) is (...) traced as the origin of non-observable-based languages. The possibility of defining new quantum mechanical observables for open quantum subsystems and of replacing them with non-observable-based concepts has been mentioned and the AIM theory is explained as an example. An account of some current non-observable-based models for molecular geometry is discussed and it is shown that not all non-observable-based languages possess the same effectiveness. In the end, the need to develop a clear chemical language is stressed. (shrink)

Fundamental experiments on the dual nature of atomic entities (photons, electrons, neutrons, etc.) can be interpreted in terms of “empty” waves not carrying energy and momentum. Similar points of view were advanced in famous papers by Einstein, de Broglie, Bohr, and Born. Recent proposals could lead to experimental tests of this idea, using low intensity photon beams, thanks to modern experimental apparatuses.

In this paper I examine two mathematical definitions of observational equivalence, one proposed by Charlotte Werndl and based on manifest isomorphism, and the other based on Ornstein and Weiss's ε-congruenceε-congruence. I argue, for two related reasons, that neither can function as a purely mathematical definition of observational equivalence. First, each definition permits of counterexamples; second, overcoming these counterexamples will introduce non-mathematical premises about the systems in question. Accordingly, the prospects for a broadly applicable and purely mathematical definition of observational equivalence (...) are unpromising. Despite this critique, I suggest that Werndl's proposals are valuable because they clarify the distinction between provable and unprovable elements in arguments for observational equivalence. (shrink)

SummaryCertain problems in Quine's philosophy of language are discussed. The first issue is his theory of how an observation sentence is understood. This is part of the more general problem of constructing a theory for how any single cognitive sentence is grasped. Quine's thesis of the inscrutability of reference, according to which it is senseless to ask what the referent of a term is, is our second subject. The content and truth of this thesis is discussed. In this context three (...) rather precise versions of the thesis are presented. The third issue to be treated is the relationship between the inscrutability thesis and theories of observation sentence understanding. The main conclusion of the paper is that the inscrutability thesis can hardly be true. (shrink)

The atomistic paradigm of high energy physics cannot anymore be dismissed because the proposed elementary particles are too many or because it is not possible to observe quarks in an isolated manner. The developments in particle physics have brought about radical changes to our notions of simplicity and observability, and in this paper we elaborate on these changes. It is as a result of these changes that the present situation in elementary particle physics justifies our claim that we have (...) indeed reached a level of explanation where the constituent particles used for the explanation of the various phenomena considered to be delineating a particular level in the descriptive framework of the physical phenomena and a specific stratum in the organization of nature, can be regarded as elementary. (shrink)

Research into robotic social learning, especially that concerned with imitation, often focuses at differing ends of a spectrum from observational learning at one end to following or matched-dependent behaviour at the other. We study the implications and differences that arise when carrying out experiments both at the extremes and within this spectrum. Physical Khepera robots with minimal sensory capabilities are used, and after training, experiments are carried out where an imitating robot perceives the dynamic movement behaviours of another model robot (...) carrying a light source. It learns the movement behaviour of the model by either statically observing the model, dynamically observing the model or by following the model. It finally re-enacts the learnt behaviour. We compare the results of these re-enactments and illustrate the differences and trade-offs that arise between static observational and reactive following learning methods. We also consider circumstances where, for this robotic embodiment, dynamic observation has both advantages and disadvantages when compared to static observation. We conclude by discussing the implications that arise from using and combining these types of social learning. (shrink)

There is a natural objection to the epistemic coherence of Bas van Fraassen’s use of a distinction between the observable and unobservable in his constructive empiricism, an objection that has been raised with particular clarity by Alan Musgrave. We outline Musgrave’s objection, and then consider how one might interpret and evaluate van Fraassen’s response. According to the constructive empiricist, observability for us is measured with respect to the epistemic limits of human beings qua measuring devices, limitations ‘which will be (...) described in detail in the final physics and biology’ (van Fraassen 1980: 17). In order for the constructive empiricist to determine what counts as observable, he will have to appeal to our best scientific theories of light, human physiology, and so forth. To put the same point in a slightly more abstract way, in order to draw a distinction between observable and unobservable entities, the constructive empiricist needs to use his best scientific theory of observability – call it T* – to tell him the identity of the observable entities. This raises an interesting difficulty. Constructive empiricism is the view that ‘science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate’ (van Fraassen 1980:12). When he accepts a theory, the constructive empiricist only believes the statements of his scientific theories that are about observable entities. Thus, in order to know which statements of a scientific theory to believe, the constructive empiricist needs to know which statements of that theory are about observable entities. In particular then, the constructive empiricist only believes the statements of his theory of observability T* that are about observable entities. Therefore, in order to know which statements of T* he can believe, the constructive empiricist needs to know which statements of T* are about observable entities. However, it is T* that tells the constructive empiricist what counts as an observable entity: the constructive empiricist therefore needs to use T* to tell him which statements of T* he can believe. The fact that the distinction drawn by T* must also apply to itself is not an immediate cause for alarm.. (shrink)

There is perhaps no more succinct a way of describing the controversy between scientific realists and antirealists than to say that it turns on the reality of the unobservable. Less concisely, it turns on whether we have reason to think that scientific theories tell us the truth (or something close to it) about some of the underlying, unobservable bits of a mind-independent, external reality, among other things. Claims to knowledge of such a reality have traditionally been a bone of contention (...) between realists and empiricists. Two decades ago, this ongoing debate was inflamed by the introduction of Bas van Fraassen’s particular brand of empiricism. Wholesale idealists and phenomenalists have been increasingly marginalized. The reality of the observable is now generally taken for granted by most parties to the debate. The epistemic status of the unobservable, however, remains controversial. (shrink)

,d simple example is used to analyze the issue ofimperfcsct obseruabilitt of commitmerit and to highlight the follotving phenor»enon: u'hen a player h«s tlie option of taking — at a cost — a (potentiality' deterring action, she is less lil.ely to do so cigainst an opponent rgho is aware of' tlie aoailabilitt' of tliis opticrn thaii against an opponent it her is not..

The primacy of the act of observation, one of the hallmarks of empiricism, found new life in the centrality of the distinction, made in Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, between observable and unobservable. As Elliott Sober have pointed out, however, it is not clear what van Fraassen understands by observing an object. Worse, the Dutch philosopher does not seem to consider that a clarification of this point is necessary. This, of course, represents an important lacuna in a position generally considered (...) as the main reference for modern empiricism. My goal is to take up again the counterfactual conditionals characterizing perception that Otávio Bueno presented in 2011 in this journal, and also to consider the observability and the existence criteria proposed by Filip Buekens and Michel Ghins, in order to get to a definition of observation that should give van Fraassen's observability concept the support it actually lacks, but without presenting itself as an ad hoc solution. (shrink)

Some epistemological and methodological problems associated with the principle of observability are discussed, especially in relation to this principle's heuristic role and its objective basis and in relation to the philosophical doctrine of Mach.

In climate science, observational gridded climate datasets that are based on in situ measurements serve as evidence for scientific claims and they are used to both calibrate and evaluate models. However, datasets only represent selected aspects of the real world, so when they are used for a specific purpose they can be a source of uncertainty. Here, we present a framework for understanding this uncertainty of observational datasets which distinguishes three general sources of uncertainty: (1) uncertainty that arises during the (...) generation of the dataset; (2) uncertainty due to biased samples; and (3) uncertainty that arises due to the choice of abstract properties, such as resolution and metric. Based on this framework, we identify four different types of dataset ensembles — parametric, structural, resampling, and property ensembles—as tools to understand and assess uncertainties arising from the use of datasets for a specific purpose. We advocate for a more systematic generation of dataset ensembles by using these sorts of tools. Finally, we discuss the use of dataset ensembles in climate model evaluation. We argue that a more systematic understanding and assessment of dataset uncertainty is needed to allow for a more reliable uncertainty assessment in the context of model evaluation. The more systematic use of such a framework would be beneficial for both scientific reasoning and scientific policy advice based on climate datasets. (shrink)

Results on the observational indistinguishability of spacetimes demonstrate the impossibility of determining by deductive inference which is our spacetime, no matter how extensive a portion of the spacetime is observed. These results do not illustrate an underdetermination of theory by evidence, since they make no decision between competing theories and they make little contact with the inductive considerations that must ground such a decision. Rather, these results express a variety of indeterminism in which a specification of the observable past always (...) fails to fix the remainder of a spacetime. This form of indeterminism is more troubling than the familiar indeterminism of quantum theory. The inductive inferences that can discriminate among the different spacetime extensions of the observed past are here called “opaque,” which means that we cannot readily see the warrant that lies behind them. (shrink)

In order to effectively communicate information, the choice of representation is important. Ideally, a chosen representation will aid readers in making desired inferences. In this paper, we develop the theory of observation: what it means for one statement to be observable from another. Using observability, we give a formal characterization of the observational advantages of one representation of information over another. By considering observational advantages, people will be able to make better informed choices of representations of information. To demonstrate (...) the benefit of observation and observational advantages, we apply these concepts to set theory and Euler diagrams. In particular, we can show that Euler diagrams have significant observational advantages over set theory. This formally justifies Larkin and Simon’s claim that “a diagram is worth ten thousand words”. (shrink)

There is growing interest in whether and how sunk-cost effects for purely behavioral investments occur. In this article, we further discuss Cunha and Caldieraro’s (2009) Behavioral Investment Sunk Cost (BISC) model and reconcile Otto’s (2010) results with the BISC model predictions. We also report new data from two unpublished experiments that are consistent with the BISC model, and we discuss the conditions under which purely behavioral sunk-cost effects are likely to be observed.

In recent years there have been several attempts to construct inductive arguments for some version of scientific realism. Neither the characteristics of what would count as inductive evidence nor the conclusion to be inferred have been specified in ways that escape sceptical criticism. By introducing the pragmatic criterion of manipulative efficacy for a good theory and by sharpening the specification of the necessary inductive principle, the viability of a mutually supporting pair of argument forms are defended. It is shown that (...) by the use of these forms, taken together, a sequence of inductive arguments could be constructed, given suitable cases histories to serve as evidence. It also shown that the best inductive argument for the most daring realist claim is the weakest when compared with similarly structured arguments for less daring claims. (shrink)