The paper presents some principal motives that made I. Kant take the position of transcendental idealism. They are the following: the question of a priori synthetic judgements, the question of the cognitive and ontic status of space and time, the problem of the constitution of the phenomenal world, and the problem of the objectivity of empirical judgments (the so-called transcendental deduction). In relation to Kant’s solutions some objections have been formulated and a thesis that neither separately nor in combination (...) can the main four motives be treated as conditions sufficient for idealism and agnosticism. The author also seeks to show the relationship between transcendental idealism and Kant’s belief of the impossibility to solve the “great” metaphysical problems, therefore the problem of the existence of God, soul, and freedom. (shrink)

La intención principal del presente artículo se centra en tres puntos esenciales y correlacionados entre sí. Nuestra principal intención es presentar, argumentativamente, las razones por las que Juan David García Bacca habría cometido un error al traducir el término heideggeriano Sorge por preocupación y no por cuidado. Pretendemos sostener que el hecho de traducir Sorge por preocupación, distorsiona gravemente todo el andamiaje ontológico y existencial propuesto por Heidegger. Si esto es así, Juan David García Bacca habría elaborado un sistema crítico (...) contra Heidegger, sostenido sobre un error de fondo, de traducción y de nivel de discurso. Es decir, el filósofo español únicamente se habría quedado en un orden de discurso óntico y no ontológico tal y como exige el proyecto fenomenológico heideggeriano.The aim of this essay focuses on three main points which are essentials and related to each other. Our main aim is to present, in our argument, the reasons for which Juan David García Bacca would have erroneously translated Heidegger´s term “Sorge” for “concern” instead of “care”. We hope to maintain the argument that the fact of translating Sorge for concern seriously distorts the ontological and existential framework that Heidegger proposes. If this is a fact, Juan David García Bacca would have developed a critical system against Heidegger, held over a fundamental mistake, at both a discourse and a translation level. In this way, the Spanish philosopher would have only achieved an ontic discourse and not an ontologic one, which is what Heidegger´s phenomenological project requires. (shrink)

The claim that, in some nontrivial sense, nursing can be identified with caring has prompted a search for the philosophical foundations of care in the nursing literature. Although the ethics of care was initially associated with Gilligan's ‘different voice’, there has more recently been an attempt – led principally by Benner – to displace the gender perspective with a Heideggerian one, even if Kant is the figure to whom both Gilligan and Benner appear most irretrievably opposed. This paper represents the (...) first half of a double-edged project: initially, to point out that Heidegger explicitly disowns any ethical implications for his ontological thinking, and to argue that no ethical theory (including an ethics of care) can be derived from Being and Time; and then to argue that Kant's categorical imperative is not only compatible with the ethics of care but actively entails it. In this, Heideggerian, part of the argument, I consider three attempts to wrest an ethics from Being and Time– those of Benner, Olafson and Guignon – suggesting that, for different reasons, they all fail. Benner systematically confuses the ontological with the ontic, not recognizing that care, concern and solicitude have ‘deficient’ modes as well as positive ones, and that Heidegger's ontology retrieves the possibility of an ethics-in-general without at any point implying an ethics-in-particular (whether of care or justice). Olafson does recognize this, and to that extent admits his failure, but his efforts to amplify Heidegger's thought in such a way as to generate an ethical theory involve both the importing of Kantian premises, and an appeal to some rather doubtful empirical observations. Guignon resorts to Heidegger's discussion of authenticity, and the idea that authentic Dasein ‘may choose its hero’, suggesting a morally reassuring list of heroes who might fit the bill. However, there is nothing in Heidegger's account of this choice that justifies his confidence, and I conclude by proposing that we should take Heidegger at his word when he says that ontology has ‘no result, no effect’. (shrink)

Central to Elements is an assay of the attributional union properties and relations have with their subjects, a topic historically left metaphorical. The work critiques eight Aristotelian assumptions concerning attribute dependence and ‘inherence’, per se subjects, attributes as agent-organizers, and unity-by-a-shared-one. Groups of these assumptions are seen to yield contradiction, vicious regress, or other problems. This analysis, joined with insights from an assay of ubiquitous structure, motivate ten theses explicating attribution and its primary ontic status. The theses detail: attributes (...) proper as individuated instances, structure as instance-generated facts and their two forms of composition, the conditioning role and universal nature of instances’ component intensions, the primacy of attribute instances for generating all forms of composition and complex entities, and identity and indiscernibility criteria for the latter. Principal is the insight that attribution is intension-determined combinatorial agency. It is its systematizing implications that provide solutions to classic problems, e.g., Composition, Individuation, and Universals, and in net generate a comprehensive one-category structuralist ontology. (shrink)

Se propone un examen crítico de la última obra de J.-L. Marion titulada, dedicada a la unión de alma y cuerpo, y cuya tesis principal es: los problemas que esta unión suscita confunden dos términos, cuerpo y mi cuerpo. Esta confusión lleva a que se apliquen al primero categorías propias del segundo. Se examinan las "paradojas ónticas" que mi cuerpo (la carne) inaugura (a); se despeja la tesis de dos interpretaciones de las meditaciones primera y sexta (b); se discute la (...) "excepción a la metafísica" instaurada por el conocimiento de mi cuerpo (c); se arriesga, siguiendo una indicación del autor, la apertura a una dimensión ética que exige examinar ya no la unión de cuerpo y alma, sino la unión por el amor a un semejante y a la comunidad de semejantes (d). The article carries out a critical examination of J.-L. Marion's latest work, "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", whose main thesis is that the problems posed by the union of body and soul confuse two terms: body and my body. This confusion leads to the application to the former of categories inherent to the latter. The paper examines the "ontic paradoxes" that my body (the flesh) gives rise to (a); it clarifies the thesis of two interpretations of the First and Sixth Meditations (b); it discusses the "exception to metaphysics" established by the knowledge of my body (c); and, following an indication by the author, it proposes an opening to the ethical dimension, which demands an examination of the union, through love, with a fellow human being and with the community of human beings, rather than of the union of body and soul (d). Neste artigo, propõe-se um exame crítico da última obra de J.-L. Marion, intitulada "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", dedicada à união de alma e corpo, e cuja tese principal é: os problemas que essa união suscita confundem dois termos, corpo e meu corpo. Essa confusão leva a que se apliquem ao primeiro categorias próprias do segundo. Examinam-se os "paradoxos ônticos" que meu corpo (a carne) inaugura; a tese de duas interpretações das medita ccedil;ões primeira e sexta é esclarecida; arrisca-se, seguindo uma indicação do autor, a abertura a uma dimensão ética que exige examinar já não a união de corpo e alma, mas sim a união pelo amor a um semelhante e à comunidade de semelhantes. (shrink)

Se propone un examen crítico de la última obra de J.-L. Marion titulada, dedicada a la unión de alma y cuerpo, y cuya tesis principal es: los problemas que esta unión suscita confunden dos términos, cuerpo y mi cuerpo. Esta confusión lleva a que se apliquen al primero categorías propias del segundo. Se examinan las "paradojas ónticas" que mi cuerpo (la carne) inaugura (a); se despeja la tesis de dos interpretaciones de las meditaciones primera y sexta (b); se discute la (...) "excepción a la metafísica" instaurada por el conocimiento de mi cuerpo (c); se arriesga, siguiendo una indicación del autor, la apertura a una dimensión ética que exige examinar ya no la unión de cuerpo y alma, sino la unión por el amor a un semejante y a la comunidad de semejantes (d). The article carries out a critical examination of J.-L. Marion's latest work, "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", whose main thesis is that the problems posed by the union of body and soul confuse two terms: body and my body. This confusion leads to the application to the former of categories inherent to the latter. The paper examines the "ontic paradoxes" that my body (the flesh) gives rise to (a); it clarifies the thesis of two interpretations of the First and Sixth Meditations (b); it discusses the "exception to metaphysics" established by the knowledge of my body (c); and, following an indication by the author, it proposes an opening to the ethical dimension, which demands an examination of the union, through love, with a fellow human being and with the community of human beings, rather than of the union of body and soul (d). Neste artigo, propõe-se um exame crítico da última obra de J.-L. Marion, intitulada "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", dedicada à união de alma e corpo, e cuja tese principal é: os problemas que essa união suscita confundem dois termos, corpo e meu corpo. Essa confusão leva a que se apliquem ao primeiro categorias próprias do segundo. Examinam-se os "paradoxos ônticos" que meu corpo (a carne) inaugura; a tese de duas interpretações das medita ccedil;ões primeira e sexta é esclarecida; arrisca-se, seguindo uma indicação do autor, a abertura a uma dimensão ética que exige examinar já não a união de corpo e alma, mas sim a união pelo amor a um semelhante e à comunidade de semelhantes. (shrink)

L'analyse de la personne ou de l'oeuvre d'art comme entité matériellement incorporée et culturellement émergente est centrale dans l'oeuvre de Joseph Margolis : il tente de développer un dualisme des propriétés, comme alternative au réalisme platonicien et au dualisme ontique cartésien, en esthétique et en « philosophy of mind ». La définition de l'incorporation proposée par Margolis est ici critiquée par le moyen d'un contre-exemple, et plusieurs révisions possibles de cette définition, en vue d'éviter l'objection, sont aussi rejetées. La théorie (...) de Margolis nous délivre en principe des inconvénients métaphysiques des ontologies traditionnelles ; mais elle ne peut être acceptée tant et aussi longtemps que le concept d'incorporation n'aura pas été défini d'une façon satisfaisante.The analysis of a person or artwork as a materially embodied culturally emergent entity is central to Joseph Margolis' attempt to develop property dualism as an alternative to Platonic realism or ontic Cartesian dualism in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. Margolis' definition of material embodiment is criticized by counter-example, and several methods of revising the definition to avoid the objection are discredited. Margolis' theory in principle offers relief from the metaphysical disadvantages of traditional ontologies. But the proposal cannot be accepted unless or until the concept of material embodiment is correctly defined. (shrink)

In contrast to Anglophone debates on personal identity initially formed by John Locke’s investigation of personal identity in the sense of personal continuity or persistence through time, the Continental tradition focuses on what constitutes ipseity in the sense of individuality or uniqueness of the human being “constituted” by its continuous transformation through changing experience. In this study, I claim that contemporary phenomenological research in France—especially the “phenomenology of the event” as represented by Henri Maldiney and Claude Romano—contributes to this Continental (...) discussion in a significant way: it formulates the conditions of personal uniqueness or distinctiveness with regard to other persons, conditions not to be found in Heidegger’s existential conception of selfhood in Being and Time. More precisely, Maldiney and Romano allow us to answer the principal questions of this study: In what does the personal uniqueness consist? What exactly individualizes the first-person selfhood disclosed in Dasein’s relation to death? In my three-stage analysis, I first deal with Heidegger’s conception of selfhood in Being and Time and its limits with respect to the question of personal uniqueness. Next, I analyse Maldiney’s conception of “eventful selfhood” in which he “completes” Heidegger’s conception of selfhood by describing Dasein’s openness to ontical, and yet fully authentic events. Finally, I develop the argumentation by presenting Romano’s even more radical conception of the “happening subjectivity”, which allows us to return to the second major feature of personal identity: personal persistence. Nonetheless, I conclude that the connection between personal uniqueness and persistence is not sufficiently examined in the phenomenology of the event, which opens the path towards another related inquiry into the following problem: What is the proper subjective dimension or the “underlying thing” in the background of personal persistence which somehow resists events? (shrink)

In this article, I will present a construction of a Nishitanian ethics of sympathy primarily based on passages from Nishitani Keiji’s principal work of his middle period Religion and Nothingness (Shūkyō to ha nani『宗教とは何か』). To establish the normativity of Nishitani’s concept of sympathy I will present his concept of force (chikara 力) as its basis. I will argue that the role of force has been hereto overlooked in the analysis of Nishitani’s concept of circuminsessional relations which has impaired the task (...) of constructing an ethical theory from his thought. I will primarily engage with Brett Davis’s work on circuminsessional relations to demonstrate this point, as I believe he has provided the most robust account of it thus far. After establishing this construction, I aim to elucidate the relative advantages of Nishitanian ethics of sympathy and address potential critiques. First, I will position Nishitanian ethics of sympathy as responding to Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer’s morality of compassion. Nietzsche's critique is strong and that responding to him on Nishitanian grounds will be useful in demonstrating the advantages of my construction. Next, I will respond to a critique given in Peter-Hans Liederbach’s ‘Between the Ontological and the Ontic’ that accuses Nishitani’s philosophy of being unable to offer a basis for ethics. Lastly, I wish to position Nishitanian ethics of sympathy as a starting point for expanding the tradition of sympathy-based morality in East Asian philosophy. I will do this by relating Nishitani’s concept of sympathy to Justin Tiwald’s work on sympathy in Confucianism. (shrink)

Se propone un examen crítico de la última obra de J.-L. Marion titulada, dedicada a la unión de alma y cuerpo, y cuya tesis principal es: los problemas que esta unión suscita confunden dos términos, cuerpo y mi cuerpo. Esta confusión lleva a que se apliquen al primero categorías propias del segundo. Se examinan las "paradojas ónticas" que mi cuerpo (la carne) inaugura (a); se despeja la tesis de dos interpretaciones de las meditaciones primera y sexta (b); se discute la (...) "excepción a la metafísica" instaurada por el conocimiento de mi cuerpo (c); se arriesga, siguiendo una indicación del autor, la apertura a una dimensión ética que exige examinar ya no la unión de cuerpo y alma, sino la unión por el amor a un semejante y a la comunidad de semejantes (d). -/- The article carries out a critical examination of J.-L. Marion's latest work, "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", whose main thesis is that the problems posed by the union of body and soul confuse two terms: body and my body. This confusion leads to the application to the former of categories inherent to the latter. The paper examines the "ontic paradoxes" that my body (the flesh) gives rise to (a); it clarifies the thesis of two interpretations of the First and Sixth Meditations (b); it discusses the "exception to metaphysics" established by the knowledge of my body (c); and, following an indication by the author, it proposes an opening to the ethical dimension, which demands an examination of the union, through love, with a fellow human being and with the community of human beings, rather than of the union of body and soul (d). -/- Neste artigo, propõe-se um exame crítico da última obra de J.-L. Marion, intitulada "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", dedicada à união de alma e corpo, e cuja tese principal é: os problemas que essa união suscita confundem dois termos, corpo e meu corpo. Essa confusão leva a que se apliquem ao primeiro categorias próprias do segundo. Examinam-se os "paradoxos ônticos" que meu corpo (a carne) inaugura; a tese de duas interpretações das medita ccedil;ões primeira e sexta é esclarecida; arrisca-se, seguindo uma indicação do autor, a abertura a uma dimensão ética que exige examinar já não a união de corpo e alma, mas sim a união pelo amor a um semelhante e à comunidade de semelhantes. (shrink)

The idea that the world is made of particles — little discrete, interacting objects that compose the material bodies of everyday experience — is a durable one. Following the advent of quantum theory, the idea was revised but not abandoned. It remains manifest in the explanatory language of physics, chemistry, and molecular biology. Aside from its durability, there is good reason for the scientific realist to embrace the particle interpretation: such a view can account for the prominent epistemic fact that (...) only limited knowledge of a portion of the material universe is needed in order to make reliable predictions about that portion. Thus, particle interpretations can support an abductive argument from the epistemic facts in favor of a realist reading of physical theory. However, any particle interpretation with this property is untenable. The empirical adequacy of modern particle theories requires adoption of a postulate known as permutation invariance — the claim that interchanging the role of two particles of the same kind in a dynamical state description results in a description of the identical state. It is the central claim of this essay that PI is incompatible with any particle interpretation strong enough to account for the epistemic facts. This incompatibility extends across all physical theories. To frame and motivate the inconsistency argument, I begin by fixing the relevant notion of particle. To single out those accounts of greatest appeal to the realist, I develop the logically weakest particle ontology that entails the epistemic fact that the world is piecewise predictable, an ontology I call ‘minimal atomism’. The entire series of scientific conceptions of the particle, from Newton’s mechanically interacting corpuscles to the ‘centers of force’ in classical field theories, all comport with MA. As long as PI is left out, even quantum mechanics can be viewed this way. To assess the impact of PI on this picture, I present a framework for rigorously connecting interpretations to physical theories. In particular, I represent MA as a set of formal conditions on the models of physical theories, the mathematical structures taken to represent states of the world. I also formulate PI — originally introduced as a postulate of non-relativistic quantum mechanics — in theory independent terms. With all of these pieces in hand, I am then able to present a proof of the inconsistency of PI and MA. In the second part of the essay, I survey responses to the inconsistency result open to the scientific realist. The two most plausible approaches involve abandoning particles in one way or another. The first alternative interpretation considered takes the property bearing objects of the world to be regions of space rather than particles. In this view, the properties once attributed to particles in quantum states are attributed instead to one or more regions of space. PI no longer obtains in this case, at least not as a statement about the permutation symmetry of property bearers. Rather, the new interpretation naturally imposes an analogous constraint on quantum states. The second major approach to evading the inconsistency result is to dispense with objects altogether. This is the recommendation of so-called ‘Ontic Structural Realism’. The central OSR thesis is that structure rather than entities are the basic ontological components of the world. OSR is intended to embrace the ‘miracle’ argument in favor of scientific realism while avoiding the pessimistic meta-induction. I demonstrate that one principal motivation for OSR based on the under-determination of interpretations in QM is actually dissolved by the incompatibility result. At the same time, I suggest reasons to think that OSR fares no better with respect to the pessimistic meta-induction than traditional realism does. Thus, while PI and MA may be incompatible, object ontologies remain the best option for the realist. (shrink)

A Fortiori Logic: Innovations, History and Assessments is a wide-ranging and in-depth study of a fortiori reasoning, comprising a great many new theoretical insights into such argument, a history of its use and discussion from antiquity to the present day, and critical analyses of the main attempts at its elucidation. Its purpose is nothing less than to lay the foundations for a new branch of logic and greatly develop it; and thus to once and for all dispel the many fallacious (...) ideas circulating regarding the nature of a fortiori reasoning. -/- The work is divided into three parts. The first part, Formalities, presents the author’s largely original theory of a fortiori argument, in all its forms and varieties. Its four (or eight) principal moods are analyzed in great detail and formally validated, and secondary moods are derived from them. A crescendo argument is distinguished from purely a fortiori argument, and similarly analyzed and validated. These argument forms are clearly distinguished from the pro rata and analogical forms of argument. Moreover, we examine the wide range of a fortiori argument; the possibilities of quantifying it; the formal interrelationships of its various moods; and their relationships to syllogistic and analogical reasoning. Although a fortiori argument is shown to be deductive, inductive forms of it are acknowledged and explained. Although a fortiori argument is essentially ontical in character, more specifically logical-epistemic and ethical-legal variants of it are acknowledged. -/- The second part of the work, Ancient and Medieval History, looks into use and discussion of a fortiori argument in Greece and Rome, in the Talmud, among post-Talmudic rabbis, and in Christian, Moslem, Chinese and Indian sources. Aristotle’s approach to a fortiori argument is described and evaluated. There is a thorough analysis of the Mishnaic qal vachomer argument, and a reassessment of the dayo principle relating to it, as well as of the Gemara’s later take on these topics. The valuable contribution, much later, by Moshe Chaim Luzzatto is duly acknowledged. Lists are drawn up of the use of a fortiori argument in the Jewish Bible, the Mishna, the works of Plato and Aristotle, the Christian Bible and the Koran; and the specific moods used are identified. Moreover, there is a pilot study of the use of a fortiori argument in the Gemara, with reference to Rodkinson’s partial edition of the Babylonian Talmud, setting detailed methodological guidelines for a fuller study. There is also a novel, detailed study of logic in general in the Torah. -/- The third part of the present work, Modern and Contemporary Authors, describes and evaluates the work of numerous (some thirty) recent contributors to a fortiori logic, as well as the articles on the subject in certain lexicons. Here, we discover that whereas a few authors in the last century or so made some significant contributions to the field, most of them shot woefully off-target in various ways. The work of each author, whether famous or unknown, is examined in detail in a dedicated chapter, or at least in a section; and his ideas on the subject are carefully weighed. The variety of theories that have been proposed is impressive, and stands witness to the complexity and elusiveness of the subject, and to the crying need for the present critical and integrative study. But whatever the intrinsic value of each work, it must be realized that even errors and lacunae are interesting because they teach us how not to proceed. -/- This book also contains, in a final appendix, some valuable contributions to general logic, including new analyses of symbolization and axiomatization, existential import, the tetralemma, the Liar paradox and the Russell paradox. (shrink)

The concept of innovation defines our age. It fuels the global economy, promises a sustainable future, and stands at the heart of our interconnected society. On the one hand, the concept of innovation is widely presupposed in terms of the commercial value it generates. As claimed in the tradition of economic analysis, innovation is characterized by its competitive dynamics and primarily directed at developing marketable products and services. On the other hand, the reality of today’s global issues, such as climate (...) change and food security, urges innovation to generate societal value beyond mainstream economic incentive. To this end, the EU policy discourse has paved the way for Responsible Innovation. The core idea here is to steer innovation processes towards societally desirable outcomes, specifically in response to the ‘grand challenges’ of our time. Under the sway of ‘science with and for society’, the hypothesis is that innovation can only respond to the needs and ambitions of society by including all its actors throughout the process. However, while much effort is dedicated to governing innovation, little thought goes to what innovation itself means conceptually. What understanding of innovation underpins the framework of RI? What implications, if any, does this have for the ambition to achieve RI? These are important questions to raise as they enable critical reflection on the relation between responsibility and innovation, broadly speaking. Does the ‘R’ in RI entail an application of ethical keys to an already existing concept of innovation, or does it require us to rethink the concept of innovation altogether? After providing a general introduction in chapter 1 on the context of the dissertation and its main research objectives, chapter 2 shows how RI emerged from a longer history of efforts to incorporate ethical dimensions in new and emerging technologies, such as Technology Assessment and Science and Technology Studies. While similar to its precursors in prioritizing ethical concerns, RI clearly distinguishes itself by shifting from an ethics of constraints to an ethics of construction. The chapter continues to show that such an approach comes with an epistemic challenge, a political challenge, and a conceptual challenge. Through an extensive analysis of policy documents and academic literature, chapter 3 breaks open the concept of innovation in the RI discourse. Firstly, it demonstrates that the RI discourse tends to presuppose a techno-economic concept of innovation, as coined by the terms ‘technological innovation’ and ‘commercialized innovation’. Secondly, it provides a historical analysis to show that the concept of innovation was originally politically oriented and had little to do with the way in which it is commonly understood today. Thirdly, it discusses the implications of a techno-economic concept of innovation for achieving the ideal of RI and brings into question whether the political origins of innovation may inspire an alternative route. Chapter 4 engages with the philosophy of technology to assess the feasibility of RI at both an ontic and ontological level. While innovation at the ontic level refers to concrete innovative artefacts, innovation at the ontological level refers to the mode through which these artefacts are seen, understood, and created. At the ontic level, RI is shown to play a significant role in steering emerging technologies towards societally desirable outcomes. Even so, at the ontological level, the question is whether the ideal of RI is feasible insofar its scope is limited to governing a techno-economic concept of innovation. Parallel to Martin Heidegger’s view of technology as Enframing, this chapter denotes that in trying to govern a techno-economic concept of innovation, the RI discourse remains subject to its dominance. This in turn explains why, at the operational level, RI is often employed for mere strategic and instrumental purposes, while falling short on its promoted ambitions. Chapter 5 articulates an orientation shift from a techno-economic concept of innovation towards a political concept of innovation in the RI discourse. To this end, the chapter distinguishes between weak RI, which seeks to govern a techno-economic concept of innovation through an applied set of ethical dimensions; and strong RI, which seeks to conceive a political concept of innovation beyond techno-economic ideology and practice. Inspired by the work of Hannah Arendt, the chapter establishes a political concept of innovation that actualizes the human capacity for speech and action, inspires radical novelty, and empowers the public sphere. In doing so, the chapter concludes that strong RI is principally a plural undertaking which guards individual opinion from collective opinion; enables a physical and symbolic openness that genuinely activates citizenry; and stimulates performative speech. The final chapter, chapter 6, briefly recaps the main research objectives and takes stock of the insights gained. It concludes that the contribution of this dissertation does not reside in the concern with the techno-economic ideology of innovation as such – a concern which RI in fact already expressed when it first emerged – but more so in the ontological critique to the idea that this ideology can somehow be overpowered through governance and regulation. The rehabilitation of an ontological dimension in RI in turn provides a new perspective to the philosophy of technology, which over the years has taken a course away from ontological viewpoints. Moreover, the chapter elaborates on how a political concept of innovation adds depth to the foundational claims of RI. Based on these conclusions, the chapter reflects on a range of broader insights, particularly in relation to the philosophy of innovation and the ethics of socially disruptive technologies. In sum, this dissertation politicizes the RI discourse precisely in the way it was originally envisioned, that is, through conceptualizing innovation as a fundamentally political matter. In this view, politics is not merely an extension of RI but is itself the condition of RI; it is what enables innovation to genuinely serve the public good. (shrink)

Se propone un examen crítico de la última obra de J.-L. Marion titulada, dedicada a la unión de alma y cuerpo, y cuya tesis principal es: los problemas que esta unión suscita confunden dos términos, cuerpo y mi cuerpo. Esta confusión lleva a que se apliquen al primero categorías propias del segundo. Se examinan las "paradojas ónticas" que mi cuerpo (la carne) inaugura (a); se despeja la tesis de dos interpretaciones de las meditaciones primera y sexta (b); se discute la (...) "excepción a la metafísica" instaurada por el conocimiento de mi cuerpo (c); se arriesga, siguiendo una indicación del autor, la apertura a una dimensión ética que exige examinar ya no la unión de cuerpo y alma, sino la unión por el amor a un semejante y a la comunidad de semejantes (d). The article carries out a critical examination of J.-L. Marion's latest work, "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", whose main thesis is that the problems posed by the union of body and soul confuse two terms: body and my body. This confusion leads to the application to the former of categories inherent to the latter. The paper examines the "ontic paradoxes" that my body (the flesh) gives rise to (a); it clarifies the thesis of two interpretations of the First and Sixth Meditations (b); it discusses the "exception to metaphysics" established by the knowledge of my body (c); and, following an indication by the author, it proposes an opening to the ethical dimension, which demands an examination of the union, through love, with a fellow human being and with the community of human beings, rather than of the union of body and soul (d). Neste artigo, propõe-se um exame crítico da última obra de J.-L. Marion, intitulada "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", dedicada à união de alma e corpo, e cuja tese principal é: os problemas que essa união suscita confundem dois termos, corpo e meu corpo. Essa confusão leva a que se apliquem ao primeiro categorias próprias do segundo. Examinam-se os "paradoxos ônticos" que meu corpo (a carne) inaugura; a tese de duas interpretações das medita ccedil;ões primeira e sexta é esclarecida; arrisca-se, seguindo uma indicação do autor, a abertura a uma dimensão ética que exige examinar já não a união de corpo e alma, mas sim a união pelo amor a um semelhante e à comunidade de semelhantes. (shrink)

This book brings together several strands of Salmon's important philosophical investigations, spanning two decades, into a comprehensive theory of scientific explanation. The fundamental tenet of Salmon's ontic conception of explanation is that "to explain an event is to exhibit it as occupying its... place in the discernible [causal] patterns of the world". Thus an adequate theory of explanation presupposes an account of the causal structure of the world, and one of the principal objectives of the book is to outline (...) a theory of causal processes that will provide the requisite foundation for a theory of objective scientific explanation. (shrink)

In his extensive work as a theologian and a historian, Walter H. Principe, CSB, (1922-1996) was committed to reflecting on both the present and the past. He was well-known as an historian of medieval theology and philosophy - especially through the work of Thomas Aquinas, as well as a contemporary theologian. This memorial collection addresses a fundamental feature of Principe's thought, namely his concern that the history of medieval theology and philosophy have a significant role to play in contemporary discussions. (...) Strengthening the ties between historical study and contemporary theological and philosophical thought, this book offers much to those who teach and research in historical theology and the history of philosophy. The ten essays provide significant test cases of how modern scholars may utilise the historical record judiciously for contemporary debates. Those who are concerned with intellectual history (both medieval and modern), the history of doctrines, and Thomism will also find this collection a useful contribution to modern scholarship. (shrink)

En 1705, Wilhem Homberg, le principal chimiste de l’Académie royale des sciences, proposa une nouvelle théorie chimique selon laquelle le Soufre principe des corps mixtes était identique à la lumière. Il affirma par la suite que cette lumière corporelle était la seule source d’activité et de changement dans les substances matérielles. Cet article montre comment la théorie de Homberg s’élabora progressivement pendant de nombreuses années sous l’influence de ses observations et des résultats de ses expériences de laboratoire, ce qui nous (...) fournit un exemple de la manière selon laquelle un chimiste du début du XVIIIe siècle a pu développer une théorie raffinée grâce à l’interaction de la réflexion et de la manipulation. L’influence probable de la théorie de Homberg sur les fameuses « questions chimiques » de Newton est également signalée ici pour la première fois. Enfin l’article avance que nous comprendrons plus précisément l’histoire de la chimie si nous reconnaissons le caractère spécifique de la chimie et sa relative autonomie, plutôt que si nous cherchons à lui imposer des développements faciles et convenus tirés d’autres champs du savoir comme la philosophie ou la physique. (shrink)

Après 1850, la physique moléculaire laplacienne ou ampérienne s’est trouvée en compétition avec d’autres approches impliquant la thermodynamique et les théories cinétiques. Henri Poincaré est l’un des deux seuls savants français qui contribuèrent au développement de la mécanique statistique classique au tournant du siècle. Son ouverture à la physique étrangère et son engagement pour une physique des principes et pour un pluralisme méthodologique marquent une rupture avec l’autosuffisance prétendue de la physique française. Cependant, l’évolution des idées de Poincaré sur le (...) réductionnisme mécaniste ne peut se comprendre sans évoquer la cosmovision laplacienne, laquelle restait vivante vers 1880, à rebours d’une vision positiviste ou descriptive. Son apport à la mécanique statistique a des liens avec ce vieil engagement thématique des physiciens français, alors même qu’il s’ouvre aux idées de Maxwell et qu’il mobilise la mécanique céleste. Dans son cours sur la thermodynamique (1888-1889), il s’intéresse d’abord aux analogies mécaniques non-probabilistes proposées par Helmholtz pour les principes de la thermodynamique, en harmonie avec cette cosmovision. Vers 1893, il se rapproche des idées de Boltzmann et Maxwell et établit un rapport entre quelques résultats de mécanique céleste (récurrence, intégrales non-uniformes) et les fondements de la statistique. Il développe aussi un intérêt croissant pour les explications de l’irréversibilité thermodynamique. (shrink)

As fontes da pedagogia trabalhista de António Sérgio Resumo: Porventura o traço mais saliente da proposta educativa de António Sérgio para o Portugal republicano é a de ser uma pedagogia trabalhista, em que a preparação para e pelo trabalho é uma condição para a construção de pessoas autónomas, membros de uma sociedade baseada na cooperação. Para Sérgio, a correcta operacionalização dos novos métodos de ensino, valorizadores dos interesses imanentes das crianças, implicava uma fundamentação filosófica séria, um modelo antropológico coerente no (...) qual uma concepção do trabalho humano é fulcral. O propósito deste artigo é o de articular sinteticamente os fundamentos da sua proposta trabalhista do valor educativo e social de um ideal de trabalho, cuidando das fontes estrangeiras de inspiração da mesma, entre as quais destacaremos Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, John Dewey e Georg Kerschensteiner. Mostra-se que Sérgio soube encontrar uma fundamentação que junta reflexões daqueles pensadores, estabelecendo uma relação habitualmente ignorada entre os pedagogos seus, e nossos, contemporâneos. Pretende-se assim, recorrendo aos métodos da história das ideias, valorizadores da genealogia e da contextualização intelectual, homenagear, no cinquentenário da sua morte, um dos paladinos da Escola Nova em Portugal, dissipando algumas dúvidas sobre as reais motivações daquele Movimento pedagógico progressista no Portugal Republicano. Palavras Chave: António Sérgio. Pedagogia trabalhista. Proudhon. Dewey. Kerschensteiner. The sources of the labour pedagogy of António Sérgio: Perhaps the most striking feature of the thought of António Sérgio is his proposal of a labour pedagogy, where the preparation for and through work is a condition for the construction of persons that live in a society based on cooperation. For Sérgio the proper implementation of new teaching methods, that respect the true interests of children, implies a serious philosophical reflection, a coherent anthropological model in which a conception of human labour is critical. Our purpose is to articulate his philosophical reflections that justify the educational and social value of human labour, taking care of foreign sources of inspiration, among which are Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, John Dewey and Georg Kerschensteiner. It is shown that Sérgio brought together reflections of those thinkers, establishing a harmonic philosophical communion, usually ignored. By using the methods of the history of ideas that value the search of genealogy and intellectual context, we honour, in the fiftieth anniversary of his death, one of the paladins of the Éducation Nouvelle in Portugal, showing the real motivations of that progressive educational movement during the First Portuguese Republic. Keywords: António Sérgio. Labour pedagogy. Proudhon. Dewey. Kerschensteiner. Les sources de la pédagogie travailliste d’António Sérgio Résumé: Peut-être la caractéristique la plus frappante de la pensée éducationnelle d'António Sérgio est son pari dans une pédagogie du travail, où la préparation pour et par le travail est une condition pour la construction de personnes qui vivent dans une société fondée sur la coopération. Pour Sérgio, la mise en œuvre de nouvelles méthodes d'enseignement, qui respectent les véritables intérêts des enfants, implique une réflexion philosophique sérieuse, un modèle anthropologique cohérent pour lequel une conception du travail humain est essentielle. Notre but est d'articuler ses réflexions philosophiques qui justifient la valeur éducative et sociale du travail humain, en prenant soin des sources étrangères d'inspiration: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, John Dewey et Georg Kerschensteiner. On démontre que Sérgio a rassemblé des réflexions de ces penseurs, en établissant une communion philosophique harmonique, généralement ignorée par les pédagogues et philosophes de son temps et du notre. En utilisant les méthodes de l'histoire des idées qui reconstruisent des généalogies et des contextes intellectuels, nous rendons hommage, dans le cinquantième anniversaire de sa mort, à l'un des paladins de l’Éducation Nouvelle au Portugal, en montrant les motivations réelles de ce mouvement éducatif pendant la Première République portugaise. Mots clés: António Sérgio. Pédagogie du travail. Proudhon. Dewey. Kerschensteiner. Data de registro: 23/10/2019 Data de aceite: 09/12/2019. (shrink)

Cette étude montre que les réflexions épistémologiques de Poincaré émergèrent dans le cadre de ses recherches scientifiques et qu’elles furent en partie inspirées par sa lecture de savants philosophes comme Helmholtz et surtout Maxwell. Elle donne une analyse systématique des textes philosophiques publiés par Poincaré vers 1900, au moment où il juge que la physique des principes constitue le sommet de l’évolution des théories. Enfin, elle met en rapport certaines de ses thèses sur la physique avec l’Analytique et la Dialectique (...) transcendantales kantiennes. (shrink)

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In 1677, Georges Pierre des Clozets visited Robert Boyle and told him that he had been approved for membership in the Asterism, a secret international society of alchemical masters, headed by Pierre's patron Georges du Mesnillet, the Patriarch of Antioch. Extensive correspondence followed, replete with gifts and bizarre claims, until Pierre vanished in August 1678. This paper links several new documents—articles in the Mercure galant and the Gazette de France and a manuscript account by another convinced admirer of Pierre—to my (...) previous study of him, particularly in regard to Pierre's claim to be working with the Patriarch to reunite Eastern and Western Churches. Dating from before and after Boyle's involvement, these sources add fresh details about Pierre and his other contacts, and show the consistency of Pierre's stories and the credibility he fashioned as he travelled around Europe convincing people of his claims alchemical and otherwise. (shrink)