It remains to summarize the contributions which each of the three disciplines discussed here is making toward the development of a science of man. "Significs" makes a study of the effects on human behavior of the linguistic aspects of the evaluative process, the most distinctly human aspect of the behavior of the human organism. "Mathematical Biophysics" seeks to describe the events associated with evaluative processes in physico-mathematical terms. "Cybernetics" is discovering important invariants common to these processes and others, particularly those (...) observed in man-made machines and in situations which lend themselves to description in thermo-dynamic or statistical (order -- chaos) terms. (shrink)

In this definitive overview of Victoria Welby's contributions to sign theory through the Significs Movement, Susan Petrilli utilizes her extraordinary interpretive abilities to provide the reader with an overview of Welby's research and her contribution to the study of signs. In order to bring this monumental work to fruition, Petrilli spent time at the Welby Collection of the York University Archives in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, the Lady Welby Library, University of London, and The British Library in London. In addition (...) to Petrilli's insightful analysis and elucidation of Welby's original works, she also provides the reader with selections from Welby's published writings as well the a significant amount of previously unpublished material located in the Welby Collection at York University. Petrilli's careful editing and cross-referencing of these materials contributes to a logical and revealing account of Welby's influential and voluminous work and the Significs Movement. (shrink)

La manière dont Jacob Klein rend compte de l’historicité propre aux unités de base de la signification dans la pensée de la Grèce ancienne ainsi que de l’Europe moderne est présentée et étudiée en relation au « sens de l'être » dans la pensée phénoménologique heideggerienne et à la conception husserlienne de la signification ontologique instrumentale du calcul symbolique. Sur le fond des reconstructions kleiniennes des nombres éidétiques dans le Sophiste de Platon et de l’ontologie cartésienne des objets (...) mathématiques indéterminés, deux affirmations se trouvent avancées, à savoir (1) que la composition « artithmologique » de l'être dans le Sophiste de Platon représente un défi par rapport au caractère prétendument fondamental du « sens » dans l’historicité heideggerienne de l’être et (2) que la constitution de la conceptualité propre aux unités de base du calcul symbolique excède celle de la conception husserlienne de leur « simple » instrumentalité. (shrink)

For several decades, Dr. Morris has worked primarily with twoproblems: the development of a general theory of signs, and thedevelopment of a general theory of value. He approached both problemsin terms of George Mead's theory of action or behavior. This bookbrings together these two lines of development. For several decades, Dr. Morris has worked primarily with two problems: the development of a general theory of signs, and the development of a general theory of value. He approached both problems in terms (...) of George Mead's theory of action or behavior. This book brings together these two lines of development. In many languages there is a term like the English "meaning" which has two poles: that which something signifies and the value or significance of what is signified. The nature of signification and significance, as well as their relations within human behavior, is the subject matter of this book. This book is addressed to philosophers and to students of the behavioral sciences, but it will also appeal to anyone seriously interested in the study of human communication. (shrink)

Locke is what present-day aestheticians, critics, and historians call an intentionalist. He believes that when we interpret speech and writing, we aim—in large part and perhaps even for the most part—to recover the intentions, or intended meanings, of the speaker or writer. Berkeley and Hume shared Locke’s commitment to intentionalism, but it is a theme that recent philosophical interpreters of all three writers have left largely unexplored. In this paper I discuss the bearing of intentionalism on more familiar themes in (...) empiricist reflections on language, among them the signification of things (as opposed to ideas); the signifying role of whole propositions; and the possibility of reference to an “external” world. (shrink)

The notion of signification is an important part of Hobbes's philosophy of language. It also has broader relevance, as Hobbes argues that key terms used by his opponents are insignificant. However Hobbes's talk about names' signification is puzzling, as he appears to have advocated conflicting views. This paper argues that Hobbes endorsed two different views of names' signification in two different contexts. When stating his theoretical views about signification, Hobbes claimed that names signify ideas. Elsewhere he (...) talked as if words signified the things they named. Seeing this does not just resolve a puzzle about Hobbes's statements about signification. It also helps us to understand how Hobbes's arguments about insignificant speech work. With one important exception, they depend on the view that names signify things, not on Hobbes's stated theory that words signify ideas. The paper concludes by discussing whether arguments about insignificant speech can provide independent support for Hobbes's views about other issues, such as materialism. (shrink)

Résumé — L’interprétation de la sémantique modale bidimensionnelle fait aujourd’hui l’objet de nombreuses discussions et confrontations. En remontant à Signification et nécessité et en rappelant les bases de l’analyse de Carnap, on peut montrer que les deux dimensions de l’intension forment un développement naturel de son fonctionnalisme. Mais Carnap était sensible à l’engagement théorique des propriétés. Ce type d’engagement, établi à partir d’un exemple simple, offre un argument général en faveur de l’interprétation métasémantique du cadre bidimensionnel.— The interpretation of (...) 2-dimensional modal semantics has given rise to much controversy over the last couple of decades. By reverting to the main lines of Carnap’s analysis in Meaning and Necessity, it can be shown that the distinction between two dimensions of intension can be regarded as a natural outcome of Carnap’s functionalism. However, Carnap was not unconcerned about theoretical commitment of properties. The inevitability of such a commitment, which can be demonstrated with the help of a simple example, provides an overall argument in favour of the so-called « meta-semantic » interpretation of the 2-dimensional framework. (shrink)

Riassunto : L’obiettivo di questo lavoro è di analizzare le prime riflessioni di Merleau-Ponty sul tema dell'animalità, in riferimento particolare alla sua prima opera, La struttura del comportamento. L'articolo – attraverso un’ampia introduzione sulla rielaborazione merleau-pontyana delle nozioni di “comportamento” e di “gestalt”, seguita da un’analisi specifica della tripartizione delle forme di comportamento animale – farà emergere la ricchezza e insieme l’ambiguità del primo lavoro di Merleau-Ponty: se da una parte il fenomenologo francese rintraccia fin da subito una continuità ontologica (...) tra animale e umano, d'altra parte essa rimane ancorata in una visione “privativa” dell’animalità. Parole chiave : Maurice Merleau-Ponty; Animalità; Comportamento; Gestalt; Relazioni uomo/animale Une signification nouvelle. Merleau-Ponty's Early Analysis on Animality: The purpose of this article is to examine Merleau-Ponty’s early analysis on animality, particularly referring to his first work The Structure of Behaviour. The article focuses on the review of notions like “behaviour” and “gestalt” and on the analysis of the tripartition of the forms of animal behaviour. It will be underlined both the richness and the ambiguity of Merleau-Ponty’s first reflection. Indeed on the one hand, the French philosopher immediately discovers an ontological continuity between animals and humans but, on the other hand, his point of view on animality is still “privative”. Keywords : Maurice Merleau-Ponty; Animality; Behaviour; Gestalt; Human/Animal Relationships. (shrink)

In European philosophical psychology, the work of Jacques Lacan has exerted a great deal of influence but it has received little attention from analytic philosophers. He is famous for the view that the unconscious is a repository of influences arising from language and the meanings it captures, but the presentation of his ideas is sometimes perplexing and impenetrable and its conceptual links with analytic philosophers like Frege and Wittgenstein are not easily discerned. In fact, there are a number of such (...) links and they are worth pursuing for those interested in language, mind, and the unconscious. If we explore Lacan's claim about the link between signification and the tuchè (the encounter with the real) we find that the mental content of the subject is essentially tied to the external world both causally and linguistically. The means of tying the two together arise in the context of human interactions and therefore are charged with personal and emotive content as well as the semantic content with which we are normally concerned in philosophy of language. When we pursue the implications of his view it becomes plausible both that the unconscious is structured like a language and that language borrows much of its meaning and significance to a subject from the interpersonal medium through which it has been inscribed on that subject. His approach is therefore illuminating both for linguistics (especially psycholinguistics) and for the psychology of the unconscious. (shrink)

Pendant la construction de sa philosophie Dilthey montre qu’une de sa principale tâche est le travail con les catégories de la vie que, différemment de les catégories formelles de l’entendement, ne se comprennent pas isolées, mais comme part d’un tout. Même si ce tout soit donné comme la plus grande expression de la histoire, la signification est plus une catégorie de la vie que une catégorie de la histoire, parce que le concept de force, que est originalement de la (...) vie comme ce qui la move contre la pression exercé par le monde, se trouve aussi dans le monde historique, quand elle est l’essai du présent à solutionner les problèmes du passé. (shrink)

In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a number of different things. This pluralist conception of signification lies at the heart of Thomas Bradwardine’s solution to the insolubles, logical puzzles such as the semantic paradoxes, presented in Oxford in the early 1320s. His leading assumption was that signification is closed under consequence, that is, that a proposition signifies everything which follows from what it signifies. Then any proposition signifying its own falsity, (...) he showed, also signifies its own truth and so, since it signifies things which cannot both obtain, it is simply false. Bradwardine himself, and his contemporaries, did not elaborate this pluralist theory, or say much in its defence. It can be shown to accord closely, however, with the prevailing conception of logical consequence in England in the fourteenth century. Recent pluralist theories of signification, such as Grice’s, also endorse Bradwardine’s closure postulate as a plausible constraint on signification, and so his analysis of the semantic paradoxes is seen to be both well-grounded and plausible. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION The following is a study of Boethius' thought on signification which attempts to situate that thought historically and to evaluate it ...

Wittgenstein, selon R. Rorty, accepte dans ses Recherches philosophiques une variété d' « antireprésentationnalisme » en ce sens qu 'il refuse la distinction entre certaines représentations envers lesquelles on devrait adopter une attitude réaliste et d'autres envers lesquelles il faudrait adopter une attitude non réaliste . Je soutiens dans cet article que le contraire est vrai. Wittgenstein adhère en particulier à une forme de non-réalisme quant au concept de signification et certains concepts d'états et de processus mentaux. L'expression « (...) la signification de M » n 'a pas selon lui une fonction reférentielle . Une expression du vocabulaire mental telle que « savoir réciter l'alphabet» ne désigne pas un état interne de l'individu sachant réciter l'alphabet. « Savoir réciter l'alphabet » et « la signification de M » ne sont pas des expressions employées pour « parler de » quelque chose ou s'y référer.R. Rorty daims that Wittgenstein agrees in the Philosophical Investigations with "antirepresentationalism " in that he rejects the distinction between representations toward which we should have a realist attitude and those toward which we should have the opposite, nonrealist, attitude. The aim of this paper is to show that this reading is incorrect. Wittgenstein accepts antirealist views in particular with respect to meaning and some mentalconcepts. The expression "the meaning of W", he holds, is not a referential expression . Expressions from our mental vocabulary such as "knowing the ABC" do not refer to internal states . "The meaning of W" and "knowing the ABC" are not expressions used to refer to or "talk about" anything. (shrink)

Thomas Bradwardine's solution to the semantic paradoxes, presented in his Insolubilia written in Oxford in the early 1320s, turns on two main principles: that a proposition is true only if things are wholly as it signifies; and that signification is closed under consequence. After exploring the background in Walter Burley's account of the signification of propositions, the question is considered of the extent to which Bradwardine's theory is compatible with the distribution of truth over conjunction, disjunction, negation and (...) the conditional. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Dans la tradition logique de la philosophie analytique, comprendre la signification d’un énoncé, c’est comprendre ses conditions de vérité. Dans la tradition du langage naturel, la signification est liée à l’usage du langage. Depuis Grice, elle est liée aux attitudes et aux actions des interlocuteurs. Selon Austin, Searle et Vanderveken, signifier c’est utiliser des mots avec l’ intention d’accomplir des actes illocutoires. Pareils actes ont des conditions de félicité plutôt que des conditions de vérité. Selon nous, (...) signifier c’est essentiellement tenter d’accomplir des actes illocutoires. Et comme toute tentative est une action intentionnelle plutôt qu’une attitude, signifier c’est agir intentionnellement. ABSTRACT: In the logical tradition of analytical philosophy, to understand the meaning of an utterance is to understand its truth conditions. In the tradition of natural language analysis, meaning is related to language use. Since Grice, meaning is linked to speakers’ attitudes and actions. Following Austin, Searle, and Vanderveken, to mean is to use words with the intention of performing illocutionary acts. Such acts have felicity conditions instead of truth conditions. The aim of my work is to clarify the nature of meaning in the second tradition. In my view, to mean something is mainly to attempt to perform illocutionary acts. Any attempt is an intentional action rather than an attitude. (shrink)

Cette etude est une analyse des uvres de Nietzsche (1878-1885) ayant trait non seulement a sa critique du christianisme en general et a son interpretation de la Mort de Dieu en particulier, mais aussi a l'elaboration de ses anti-ideals.

Welby’s correspondence with Peirce began with his review of What is Meaning? (1903), a contribution not only to spreading Peirce’s later thinking, but also to reproposing Welby’s “significs.” This is encounter between the pragmatist Peirce’s approach to semiotic and Welby’s significs oriented by mother-sense. A dialogue between two conceptions of meaning which, notwithstanding differences, meet in a participative contribution to constructing the sign sciences – from Peirce to semiotics, from Welby to significs. Their focus does not only concern signs but (...) also values which are inextricably interconnected. In this encounter, significs doubtlessly exerts a non-negligible influence on semiotics. If with (Peirce’s) “play of musement” we are endowed to imagine different worlds from the present, a male-dominated world, to resist the world as-it-is and construct new worlds presupposes what Welby calls mother-sense. In human signifying processes the epistemological dimension is clearly not separable from the axiological, aesthetic or ideological-political. (shrink)

Paul Spade argues that there is a tension between Ockham’s descriptions of the various types of supposition at Summa Logicae I.64 and a rule he provides at sl I.65. In later papers, Spade proposes a solution: a term supposits significatively just in case it supposits for everything it signifies. I evaluate Spade’s proposal and explore some of its implications. I show that it successfully resolves the tension and that it suggests a way to more precisely describe material and simple supposition. (...) I argue furthermore that Ockham is committed to the proposal by showing that uncontroversial features of his theory imply it. In doing so, I raise and refute three potential objections. Finally, I highlight and discuss a controversial result: self-signifying conventional terms can supposit materially. I argue that this result makes for a more satisfying theory. (shrink)

Charles Groulier | : La question de savoir si la signification est normative et comment préciser l’idée de normativité sémantique fait l’objet de nombreux débats actuels. Nous proposons de partir de l’hypothèse qu’un langage est un système de règles, et qu’apprendre un langage c’est apprendre à obéir à des règles qui régissent l’usage de ses expressions. Nous distinguons d’abord entre différentes notions de signification et de normativité. Puis nous examinons de façon critique deux objections à l’idée d’une normativité (...) sémantique : la première réduit la normativité sémantique au « doit » instrumental, l’autre à la normativité épistémique. Nous proposons ensuite une conception alternative de la normativité sémantique fondée sur le concept d’acte locutionnaire. | : There are many ongoing debates over whether meaning is normative or about how the idea of semantic normativity is to be fleshed out. We suggest to start from the assumption that language is a system of rules, and learning a language is learning to obey the rules for the use of its expressions. We first distinguish between different notions of meaning and of normativity. Then we critically examine and reject two objections to the idea of semantic normativity : one reducing semantic normativity to instrumental “ought”, the other to epistemic normativity. We then propose an alternative conception of semantic normativity based on the speech-acts theorists’ concept of locutionary act. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Signification Truth Note Further Reading.

The Transparent Intensional Logic explicates the meaning of a linguistic expression as a construction. The construction is a hyperintensional entity. It is characterised as instructions for a „calculation“ of a concrete value. In the terminology of Pavel Tichy a linguistic expression denotes its meaning , which construes the signification of the expression. If the signification is an intension, we can call it a reference of the expression. In several semantic conceptions the question of the denotation and of the (...) reference are not treated equally. The terminological chaos can be resolved in a specific way thanks to „fine-grained“ character of the logical analysis offered by TIL. (shrink)

In De Anima, Aristotle develops an analogy between perception and thought. This is based, I argue, on his account of what causally determines the object of the relevant perception or thought. I examine how his account accommodates visual error and erroneous thoughts and the analogy between the role of light in colour perception and the Active Intellect in the case of thought. Aristotle's account of the object of thought in De Anima supports his account of the signification of names (...) in De Interpretatione. This supports claim in Ch. 4. (shrink)

L'etude menee par Walter Biemel ne pretend nullement isoler et epuiser un concept de la philosophie de Heidegger, mais s'attache tout au contraire a suggerer une interpretation originales d'une pensee a partir de l'un de ses concepts fondamentaux. Pour saisir le probleme du monde, il apparait en effet necessaire de comprendre la structure fondamentale du Dasein. Que la problematique du monde soit intimement liee a celle de l'Etre, c'est ce qui se manifeste clairement dans la definition que donne Heidegger du (...) Dasein, au troisieme chapitre de Sein und Zeit, comme etre-dans-le-monde. De la comprehension de cette modalite d'etre ve dependre la saisie adequate des elements structurels du Dasein. Walter Biemel releve l'importance de cette nouvelle facon de concevoir le Dasein et le changement qu'elle apporte par rapport a la conception traditionnelle partant de l'ego pur. L'expression etre-dans-le-monde, loin de se resumer a une constatation de fait, possede pour Heidegger la signification d'une these ontologique. Bien plus qu'une simple determination spatiale s'epuisant dans l'extensio cartesienne, il s'agit la d'une attitude de familiarite, qui se decline selon divers types de reference du Dasein au monde. Etre-dans-le-monde signifie au fond: etre ouvert a l'Etre, se trouver placer dans l'eclaircie de l'Etre. (shrink)

Mon titre est descriptif. Je propose une interprétation du slogan de Wittgenstein : « la signification est l'usage ». Cette interprétation exploite une idée proche de celle du Putnam de « The Meaning of Meaning » selon laquelle il y aurait une division du travail linguistique. Je soutiens que la capacité de pratiquer un certain type d'inférences à l'aide d'un stock d'expressions spécialisées ou techniques sert d'accréditation au sein d'une communauté d'experts. Les membres de cette communauté sont alors dépositaires (...) du bon usage des expressions en question. Cette interprétation se veut, curieusement peut-être, une réponse non -kripkéenne à la question « qu'est-ce que suivre une règle ? ».My title is descriptive. I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's “meaning is use” slogan. This interpretation exploits an idea close to one of Putnam's in “The Meaning of Meaning” according to which there is a division of linguistic labour. I hold that a capacity to make certain inferences from a given stock of specialised or technical expressions entitles one to belong to a certain community of experts. Members of this community are then responsible for the good use of said expressions. Curiously perhaps, this interpretation is also a non -kripkean answer to the rule following riddle. (shrink)

Aristotle says at the start of the De interpretatione that words symbolise thoughts, which are in turn likenesses of things. The present paper argues that he is speaking here primarily of the signification of whole sentences, and at most secondarily of the semantics of individual words. This proposal is defended by drawing attention to a shift in the meaning of ‘sign’ and cognate terms that occurs in the course of the first chapter, one which enables us to separate the (...) way in which words ‘signify’ thoughts (declarative, interrogative, etc.), by expres­sing them, from the more narrowly semantic way in which, subsequently, they are said to signify things. Aristotle’s famous opening state­ment finds its main application, not in the rudimentary grammar of nouns and verbs that follows in chapters 2-3, but later in the treatise, and above all in chapter 14, where it is invoked to establish for dialectical purposes that the relation between a sentence and its negation is the strongest of all contrarieties. Aristotle’s insis­tence, in this same treatise, on the conventional character of language is also explained: for in chapters 8 and 11 it is because of the conventionality of language, and its consequent failure to map systemati­cally onto the divisions between things, that what is in surface grammar a single sentence may turn out to be in reality two or more sentences, in other words, to signify (i.e. express) two or more different thoughts. Aristotle’s primary focus on the meanings of entire sentences is thus explained by the role of the De interpretatione as a work ancillary to dia­lectic, a discipline for which the relation between contradictory pairs of assertions is fundamen­tal. In addition, such a focus is argued (with a comparison to the Stoic lekton) to reflect Aris­totle’s teleological frame of thought. (shrink)

Résumé Étude préliminaire à la nouvelle édition critique et à la traduction inédite offertes, dans ce numéro thématique, du début de la Logica « Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium d’Abélard, cet article opère d’abord un survol d’ensemble du texte, avec insistance sur l’exposé relatif aux universaux, et approfondit ensuite trois points de doctrine difficiles, sur lesquels l’historiographie récente a parfois hésité ou buté : la troisième signification des noms universels ; la conception prisciano-platonicienne de la pensée divine ; l’univocité (...) de la notion de status. Ce faisant, quant aux thèmes de l’intellection et de l’abstraction en particulier, une attention constante est portée au lien, parfois critique mais toujours fécond, existant entre cette portion de la Logica « Ingredientibus » et sa source principale, l’In « Isagogen » Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda de Boèce, dont l’article précédent fournit une présentation, le texte latin révisé et la première traduction française.As a preliminary study to the new critical edition and to the original French translation presented, in this thematic issue, of the first part of Abelard’s Logica “Ingredientibus” : Super Porphyrium, this article first operates a global survey of the text, dwelling upon the account of universals, and then elaborates upon three difficult doctrinal points, somehow problematic in recent historiography : the third signification of universal nouns ; the prisciano-platonic conception of divine thought ; the univocity of the notion of status. So doing, especially in regard to the themes of intellection and abstraction, a constant attention is given to the link, sometimes critical but always fruitful, existing between this portion of the Logica « Ingredientibus » and its main source, Boethius’ In “Isagogen” Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda, of which the preceding article offers a presentation, the revised Latin text, and the first French translation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical, methodological, and technical framework for the semiotic delimitation and analysis of those systems ofmaterial objects and practices which do not belong primarily to the sphere of signification. For the purposes of this paper, we will call such systems (for example economic, urban, or demographic systems) non-communication systems. By their very nature, the study of such systems does not fall wholly within the domain of semiotics, if we consider this domain (...) as coextensive with the study of cultural attitudes and practices. Thus, these systems differ structurally from communication systems, such as language, literature, and the arts, whose primary function is to be used for communication between members of a society and whose structure is primarily semiotic. (shrink)

The paper describes W. Ockham’s theory of signification on the background of the classical medieval philosophy, with which Ockham comes to terms by the help of an original metaphysical-logical theory of sign having its effects also on the theory of universals. There are two approaches rejected by Ockham: First, the Aquinas’s theory of species which in Ockham’s view can not correspond to the really perceived world; secondly, from the metaphysical perspective he also rejects Scot’s metaphy- sics and epistemology, whose (...) terminology in his view was too detailed and expanded. Ockham’s logic and metaphysics intertwine in his theory of signification, which, seen from the semantic perspective, makes the resolution of the relationship between world and language reflecting the former possible. (shrink)

The reflections on music are crucial in the philosophy of language and the mind of the second Wittgenstein. These reflections go around the comparisons Wittgenstein did between meaning and understanding language, and meaning and understanding music. Musical passages show a language as independent from reality, i.e. objects, events or mental states, centered instead in intonations, conclusions, parenthesis, confirmations, questions and answers, a phenomenon enough studied in musicology. Two interpretations on the signification of musical meaning are analyzed: Ahonen’s formalist view (...) [2005], based in the following of rules, and Scruton’s expressive view [2004], based on the comparison between the intuitive recognition of a mental state “hidden” behind the facial expressions. As a conclusion we arrive to a mixed argument: Either of the alternatives whether annulling the other, are possibly telling about Wittgenstein’s conception but do not elucidate the problem itself. (shrink)

This paper examines the temporality of agency in Judith Butler's and Saba Mahmood's writing. I argue that Mahmood moves away from a performative understanding of agency, which focuses on relations of signification, to a corporeal understanding, which focuses on desire and sensation. Drawing on Gilles Deleuze's reading of Henri Bergson, I show how this move involves a changed model of becoming: whereas Butler imagines movement as a series of discontinuous beings, in Mahmood's case, we get an understanding of becoming.

Returning to my monograph of 1996, Subjectivité et alterité dans la philosophie de Emmanuel Lévinas, I intend to illustrate an issue that is central in life and thought in today's world: the possibility that self has of justifying itself before the other. This possibility subtends the constitution of identity in relation to the individual, class, nation, and community. As regards Western thought, all its culture is a justification towards others. Peoples inhabiting the so-called developed world (15% of the world population) (...) still succeed in justifying themselves in the face of peoples inhabiting the underdeveloped world (85% of the world population), with all necessary means. The reason of identity is reason against the other. But for how long can this situation last? At a certain point it will be necessary to answer to the other not only for self but also for the other him/herself. (shrink)

The fourth choral ode in Seneca's tragedyTroadesends thus (1050–5):tum puer matri genetrixque natoTroia qua iaceat regione monstransdicet et longe digito notabit:‘Ilium est illic, ubi fumus alteserpit in caelum nebulaeque turpes.’Troes hoc signo patriam uidebunt.This ending provides a powerful conclusion to the Chorus’ Epicurean-inspired philosophizing in the ode. The image of the Trojan women ‘seeing’ (uidebunt) the ‘smoke and squalid clouds creep[ing] high into the heavens’ (1053–4) recalls the Lucretian description of the soul, atomic in nature, leaving the dead body: compare (...) especiallyet nebula ac fumus quoniam discedit in auras,|crede animam quoque diffundi …(Lucr. 3.436–7) andergo dissolui quoque conuenit omnem animai|naturam, ceu fumus, in altas aeris auras(Lucr. 3.455–6). The image and the Lucretian resonance also create an intratextual link with the second ode ofTroades(371–408). In that ode, the Chorus set out to develop a philosophical position about the question of death and the possibility of an afterlife. Their philosophizing is aided by Lucretian language and imagery, and the clear verbal echoes of Lucretius include the soul escaping into air like vapour: ‘the spirit, with fleeing breath, has mingled with the clouds and passed away into air’ (…profugo spiritus halitu|immixtus nebulis cessit in aera, 379–80), which recalls the Lucretian lines above. At the end of the fourth ode, the Lucretian intertext of the smoke image is linked to another startling element that may point to (Epicurean) philosophizing: Seneca's use ofsignum(1055). (shrink)

In this paper, we address the model of global attractor formulated in the form of evolution differential inclusions with second order in Banach spaces. Firstly, based on the fixed point theorem, the existence result of mild solutions is deduced. Then, by implementing the measure of noncompactness, the existence of global attractor associated with m -semiflow is validated. Finally, a concrete application of the main result is demonstrated to enhance the practical signification.

RésuméLa définition de la condition suspensive, telle qu’elle nous est donnée dans l’article 1181 du Code civil français, est aujourd’hui au centre de différents projets de réforme. Si aucun projet de réforme n’a réussi à emporter l’assentiment de tous les juristes, nombre d’entre eux semblent s’accorder sur la nécessité de réformer ce texte—inchangé depuis 1804. Pourquoi un tel consensus sur ce besoin de réécriture de la définition de la condition suspensive mène à une discussion doctrinale où deux positions principales s’opposent? (...) C’est à cette question que nous tâchons de répondre en traquant l’origine de cette scission dans la lettre même du texte dont nous analysons à la fois la structure logique et la signification des termes employés pour sa rédaction. Cette analyse nous permet de mettre en évidence la sémantique ambiguë du terme “incertain”, terme pour lequel nous proposons une analyse logique de sa signification que nous comparons ensuite à celle du terme “inconnu”. (shrink)