This essay briefly explores the phenomenon of nepantla in three representative cross-cultural encounters, in both initial and later phases: Spain-Latin America, England-India, and the West-Japan. N...

Cantus firmus der analytischen Sprachphilosophie als der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts ist die Theorie des Sprachverstehens, die für die Human- und die Sozialwissenschaft immer mehr in den Mittelpunkt tritt. Das Buch führt in die Problemsituation der sprachanalytischen Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie ein, die dann eintritt, wenn die metaphysische Bestimmung der Sprache (Scheitern des logischen Atomismus) und die Zurückführung der Rekonstruktion von Verstehen mit semantischen Begriffen, die sich auf den Ausdrucksgebrauch und die Satzwahrheit als Analysans beziehen, strittig wird. Die Problemsituation wird konstruktiv (...) an den beiden Traditionen der analytischen Philosophie, der klassischen Debatten logische versus begriffliche Analyse, semantische versus pragmatische Präsuppositionen und der nach-empiristischen Bedeutungstheorie dargestellt. Eine Orientierung über die sprachanalytische Handlungstheorie ergänzt die Untersuchung. Die Perspektive geht dahin, dass in der Frankfurter Schule der Sprechakttheorie eine Sprachpragmatik Weichen für eine Protosoziologie stellt. (shrink)

Riddles of induction – old or new, Hume’s or Goodman’s – pose unanswered challenges to assumptions that experiences logically legitimate expectations or classifications. The challenges apply both to folk beliefs and to scientific ones. In particular, Goodman’s ‘new riddle’ famously confounds efforts to specify how additional experiences confirm the rightness of currently preferred ways of organizing objects, i.e. our favored theories of what kinds there are.1 His riddle serves to emphasize that neither logic nor experience certifies accepted groupings of objects (...) into kinds.2 Hacking strongly endorses Goodman’s riddle and its chief consequences – nature does not dictate any organizing scheme to us, and different schemes need have no connection to one another. (shrink)

Is there something special about one’s attitude toward a prospective action when deciding or intending to do it? Philosophers often appeal to the idea of settling to distinguish intention from other attitudes toward some prospective action, such as expecting it, or desiring it. But 'settle' has become a term of art invoked in divergent ways. The first use of the term concerns the more immediate upshot of a decision on the psychology of the agent. Once a decision has been made (...) and an intention formed, the agent is settled on a course of action to pursue. She stops considering alternatives and attends to means for bringing it about. Decision and intention thus play a distinctive role in the agent’s psychology and practical reasoning. Call this intransitive settling. In contrast, the transitive use of the term involves the thought that when, for example, you decide and intend to attend a lecture tomorrow, what you’re settling goes beyond your psychology, to take in worldly matters such as your being at the lecture. If we take this idea seriously, as I think we should, it might seem that we are led to an implausible picture of the agent reaching outside the temporal order to determine in direct fashion some future state of affairs. We can avoid this consequence while maintaining a robust transitive conception of settling. This will require articulating how one can act directly on a prior intention, and appreciating the role of intention in preserving reasons for action. (shrink)

The theory of knowledge objectification, initially presented and developed by Luis Radford, has gained some traction in the field of mathematics education. As with any developing theory, its presentation contains statements that may contradict its stated intents; and these problems are exacerbated in its uptake into the work of other scholars. The purpose of this study is to articulate a Spinozist-Marxian approach, in which the objectification exists not in things—semiotic means that mediate interactions—but as real relation between people. As a (...) consequence, the concept of mediation is unnecessary and can be abandoned. A concrete classroom example from Radford’s own studies is used to exemplify and develop pertinent issues. In particular, the societal nature of the ideal—a synecdoche of relations between objects that reflect relations between people—should be added and the notion of mediation no longer is required. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2014 Heft: 202 Seiten: 109-154.

En las décadas de 1970 y 1980, se dieron sendos debates entre marxismo y feminismo a través de las lecturas de intelectuales feministas socialistas, radicales y marxistas, con el objetivo de reflexionar sobre “la cuestión de la mujer” en el sistema capitalista. Estas escritoras pensaron el “trabajo” en las producciones de Marx y construyeron, primero, la categoría de “trabajo doméstico” y, después, la de “trabajo de reproducción”. Luego, en las primeras décadas del siglo XXI, surgieron nuevas lecturas feministas de los (...) escritos marxistas a través de la categoría de “trabajo de reproducción”, que se nutrieron de los debates de las décadas anteriores. En los últimos años, en un contexto de visibilización de la violencia de género, así como de las luchas de los movimientos de mujeres y feministas en todo el mundo, las luchas por el reconocimiento de las tareas domésticas y de cuidado como trabajo se volvieron centrales. Entonces, resulta fructífero explorar las reflexiones de autoras feministas marxistas respecto del “trabajo” en Marx. Este artículo tiene como objetivo explorar las reflexiones de las intelectuales feministas que retoman la teoría marxista para pensar el trabajo femenino en el siglo XXI. Para ello, retomo las producciones de aquellas escritoras que vuelven a las obras marxianas y exponen tanto los aportes como las críticas hacia la teoría del pensador alemán, no sin antes revisar brevemente el legado de los debates que se dieron en los 70 y 80, en cuanto nutren el análisis de los feminismos marxistas actuales. (shrink)

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 5, Page 706-707, August 2012.

Alvin Goldman's recent collection (Goldman, 1992) includes many of the important and seminal contributions made by him over the last three decades to epistemology, philosophy of mind, and analytic metaphysics. Goldman is an acknowledged leader in efforts to put material from cognitive and social science to good philosophical use. This is the “liaison” which Goldman takes his own work to exemplify and advance. Yet the essays contained in Liaisons chart an important evolution in Goldman's own views about the relation between (...) philosophy and empirical inquiry. Goldman raises, if only unwittingly, the question of what philosophy per se contributes to the encounter. The way in which Goldman's work problematizes the claim that philosophy forms a working liaison with the cognitive and social sciences is revealed by examining two sets of distinctions prominent in Goldman's analyses in this volume. I trace how each pair of terms—philosophy versus science, individual versus social—is used by Goldman and suggest that it is less clear than one would like how these key notions are or could be distinguished from one another. Doubts about these distinctions, at least as Goldman employs them, suggest more general concerns regarding Goldman's style of naturalism and the status of philosophy as a source of knowledge. Liaisons: philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences , A. Goldman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992. (shrink)