One hundred years separates the birth of T. Campanella from that of G. B. Vico. This collection of essays, published in 1969 by the Archives of Philosophy, is the end result of a congress held in Rome commemorating the birth of both philosophers. Campanella and Vico are celebrated in the same volume on the assumption of ideal affinities besides the accidental circumstances of having been born a century apart. Unfortunately, only one essay is expressly devoted to the analysis of Campanella's (...) and Vico's metaphysics. While the first two papers consider Campanella's medical biography and his epistemology, the last four are dedicated solely to various aspects of Vico's thought. On Iacobelli Isoldi falls the responsibility of justifying the title of the volume. But her attempt to demonstrate a family resemblance between Vico's and Campanella's metaphysics remains farfetched. For Campanella's way of solving the theoretical problem arising from Descartes' dualism issues in inevitable skepticism. Campanella never abandoned the position that the cogito is a vehicle of certainty, but not a criterion of truth. Vico on the other hand, overcomes his initial skepticism by transforming the criterion of truth into a criterion of certainty. In the New Science he demonstrates how man can possess true knowledge of the social and historical sciences. To demonstrate that this symposium had been assembled for reasons other than physical convenience, more papers on possible relations between the Dominican friar of Cosenza and the professor of eloquence of Naples would have been a desideratum.--L. M. P. (shrink)

Cicero's philosophical works are now exciting renewed interest, in part because he provides vital evidence of the views of the Greek philosophers of the Hellenistic age, and partly because of the light he casts on the intellectual life of first century Rome. This edition uses the 1997 Clarendon text by the acclaimed translator P.G. Walsh.

The words I wish to delete in 48-9 spoil a ‘tricolon crescendo’ whose three members are clearly marked and whose verbs are perhaps deliberately varied in person and tense. The parataxis by means of hic is awkward, and the words seem to be a versified gloss. The Scholiast says : id est: to nobilis tantum et imperitus. nam de plebe, id est de humili familia, eloquentes exeunt, qui nobilium imperitorum causas defendunt; but that could be a paraphrase based on the (...) text as it stands in our manuscripts. (shrink)

In his article ‘Did the Athenians Regard Seduction as a Worse Crime than Rape?’, CQ 40 , 370–7, Edward M. Harris rightly casts doubt on the value of Lysias 1.30–5, which has generally been accepted as evidence that the Athenians did indeed regard seduction as the worse of the two crimes. Euphiletos in this speech is defending himself on a charge of murder, and, as Harris says , ‘Euphiletus’ presentation of the Athenian statutes regarding rape and seduction is dictated by (...) the rhetorical constraints of his case. It is not a reflection of widely held social attitudes.'. (shrink)

Hanc quoque ‘iucunditatem’, si vis, transfer in animum , rnodo intellegas inter ilium qui dicat Tanta laetitia auctus sum ut nihil constet et eum qui Nunc demum mihi animus ardet, quorum alter laetitia gestiat, alter dolore crucietur, esse ilium medium [Quamquam haec inter nos nuper notitia admodum est] qui nee laetetur nee angatur, itemque inter eum qui potiatur corporis expetitis voluptatibus et eum qui crucietur summis doloribus esse eum qui utroque careat.

This would be admirably clear and would give excellent sense, but it does entail the deletion of as an interpolation before Marshall is aware that is a word that is not likely to be used by an interpolator, but still feels able to propose its deletion and gives a detailed account of the way in which an interpolator might have approached the sentence. When one attempts to read the mind of an ancient scribe, all sorts of possibilities are opened up; (...) in this instance, it seems equally possible that a reader who, as Marshall suggests, was faced with … and was not able to understand the sentence because he failed to separate from and to see that was to be taken in the second clause, would have been inclined first at least to see whether sense could be obtained by separating from rather than to conjure up the word. (shrink)

Although there is great concern about protecting those who participate in research, little if any concern has been expressed in the literature about protecting “decliners”—individuals who were invited to participate, but did not. However, there are several situations in which potential participants may experience negative consequences if they choose not to participate—for example, the prison setting, where the power imbalance is obvious and the history of research is not a positive one. We offer several options to protect decliners from possible (...) adverse consequences. (shrink)

A neurosurgical view of consciousness is presented. It is biased by our need to deal with coma. The concept of primary or neurosurgical consciousness is discussed, and the anatomy, physiology, pathology and clinical features described in a simple a way. It is suggested that the dynamic interaction between the reticular activating system and the cerebral cortex is the anatomic and physiologic basis for primary consciousness. It is emphasised that this in no way diminishes the role of the cortex in either (...) primary or higher-order consciousness. In essence, a presentation is made of the neurosurgical view of cortex-brainstem inter- relationships, and the importance of this interrelationship to consciousness. (shrink)

Irrationality remains a central issue in the philosophy of psychoanalysis. While some approaches in the philosophy of mind have argued that irrationality demands no special account, one of the central conceptual planks of psychoanalytic theory is the notion that irrational motivations have their origin in the dynamic unconscious. This article reviews recent attempts to account for the phenomenon of motivated irrationality, and argues that the problem of self-understanding will remain central to the philosophy of mind so long as we accept (...) the notion of rational agency. Any account of the mind which ignores or denies the appeal of first-person mental phenomena risks rendering itself unintelligible as a convincing account of the conscious subject. (shrink)