Il pensiero politico di Augusto Del Noce si caratterizza per una complessa interpretazione della modernità. Essa non rappresenta per lui il luogo del necessario processo verso la meta finale e perfetta dell’immanenza, che trova nelle religioni secolari del totalitarismo e nel nichilismo scientista delle società opulente la sua più significativa rappresentazione. La modernità come tale va per lui contestata nel suo significato assiologico perché la sua problematizzazione è la condizione filosofica e politica per immaginarne un esito che permetta invece (...) di recuperare il valore della persona umana come luogo dell’apertura alla trascendenza e come prima pietra dell’edificio sociale. Senza questa prospettiva le promesse di emancipazione delle teorie politiche legate ad una idea di progresso ineluttabile ma circoscritto entro visioni materialistiche ed atee sono destinate al fallimento, come è stato tragicamente testimoniato dalla storia. Diversa è stata l’ermeneutica della modernità offerta da Del Noce, che contro la rivoluzione intesa come tentativo di sostituire la religione nell’opera di liberazione dell’uomo dall’alienazione, vede invece nel risorgimento una categoria ancora feconda di possibilità di libertà per l’uomo dell’epoca della secolarizzazione. Di fronte ai dilemmi delle odierne società liberaldemocratiche, la visione personalistica, che fa dell’uomo un essere dotato di un principio di dignità infinito, rimane il retaggio di quelle figure della nostra tradizione ottocentesca che, lungi dall’avere esaurito sue potenzialità, offre per lui ancora delle risorse per la salvezza di ciò rimane di più prezioso dell’umanesimo europeo. (shrink)

This book is about Buttiglione's teacher and friend, Augusto Del Noce, an Italian philosopher who died in 1989. It would be hard to describe the relevance of Del Noce's thought to twentieth-century Italian cultural and philosophical history, both because of the complexity of Del Noce's thought and because of the limited space of this review. Therefore I will outline three components of the thought of Del Noce as presented by Buttiglione in this book: Christianity and modernity, the criticism of (...) the idea of one modernity, Marxism, and "Western irreligion.". (shrink)

This paper investigates the link between informational consequence and credence. I first suggest a natural constraint, namely that informational consequence should preserve certainty: on any rational credence distribution, when the premises of an informational inferences have credence 1, the conclusion also has credence 1. Then I show that the certainty‐preserving constraint leads to triviality. In particular, the following three claims are incompatible: (i) informational consequence is extensionally distinct from classical consequence; (ii) informational inferences preserve certainty; (iii) credences obey (a subset (...) of) classical Bayesian constraints. The proof is straightforward, but the theoretical implications are substantial. Informational theorists need to either give up the idea that credence applies to epistemic discourse, or develop a nonclassical theory of credence and credal update. Moreover, the result also suggests that there is a connection between informational consequence and triviality results, including classical triviality results like Lewis's. (shrink)

On an influential line of thinking tracing back to Ramsey, conditionals are closely linked to the attitude of supposition. When applied to counterfactuals, this view suggests a subjunctive version of the so-called Ramsey test: the probability of a counterfactual If A, would B ought to be equivalent to the probability of B, under the subjunctive supposition that A. I present a collapse result for any view that endorses the subjunctive version of the Ramsey test. Starting from plausible assumptions, the result (...) shows that one’s rational credence in a would-counterfactual and in the corresponding might-counterfactual have to be identical. (shrink)

An algebraization of the notion of topology has been proposed more than 70 years ago in a classical paper by McKinsey and Tarski, leading to an area of research still active today, with connections to algebra, geometry, logic and many applications, in particular, to modal logics. In McKinsey and Tarski’s setting the model theoretical notion of homomorphism does not correspond to the notion of continuity. We notice that the two notions correspond if instead we consider a preorder relation \( \sqsubseteq (...) \) defined by \(a \sqsubseteq b\) if _a_ is contained in the topological closure of _b_, for _a_, _b_ subsets of some topological space. A _specialization poset_ is a partially ordered set endowed with a further coarser preorder relation \( \sqsubseteq \). We show that every specialization poset can be embedded in the specialization poset naturally associated to some topological space, where the order relation corresponds to set-theoretical inclusion. Specialization semilattices are defined in an analogous way and the corresponding embedding theorem is proved. Specialization semilattices have the amalgamation property. Some basic topological facts and notions are recovered in this apparently very weak setting. The interest of these structures arises from the fact that they also occur in many rather disparate contexts, even far removed from topology. (shrink)

This paper explores the epistemology of extrapolation from model organisms to humans in molecular medicine. We take into account two common views on the issue, the homology view and the disanalogy view. In response to both interpretations, we argue that the foundational basis of extrapolations cannot simply be provided by homology and that relevant disanalogies can, thanks to the techniques of molecular biology, be experimentally controlled and exploited to allow useful and reliable extrapolations. The case of "humanised mice" in the (...) context of cancer stem cell research provides evidence of how animal models can be construed to approximate bona fide causal analogue models of human diseases. To supplement this view we show how the epistemology of model organisms needs to take into account the engineering side of molecular medicine. Model organisms are often manipulated to create analogies or remove disanalogies with the target system. We maintain that highlighting this feature is fundamental to explain what warrants extrapolation in the search for the molecular causes of disease. (shrink)

Learning to perceive is faced with a classical paradox: if understanding is required for perception, how can we learn to perceive something new, something we do not yet understand? According to the sensorimotor approach, perception involves mastery of regular sensorimotor co-variations that depend on the agent and the environment, also known as the “laws” of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs). In this sense, perception involves enacting relevant sensorimotor skills in each situation. It is important for this proposal that such skills can be (...) learned and refined with experience and yet up to this date, the sensorimotor approach has had no explicit theory of perceptual learning. The situation is made more complex if we acknowledge the open-ended nature of human learning. In this paper we propose Piaget’s theory of equilibration as a potential candidate to fulfill this role. This theory highlights the importance of intrinsic sensorimotor norms, in terms of the closure of sensorimotor schemes. It also explains how the equilibration of a sensorimotor organization faced with novelty or breakdowns proceeds by re-shaping pre-existing structures in coupling with dynamical regularities of the world. This way learning to perceive is guided by the equilibration of emerging forms of skillful coping with the world. We demonstrate the compatibility between Piaget’s theory and the sensorimotor approach by providing a dynamical formalization of equilibration to give an explicit micro-genetic account of sensorimotor learning and, by extension, of how we learn to perceive. This allows us to draw important lessons in the form of general principles for open-ended sensorimotor learning, including the need for an intrinsic normative evaluation by the agent itself. We also explore implications of our micro-genetic account at the personal level. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of philosophical interpretations of Dostoevsky, focusing on readings that pay particular attention to his representation of the battle between good and evil, and postulating that said representation constitutes the essence of his works. The analysis maps this history of interpretations as developing within a specific framework: the dispute between interpreters who argue that good triumphs in Dostoevsky’s works and those who maintain that nihilism prevails in the end. In this context, the article submits its own (...) thesis: that a fundamental contradiction haunts the offer, in Dostoevsky’s works, of Christian salvation, and condemns Dostoevsky to defeat at the hands of his nihilists. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the interpretation of Kant's a priori in Marburg neo-Kantianism involved a historiographical problem concerning the Platonic interpretation of the history of exact sci...

The aim of this article is to understand an important passage in the history of the sciences of the psyche: starting from the psychiatric problematization — and the consequent emergence — of the concept and the object called ‘sexuality’ in the second half of the 19th century, it attempts to show a series of continuities and discontinuities between this kind of reasoning and the birth of psychoanalysis in the first years of the 20th century. The particular focus is therefore directed (...) on two texts: Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis and Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. The argument runs along three intertwined axes: (1) an historico-epistemological analysis of the concepts and their transformations in the field of the science of sexuality; (2) an analysis of the power relationships between patients and physicians; and (3) an account of the psychiatric technologies of the self that have as an effect the emergence of new forms of ‘objective’ knowledge of the subject. The broader goal is to trace a map of the simultaneous and correlate coming into being and transformations both of new forms of objects and of new forms of subjects through the mediation of scientific concepts and techniques. (shrink)

It has often been claimed that (i) Aristotle's expression 'protasis' means 'premiss' in syllogistic contexts and (ii) cannot refer to the conclusion of a syllogism in the Prior Analytics. In this essay we produce and defend a counter-example to these two claims. We argue that (i) the basic meaning of the expression is 'proposition' and (ii) while it is often used to refer to the premisses of a syllogism, in Prior Analytics 1.29, 45b4-8 it is used to refer to the (...) conclusion of a syllogism. In our view, the best explanation of Aristotle's use of the expression 'protasis' is that it means proposition throughout but is frequently used without change of meaning (in certain specific contexts) to refer to the premisses from which a conclusion follows. In Prior Analytics 1.29, 45b4-8 he uses 'protasis' to refer to the conclusion when he needs a single expression to refer to both the conclusion and one of the premisses of the syllogism that constitutes the core of a syllogism through the impossible. If we are correct, we have shown that the view that the expression 'the final protasis' in EN 7.3, 1147b9ff must mean 'the final premiss' and so cannot refer to the conclusion of the relevant syllogism is mistaken. (shrink)

Hypercomputation—the hypothesis that Turing-incomputable objects can be computed through infinitary means—is ineffective, as the unsolvability of the halting problem for Turing machines depends just on the absence of a definite value for some paradoxical construction; nature and quantity of computing resources are immaterial. The assumption that the halting problem is solved by oracles of higher Turing degree amounts just to postulation; infinite-time oracles are not actually solving paradoxes, but simply assigning them conventional values. Special values for non-terminating processes are likewise (...) irrelevant, since diagonalization can cover any amount of value assignments. This should not be construed as a restriction of computing power: Turing’s uncomputability is not a ‘barrier’ to be broken, but simply an effect of the expressive power of consistent programming systems. (shrink)

This paper is the second part of the syntactic demonstration of the Arithmetical Completeness of the modal system G, the first part of which is presented in [9]. Given a sequent S so that ⊢GL-LIN S, ⊬G S, and given its characteristic formula H = char(S), which expresses the non G-provability of S, we construct a canonical proof-tree T of ~ H in GL-LIN, the height of which is the distance d(S, G) of S from G. T is the syntactic (...) countermodel of S with respect to Gand is a tool of general interest in Provability Logic, that allows some classification in the set of the arithmetical interpretations. (shrink)

The study of the neuroscience and genomics of mental illness are increasingly intertwined. This is mostly due to the translation of medical technologies into psychiatry and to technological convergence. This article focuses on psychosis. I argue that the convergence of neuroscience and genomics in the context of psychosis is morally problematic, and that ethics scholarship should go beyond the identification of a number of ethical, legal, and social issues. My argument is composed of two strands. First, I argue that we (...) should respond to technological convergence by developing an integrated, patient-centred approach focused on the assessment of individual vulnerabilities. Responding to technological convergence requires that we integrate insights from several areas of ethics, translate bioethical principles into the mental health context, and proactively try to anticipate future ethical concerns. Second, I argue that a nuanced understanding of the concept of vulnerability might help us to accomplish this task. I borrow Florencia Luna’s notion of ‘layers of vulnerability’ to show how potential harms or wrongs to individuals who experience psychosis can be conceptualised as stemming from different sources, or layers, of vulnerability. I argue that a layered notion of vulnerability might serve as a common ground to achieve the ethical integration needed to ensure that biomedical innovation can truly benefit, and not harm, individuals who suffer from psychosis. (shrink)

RESUMO O artigo propõe uma releitura cruzada dos conceitos de acidente, desenvolvido por Landowski no âmbito de sua teoria sociossemiótica da interação, e explosão, elaborado por Lotman em seus últimos escritos de semiótica da cultura. Longe de ser um fim em si mesmo, este confronto almeja esboçar uma síntese teórico-epistemológica que possa contribuir à análise dos processos comunicacionais-discursivos que regem o devir dos sistemas socioculturais, bem como ao seu enquadramento conceitual. A minha hipótese é que a cifra desta articulação resida (...) no vínculo entre a indeterminação destacada por ambos os autores e a carga estésica, isto é, o núcleo de tensões sensíveis que, conforme vislumbra Landowski, os acontecimentos acidentais/explosivos são capazes de mobilizar. Para procurar demonstrar sua pertinência e relevância, partirei de um caso concreto: as jornadas de junho de 2013 e seu impacto no processo que levou, em 2016, ao impeachment de Dilma Rousseff e, em 2018, à eleição de Jair Bolsonaro. ABSTRACT The article proposes a comparison between the concepts of accident, developed by Landowski in his sociosemiotic theory of interaction, and explosion, elaborated by Lotman in his last writings on the semiotics of culture. Far from being an end in itself, this confrontation aims to sketch a theoretical-epistemological synthesis that can contribute to the analysis of the communicational-discursive processes that trigger the historical flow of sociocultural systems, as well as to their conceptual categorisation. My hypothesis is that the basis of this articulation lies in the link between the indeterminacy highlighted by both authors, and the aesthesic value, that is, the core of sensible tensions that, as shown by Landowski, the accidental/explosive events could mobilise. In order to demonstrate its pertinence and relevance, I will focus on a specific case study: the 2013 protests in Brazil and their impact on the process that led to the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 and the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. (shrink)

The author argues that one of the “circles” that constitute Hegel’s philosophical system, as it is displayed in the Encyclopedia, is the circle between the I and the spirit. Specifically, the author focuses on the emergence of spirit as a self and an I, and on the encounter of the I with nature. The author also argues that absolute spirit maintains fundamental intersubjective and perspectival features that are proper to the I, and that grasping the circular movement between the I (...) and the spirit in the context of Hegel’s discussion of absolute Geist is also relevant to appreciating how normative categories of social thought can be challenged and altered through Geist’s ability to achieve critical distance by overcoming subject/object distinctions. (shrink)

Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.

Constrained coherence is compared to coherence and its role in the behavioural interpretation of coherence is discussed. The equivalence of these two notions is proven for coherent conditional previsions, showing that the same course of reasoning applies to several similar concepts developed in the realm of imprecise probability theory.

The review focuses basically on Leader’s paper "Toleration without Liberal Foundations". First, the author makes some semantic remarks about the uses of the word “toleration”; second, he offers some criticisms of Leader’s paper; and, finally, he puts forward the outline of a modest proposal.

The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is “he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever” (188d3–4), how should (...) the clause “about anything whatsoever” be construed? In common with “he who judges” and “the things which are not” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not about it”), or exclusively with “he who judges” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not”)? The most plausible answer is that both construals are envisaged. Accordingly, the argument has two branches corresponding to these two alternative construals. In particular, it attempts to show that in both cases the cognizer will address what does not exist – an impossibility. The idea that a false judgement is concerned with what is not about its reference has a clear echo in the Sophist. The way in which the problem is handled in the Theaetetus provides a hint that can help to find a solution for the hotly debated issue of the interpretation of the Sophist’s account of false statement. (shrink)

In agreement with some of the ideas expressed by Perruchet & Vinter (P&V), we believe that some phenomena hitherto attributed to processing may in fact reflect a fundamental distinction between direct and reflexive forms of consciousness. This dichotomy, developed by the phenomenological tradition, is substantiated by examples coming from experimental psychology and lesion neuropsychology.

A default theory can be seen as a way for representing a set of formulae, i.e., its extensions. In this paper, we characterize the sets of formulae that can be expressed by a default theory according to various semantics: justified, constrained, rational, cumulative, QDL, CADL, and two semantics with priorities. These characterizations imply some non-translatability results between semantics.

In recent years, reflection on pedagogical tact has made a comeback in the international debate. Tact is a fundamental disposition of the educator, albeit one that is scarcely addressed in the training of teachers and educators. The question is whether it is possible to treat this pedagogical propensity as a teachable habit, and to what extent. Here we propose that tact can be understood as a teachable frame of mind of the educator by analysing tactlessness. In other words, in order (...) to become a tactful teacher, one has to pass through situations in which tact is not enacted, because the absence of tact – as Adorno proposes in his dialectical-negative perspective – becomes a condition for soliciting doubts about one’s educational action, metareflexive rethinking and finally tactful responses. (shrink)

This paper deals with a case of Virgilian ambiguity, namely the famous hemistich at Aen. 4.298 omnia tuta timens. By highlighting a plausible reading with a causal force (‘fearing everything too calm’, ‘because of the excessive calmness’), it seeks to demonstrate that this hemistich is an ambiguous passage. This view is confirmed through the imitation by Valerius Flaccus, who, in alluding to the Virgilian passage (Argonautica 8.408–12), highlights its ambiguity by including both of the most plausible readings.