This is a new volume of original essays on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. The essays address questions such as: What fundamental metaphysics is best motivated by quantum mechanics? What is the ontological status of the wave function? Does quantum mechanics support the existence of any other fundamental entities, e.g. particles? What is the nature of the fundamental space of quantum mechanics? What is the relationship between the fundamental ontology of quantum mechanics and ordinary, macroscopic objects like (...) tables, chairs, and persons? This collection includes a comprehensive introduction with a history of quantum mechanics and the debate over its metaphysical interpretation focusing especially on the main realist alternatives. (shrink)

Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories can be regarded as (approximately) true. This is connected with the view that science, physics in particular, and metaphysics could (and should) inform one another: on the one hand, science tells us what the world is like, and on the other hand, metaphysical principles allow us to select between the various possible theories which are underdetermined by the data. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics has always been regarded as, at best, puzzling, (...) if not contradictory. As such, it has been considered for a long time at odds with scientific realism, and thus a naturalized quantum metaphysics was deemed impossible. Luckily, now we have many quantum theories compatible with a realist interpretation. However, scientific realists assumed that the wave-function, regarded as the principal ingredient of quantum theories, had to represent a physical entity, and because of this they struggled with quantum superpositions. In this paper I discuss a particular approach which makes quantum mechanics compatible with scientific realism without doing that. In this approach, the wave-function does not represent matter which is instead represented by some spatio-temporal entity dubbed the primitive ontology: point-particles, continuous matter fields, space-time events. I argue how within this framework one develops a distinctive theory-construction schema, which allows to perform a more informed theory evaluation by analyzing the various ingredients of the approach and their inter-relations. (shrink)

We discuss the issue of quantum-classical transition in a system of a single particle with and without external potential. This is done by elaborating the notion of self-trapped wave function recently developed by the author. For a free particle, we show that there is a subset of self-trapped wave functions which is particle-like. Namely, the spatially localized wave packet is moving uniformly with undistorted shape as if the whole wave packet is (...) indeed a classical free particle. The length of the spatial support of the wave packet is given by the Compton wavelength so that the wave packet is more localized for particle with larger mass. Whereas for a particle of mass m in a macroscopic external potential, we show that the time needed by the corresponding self-trapped wave function to depart from a classical trajectory is of the order ∼m 2 c/ℏ. We argue that it is the Compton wavelength that matters and not the de Broglie wavelength as in conventional semiclassical approach. (shrink)

We investigate and develop further two models, the GRW model and the K model, in which the Schrödinger evolution of the wave function is spontaneously and repeatedly interrupted by random, approximate localizations, also called “self-reductions” below. In these models the center of mass of a macroscopic solid body is well localized even if one disregards the interactions with the environment. The motion of the body shows a small departure from the classical motion. We discuss the prospects and the (...) difficulties of observing this anomaly. As far a the influence of the surroundings on submacroscopic objects (like dust particles) is concerned, we show that the estimates obtained recently in the theory of continuous measurements and in the K model are compatible. Also, we elaborate upon the relationship between the models. Firstly, borrowing a line of thought from the K model, we find the transition region between macroscopic and microscopic behaviors in the GRW model. Secondly, we refine the propagation rule of the wave function in the K model with the help of the time-evolution equation proposed in the GRW model. (shrink)

Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories can be regarded as (approximately) true. This is connected with the view that science, physics in particular, and metaphysics could (and should) inform one another: on the one hand, science tells us what the world is like, and on the other hand, metaphysical principles allow us to select between the various possible theories which are underdetermined by the data. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics has always been regarded as, at best, puzzling, (...) if not contradictory. As such, it has been considered for a long time at odds with scientific realism, and thus a naturalized quantum metaphysics was deemed impossible. Luckily, now we have many quantum theories compatible with a realist interpretation. However, scientific realists assumed that the wavefunction, regarded as the principal ingredient of quantum theories, had to represent a physical entity, and because of this they struggled with quantum superpositions. In this paper I discuss a particular approach which makes quantum mechanics compatible with scientific realism without doing that. In this approach, the wave-function does not represent matter which is instead represented by some spatio-temporal entity dubbed the primitive ontology: point-particles, continuous matter fields, space-time events. I argue how within this framework one develops a distinctive theory-construction schema, which allows to perform a more informed theory evaluation by analyzing the various ingredients of the approach and their interrelations. (shrink)

It has been shown that quantum mechanics in its orthodox interpretation violates four different formulations of causality principle endowed with empirical meaning. The present work aims to highlight how even a realistic non-standard interpretation of the theory conflicts with causality in its Cartesian formulation of the principle of the non-inferiority of causes over effects. Such an interpretation, which attributes some form of weak physical reality to the wave function (called empty wave, regarded as a zero-energy wave- (...) class='Hi'>like phenomenon), is a sort of precursor of the more recent so-called wavefunction realism. We also discuss a more radical realistic interpretation according to which physical properties can also be assigned to non-metaphysical relative nothing, seen as the simple absence of a particle such as a photon, but not of its corresponding state (no-photon), which is considered real. By interpreting the wave function collapse as a consequence of an interaction with empty waves or of a detection of the no-photon, we will highlight how more real physical effects can derive from lower causes, including relative nothing. Finally, we will show how these interpretations, while violating Cartesian causality in its two variants, do not seem to affect the validity of the principle of a rational explanation that nothing can derive from (absolute) nothing, which does not seem satisfied by the orthodox interpretation. (shrink)

It is argued that the symmetry and anti-symmetry of the wave functions of systems consisting of identical particles have nothing to do with the observational indistinguishability of these particles. Rather, a much stronger conceptual indistinguishability is at the bottom of the symmetry requirements. This can be used to argue further, in analogy to old arguments of De Broglie and Schrödinger, that the reality described by quantum mechanics has a wave-like rather than particle-like structure. The question (...) of whether quantum statistics alone can give rise to empirically observable correlations between results of distant measurements is also discussed. (shrink)

The meaning of the wave function is an important unresolved issue in Bohmian mechanics. On the one hand, according to the nomological view, the wave function of the universe or the universal wave function is nomological, like a law of nature. On the other hand, the PBR theorem proves that the wave function in quantum mechanics or the effective wave function in Bohmian mechanics is ontic, representing the ontic state (...) of a physical system in the universe. It is usually thought that the nomological view of the universal wave function is compatible with the ontic view of the effective wave function, and thus the PBR theorem has no implications for the nomological view. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case, and these two views are in fact incompatible. This means that if the effective wave function is ontic as the PBR theorem proves, then the universal wave function cannot be nomological, and the ontology of Bohmian mechanics cannot consist only in particles. This incompatibility result holds true not only for Humeanism and dispositionalism but also for primitivism about laws of nature, which attributes a fundamental ontic role to the universal wave function. Moreover, I argue that although the nomological view can be held by rejecting one key assumption of the PBR theorem, the rejection will lead to serious problems, such as that the results of measurements and their probabilities cannot be explained in ontology in Bohmian mechanics. Finally, I briefly discuss three $$\psi$$ -ontologies, namely a physical field in a fundamental high-dimensional space, a multi-field in three-dimensional space, and RDMP (Random Discontinuous Motion of Particles) in three-dimensional space, and argue that the RDMP ontology can answer the objections to the $$\psi$$ -ontology raised by the proponents of the nomological view. (shrink)

The idea that the mass m of an elementary particle is explained in the semi-classical approximation by quantum-mechanical zero-point vacuum fluctuations has been applied previously to spin-1/2 fermions to yield a real and positive constant value for m, expressed through the spinorial connection Γ i in the curved-space Dirac equation for the wave function ψ due to Fock. This conjecture is extended here to bosonic particles of spin 0 and spin 1, starting from the basic assumption that (...) all fundamental fields must be conformally invariant. As a result, in curved space-time there is an effective scalar mass-squared term $m_{0}^{2}=-R/6=2\varLambda_{\mathrm{b}}/3$ , where R is the Ricci scalar and Λ b is the cosmological constant, corresponding to the bosonic zero-point energy-density, which is positive, implying a real and positive constant value for m 0, through the positive-energy theorem. The Maxwell Lagrangian density $\mathcal{L} =- \sqrt{-g}F_{ij}F^{ij}/4$ for the Abelian vector field F ij ≡A j,i −A i,j is conformally invariant without modification, however, and the equation of motion for the four-vector potential A i contains no mass-like term in curved space. Therefore, according to our hypothesis, the free photon field A i must be massless, in agreement with both terrestrial experiment and the notion of gauge invariance. (shrink)

In quantum mechanics, the wave function of a N-body system is a mathematical function defined in a 3N-dimensional configuration space. We argue that wave function realism implies particle ontology when assuming: (1) the wave function of a N-body system describes N physical entities; (2) each triple of the 3N coordinates of a point in configuration space that relates to one physical entity represents a point in ordinary three-dimensional space. Moreover, the motion of (...) particles is random and discontinuous. (shrink)

The ontology of Bohmian mechanics includes both the universal wave function and particles. Proposals for understanding the physical significance of the wave function in this theory have included the idea of regarding it as a physically-real field in its 3N-dimensional space, as well as the idea of regarding it as a law of nature. Here we introduce and explore a third possibility in which the configuration space wave function is simply eliminated—replaced by a set (...) of single-particle pilot-wave fields living in ordinary physical space. Such a re-formulation of the Bohmian pilot-wave theory can exactly reproduce the statistical predictions of ordinary quantum theory. But this comes at the rather high ontological price of introducing an infinite network of interacting potential fields which influence the particles’ motion through the pilot-wave fields. We thus introduce an alternative approach which aims at achieving empirical adequacy with a more modest ontological complexity, and provide some preliminary evidence for optimism regarding the program of trying to replace the configuration space wave function with a set of fields in ordinary physical space. (shrink)

The main interpretations of the quantum-mechanical wave function are presented emphasizing how they can be divided into two ensembles: The ones that deny and the other ones that attribute a form of reality to quantum waves. It is also shown why these waves cannot be classical and must be submitted to the restriction of the complementarity principle. Applying the concept of smooth complementarity, it is shown that there can be no reason to attribute reality only to the events (...) and not to the wave or to the initial state of a given system. Thereafter, an experiment proposed by the authors is presented, where it is shown that the wave-like behaviour allows predictions that are not allowed on the grounds of a particle-like behaviour. In conclusion, we upheld that quantum waves must be real even if they do not belong to the same ontological level of events, which connected with particle detections. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that the Kirchhoff equations are derived from the Schrödinger equation by assuming the wave function to be a polynomial like solution. These Kirchhoff equations describe the evolution of n point vortices in hydrodynamics. In two dimensions, Kirchhoff equations are used to demonstrate the solution to single particle Laughlin wave function as complex Hermite polynomials. We also show that the equation for optical vortices, a two dimentional system, is derived from (...) Kirchhoff equation by using paraxial wave approximation. These Kirchhoff equations satisfy a Poisson bracket relationship in phase space which is identical to the Heisenberg uncertainty relationship. Therefore, we conclude that being classical equations, the Kirchhoff equations, describe both a particle and a wave nature of single particle quantum mechanics in two dimensions. (shrink)

Two different concepts of distinguishability are often mixed up in attempts to derive in quantum mechanics the symmetry of the wave function from indistinguishability of identical particles. Some of these attempts are analyzed and shown to be defective. It is argued that, although identical particles should be considered as observationally indistinguishable in symmetric states, they may be considered to be conceptually distinguishable. These two notions of distinguishability have quite different physical origins, the former one being related to observations (...) while the latter has to do with the preparation of the system. (shrink)

The quantum formalism ofdistinguishable, yetequivalent particles (with symmetric or antisymmetric wave functions) is here worked out. The result is an entirely explicit formulation of the way in which classical mechanics emerges from quantum mechanics for such particles. Distinguishability is achieved at the cost of dynamical precision; the two are, in fact, complementary.

What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. Erwin Schroedinger was one of the first proponents of such a view, but he dismissed it after he realized it led to macroscopic superpositions (if the (...) wave function evolves in time according to the equations that has his name). The Many-Worlds interpretation1 accepts the existence of such macroscopic superpositions but takes it that they can never be observed. Superposed objects and superposed observers split together in different worlds of the type of the one we appear to live in. For these who, like Schroedinger, think that macroscopic superpositions are a problem, the common wisdom is that there are two alternative views: "Either the wave function, as given by the Schroedinger equation, is not everything, or is not right" [Bell 1987]. The deBroglie-Bohm theory, now commonly known as Bohmian Mechanics, takes the first option: the description provided by a Schroedinger-evolving wave function is supplemented by the information provided by the configuration of the particles. The second possibility consists in assuming that, while the wave function provides the complete description of the system, its temporal evolution is not given by the Schroedinger equation. Rather, the usual Schroedinger evolution is interrupted by random and sudden "collapses". The most promising theory of this kind is the GRW theory, named after the scientists that developed it: Gian Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tullio Weber.. It seems tempting to think that in GRW we can take the wave function ontologically seriously and avoid the problem of macroscopic superpositions just allowing for quantum jumps. In this paper we will argue that such "bare" wave function ontology is not possible, neither for GRW nor for any other quantum theory: quantum mechanics cannot be about the wave function simpliciter. That is, we need more structure than the one provided by the wave function. As a response, quantum theories about the wave function can be supplemented with structure, without taking it as an additional ontology. We argue in reply that such "dressed-up" versions of wave function ontology are not sensible, since they compromise the acceptability of the theory as a satisfactory fundamental physical theory. Therefore we maintain that: 1- Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; 2- Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously. Moreover, we will argue that any of the traditional responses to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics (Bohmian mechanics, GRW and Many-Worlds), contrarily to what commonly believed, share a common structure. That is, we maintain that: 3- All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time. (shrink)

Localised configurations of the free electromagnetic field are constructed, possessing properties of massive, spinning, relativistic particles. In an inertial frame, each configuration travels in a straight line at constant speed, less than the speed of lightc, while slowly spreading. It eventually decays into pulses of radiation travelling at speedc. Each configuration has a definite rest mass and internal angular momentum, or spin. Each can be of “electric” or “magnetic” type, according as the radial component of the magnetic or electric field (...) vanishes in the rest frame, and each has an “antiparticle.” Any such configuration, of electric or magnetic type, is characterized in part by a set of labels (κ, ω0, σ,l, m), where ω0 is the mean of the angular frequencies of the plane waves making up the configuration, σ is the variance of those frequencies, κ is a positive constant with dimensions of action, andl, m are angular momentum “quantum numbers” withl a positive integer andm an integer such that ‖m‖≤l. The rest energy of the “particle” is κω0, its spin is κ ‖m‖, and its lifetime is of the order of 1/σ. Its antiparticle has ω0 replaced by −ω0. (shrink)

Two different concepts of distinguishability are often mixed up in attempts to derive in quantum mechanics the (anti)symmetry of the wave function from indistinguishability of identical particles. Some of these attempts are analyzed and shown to be defective. It is argued that, although identical particles should be considered as observationally indistinguishable in (anti)symmetric states, they may be considered to be conceptually distinguishable. These two notions of (in)distinguishability have quite different physical origins, the former one being related to observations (...) while the latter has to do with the preparation of the system. (shrink)

In my dissertation I analyze the structure of fundamental physical theories. I start with an analysis of what an adequate primitive ontology is, discussing the measurement problem in quantum mechanics and theirs solutions. It is commonly said that these theories have little in common. I argue instead that the moral of the measurement problem is that the wave function cannot represent physical objects and a common structure between these solutions can be recognized: each of them is about a (...) clear three-dimensional primitive ontology that evolves according to a law determined by the wave function. The primitive ontology is what matter is made of while the wave function tells the matter how to move. One might think that what is important in the notion of primitive ontology is their three-dimensionality. If so, in a theory like classical electrodynamics electromagnetic fields would be part of the primitive ontology. I argue that, reflecting on what the purpose of a fundamental physical theory is, namely to explain the behavior of objects in three--dimensional space, one can recognize that a fundamental physical theory has a particular architecture. If so, electromagnetic fields play a different role in the theory than the particles and therefore should be considered, like the wave function, as part of the law. Therefore, we can characterize the general structure of a fundamental physical theory as a mathematical structure grounded on a primitive ontology. I explore this idea to better understand theories like classical mechanics and relativity, emphasizing that primitive ontology is crucial in the process of building new theories, being fundamental in identifying the symmetries. Finally, I analyze what it means to explain the word around us in terms of the notion of primitive ontology in the case of regularities of statistical character. Here is where the notion of typicality comes into play: we have explained a phenomenon if the typical histories of the primitive ontology give rise to the statistical regularities we observe. (shrink)

The meaning of the wave function and its evolution are investigated. First, we argue that the wave function in quantum mechanics is a description of random discontinuous motion of particles, and the modulus square of the wave function gives the probability density of the particles being in certain locations in space. Next, we show that the linear non-relativistic evolution of the wave function of an isolated system obeys the free Schrödinger equation due (...) to the requirements of spacetime translation invariance and relativistic invariance. Thirdly, we argue that the random discontinuous motion of particles may lead to a stochastic, nonlinear collapse evolution of the wave function. A discrete model of energy-conserved wavefunction collapse is proposed and shown consistent with existing experiments and our macroscopic experience. Besides, we also give a critical analysis of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the many-worlds interpretation and other dynamical collapse theories, and briefly discuss the issues of unifying quantum mechanics and relativity. (shrink)

We suggest scattering experiments which implement the concept of “protective measurements” allowing the measurement of the complete wave function even when only one quantum system (rather than an ensemble) is available. Such scattering experiments require massive, slow, projectiles with kinetic energies lower than the first excitation of the system in question. The results of such experiments can have a (probabilistic) distribution (as is the case when the Born approximation for the scattering is valid) or be deterministic (in a (...) semiclassical limit). (shrink)

We investigate the meaning of the wave function by analyzing the mass and charge density distributions of a quantum system. According to protective measurement, a charged quantum system has effective mass and charge density distributing in space, proportional to the square of the absolute value of its wave function. In a realistic interpretation, the wave function of a quantum system can be taken as a description of either a physical field or the ergodic motion (...) of a particle. The essential difference between a field and the ergodic motion of a particle lies in the property of simultaneity; a field exists throughout space simultaneously, whereas the ergodic motion of a particle exists throughout space in a time-divided way. If the wave function is a physical field, then the mass and charge density will be distributed in space simultaneously for a charged quantum system, and thus there will exist gravitational and electrostatic self-interactions of its wave function. This not only violates the superposition principle of quantum mechanics but also contradicts experimental observations. Thus the wave function cannot be a description of a physical field but a description of the ergodic motion of a particle. For the later there is only a localized particle with mass and charge at every instant, and thus there will not exist any self-interaction for the wave function. Which kind of ergodic motion of particles then? It is argued that the classical ergodic models, which assume continuous motion of particles, cannot be consistent with quantum mechanics. Based on the negative result, we suggest that the wave function is a description of the quantum motion of particles, which is random and discontinuous in nature. On this interpretation, the square of the absolute value of the wave function not only gives the probability of the particle being found in certain locations, but also gives the probability of the particle being there. We show that this new interpretation of the wave function provides a natural realistic alternative to the orthodox interpretation, and its implications for other realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are also briefly discussed. (shrink)

I argue that the wave function ontology for quantum mechanics is an undesirable ontology. This ontology holds that the fundamental space in which entities evolve is not three-dimensional, but instead 3N-dimensional, where N is the number of particles standardly thought to exist in three-dimensional space. I show that the state of three-dimensional objects does not supervene on the state of objects in 3N-dimensional space. I also show that the only way to guarantee the existence of the appropriate mental (...) states in the wave function ontology has undesirable metaphysical baggage: either mind/body dualism is true, or circumstances which we take to be logically possible turn out to be logically impossible.“While our theory can be extended formally in a logically consistent way by introducing the concept of a wave in a 3N-dimensional space, it is evident that this procedure is not really acceptable in a physical theory... ” (Bohm 1957, 117). (shrink)

We construct a world model consisting of a matter field living in 4 dimensional spacetime and a gravitational field living in 11 dimensional spacetime. The seven hidden dimensions are compactified within a radius estimated by reproducing the particle–wave characteristics of diffraction experiments. In the presence of matter fields the gravitational field develops localized modes with elementary excitations called gravonons which are induced by the sources. The final world model treated here contains only gravonons and a scalar matter field. (...) The gravonons are localized in the environment of the massive particles which generate them. The solution of the Schrödinger equation for the world model yields matter fields which are localized in the 4 dimensional subspace. The localization has the following properties: There is a chooser mechanism for the selection of the localization site. The chooser selects one site on the basis of minor energy differences and differences in the gravonon structure between the sites, which at present cannot be controlled experimentally and therefore let the choice appear statistical. The changes from one localization site to a neighbouring one take place in a telegraph-signal like manner. The times at which telegraph like jumps occur depend on subtleties of the gravonon structure which at present cannot be controlled experimentally and therefore let the telegraph-like jumps appear statistical. The fact that the dynamical law acts in the configuration space of fields living in 11 dimensional spacetime lets the events observed in 4 dimensional spacetime appear non-local. In this way the phenomenology of CQM is obtained without the need of introducing the process of collapse and a probabilistic interpretation of the wave function. Operators defining observables need not be introduced. All experimental findings are explained in a deterministic way as a consequence of the time development of the wave function in configuration space according to Schrödinger’s equation without the need of introducing a probabilistic interpretation. (shrink)

There is debate as to whether quantum field theory is, at bottom, a quantum theory of fields or particles. One can take a field approach to the theory, using wave functionals over field configurations, or a particle approach, using wave functions over particle configurations. This article argues for a field approach, presenting three advantages over a particle approach: particle wave functions are not available for photons, a classical field model of the electron gives (...) a superior account of both spin and self-interaction as compared to a classical particle model, and the space of field wave functionals appears to be larger than the space of particle wave functions. The article also describes two important tasks facing proponents of a field approach: legitimize or excise the use of Grassmann numbers for fermionic field values and in wave functional amplitudes, and describe how quantum fields give rise to particle-like behavior. (shrink)

We show that the physical meaning of the wave function can be derived based on the established parts of quantum mechanics. It turns out that the wave function represents the state of random discontinuous motion of particles, and its modulus square determines the probability density of the particles appearing in certain positions in space.

The mathematical structure of realist quantum theories has given rise to a debate about how our ordinary 3-dimensional space is related to the 3N-dimensional configuration space on which the wave function is defined. Which of the two spaces is our (more) fundamental physical space? I review the debate between 3N-Fundamentalists and 3D-Fundamentalists and evaluate it based on three criteria. I argue that when we consider which view leads to a deeper understanding of the physical world, especially given the (...) deeper topological explanation from the unordered configurations to the Symmetrization Postulate, we have strong reasons in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. I conclude that our evidence favors the view that our fundamental physical space in a quantum world is 3-dimensional rather than 3N-dimensional. I outline lines of future research where the evidential balance can be restored or reversed. Finally, I draw lessons from this case study to the debate about theoretical equivalence. (shrink)

It is pointed out that ordinary quantum mechanics as a classical field theory cannot account for the wave function collapse if it is not seen within the framework of field quantization. That is needed to understand the particle structure of matter during wave function evolution and to explain the collapse as symmetry breakdown by detection. The decay of a two-particle bound s state and the Stern-Gerlach experiment serve as examples. The absence of the nonlocality (...) problem in Bohm’s version of the EPR arrangement favours the approach described. (shrink)

An algebraic block-diagonalization of the Dirac Hamiltonian in a time-independent external field reveals a charge-index conservation law which forbids the physical phenomena of the Klein paradox type and guarantees a single-particle nature of the Dirac equation in strong external fields. Simultaneously, the method defines simpler quantum-mechanical objects—paulions and antipaulions, whose 2-component wave functions determine the Dirac electron states through exact operator relations. Based on algebraic symmetry, the presented theory leads to a new understanding of the Dirac equation physics, (...) including new insight into the Dirac measurements and a consistent scheme of relativistic quantum mechanics of electron in the paulion representation. Along with analysis of the mathematical anatomy of the Klein paradox falsity, a complete set of paradox-free eigenfunctions for the Klein problem is obtained and investigated via stationary solutions of the Pauli-like equations with respective paulion Hamiltonians. It is shown that the physically correct Dirac states in the Klein zone are characterized by the total particle reflection from the potential step and satisfy the fundamental charge-index conservation law. (shrink)

In physics, one is often misled in thinking that the mathematical model of a system is part of or is that system itself. Think of expressions commonly used in physics like “point” particle, motion “on the line”, “smooth” observables, wave function, and even “going to infinity”, without forgetting perplexing phrases like “classical world” versus “quantum world”.... On the other hand, when a mathematical model becomes really inoperative in regard with correct predictions, one is forced to (...) replace it with a new one. It is precisely what happened with the emergence of quantum physics. Classical models were superseded by quantum ones through quantization prescriptions. These procedures appear often as ad hoc recipes. In the present paper, well defined quantizations, based on integral calculus and Weyl–Heisenberg symmetry, are described in simple terms through one of the most basic examples of mechanics. Starting from probability distribution on the Euclidean plane viewed as the phase space for the motion of a point particle on the line, i.e., its classical model, we will show how to build corresponding quantum model and associated probabilities or quasi-probabilities distributions. We highlight the regularizing rôle of such procedures with the familiar example of the motion of a particle with a variable mass and submitted to a step potential. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics studies physical phenomena on a microscopic scale. These phenomena are far beyond the reach of our observation, and the connection between QM's mathematical formalism and the experimental results is very indirect. Furthermore, quantum indeterminism defies common sense. Microphysical experiments have shown that, according to the empirical context, electrons and quanta of light behave as waves and other times as particles, even though it is impossible to design an experiment that manifests both behaviors at the same time. Unlike Newtonian (...) physics, the properties of quantum systems are not all well-defined simultaneously. Moreover, quantum systems are not characterized by their properties, but by a wave function. Although one of the principles of the theory is the uncertainty principle, the trajectory of the wave function is controlled by the deterministic Schrödinger equations. But what is the wave function? Like other theories of the physical sciences, quantum theory assigns states to systems. The wave function is a particular mathematical representation of the quantum state of a physical system, which contains information about the possible states of the system and the respective probabilities of each state. (shrink)

In 1975, two experimental groups have independently observed the \-symmetry of neutrons’ spin, when passing through a static magnetic field, using a three-blade interferometer made from a single perfect Si-crystal. In this article, we provide a complete analysis of the experiment, both from a theoretical and conceptual point of view. Firstly, we solve the Schrödinger equation in the weak potential approximation, to obtain the amplitude of the refracted and forward refracted beams, produced by the passage of neutrons through one of (...) the three plates of the LLL interferometer. Secondly, we analyze their passage through a static magnetic field region. This allows us to find explicit expressions for the intensities of the four beams exiting the interferometer, two of which will be interfering and show a typical \-symmetry, when the strength of the magnetic field is varied. In the last part of the article, we provide a conceptual analysis of the experiment, showing that a neutron’s phase change, when passing through the magnetic field, is due to a longitudinal Stern–Gerlach effect, and not to a Larmor precession. We also emphasize that these experiments do not prove the observability of the sign change of the wave function, when a neutron is \ rotated, but strongly indicate that the latter, like any other elementary “particle,” would be a genuinely non-spatial entity. (shrink)

The main idea of quantum mechanics, whether formulated in terms of the Planck constant or the noncommutativity of certain observables, must be tied to the recognition of the relativity and nonuniversality of the abstract concept of set (manifold) in the description of quantum systems. This entails the necessarily probabilistic description of quantum systems: since a quantum system ultimately cannot be decomposed into elements or sets, we have to describe it in terms of probabilities of only a relative selection of certain (...) elements or sets in its structure. This gives rise to the potential possibilities of quantum systems in an actual physical situation, and as a result the corresponding probabilities are ontologically real, like any other physically verifiable relationships. In this way, the quantum potential possibilities (and probabilities as their measure) are no less objectively real than the conventional reality which we identify with the physically directly verifiable elements, particles, etc. Indeed, the distribution of probabilities described by the nonfactorizable wave function is as objectively real and concrete as chairs, walls and all other physical things. In the pure quantum state the probabilities of selection of elements from the ultimately detailed state of the system are mutually coordinated and correlated by the phenomenon of wholeness of the system, and form an implicative logical structure governed by this phenomenon of wholeness. This idea of the implicative logical organization of the probabilistic structure of a quantum system in the so-called pure (non-detailable) state, and the governing role of the phenomenon of wholeness (in the redistribution of probabilities depending on the nature of the development of the real experiment), is in good agreement with the results of quantum correlation experiments (for example, the experiments of Alain Aspect, Nicolas Gisin and others). (shrink)

The correspondence principle states that the quantum system will approach the classical system in high quantum numbers. Indeed, the average of the quantum probability density distribution reflects a classical-like distribution. However, the probability of finding a particle at the node of the wave function is zero. This condition is recognized as the nodal issue. In this paper, we propose a solution for this issue by means of complex quantum random trajectories, which are obtained by solving the (...) stochastic differential equation derived from the optimal guidance law. It turns out that point set A, which is formed by the intersections of complex random trajectories with the real axis, can represent the quantum mechanical compatible distribution of the quantum harmonic oscillator system. Meanwhile, the projections of complex quantum random trajectories on the real axis form point set B that gives a spatial distribution without the appearance of nodes, and approaches the classical compatible distribution in high quantum numbers. Furthermore, the statistical distribution of point set B is verified by the solution of the Fokker–Planck equation. (shrink)

We have already seen what happens in a typical experiment in quantum physics. When an observation is recorded say on a phosphor screen or photographic plate quantum entities (like photons or electrons) will appear as particles in precise positions. But their observed distribution is predicted by Schroedinger's wave function, and in appropriate conditions they exhibit Airy's wave associated ring pattern. This suggests that while unobserved they were behaving as waves which can spread out in more than (...) one direction at once but once they are observed, they have just a single position, a characteristic of a particle. The act of observation "collapses the wave function" and an actual state precipitates, as it were, out of the cloud of previously possible states. This is what scandalized Einstein: that the chance event of an observation should not merely uncover but actually create the reality of the universe. But the question arises: what is so special about a device such as a light sensitive plate, that its interception of a quantum entity should count as an observation and so "create" actuality in this way? (shrink)

Multi-time wave functions are wave functions for multi-particle quantum systems that involve several time variables. In this paper we contrast them with solutions of wave equations on a space–time with multiple timelike dimensions, i.e., on a pseudo-Riemannian manifold whose metric has signature such as \ or \, instead of \. Despite the superficial similarity, the two behave very differently: whereas wave equations in multiple timelike dimensions are typically mathematically ill-posed and presumably unphysical, relevant Schrödinger equations (...) for multi-time wave functions possess for every initial datum a unique solution on the spacelike configurations and form a natural covariant representation of quantum states. (shrink)

The traditional analysis of the basic version of the double-slit experiment leads to the conclusion that wave-particle duality is a fundamental fact of nature. However, such a conclusion means to imply that we are not only required to have two contradictory pictures of reality but also compelled to abandon the objectiveness of the truth values, “true” and “false”. Yet, even if we could accept wave-like behavior of quantum particles as the best explanation for the build-up of (...) an interference pattern in the double-slit experiment, without the objectivity of the truth values we would never have certainty regarding any statement about the world. The present paper discusses ways to reconcile the correct description of the double-slit experiment with the objectiveness of “true” and “false”. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of physically impossible idealizations in model-based explanation. We do this by examining the explanation of gravitational waves from distant stellar objects using models that contain point-particle idealizations. Like infinite idealizations in thermodynamics, biology and economics, the point-particle idealization in general relativity is physically impossible. What makes this case interesting is that there are two very different kinds of models used for predicting the same gravitational wave phenomena, post-Newtonian models and effective field (...) theory models. The paper contends that post-Newtonian models are explanatory while effective field theory models are not, because only in the former can we eliminate the physically impossible point-particle idealization. This suggests that, in some areas of science at least, models invoking ineliminable infinite idealizations cannot have explanatory power. (shrink)

This paper examines the tension between wave function realism and interpretations of gauge symmetries within quantum mechanics. We explore how traditional views of gauge symmetries as descriptive redundancies challenge the principles of wave function realism, which regards the wave function as a real entity. By noting that, through the case study of a quantum particle in an electromagnetic field, gauge transformations impact the wave function’s phase, we present a dilemma for (...) class='Hi'>wave function realism. We discuss potential resolutions, including redefining ontological commitments to accommodate gauge-invariance. (shrink)

A prominent way through which wave-particle duality has been ascribed to photons is by illustrating their “wave-like” behaviour in the Mach-Zehnder interferometer and “particle-like” behaviour in the anti-correlation experiment. This duality has been formulated in two ways. Some have based the claim on the complementarity principle. This formulation, however, has already been shown to be problematic. Others have made a much simpler duality claim by considering that single-photons are analogous to waves and particles in (...) the above experiments. I criticise this formulation by arguing that the analogies cannot be distinctly established. Thus, this duality claim is found to be unsubstantiated. (shrink)

In a model of extended particles described by Minkowski space-time variables x, de Sitter internal variables ξ, a physical wave Ψ x (ξ) representing the proper characteristics of the particles, and a functional wave X [ Ψ ] giving previsions, we study functional propagation of X in the space of physical waves (as advocated by a quantum functional theory) as well as the nonlinear realization of the internal de Sitter group on its Lorentz subgroup (introduced by Drechsler). The (...) first study is undertaken in a special instance Ψ x (ξ) = ξ(x), while in the second the general structure of the model is adopted and curved space-time treated, but the functional propagation is not considered. A fiber bundle structure and an induced representation method are used. Propagators are derived, a quantum version of a variant of Drechsler's theory is obtained, and a nonlinear version of our model is constructed. (shrink)

Among several possibilities for what reality could be like in view of the empirical facts of quantum mechanics, one is provided by theories of spontaneous wave function collapse, the best known of which is the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory. We show mathematically that in GRW theory there are limitations to knowledge, that is, inhabitants of a GRW universe cannot find out all the facts true of their universe. As a specific example, they cannot accurately measure the number of collapses (...) that a given physical system undergoes during a given time interval; in fact, they cannot reliably measure whether one or zero collapses occur. Put differently, in a GRW universe certain meaningful, factual questions are empirically undecidable. We discuss several types of limitations to knowledge and compare them with those in other versions of quantum mechanics, such as Bohmian mechanics. Most of our results also apply to observer-induced collapses as in orthodox quantum mechanics. 1 Introduction1.1 Known examples of limitations to knowledge1.2 Remarks2 Brief Review of GRW Theories2.1 The GRW process2.2 GRWm2.3 GRWf3 First Examples of Limitations to Knowledge in GRW Theories4 Measurements of Flashes in GRWf, or of Collapses in GRWm4.1 An example in which ψ is known4.2 Other choices of ψ4.3 Experiments beginning before t24.4 If ψ is random4.5 Optimal way of distinguishing two density matrices4.6 If ψ is unknown5 Measurements of m in GRWmAppendix. (shrink)

A new approach to developing formulisms of physics based solely on laws of mathematics is presented. From simple, classical statistical definitions for the observed space-time position and proper velocity of a particle having a discrete spectrum of internal states we derive u generalized Schrödinger equation on the space-time manifold. This governs the evolution of an N component wave function with each component square integrable over this manifold and is structured like that for a charged particle (...) in an electromagnetic field but also includes SU(N) gauge field couplings. This construction reveals a new hasis for gauge invariance and new insight into the appearance of spin and other such properties in relativistic quantum mechanics and suggests a new charged particle model. (shrink)

The complexity and flexibility of tagmemic theory, as a semiotic theory developed by Kenneth L. Pike, can be better understood by examining how it applies to a simple semiotic system like traffic lights. We can then compare the result with how it functions in analyzing a piece of natural language. Tagmemic theory introduces three observer viewpoints – the particle view, the wave view, and the field view. Each view generates a suite of questions to answer. Any one (...) of the views results in a “complete” description of traffic lights, from which the information about the other views can be inferred. And yet each view is distinct in texture from the others, and the existence of such multiple views – each with a claim to emic integrity and each serving as a perspective on the whole – has to be accounted for in a robust semiotic approach. The same phenomena occur when we apply the three views to the analysis of meaning in natural language. The chief illustration is to analyze the meaning of the word dog in multiple ways. The multi-dimensional potential for semiotic analysis highlights the limitations of Aristotelian logic and symbolic logic, both of which simplify for the sake of rigor. (shrink)

This thesis is a sceptical investigation into the notion that the metaphorical wave-particle binary of Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse is related to quantum physics. Indeed, the field of literature and science has employed conceptual similarities as the main means of connecting quantum concepts to novels, however, this has led to a host of scholarly difficulties, prompting the need for a re-examination of analogical linkages. Woolf is the model candidate for such a re-examination, given her historical and philosophical (...) proximity with the developments of quantum mechanics. To the Lighthouse, in particular, was written between 1925 and 1927: precisely when quantum physicists were attempting to resolve the wave-particle duality, leading to Niels Bohr's complementarity. This parallel has been noted by researchers as relevant to the novel, as it too displays a general binary that can be read as wave-particle-like, which the author also attempts to resolve along similar philosophical lines. Nevertheless, other than proximity and similarity, there are no reasons to affirm that the science is related to the novel; hence, it is an ideal case study to examine in order to ascertain the value of conceptual similarities in literature and science. To do so, To the Lighthouse's binary and its resolution are interpreted in a thesis-long close reading, in order to compare aspects of it firstly to Woolf's personal thought, and secondly to various non-quantum intellectual contexts that preceded and surrounded her. In doing so, it becomes clear not only that invoking quantum physics serves no clear purpose in better understanding the novel, but also that the notion of resolving wave- particle-like binaries was a widespread philosophical procedure at the turn of the century, decades before Bohr's concept. This negative conclusion interrogates what the scholarly value of interpreting similarities is, though a hypothetical solution can be found in conceptual metaphor theory. (shrink)

Scientific endeavour has often tried to localize superior cerebral functions either in areas like the ones described by Broca as being those connected with language in the left hemisphere, or in the huge array of the hundred billion of interconnected neurons. But in this last case the coined description of the grandmother neuron, tends to show humorously that hopes have fallen short of their target.Along the same lines, the specific timing of electric neural activity is known to take place (...) around a few milliseconds, which seems to be insufficient to account for the high potential speed necessary to sustain the very massive and complex process which is involved in mental activity. (shrink)

A straightforward explanation of fundamental tenets concerning the quantum mechanical wave function results in the thesis that the quantum mechanical wave function is a link between human cognition and the physical world. The way in which physicists have not accepted this explanation is discussed, and some of the roots of the problem are explored. The basis for an empirical test as to whether the wave function is a link between human cognition and the physical (...) world is provided through developing an experiment incorporating methodology from psychology and physics. Research in psychology and physics that relied on this methodology indicates that it is likely that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's theoretical result that mutually exclusive wave functions can simultaneously apply to the same concrete physical circumstances can be implemented on an empirical level. (shrink)

This paper develops and defends a new account of B-theoretic endurantism and a new account of the metaphysics of the quantum state, and highlights the parallels between the considerations that motivate them. These new accounts are both fragmentalist, in the sense that they follow Fine (2005) in invoking a symmetric coordination relation between facts, such that facts that are pairwise incompatible (like Hugh's being happy and Hugh's being sad) can both obtain provided that they are not related by this (...) relation. However, while Fine allows that fragments can be logically incoherent— P can obtain in one fragment while not-P obtains in another—the fragmentalist accounts defended here are motivated even if we insist on logical coherence between fragments. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the relation between actual scientific practice and conceptual interpretation of scientific theories by investigating the particle concept in non-relativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM). On the one hand, philosophers have raised various objections against the particle concept within the context of NRQM and proposed alternative ontologies such as wave function realism, Bohmian particles, mass density field, and flashes based on different realist solutions to the measurement problem. On the other hand, scientists continue to (...) communicate, reason, and explain experimental phenomena using particle terms in the relevant regimes. It has been explicitly argued and, for most of the time, implicitly assumed in the philosophical literature that we do not need to take scientists’ particle talk seriously, and recovering position measurement of particles in our ontological accounts is sufficient to make contact with scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that although scientific discourse does not postulate a uniform and coherent ontology, it nevertheless postulates real properties. Our ontological accounts thus need to recover the various properties associated with the NRQM particle concept in scientific discourse. I show that recovering these particle properties is not trivially achievable by pointing out some particular challenges these revisionary ontologies face in the process. (shrink)