La parenthèse Vichy marque un tournant dans la carrière de Jean Thibaud (1901-1960). Il occupe des postes rendus vacants par la mise à l’écart de Jean Perrin et de Paul Langevin, deux figures tutélaires de la physique française aux engagements politiques incompatibles avec le nouveau régime. Ces initiatives provoquent des réactions de rejet chez les universitaires qui œuvrent pour la résistance et pointent dès lors Thibaud comme un collaborateur. Nous proposons de suivre au plus près l’itinéraire de Thibaud sous l’angle (...) d’une stratégie personnelle d’accommodement, concept que l’historien Philippe Burrin a proposé pour décrire diverses formes d’adaptation aux circonstances nées de l’Occupation et que nous entendons revisiter dans le cadre de la présente étude. (shrink)

La « parenthèse Vichy » marque un tournant dans la carrière de Jean Thibaud (1901-1960). Il occupe des postes rendus vacants par la mise à l’écart de Jean Perrin et de Paul Langevin, deux figures tutélaires de la physique française aux engagements politiques incompatibles avec le nouveau régime. Ces initiatives provoquent des réactions de rejet chez les universitaires qui œuvrent pour la résistance et pointent dès lors Thibaud comme un « collaborateur ». Nous proposons de suivre au plus près l’itinéraire (...) de Thibaud sous l’angle d’une stratégie personnelle d’« accommodement », concept que l’historien Philippe Burrin a proposé pour décrire diverses formes d’adaptation aux circonstances nées de l’Occupation et que nous entendons revisiter dans le cadre de la présente étude. (shrink)

The last two decades have seen a massive increase in the scholarly interest in technology, and have provoked new lines of thought in philosophy, sociology and cultural studies. Gilbert Simondon (1924 - 1989) was one of Frances's most influential philosophers in this field, and an important influence on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Bernard Stiegler. His work is only now being translated into English. Chabot's introduction to Simondon's work was published in French in 2002 and is now available (...) in English for the first time. It is the most accessible guide to Simondon's important but often opaque work. Chabot provides an excellent introduction to Simondon, positioning him as a philosopher of technology, and he describes his theory of individuation including his crystalline ontology. He goes on to offer a bridge between these two concerns, exploring how they are related. (shrink)

Etude sur la philosophie de la technique et la pensée de l'individuation chez Gilbert Simondon qui interroge les notions de progrès, d'aliénation et de mémoire et leur devenir lors des grands changements de l'histoire des techniques (tradition, révolution industrielle, cybernétique). Met également en lumière son rapport à la psychologie des profondeurs, au sacré et à la technoesthétique.

The aim of this paper is to show how the concept of “possible world”, that Husserl inherits from his study of logics, is capital for the understanding of his phenomenology. This concept is a fine tool that provides him a possibility to articulate the question of the physical and the cultural dimensions of some objects. A cultural object as a book or a painting has in fact two dimensions: a “material” one and a “spiritual” one. The author examines which are (...) the relationships between those two dimensions. This question leads him to an interrogation on the genesis of the ideality of the cultural world. Is there not a contradiction between the ideality of the meaning and his historical genesis? In order to provide an answer to this question, the author suggests that one may use the notion of a “linked ideality”, i.e. ideal but linked up to the earth. (shrink)

Les etudes reunies ont ete presentees au Colloque International de Bruxelles organise sous les auspices de la FISP (Federation Internationale des Societes de Philosophie) en 2002 dont le theme a ete conserve comme titre du recueil. L'intention etait d'illustrer la maniere dont divers philosophes ont traite ou esquive la question de la technique. L'ampleur du champ, historique et contemporain, interdisait toute exhaustivite. Le dessein etait plus anthologique qu'encyclopedique. Les analyses critiques qui composent le volume manifestent l'interet de cette approche appliquee (...) a Aristote, Lulle, Salutati, Kant, Kapp, Bergson, Ortega, Schmitt, Jonas, Brun, Arendt, Foucault, Simondon, Heidegger, Haraway, Fukuyama. Et il serait fecond de l'etendre tant il vrai qu'en notre epoque tres technologique, poser aux philosophes qui nous sont les plus familiers, la question du sort qu'ils reservent a la technique s'avere riche en enseignements sur eux et pour nous. (shrink)

" Exister dans le système, c'est souvent être assis derrière des vitres, face à un écran. " Des forces nouvelles, mixtes de technique, d'économique et de numérique, ont fait irruption au sein du technocapitalisme mondial. Nous assistons aux premiers effets de ce qu'il faut bien appeler des " ultraforces " qui, en créant un nouveau monde, déstabilisent les systèmes et fragilisent les existences. Dans ce contexte, nous devenons multiples, éclatés, parfois écartelés. En nous coexistent trois visages : un moi cherchant (...) sa place dans un système constitué de vitres protectrices et d'écrans ; un sujet clivé par les ultraforces d'une mondialisation qui crée autant qu'elle détruit ; et enfin un soi précieux marqué par la saveur d'exister, la recherche d'équilibre et le goût des autres. Comment inventer une convergence entre ces trois facettes de nous-même? Comment sortir du dualisme appauvrissant qui résulte de la surenchère entre systèmes fragilisés et ultraforces décomplexées? Cela ressemble à la fin d'une ère. Peut-être le moment est-il venu de préparer la transition vers un monde où la culture de soi et le sens des autres deviendraient centraux. (shrink)

La 4e de couv. indique : "La qualité est l'enjeu du siècle : qualité de l'air, de l'alimentation, des soins, des relations, du travail, de l'industrie ou du pouvoir... Le terme s'est immiscé dans tous les domaines où un jugement de valeur est nécessaire, au point de détrôner les figures traditionnelles du bien et du bon. Précisons que son contraire, le "merdique", est lui aussi en passe de devenir un invariant culturel. Pour savoir ce que cache ce mot du contemporain, (...) il faut se tourner vers les qualités humaines et leur impressionnante diversité, comprendre comment notre espace-temps est devenu un monde de qualités artificielles, assister aux chocs de la qualité et de la quantité, et voir comment les standards de contrôle font l'objet d'une lutte économique et politique omniprésente. Dans ce cadre fortement contraint par notre âge technique, une philosophie ouverte aura à cœur de se recentrer sur les libres qualités, celles que l'on cultive pour la saveur de vivre. Car le défi de notre époque est bien d'articuler la valeur qualité aux exigences de liberté et aux besoins de justice. L'enjeu est de taille, pour peu que l'on veuille construire un monde commun, où les existences soient à même de prospérer.". (shrink)

(2005). The Philosophical August 4th. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the french tradition issue editor: andrew aitken, pp. 103-108.

"I know of no religious writer more pertinent to our time."—T. S. Eliot, Introduction to Pensees Intended to prove that religion is not contrary to reason, Pascal's Pensees rank among the liveliest and most eloquent defenses of Christianity. Motivated by the seventeenth-century view of the supremacy of human reason, Pascal (1623–1662) had intended to write an ambitious apologia for Christianity in which he argued the inability of reason to address metaphysical problems. His untimely death prevented the work's completion, (...) but the fragments published posthumously in 1670 as Pensees remain a vital part of religious and philosophical literature. W. F. Trotter translation. Introduction by T. S. Eliot. (shrink)

In the twentieth century there were two great political and social paradigms, the liberal-democratic and the libertarian. The central idea of the first approach is isonomy: the exclusion of any discrimination on the basis that legal rights are afforded equally to all people. The central idea of the second approach is rather to acknowledge and address a broader spectrum of known inequalities. Such an approach, Bellanca argues, allows the pursuit of pluralism as well as a more realistic and complex (...) view of what equality is. Here he analyzes the main economic and political institutions of an isocratic society, and in so doing, effectively outlines how a utopian society can be structurally and anthropologically realized. This book is ideal reading for an audience interested in the critique of contemporary capitalism through a renewed perspective of democratic socialism and leftist libertarianism. Nicolò Bellanca is Associate Professor of Development Economics at the University of Florence, Italy. He is the author of a broad array of scholarly articles, books and textbooks about both the history of economic thought and development economics. His current research focuses on the theory of institutional change. (shrink)

"I know of no religious writer more pertinent to our time."—T. S. Eliot, Introduction to Pensees Intended to prove that religion is not contrary to reason, Pascal's Pensees rank among the liveliest and most eloquent defenses of Christianity. Motivated by the seventeenth-century view of the supremacy of human reason, Pascal (1623–1662) had intended to write an ambitious apologia for Christianity in which he argued the inability of reason to address metaphysical problems. His untimely death prevented the work's completion, (...) but the fragments published posthumously in 1670 as Pensees remain a vital part of religious and philosophical literature. W. F. Trotter translation. Introduction by T. S. Eliot. (shrink)

Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and (...) differences between these doxastic attitudes, and claim that although acceptance is distinct from belief, it rests upon it, and is therefore a species of belief. (shrink)

This article identifies power, subjectivity, and practices of freedom as neglected but significant elements for understanding the ethics of social entrepreneurship. While the ethics of social entrepreneurship is typically conceptualized in conjunction with innate properties or moral commitments of the individual, we problematize this view based on its presupposition of an essentialist conception of the authentic subject. We offer, based on Foucault’s ethical oeuvre, a practice-based alternative which sees ethics as being exercised through a critical and creative dealing with the (...) limits imposed by power, notably as they pertain to the conditioning of the neoliberal subject. To this end, we first draw on prior research which looks at how practitioners of social enterprises engage with government policies that demand that they should act and think more like prototypical entrepreneurs. Instead of simply endorsing the kind of entrepreneurial subjectivity implied in prevailing policies, our results indicate that practitioners are mostly reluctant to identify themselves with the invocation of governmental power, often rejecting the subjectivity offered to them by discourse. Conceiving these acts of resistance as emblematic of how social entrepreneurs practice ethics by retaining a skeptical attitude toward attempts that seek to determine who they should be and how they should live, we introduce three vignettes that illustrate how practices of freedom relate to critique, the care for others, and reflected choice. We conclude that a practice-based approach of ethics can advance our understanding of how social entrepreneurs actively produce conditions of freedom for themselves as well as for others without supposing a ‘true self’ or a utopian space of liberty beyond power. (shrink)

Ritualized behavior, intuitively recognizable by its stereotypy, rigidity, repetition, and apparent lack of rational motivation, is found in a variety of life conditions, customs, and everyday practices: in cultural rituals, whether religious or non-religious; in many children's complicated routines; in the pathology of obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD); in normal adults around certain stages of the life-cycle, birthing in particular. Combining evidence from evolutionary anthropology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging, we propose an explanation of ritualized behavior in terms of an evolved Precaution System geared (...) to the detection of and reaction to inferred threats to fitness. This system, distinct from fear-systems geared to respond to manifest danger, includes a repertoire of clues for potential danger as well as a repertoire of species-typical precautions. In OCD pathology, this system does not supply a negative feedback to the appraisal of potential threats, resulting in doubts about the proper performance of precautions, and repetition of action. Also, anxiety levels focus the attention on low-level gestural units of behavior rather than on the goal-related higher-level units normally used in parsing the action-flow. Normally automatized actions are submitted to cognitive control. This “swamps” working memory, an effect of which is a temporary relief from intrusions but also their long-term strengthening. Normal activation of this Precaution System explains intrusions and ritual behaviors in normal adults. Gradual calibration of the system occurs through childhood rituals. Cultural mimicry of this system's normal input makes cultural rituals attention-grabbing and compelling. A number of empirical predictions follow from this synthetic model. (Published Online February 8 2007) Key Words: childhood ritual; compulsion; event boundaries; evolutionary psychology; obsessive-compulsive disorder; ritual; thought intrusion. (shrink)

The thesis that mental content is normative is ambiguous and has many forms. This article deals only with the thesis that normativity is connected to our mental attitudes rather than with the content of the attitudes, and more specifically with the view that it is connected to belief. A number of writers have proposed various versions of a ‘norm of truth’ attached to belief. I examine various versions of this claim, and defend it against recent criticisms according to which this (...) norm lacks normative force, that it violates the principle that ‘ought implies can,’ and that it is viciously circular. I defend the view that we should distinguish the statement of the objective norm and the way it is regulated, and that this distinction can answer most of the criticisms of the norm of truth for belief. (shrink)

The knowledge account of assertion (KAA) is the view that assertion is governed by the norm that the speaker should know what s/he asserts. It is not the purpose of this article to examine all the criticisms nor to try to give a full defence of KAA, but only to defend it against the charge of being normatively incorrect. It has been objected that assertion is governed by other norms than knowledge, or by no norm at all. It seems to (...) me, however, that a number of these criticisms are based on a number of misunderstandings of the notion of a norm and of the way it can regulated a given practice. Once we spell out in what sense knowledge can play a normative role in this context, the KAA appears much more plausible. (shrink)

Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirelyad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of (...) two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as “this is hers,” “that is not mine.” This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand “cultural appropriation” and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free ofad hocstipulations. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between perceived co-worker support, commitment to colleagues, job satisfaction, intention to help others, and pro-environmental behavior with the emphasis on eco-helping, with a view to determining the extent to which peer relationships encourage employees to engage in pro-environmental behaviors at work. This paper is framed by adopting social exchange theory through the lens of ethics of care. Data from a sample of 449 employees showed that receiving support from peers triggers (...) an exchange process that encourages eco-helping among colleagues. The implications of the findings are discussed in the light of the social exchange literature. (shrink)

Recent work in biology, cognitive psychology, and archaeology has renewed evolutionary perspectives on the role of natural selection in the emergence and recurrent forms of religious thought and behavior, i.e., mental representations of supernatural agents, as well as artifacts, ritual practices, moral systems, ethnic markers, and specific experiences associated with these representations. One perspective, inspired from behavioral ecology, attempts to measure the fitness effects of religious practices. Another set of models, representative of evolutionary psychology, explain religious thought and behavior as (...) the output of cognitive systems (e.g., animacy detection, social cognition, precautionary reasoning) that are not exclusive to the religious domain. In both perpectives, the question remains open, whether religious thought and behavior constitute an adaptation or a by-product of adaptive cognitive function. (shrink)

Secrète convergence ou énigmatique connivence par-delà l'ombre ou le reproche d'antisémitisme? Loin des polémiques et des controverses récurrentes à chaque découverte de quelque nouveau "flagrant délit" ou tenu pour tel, il reste à interroger la relation ambiguë parce que profonde entre la pensée de Heidegger et l'esprit du judaïsme, d'un Heidegger irréductible à ses circonstances biographiques et d'un judaïsme irréductible à l'ancien Testament du christianisme. C'est à la lumière de la distinction essentielle entre le nom et le nombre que (...) class='Hi'>Pascal David mène cette investigation cruciale, en mettant en évidence l'occultation croissante du nom par le nombre dans le cours de la pensée occidentale et à laquelle ne peut dès lors qu'échapper l'incalculable. Il s'agit donc d'interroger et de mettre en question la constitution de la rationalité occidentale comme computatio ou calcul visant à tout faire entrer en ligne de compte - autrement dit les ressorts de notre époque et de notre monde. Cet essai inattendu, dérangeant, fort de bout en bout, fait droit au pouvoir d'interpellation de la pensée de Heidegger lorsqu'elle se demande et nous demande en quoi le vacarme des machines et la soufflerie des ordinateurs couvrent aujourd'hui la voix de Dieu. (shrink)

In Contingency, Time and Possibility, Pascal Massie explores the inquiries of Aristotle and Duns Scotus into contingency and possibility, as well as the complex and fascinating questions they raise.

Philibert Secretan compose ici une manière de portrait de Pascal par le choix de quelques "Pensées" où se dessine sa vision de la condition humaine ; il en commente certains thèmes et donne la voix à des pages riches de résonances poétiques : plus qu'il ne le lit, il écoute Pascal. Enfin, associant sa lecture à celle de trois autres grands lecteurs du philosophe Ludwig Wittgenstein, Edgar Morin et Pierre Bourdieu, il s'arrête sur deux aspects particuliers du philosophe (...) : Pascal, critique, précurseur de Kant ; Pascal, architecte d'une pensée qui s'organise autour de la hiérarchie des ordres. A rebours d'une tradition de lecture par aphorismes, Philibert Secretan privilégie une systématique pascalienne qui en fait ressortir les fulgurances et les abîmes. (shrink)

La obra póstuma de Pascal, Pensamientos, conforma una apología del cristianismo. Nos encontramos ante un texto literariamente magnífico, con sentencias, a menudo breves, que dan que pensar.

Intended to convert religiously indifferent readers to Christianity, Pascal’s Pensees were published posthumously, to wide and ongoing acclaim. This selection of highlights focuses on their secular aspects and the author’s sensitive examination of human psychology as well as his popular epigrams. Written between 1656 and 1657 in support of the Jansenist movement, Provincial Letters captivated a large audience—including many of the cause’s opponents—with their satirical wit, righteous indignation, and effervescent style. This is the only dual-language edition available of these (...) frequently studied works. Introduction, notes. (shrink)

A prolific essayist, novelist, translator, philosopher, and a critic of rare elegance, Pascal Quignard returns anew to the major questions of existence in The Silent Crossing, a haunting homage to life and liberty, to society and solitude, and to the binding and unbinding that constitute the weft of our lives. Drawing on materials from across many cultures, Quignard makes an effort to establish shared human values as the breeding ground for a modern Enlightenment. Considering atheism as a spiritual liberation, (...) suicide as a free act, and the rejection of society as a free choice, the author explores philosophical themes that have run through human civilizations—most often as heresies—from our earliest days. In his search for freedom, Quignard questions the binding dependency of religion, querying how, in a world where all forms of society presuppose that someone is looking over our shoulders, we can be free. These reflections, he implies, are the essential spiritual exercise for our times. Few voices in contemporary French literature are more distinct than that of Quignard. By reading this fragmentary, episodic assemblage of intimate experiences and borrowed tales, we open up a space of liberty, creating for the reader space for meditation and, perhaps, liberation. “Pascal Quignard is undoubtedly the most iconoclastic of contemporary French authors.”—Catherine Argand, Lire “Quignard has redefined historical fiction as both hoax and enigma.”—Burning Deck on Wooden Tablets: Apronenia Avitia. (shrink)

Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''natural metaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence for this (...) system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with two interrelated questions. First, a broad question: in what sense is Skepticism a philosophy− or in what sense is it “philosophy” (as we will see, these are not identical questions)? Second, a narrow one: how should we understand the process whereby ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) emerges out of epochē (suspension of judgment)? The first question arises because Skepticism is often portrayed as anti-philosophy. This depiction, I contend, surreptitiously turns a Skeptical method into a so-called Skeptical (...) doctrine which is then either condemned for being self-refuting or salvaged as a plausible (albeit odd) epistemological theory. Instead, philosophy, for the Skeptics, is a matter of practice. Skepticism is not so much a philosophy that has a worldview to proclaim as it is a philosophy that invites us to perform something. (shrink)

There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic agents, which is that the structure of reasons for epistemic attitudes differs fundamentally from the structure of reasons for actions. The main differences are that we cannot act for the wrong reasons although we can believe for the wrong reasons, and that reasons for beliefs are exclusive in (...) a sense in which our reasons for actions are not. Epistemic agency is possible in the weak sense that we can be active, but not in the strong one in which we could have some elbow room for our epistemic reasons in reasoning leading to beliefs and other epistemic states. (shrink)

This paper argues that the normative dimension in mental and semantic content is not a categorical feature of content, but an hypothetical one, relative to the features of the interpretation of thoughts and meaning. The views of Robert Brandom are discussed. The thesis defended in this paper is not interpretationist about thought. It implies that the normative dimension of content arises from the real capacity of thinkers and speakers to self ascribe thoughts to themselves and to reach self knowledge of (...) their own thoughts. (shrink)

The diversity of interpretations of Aristotle’s treatment of chance and luck springs from an apparent contradiction between the claims that “chance events are for the sake of something” and that “chance events are not for the sake of their outcome.” Chance seems to entail the denial of an end. Yet Aristotle systematically refers it to what is for the sake of an end. This paper suggests that, in order to give an account of chance, a reference to “per accidens causes” (...) is not sufficient. Chance occurs as a parody of teleology; it is a“for-no-purpose” that looks like a purpose. The notion of “irony” is suggested as a way of accounting for a situation that keeps an ambiguity open. The fact that chance is thought of in relation to teleology does not mean that it is “reappropriated” by teleology. Rather,chance reveals a hiatus that betrays the limitation of a language concerned with substances to account for events. (shrink)

In reply to commentary on our target article, we supply further evidence and hypotheses in the description of ritualized behaviors in humans. Reactions to indirect fitness threats probably activate specialized precaution systems rather than a unified form of danger-avoidance or causal reasoning. Impairment of precaution systems may be present in pathologies other than obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), autism in particular. Ritualized behavior is attention-grabbing enough to be culturally transmitted whether or not it is associated with group identity, cohesion, or with any (...) other social aspect of collective ceremonies. (Published Online February 8 2007). (shrink)

In order to study the relationship between genes and diseases, the increasing availability and sharing of phenotypic and genotypic data have been promoted as an imperative within the scientific community. In parallel with data sharing practices by clinicians and researchers, recent initiatives have been observed in which individuals are sharing personal genomic data. The involvement of individuals in such initiatives is facilitated by the increased accessibility of personal genomic data, offered by private test providers along with availability of online networks. (...) Personal webpages and on-line data sharing platforms such as Consent to Research, Free the Data, and Genomes Unzipped are being utilized to host and share genotypes, electronic health records and family history uploaded by individuals. Although personal genomic data sharing initiatives vary in nature, the emphasis on the individuals’ control on their data in order to benefit research and ultimately health care has seen as a key theme across these initiatives. In line with the growing practice of personal genomic data sharing, this paper aims to shed light on the potential challenges surrounding these initiatives. As in the course of these initiatives individuals are solicited to individually balance the risks and benefits of sharing their genomic data, their awareness of the implications of personal genomic data sharing for themselves and their family members is a necessity. Furthermore, given the sensitivity of genomic data and the controversies around their complete de-identifiability, potential privacy risks and harms originating from unintended uses of data have to be taken into consideration. (shrink)

Influential classical and recent approaches to explicate confirmation, explanation, or explanatory power define these relations or degrees between hypotheses and evidence. This holds for both deductive and Bayesian approaches. However, this neglects the role of data, which for many everyday and scientific examples cannot simply be classified as evidence. I present arguments to sharply distinguish data from evidence in Bayesian approaches. Taking into account this distinction, we can rewrite Schupbach and Sprenger’s measure of explanatory power and show the strengths of (...) this adaptation by applying it to the example of the detection of gravitational waves in physics. (shrink)

Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P.

The master argument posits a metaphysical thesis: Diodorus does away with Aristotle’s dunamis understood as a power simultaneously oriented toward being and non-being and proclaims that possibilities that fail to actualize are simply nothing. My contention is that this claim is not a mere application of Diodorus’ contribution to modal logic. Rather, Diodorus creates an ontologico-temporal concept of possibility and impossibility. Diodorus envisions the future as the past that the future will become. Since what will have been can never be (...) the accomplishment of a possibility that did not obtain, and since the future is destined to become past, any futural possibility that doesn’t actualize is neither futural nor even possible. (shrink)