La composición polifónica musical nos permite hablar de la emergencia, en el sur y desde el sur que somos, de Voces de la Tierra, que han susurrado, cantado, llorado o gritado el dolor producido por las maneras de habitar humanas construidas en la modernidad cosificadora de la tierra y del mundo de la vida, modernidad mercantil, industrial y global cuya ética se ha reducido a valores absolutamente euro-antropo-racional-centristas, permeados por el valor supremo del capital. En este artículo, emergente de pensadores (...) ambientales latinoamericanos y pensadores-otros que han sospechado radicalmente del edificio de la ética ambiental emergente de la conferencia del Club de Roma o del Informe Burndtland, intentamos desplegar lo ético, como ethos con e larga, que en griego significa casa, y desde este lugar de enunciación, intentamos salirnos del sujeto y del objeto en la variación ética ambiental eurocentrista, y proponer con las voces de la tierra sur, abya yala, diseños del ethos, ligado óntica-relacionalmente con el cuerpo-tierra. Diseñamos, inspirados en Husserl, Heidegger, Deleuze, Guattari, Ángel-Maya, Enrique Leff, Noguera, Echeverri, pensadores-otros y voces de montañas, animales, ríos, y plantas, la vida, territorios de libertad entendida ésta como expansión de los cuerpos en la naturaleza y de paz integral y completa, entendiendo que no puede haber paz, si no amamos ni respetamos la tierra que somos. Esto exige el giro óntico-etico- estético-político de la ética en clave de un Pensamiento Ambiental Sur. (shrink)

Existe una escisión del hombre con la naturaleza inscrita en los aspectos de la vida; la civilización moderna está en crisis ambiental, de la cultura, de sentido, de la técnica y de la manera en que habita y crea hábitat el hombre. La técnica moderna se ha instaurado de la mano de la ciencia y la economía llamándose tecnología: una manera de la techné distanciada de sus orígenes y que ha pasado de la creación e invención a una repetibilidad que (...) solo permite crear lo que cumple las condiciones e ideales establecidos por un modelo económico. Mientras la techné se comprende en un mundo de la vida, en un lugar con espacio y tiempo, la técnica moderna se cree separada de él. Se propone entonces un giro en el pensar/habitar hacia la techné, para un reencuentro con el mundo de la vida. (shrink)

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their (...) cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non-basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties. (shrink)

Carter and Pritchard (2016) and Pritchard (2010, 2012, 2016) have tried to reconcile the intuition that perceptual knowledge requires only limited discriminatory abilities with the closure principle. To this end, they have introduced two theoretical innovations: a contrast between two ways of introducing error-possibilities and a distinction between discriminating and favoring evidence. I argue that their solution faces the “sufficiency problem”: it is unclear whether the evidence that is normally available to adult humans is sufficient to retain knowledge of the (...) entailing proposition and come to know the entailed proposition. I submit that, on either infallibilist or fallibilist views of evidence, Carter and Pritchard have set the bar for deductive knowledge too low. At the end, I offer an alternative solution. I suggest that the knowledge-retention condition of the closure principle is not satisfied in zebra-like scenarios. (shrink)

Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former approach that construes object files as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the evidence that motivates the architectural account, can respond to the key arguments against (...) representational accounts, and has explanatory advantages. I draw general lessons for the philosophy of perception and the naturalization of intentionality. (shrink)

The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has challenged the dental health profession in an unprecedented manner. Suspension of elective dental care across the United States during the initial phase of the pandemic was necessary to prevent viral transmission. The emergency dental care that was provided had to be tailored to minimize the generation of aerosols. With the suspension of elective care, over time, the proportion of dental emergencies was anticipated to rise. Dentists who care for children have continued to provide emergency dental (...) treatment to this vulnerable population. Treatment decisions for pediatric dental emergencies had to be tailored to principles of public health that best mitigated risk of viral transmission. Decisions needed to balance the benefits of chosen treatment modality for the individual child with the risk of viral transmission to dental professionals and their staff, patients, and community. The paucity of reliable research for dentists to aid in clinical decision making may have left careproviders feeling ethically and morally insecure in shifting from a patient-centered to a community-centered paradigm. We present analysis of four pediatric emergency case scenarios that are representative of those likely to present to a private practice, academic setting, or emergency department during the pandemic. This analysis aims to empower dentists who care for children to implement the American Dental Association’s Principles of Ethics & Code of Professional Conduct within the context of a global health crisis. (shrink)

Object files are mental representations that enable perceptual systems to keep track of objects as numerically the same. How is their reference fixed? A prominent approach, championed by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Campbell, makes room for a non-satisfactional use of properties to fix reference. This maneuver has enabled them to reconcile a singularist view of reference with the intuition that properties must play a role in reference fixing. This paper examines Campbell’s influential defense of this strategy. After criticizing it, a (...) new approach is sketched. The alternative view introduces representational contents to explain perceptual individuation. After arguing that those contents are not satisfactional, it is concluded that there is room for a third view of reference fixing that does not fit into the singularist/descriptivist dichotomy. (shrink)

Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to do (...) so fall prey to one or another of three pitfalls: they end up incomplete, reveal a deep contradiction or recreate a non-skeptical hypothesis. I use these results to improve upon Pritchard’s recent attempt at undercutting radical skepticism. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. (...) I exploit these results to formulate a series of constraints that a satisfactory account of the epistemic role of perception should fulfil. I also make a positive suggestion: coherentists are right when they claim that only beliefs can be reasons for other beliefs. Nevertheless, I depart from traditional coherentism, for I do not buy its conception of perception as bare sensation, nor explicate the justificatory status of beliefs in terms of coherence. My point is rather that, when one invokes experience to justify a belief, the justifying state must have structural features of beliefs. (shrink)

Austere relationism rejects the orthodox analysis of hallucinations and illusions as incorrect perceptual representations. In this article, I argue that illusions of optimal motion present a serious challenge for this view. First, I submit that austere-relationist accounts of misleading experiences cannot be adapted to account for IOMs. Second, I show that any attempt at elucidating IOMs within an austere-relationist framework undermines the claim that perceptual experiences fundamentally involve relations to mind-independent objects. Third, I develop a representationalist model of IOMs. The (...) proposed analysis combines two ideas: Evans' dynamic modes of presentation and Fine's relational semantics for identity. (shrink)

This article develops a framework to analyze how political actors adopt social media in systems characterized by clientelism and populism, tracing the consequences and disruptive capabilities of the forms of social media adoption. The framework proceeds in two analytical stages. The first locates actors’ structural positions in the political system (internal/external) and their relationship with the mainstream media (allied/antagonistic). The second builds on pragmatism focusing on iterative problem situations actors face that explain forms of social media adoption. In examining the (...) structural positions and problem-solving stages of Colombian political actors, this article articulates three paths of adoption: habit preservation, internal innovation, and external innovation. Preservationists understand the new technology in old terms, projecting their understandings of old media onto the new one. Internal innovators combine clientelist practices and communication ones, upholding core routines while integrating new ones; they show a potential to reshape the system internally, making viable part of it, but changing the balance of power between existing elites. External innovators develop practices that integrate physical spaces and online communication, displaying a disruptive potential for existing core practices and the political system. In this way, the framework and empirical case link and develop the literatures on clientelism and political communication. (shrink)

Research in vision science, developmental psychology, and the foundations of cognitive science has led some theorists to posit referential mechanisms similar to indices. This hypothesis has been framed within a Fodorian conception of the early vision module. The article shows that this conception is mistaken, for it cannot handle the ‘interface problem’—roughly, how indexing mechanisms relate to higher cognition and conceptual thought. As a result, I reject the inaccessibility of early vision to higher cognition and make some constructive remarks on (...) the perception–cognition interface. -/- 1 The Case for Visual Indices 1.1 Preliminary assumptions 1.2 Transcendental arguments 1.3 Evidence from vision science 2 Visual Indices, Object Files, and Fodorian Modularity 3 The Interface Problem 3.1 Top-down attention and modularity 3.2 Selective attention and information 4 Revising the Indexing Hypothesis 4.1 Revising the perception–cognition interface 4.2 Revising the modularity of early vision 5 Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article interprets a recently recovered manuscript, Tratado de astronomía y la reformaçión del tiempo, composed by Antonio Sánchez in New Granada c.1696, in the context of the Spanish and Renaissance cosmographies. Sánchez’s Tratado proposes a spherical astronomy, in which celestial bodies – including comets — move in orbs containing pyramidal knots that explain the changing speed observed in the motion of planets. From this astronomy and following the peninsular style of repertorios, Sánchez derives two major conclusions: the corrected (...) length of the solar year and a revised birth date of Jesus. Taking as center of reference Vélez, where Sánchez was based, these claims led to conclusions in domains ranging from calendric astronomy to eschatology, including the incorporation of the indigenous peoples into salvation narrative and a demonstration of the arrangement of the celestial orbs at the Last Judgment. Sánchez’s Tratado constitutes an expansion of the Spanish mathematical cosmography that sheds light on the production of knowledge in the Spanish-American world and, at the same time, provides elements to reassess our understanding of the global circulation of Renaissance and early modern ideas. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es compartir con la comunidad académica el resultado de investigación de la tesis doctoral de filosofía intitulada La parresía como heterotopía en el último Foucault: otro modo crítico y específico de ser, pensar, decir y vivir. En efecto, intento esbozar el itinerario de la obra del úlltimo Foucault como una genealogía de la parresía, que recoge las conclusiones más relevantes de cuatro años de indagación. Finalmente, resalto la retrospectiva y la prospectiva de la parresía foucaultiana (...) como un arte integral de vivir a partir del cuidado de sí, desarrollado por sus autores más estudiosos y otras corrientes contemporáneas afines a este tópico. Todo converge en la “heterotopía” como ese tetraédrico otro modo crítico y específico o línea de fuga: ser, pensar, decir y vivir, que culmina con una relectura desde el ámbito latinoamericano como una propuesta pertinente altermundialista focalizada en una “cuidadanía” —más que ciudadanía— ética en todos los ámbitos humanos, sobre todo el que más nos compete: el educativo. (shrink)

Our thoughts on the knowledge that we are out, in the periphery, are still deceiving us; the conviction we have when we ask others to react when their own beings are denied; the recovering of what is ours by law, the possibility to imagine the world from our localities; to act critically towards ..

La teoría neoliberal, leída en clave antropológica -- Educación, investigación y universidad en Friedrich Hayek -- Educación y formación universitaria en Milton Friedman -- Sujeto, educación y formación universitaria en el neoliberalismo en y para América Latina -- Apropiación de la antropología neoliberal: el otro sendero -- Educación y formación universitaria en El ladrillo -- Educación y formación universitaria en los organismos internacionales: Banco Mundial, CEPAL y UNESCO -- Educación y formación universitaria en José Joaquín Brunner -- Sujeto, educación y (...) formación universitaria en los críticos latinoamericanos -- Una concepción economicista de la educación -- Concepción y formación reduccionistas del sujeto -- La universidad en peligro -- Reflexiones finales: sobre la normatividad, el lenguaje y las categorías de la crítica. (shrink)

Este artículo plantea un diálogo sobre la ficción y su relevancia narrativa dentro del relato histórico contemporáneo colombiano, a la luz de sus relaciones transversales. Tras el Acuerdo de Contribución a la Verdad Histórica y la Reparación y de la consolidación del trabajo llevado a cabo por el Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica iniciado hace casi una década con su primer informe, es pertinente volver sobre algunas ideas relacionadas con la manera en la que se narra la historia en Colombia. (...) En este sentido, se constata el valor histórico de la ficción, así como la vitalidad de sus diversos actores sociales y culturales, en sus intersecciones y recorridos por la memoria colectiva, en su materialidad y en su reinvención histórica. Los textos de ficción, por tanto, ofrecen caminos de reinvención de los relatos históricos, que no los sustituyen, pero sí empoderan a sus participantes/enunciantes, sus lectores/receptores y sus versiones/ relatos dentro de los procesos de memorias nacionales y humanas de la Colombia de hoy. Lo significativo de esta propuesta radica en que estos relatos son inclusivos, plurales y carecen del juicio moral hecho por una voz narradora autoritaria y única. (shrink)

Epistemological disjunctivism (ED) has been thought to solve the conditionality problem for epistemic externalism. This problem arises from externalists’ characterization of our epistemic standings as conditional on the obtaining of worldly facts which we lack any reflective access to. ED is meant to avoid the conditionality problem by explicating subjects’ perceptual knowledge in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge via their possession of perceptual reasons that are both factive and reflectively accessible. I argue that ED’s account of reflectively accessible factive perceptual (...) reasons is also prey to the conditionality problem. After that, I submit that Stroud’s influential formulation of the conditionality problem relies on a methodological requirement that is potentially dissociable from ED. So, it is possible to put ED in the service of a more modest anti-skeptical strategy. I close by suggesting that this modest anti-skeptical strategy successfully undercuts the underdetermination-based skeptical paradox. Nevertheless, it does not have substantial advantages over some forms of epistemic externalism. (shrink)

‘Modest’ and ‘full-blooded’ conceptions of meaning disagree on whether we should try to provide explanations of reference. In this paper, I defend a psychological brand of the full-blooded program. As I understand it, there are good reasons to provide a psychological explanation of referential abilities. This explanation is to be framed at an intermediary level of description between the personal level and the explanations provided by neuroscience. My defense of this program has two parts: First, I display the explanatory insufficiency (...) of truth-conditional semantics and, second, I respond to some widespread arguments against psychological explanations of referential abilities. (shrink)

According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a subject, S, has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of reasons for her belief that p which are both factive and reflectively accessible to S. It has been argued that ED is better placed than both knowledge internalism and knowledge externalism to undercut underdetermination-based skepticism. I identify several principles that must be true if ED is to be uniquely placed to attain this goal. After (...) that, I use those principles to formulate a diachronic skeptical argument. This argument yields the counterintuitive conclusion that understanding a global skeptical hypothesis is all it takes for a rational subject to lose all her perceptual knowledge of the world. Next, I show that a popular Austinian move must reject one or another of the principles that underlie ED. I close by delineating a novel strategy that can block the diachronic skeptical argument while preserving all the principles. The key idea is that perceptual knowledge is grounded in primitive, perceptual and recognitional abilities. This view sheds new light on some puzzling features of global skepticism that have been noted by Descartes and Hume, among others. (shrink)

In everyday life, we think of skepticism as the position of a stubborn person who has higher epistemic standards than others. Hence, the skeptic is someone who defends extravagant ideas. Some skeptics may deny that climate change is real, while others claim that the first moon landing did not take place. Contemporary philosophers think of skepticism in a different way. In their view, skepticism is the conclusion of a paradoxical argument about epistemic statuses like knowledge and reasons. A paradoxical argument (...) is a logically valid argument that, starting from seemingly plausible premises, reaches an absurd conclusion. We introduce two skeptical arguments. The regress argument purports to show that we lack reasons to believe any claim whatsoever because the search for those reasons inevitably leads to an infinite regress. The underdetermination argument seeks to prove that we lack reasons to believe that there are chairs, trees, other people, and so on; it supports that conclusion by citing skeptical hypotheses, including the idea that we might be dreaming (Descartes 1641) or the suggestion that we could be brains in a vat connected to a supercomputer that mimics the pattern of neural activity that would be produced if we were perceiving external objects (Putnam 1981). (shrink)

Many philosophers have found in Hume’s skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding the materials for an argument that generalizes from induction to other domains, like our beliefs in the external world, other minds, and the past. This chapter offers a novel reconstruction of that argument and identifies the principles that are responsible for its capacity to generalize beyond induction. Next, it presents a classical reading of Hume’s skeptical solution and shows that Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory is close in (...) spirit to it. After that, it develops two objections to entitlement theory: it relies on the truth of deeply contingent propositions that are not a priori rational, and it does not manage to redefine the concept of epistemic rationality while offering an effective anti-skeptical response. The chapter concludes with a constructive suggestion: some passages that support a non-classical reading of Hume’s positive views on induction offer the materials to reject the steps of the skeptical argument that cause trouble for entitlement theory. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo trata del método y su relación con la investigación educativa. El objetivo es analizar la relevancia del método en ciencias humanas y sociales, en especial, en educación. Para ello, dividimos este artículo en tres secciones: 1. ¿Hay método? 2. ¿Hay uno o varios métodos? 3. La discusión sobre el método en la investigación educativa. A la primera pregunta, respondemos que hay método. Respondemos a la segunda señalando la necesidad de adoptar un pluralismo metodológico. La tercera sección defiende (...) que las discusiones sobre el método de investigación educativa implican dimensiones ontológicas, epistemológicas y éticas que se han tornado críticas, y se hace una revisión de cada una de ellas. En el apartado conclusivo, sugerimos algunas vías para desanudar esos asuntos críticos en la investigación educativa.: This article deals with method and its relation to educational research. The objective is to analyze the relevance of method in human and social sciences, especially in education. To this end, we divide this article into three sections: 1. Is there a method? 2. Is there one or more methods? 3. The discussion on method in educational research. To the first question, we answer that there is a method. We answer the second question by pointing out the need to adopt methodological pluralism. The third section argues that discussions on the method of educational research involve ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions that have become critical, and a review is made of each of them. In the concluding section, we suggest some ways to disentangle these critical issues in educational research. (shrink)

This chapter examines three characteristics of environmental sciences—prediction, replication and the use of models—to explore their dissonance with the traditional representation of science. While ‘Science’ is often idealised as objective, universal, and context-independent, environmental sciences operate in ways that do not fit into these assumptions. The chapter draws on Bruno Latour’s distinction between ‘Science’ and ‘sciences’ to argue that environmental sciences, with their inherent uncertainties, local contexts, and interdisciplinary methods, conflict with the image of science as a monolithic and universally (...) reliable source of knowledge. Referring to case studies, the text explores how environmental sciences craft complex, interconnected systems that defy the reproducibility and predictability often associated with ‘Science’. This dissonance, maintains, has led to issues such as climate denialism and the politicisation of scientific knowledge. From this perspective, a call is made for a revaluation of how environmental sciences are represented in both public and policy arenas, calling for a more nuanced understanding of their provisional, context-specific nature and for educational reforms that help the public better grasp the complexities of scientific knowledge production. (shrink)

The rule account of self-conscious thought holds that a thought is self-conscious if and only if it contains a token of a concept-type that is governed by a reflexive rule. An account along these lines was discussed in the late 70s. Nevertheless, very few philosophers endorse it nowadays. I shall argue that this summary dismissal is partly unjustified. There is one version of the rule account that can explain a key epistemic property of self-conscious thoughts: Guarantee. Along the way, I (...) will rebut a number of objections and introduce two constraints on how the reflexive rule is implemented. (shrink)

This is a unique book. It is excellently written, crammed with information, wise and a pleasure to read.' ---Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University.

Desde hace algunas décadas es un lugar común en la Industria Newton mencionar una y otra vez la creencia de Isaac Newton en una sabiduría perdida. Sin embargo, el trabajo de crítica e interpretación al respecto se ha limitado a enunciar esta creencia sin ensayar una interpretación. Quienes más han trabajado el problema se han limitado a mostrar cómo esta creencia era plausible en el contexto intelectual de la época señalando a predecesores y seguidores de Newton que compartían esta creencia. (...) En contraste con lo anterior, este artículo indaga cómo, desde puntos de vista epistemológicos y filosóficos, la sabiduría de los antiguos era para Newton una fuente legítima de información sobre el mundo y sus designios, proponiendo una distinción entre tiempo y temporalidad como niveles complementarios pero diferentes de indagación sobre lo creado. (shrink)

According to MODERATISM, perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges like <There is an external world>, <I am not a brain in a vat (BIV)>, and so on. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by combining the claim that external world propositions have a substantive truth property like correspondence with the claim that hinges (...) have a deflationary truth property. I argue that the resulting view cannot offer a coherent characterization of ‘skeptical switch scenarios’ while providing an effective anti-skeptical strategy. In a more positive vein, I defend an approach that combines a correspondence conception of truth with epistemological disjunctivism. (shrink)

In everyday life, we often understand skepticism as a position that one may set aside because of its absurdity or incoherence. In Greek philosophy, skepticism was rather an inquiring attitude that led to the suspension of judgment and, as a result, the freedom from distress. In Modern philosophy, many philosophers viewed skepticism as a phase of thought that had to be overcome before laying firm foundations for the sciences. These pictures differ from the outlook that dominates current analytic epistemology, where (...) skepticism has normally been understood as a series of paradoxes that arise when we reflect on the workings of ordinary epistemic concepts like KNOWLEDGE and EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION. A skeptical paradox emerges when we identify a condition that seems to be necessary to have knowledge or epistemic justification, while it also seems that that condition cannot be met. This chapter explains why the picture of skepticism as a series of paradoxes is central to contemporary analytic epistemology and identifies some of the main features of skeptical paradoxes about the external world. After identifying two types of replies, it presents two influential paradoxes based on the closure and underdetermination principles, identifies some relevant differences between the two paradoxes, and critically examines some attempts at solving them. (shrink)

A traditional view holds that the self-concept is essentially indexical. In a highly influential article, Ruth Millikan famously held that the self-concept should be understood as a Millian name with a sui generis functional role. This article presents a novel explanatory argument against the Millian view and in favor of the indexical view. The argument starts from a characterization of the self-concept as a device of information integration. It then shows that the indexical view yields a better explanation of the (...) integration function than the Millian view. The resulting account can rebut Millikan’s objections and it has broader implications for the debate on the essential indexical. (shrink)

Iberian repertorios de los tiempos stemmed from Medieval almanacs and calendars. During the sixteenth century significant editorial, conceptual and material changes in repertorios incorporated astronomy, geography, chronology and natural philosophy. From De Li’s Repertorio (1492) to Zamorano’s Cronología (1585), the genre evolved from simple almanacs to more complex cosmological works which circulated throughout the Iberian-American world. This article claims that repertorios are a form of syncretic knowledge rather than “popular science” by relying on the concept of “knowledge in transit”. Elaborating (...) on this perspective, I present how repertorios ended up delivering a worldview from existing materials, a fact so far unnoticed by scholarship. At the same time, repertorios should not be considered an exclusively Iberian phenomenon, but the full scope of their nature as a form of syncretic knowledge should include their networks with migrants, indigenous, mestizos, and criollos across the Atlantic. In this sense, I try to trace the paths connecting productions in the Americas with Iberian repertorios. (shrink)

This article sheds light on Hobbes’s concept of the state of nature through a reading of his conception of knowledge, which makes it possible to relate him with the ‘New Science’ or the Scientific Revolution. In consequence, this article describes Hobbes with some problems and traditions of the Scientific Revolution through a fresh reading of his theory of knowledge, whence the concept of the state of nature is redefined in terms of integral cause; this makes it possible to argue the (...) need for Commonwealth, excluding the anthropological pessimism traditionally attributed to Hobbes. (shrink)

El autor revisa diferentes respuestas que se han dado a la definición de epistemología, destacando de ellas el proceso de reflexión del investigador, tanto individual, como en forma compartida.

Este artículo pretende establecer los límites y alcances de las principales interpretaciones de Newton en el siglo XX, resaltando, de un lado, la evidencia textual de la que disponían los intérpretes y, de otro, las corrientes filosóficas y epistemológicas que definen los rasgos principales de sus interpretaciones. Se verá que el rechazo al positivismo no es condición suficiente para establecer una interpretación adecuada y que, de la mano del fortalecimiento de la investigación a partir de los manuscritos de Newton, se (...) hace necesario un modelo interpretativo más amplio, flexible y detallado que los establecidos por algunos de los más importantes estudiosos como Alexandre Koyré, I. Bernard Cohen, Betty Dobbs y Richard Westfall. (shrink)