In response to criticism, we often say – in these or similar words – “Let’s see you do better!” Prima facie, it looks like this response is a challenge of a certain kind – a challenge to prove that one has what has recently been called standing. More generally, the data here seems to point a certain kind of norm of criticism: be better. Slightly more carefully: One must: criticize x with respect to standard s only if one is better (...) than x with respect to standard s. In this paper, I defend precisely this norm of criticism – an underexplored norm that is nevertheless ubiquitous in our lives, once we begin looking for it. The be better norm is, I hope to show, continuously invoked in a wide range of ordinary settings, can undergird and explain the widely endorsed non-hypocrisy condition on the standing to blame, and apparent counterexamples to the norm are no such counterexamples at all. I further contend that, given some plausible principles, my previous “moral commitment” account of the moral standing to blame will be extensionally equivalent to the be better norm. (shrink)

Definition of the problemOrganisations play a vital role in modern societies. This article presumes a lack of sufficient organisational reflection of well-established forms of ethics and ethics counselling in institutions belonging to the health sector or sees particular challenges where it is implemented.ArgumentsWe have therefore conceived a procedural type of organisational ethics which critically examines the organisational fit of processes in terms of ethical reflection, leading to practicable suggestions.ConclusionsOn the one hand they relate to where differences are established when asking (...) for the good; on the other hand they are concerned with background theories and the organisational fit of the reflection settings. (shrink)

Tschacher and Haken have recently applied a systems-based approach to modeling psychotherapy process in terms of potentially beneficial tendencies toward deterministic as well as chaotic forms of change in the client’s behavioral, cognitive and affective experience during the course of therapy. A chaotic change process refers to a greater exploration of the states that a client can be in, and it may have a potential positive role to play in their development. A distinction is made between on the one hand, (...) specific instances of instability which are due to techniques employed by the therapist, and on the other, a more general instability which is due to the therapeutic relationship, and a key, necessary result of a successful therapeutic alliance. Drawing on Friston’s systems-based model of free energy minimization and predictive coding, it is proposed here that the increase in the instability of a client’s functioning due to therapy can be conceptualized as a reduction in the precisions with which the client’s prior beliefs about themselves and their world, are held. It is shown how a good therapeutic alliance results in the emergence of a new hierarchical level in the client’s generative model of themselves and their relationship with the world. The emergence of this new level of functioning permits the reduction of the precisions of the client’s priors, which allows the client to ‘open up’: to experience thoughts, emotions and experiences they did not have before. It is proposed that this process is a necessary precursor to change due to psychotherapy. A good consilience can be found between this approach to understanding the role of the therapeutic alliance, and the role of epistemic trust in psychotherapy as described by Fonagy and Allison. It is suggested that beneficial forms of instability in clients are an underappreciated influence on psychotherapy process, and thoughts about the implications, as well as situations in which instability may not be beneficial for therapy, are considered. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the metaphysical system developed in Cheyne’s Philosophical Principles of Religion. Cheyne was an early proponent of Newtonianism and tackled several philosophical questions raised by Newton’s work. The most pressing of these concerned the causal origin of gravitational attraction. Cheyne rejected the occasionalist explanations offered by several of his contemporaries in favor of a model on which God delegated special causal powers to bodies. Additionally, he developed an innovative approach to divine conservation. This allowed him to argue that (...) Newton’s findings provided evidence for God’s existence and providence without the need for continuous divine intervention in the universe. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Literature, and the Arts is the first student-friendly introduction to the uses of cognitive science in the study of literature, written specifically for the non-scientist. Patrick Colm Hogan guides the reader through all of the major theories of cognitive science, focusing on those areas that are most important to fostering a new understanding of the production and reception of literature. This accessible volume provides a strong foundation of the basic principles of cognitive science, and allows us to (...) begin to understand how the brain works and makes us feel as we read. (shrink)

The environmental impacts of anthropogenic climate change, from an increase in global temperatures melting polar ice caps to the generation of extreme weather events, appear to be happening even mo...

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

We investigate the structure of C-minimal valued groups that are not abelian-by-finite. We prove among other things that they are nilpotent-by-finite.

Experimental research by social and cognitive psychologists has established that cooperative groups solve a wide range of problems better than individuals. Cooperative problem solving groups of scientific researchers, auditors, financial analysts, air crash investigators, and forensic art experts are increasingly important in our complex and interdependent society. This comprehensive textbook--the first of its kind in decades--presents important theories and experimental research about group problem solving. The book focuses on tasks that have demonstrably correct solutions within mathematical, logical, scientific, or verbal (...) systems, including algebra problems, analogies, vocabulary, and logical reasoning problems.The book explores basic concepts in group problem solving, social combination models, group memory, group ability and world knowledge tasks, rule induction problems, letters-to-numbers problems, evidence for positive group-to-individual transfer, and social choice theory. The conclusion proposes ten generalizations that are supported by the theory and research on group problem solving. Group Problem Solving is an essential resource for decision-making research in social and cognitive psychology, but also extremely relevant to multidisciplinary and multicultural problem-solving teams in organizational behavior, business administration, management, and behavioral economics. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

In October 2009 I decided to stop doing philosophy. This meant, in particular, stopping work on the book that I was writing on the nature of probability. At that time, I had no intention of making my unfinished draft available to others. However, I recently noticed how many people are reading the lecture notes and articles on my web site. Since this draft book contains some important improvements on those materials, I decided to make it available to anyone who wants (...) to read it. That is what you have in front of you. The account of Laplace’s theory of probability in Chapter 4 is very different to what I said in my seminar lectures, and also very different to any other account I have seen; it is based on a reading of important texts by Laplace that appear not to have been read by other commentators. The discussion of von Mises’ theory in Chapter 7 is also new, though perhaps less revolutionary. And the final chapter is a new attempt to come to grips with the popular, but amorphous, subjective theory of probability. The material in the other chapters has mostly appeared in previous articles of mine but things are sometimes expressed differently here. I would like to say again that this is an incomplete draft of a book, not the book I would have written if I had decided to finish it. It no doubt contains poor expressions, it may contain some errors or inconsistencies, and it doesn’t cover all the theories that I originally intended to discuss. Apart from this preface, I have done no work on the book since October 2009. (shrink)

The concept of media accountability is widely used but remains inadequately defined in the literature and often is restricted to a 1-dimensional interpretation. This study explores perceptions of accountability as manifestations of claims to responsibility, based on philosophical conceptions of the 2 terms, and suggests media accountability be more broadly understood as a dynamic of interaction between a given medium and the value sets of individuals or groups receiving media messages. The shape-shifting nature of the concept contributes to the volatility (...) of debate surrounding conflicting notions of press freedom and responsibility. (shrink)

Despite its philosophical interest, Susanna Newcome’s Enquiry Into the Evidence of the Christian Religion (1728, revised 1732) has received little attention from commentators. This paper seeks to redress this oversight by offering a reconstruction of Newcome’s innovative argument for God’s existence. Newcome employs a cosmological argument that differs from Thomist and kalām version of the argument. Specifically, Newcome challenges that idea that the causal chains observed in nature can exist independently. She does this through an appeal to findings from Newtonian (...) natural philosophy that suggest that the universe has entropic tendencies. This suggests that the continued operations of nature are dependent on a cause external to the universe. Newcome identifies this external cause with God. Various strengths and weaknesses of Newcome’s argument are discussed and an attempt is made to situate the argument within her broader epistemic framework and the larger context of Newtonian physico-theology. The paper also explores what is known of Newcome’s biography and intellectual milieu. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s identification of “consciousness” with “interest” in his unfinished work Johannes Climacus adds a distinctive dimension to his phenomenology of subjectivity. Commentators, however, have largely identified interesse with lidenskab, a conflation I argue to be mistaken, or have otherwise failed to note the structural implications of interesse for Kierkegaard’s account of cognition. I draw out these implications and argue that the Climacan account of interest as the experience of finding ourselves in-between ideality and reality implies, in the context of Kierkegaard’s (...) trichotomous ontology of consciousness, a form of non-thetic self-referentiality built into cognition itself. This self-referentiality also has the intriguing implication of making consciousness itself inherently teleological. (shrink)

Hutton considers the ideas of philosophers, poets, and historians to seek outthe roots of fact as mere recollection.

Few philosophers have devoted such sustained, almost obsessive attention to the topic of death as Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard and Death brings together new work on Kierkegaard's multifaceted discussions of death and provides a thorough guide to the development, in various texts and contexts, of Kierkegaard’s ideas concerning death. Essays by an international group of scholars take up essential topics such as dying to the world, living death, immortality, suicide, mortality and subjectivity, death and the meaning of life, remembrance of the (...) dead, and the question of the afterlife. While bringing Kierkegaard's philosophy of death into focus, this volume connects Kierkegaard with important debates in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This paper argues against a common misunderstanding of Foucault's work. Even after the release of his lectures at the Collège de France, which ran throughout the 1970s until his death in 1984, he is still often taken to have made an "ethical" turn toward the end of his life. As opposed to his genealogies of power published in the 1970s, which are relentlessly suspicious of claims of individual agency, his final monographs focus on the ethical self-formation of free individuals. I (...) suggest that this basic misinterpretation makes possible interpretations of Foucault's work as being sympathetic to neoliberal government, by linking the ethical turn to a "liberal" or "neoliberal" turn in his thought. I present a case against the ethical turn by arguing that Foucault's main focus, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, is a concern for the ways in which we become obligated by truth. (shrink)

Abstract:Ecological Holism—and 'radical environmentalism' more broadly—has often attracted the charge of embodying 'ecofascism.' The reason is that holism allegedly implies that it would sometimes be morally permissible—and perhaps even morally required—for fundamental individual human interests to be trumped by the interests of the ecological whole. This paper is an attempt to clarify what 'ecofascism' precisely is, and which form of it is invoked to make this objection plausible. From here, the paper goes on to argue that given the extent of (...) the impending environmental catastrophe, even the most austere anthropocentrist is in ever-growing danger of becoming a de facto ecofascist, rendering the initial objection effectively redundant. (shrink)

Some of Derek Parfit’s most significant work concerns the non-identity problem. Briefly put, this is the problem of how, morally speaking, we should understand cases in which we can act in one way, and produce persons with sub-optimal lives, or act in another way, and produce different persons with better lives. Discussions of the non-identity problem tend to assume that it is a single problem, raising a single set of moral issues. This chapter seeks to complicate this picture. It introduces (...) ‘Impure Non-Identity Cases’. These are cases in which a policy, or group of acts, is a non-identity case, and so nobody is harmed, or made worse off, by the policy, or group of acts, but some (and maybe even all) of the individual acts within the policy or group are not non-identity cases, and are harmful. The chapter investigates the moral implications of such cases, and the problems and questions they raise, aside from those raised by ‘Pure Non-Identity Cases’. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the intertwining of philosophy and Christian faith in the concrete life of the Christian philosopher, with a view toward the compatibility of critical philosophy and a post-critical faith. Philosophy, as an enterprise of reason alone, is independent of Christian faith and theology. In accord with its definition, philosophy seeks evidence along the lines of reason independent of outside authority, and thus is autonomous from such faith. Yet, for the Christian philosopher, without jeopardizing this autonomy and independence, (...) faith and theology do enter the picture in some sense. For, unless the individual is completely dichotomized in personality, her/his concrete life and existence must involve commitments both to the Christian faith and to philosophy, even though the commitment of faith is more basic. This paper explores this paradox of the independence and mutual intertwining of these two poles; then, focuses on the philosophical pole of the tension; and finally, resolves the tension for the Christian philosopher. (shrink)

The defining debate in this new century will be about technology and human enhancement, according to many across the political spectrum.[1] Our ability to use science to enhance our bodies and minds – as opposed to its application for therapeutic purposes – is one of the most personal and therefore passionate issues in an era where emerging technologies seduce us with new and fantastic possibilities for our future. But in the process, we are forced to rethink what it means to (...) be human or, essentially, our own identity. For some, technology holds the promise of making us superhuman; for others, it offers a darker path toward becoming Frankenstein’s monster. This paper will look at a growing chorus of calls for human enhancement to be embraced and unrestricted. Specifically, we will critically examine recent “pro-enhancement” arguments – articulated in More Than Human by Ramez Naam,[2] as one of the most visible works on the subject today – and conclude that they ultimately need to be strengthened, if they are to be convincing. Our overarching motive here is not so much that we are against human enhancement technologies; that seems to be too premature a conclusion given the state of research and debate, and such technologies may be inevitable anyway. However, we believe that a skeptical eye should be applied to claims that there should be no restrictions on any particular action. Even our most cherished human rights are bounded by reason or societal norms, for whatever they are worth. For instance, our right to free speech still does not allow us to yell “Fire!” in a crowded theater or to slander others. Our right to fall in love and to make love with whom we want does not extend to children. And for all the talk about the virtues of a “free market” or “free trade”, the invisible hand of our economy is still occasionally slapped by anti-trust lawsuits, which would not be an issue if the market were truly free. So even if human enhancement seems to be a reasonable practice and even a right, restrictions may still be required to mitigate undesirable circumstances or unintended consequences – which would be consistent with how functioning societies treat other liberties, values and rights. (shrink)

We have a certain fascination with the incredible untapped potential of our minds. Some studies once suggested that we use only 10% of the mind's capacity. Today that estimate has been revised to about 2%-3%. Imagine what more we could do with all of that as yet unrealized potential. What is standing in our way? How do we move into a more full realization of who we are? These are the questions that this book seeks to answer.

Evolutionary ideas and modern biological knowledge have important roles to play in the understanding of human behaviour. Nevertheless, it is deeply misleading to regard humans as robots in the grip of their genes. A well designed brain should respond to the consequences of behaviour; if an understanding of the likely consequences can be achieved without actually performing the act, then a person who knows that they will be rewarded or punished for certain acts is bound to be influenced by that (...) knowledge. A brain designed in that way facilitates the evolution of societies with explicit social approval of certain activities and explicit disapproval of others. The evolutionary approach to psychology does not imply that individuals do not make free choices. Individuals clearly do make a big difference to what happens in their lives through their decisions. They may be surprised by the consequences of their own actions. A well designed brain should be able to anticipate the consequences of various courses of action and choose between them on the basis of their likely costs and benefits. Planning before doing is clearly of great advantage. People do make well considered decisions and they benefit from doing so. (shrink)

Connu pour ses engagements et ses responsabilités politiques - il fut avocat, résistant, conseiller de la République, sénateur, député, ministre -, Léo Hamon a aussi été un grand universitaire, inaugurant sa carrière à la faculté de droit et de science politique de Dijon. Si ses travaux de jeunesse portent essentiellement sur le droit administratif, sa carrière universitaire, à partir de 1959, lui permet d'être l'un des premiers à s'intéresser à la jurisprudence naissante du Conseil constitutionnel et à consacrer des colloques (...) et des ouvrages à la science politique, irréductiblement liée, selon lui, au droit public. Lecteur infatigable et d'une curiosité intellectuelle insatiable, Léo Hamon est l'une des dernières figures d'un certain monde des juristes. Le colloque organisé à Dijon se propose de revenir sur cet itinéraire afin d'en montrer la cohérence et la diversité, à travers les thèmes du pouvoir, que Léo Hamon a souhaité à la fois restaurer, sous la Ve République, et contrôler, par l'Intermédiaire des juges, et les figures du gaulliste si particulier et de l'universitaire reconnu que Léo Hamon incarna. (shrink)

Au Moyen Âge, les rapports entre savoirs théorique et pratique dans la mesure des champs sont difficiles à appréhender. L’article examine d’une part l’évolution de la géométrie depuis les premiers traités de l’époque carolingienne jusqu’à l’apparition de la geometria practica, puis l’évolution de ce dernier genre, d’autre part la pratique effective des mesureurs telle qu’on la reconstitue à partir d’une documentation évasive. On observe que les techniques de mesure ne relèvent jamais de la géométrie savante, euclidienne ou pratique, malgré les (...) tentatives de quelques savants à partir du xiii e siècle. (shrink)

In reply to the claim that syntax is not taken into account in Linguistic Meaning Meets Linguistic Form, I show that local syntactic analysis has been implemented in the treatment of aspectual verbs and verbs of positive and negative recall, where the syntactic function of the -ing form as direct object of the main verb is put into relation with the main verb’s meaning as the basis for the inferences drawn concerning the temporal relation between the main verb’s event and (...) that expressed by the complement. I argue that I have also developed new tools of syntactic analysis for the to-infinitive, demonstrating that it is not the direct object of the main verb, but rather a goal- or result-specifier, and showing how this accounts for the fact that its event is always understood to be somehow subsequent to that of the main verb. Regarding the applicability of formal semantics to natural language, I argue that the absolute priority accorded to the truth-functional dimension of language by this type of semantics leads to the artificial separation of use-conditions from truth-conditions, with the former being treated as an additional interpretational function added on to the truth-functional one. Contra the autonomous syntax claim that our desire to express meaning is to a great extent independent of the means we use to express those meanings, it is argued that how we perceive the world in our experience is influenced by our system of linguistic representation. (shrink)