The principle of Conditional Excluded Middle has been a matter of longstanding controversy in both semantics and metaphysics. The principle suggests (among other things) that for any coin that isn't flipped, there is a fact of the matter about how it would have landed if it had been flipped: either it would have landed heads, or it would have landed tails. This view has gained support from linguistic evidence indicating that ‘would’ commutes with negation (e.g., ‘not: if A, would C’ (...) is equivalent to ‘if A, would not C’). There is, however, a long list of operators that similarly appear to commute with negation, even though the corresponding excluded middle principles are indefensible. We suggest that the data supporting Conditional Excluded Middle is best explained as a pragmatic effect. (shrink)

Strategies for combating climate change which advocate for human population limitation have recently been understandably criticised on the grounds that they embody a form of 'climate colonialism': a moral wrong that involves disproportionally shifting the burdens of climate change onto developing, historically exploited nations (which have low per capita emissions but high fertility rates) in order to offset burdens in affluent nations (which have high per capita emissions but low fertility rates). This article argues that once the relevance of population (...) growth to climate change has been correctly understood as working in tandem with consumption levels, this objection fails as a general criticism. Moreover, even if population could be ignored as a variable, the climate colonialism charge would re-emerge in a different form, since, at present population sizes, it would be environmentally catastrophic for developing nations to reach production ambitions which see their per capita emissions massively increase. Even if emission reductions in affluent nations are (rightly) prioritised, there are good reasons to prevent enormous growth of emissions in developing nations. Those environmental risks become much greater given those nations' projected population increases in the coming century. The article then explores how the necessary radical environmental policies pertaining to fertility rates might be enacted in non-coercive ways, reducing the sting of the ‘climate colonialism’ charge. The article ends by considering some reasons to be moderately sceptical about such policies. (shrink)

Todd and Rabern (2021) mount an argument that – contra both Thomason’s (1970) supervaluationism and MacFarlane’s (2014) relativism – an “open future” view is incompatible with the principle they call “Retro-closure”, according to which today’s rain implies that yesterday it was true that it would rain a day later. In a recent piece, MacFarlane replies. This paper has two aims. First, I argue that MacFarlane’s response to Todd and Rabern is unsuccessful on its own terms. Second, I attempt to clarify (...) Todd and Rabern’s overall argument, and explain how MacFarlane’s replies should be construed within the overall dialectic. The intended result: if you want an "open future", then one's best option is a modified Peirceanism (Todd 2021); if one wants Retro-closure, one's best option is one on which there is a determinate "Thin Red Line" (a view sometimes called "Ockhamism"). However, one cannot have what supervaluationism and relativism both promise, viz., a view that preserves both. (shrink)

Traditional wisdom dictates that statistical model outputs are estimates, not measurements. Despite this, statistical models are employed as measurement instruments in the social sciences. In this article, I scrutinize the use of a specific model—the logit model—for psychological measurement. Given the adoption of a criterion for measurement that I call comparability, I show that the logit model fails to yield measurements due to properties that follow from its fixed residual variance.

We present and defend a Thomistic cosmological argument that runs independently of the principle of sufficient reason, sidestepping perhaps two of the most recurrent objections to cosmological reasoning: (a) the possibility of brute facts (i.e., that not everything needs an adequate explanation of its existence) and (b) the accusation of the composition fallacy. Drawing upon the work of Barry Miller, we show that any contingent entity like Thumper the rabbit, upon metaphysical analysis, is either a contradictory structure and therefore an (...) impossible existent or else points towards an extrinsic cause for the unity of its really distinct metaphysical parts (namely, its essence and its existence). This conclusion enables the inference that only an uncaused cause with no really distinct metaphysical parts can ultimately produce anything with really distinct metaphysical parts. We then suggest it is not implausible that this entity is God. (shrink)

Philosophers, anthropologists and biologists have long puzzled over the question of human nature. It is also a question that Kant thought about deeply and returned to in many of his writings. In this lucid and wide-ranging introduction to Kant’s philosophy of human nature - which is essential for understanding his thought as a whole - Patrick R. Frierson assesses Kant’s theories and examines his critics. He begins by explaining how Kant articulates three ways of addressing the question ‘what is (...) the human being?’: the transcendental, the empirical, and the pragmatic. He then considers some of the great theorists of human nature who wrestle with Kant’s views, such as Hegel, Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche, and Freud; contemporary thinkers such as E.O.Wilson and Daniel Dennett, who have sought biological explanations of human nature; Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, and Clifford Geertz, who emphasize the diversity of human beings in different times and places; and existentialist philosophers such as Sartre and Heidegger. He argues that whilst these approaches challenge and enrich Kant’s views in significant ways, all suffer from serious weaknesses that Kant’s anthropology can address. Taking a core insight of Kant’s - that human beings are fundamentally free but finite - he argues that it is the existentialists, particularly Sartre, who are the most direct heirs of his transcendental anthropology. The final part of the book is an extremely helpful overview of the work of contemporary philosophers, particularly Christine Korsgaard and Jürgen Habermas. Patrick R. Frierson explains how these philosophers engage with questions of naturalism, historicism, and existentialism while developing Kantian conceptions of the human being. Including chapter summaries and annotated further reading, What is the Human Being? is an outstanding introduction to some fundamental aspects of Kant’s thought and a judicious assessment of leading theories of human nature. It is essential reading for all students of Kant and the philosophy of human nature, as well as those in related disciplines such as anthropology, politics and sociology. (shrink)

Language agents are AI systems that combine large language models with other elements to facilitate interaction with an environment. They include LLM-based chatbots but can have a wide range of additional features to support learning, reasoning and decision-making. Goldstein and Kirk-Giannini. Citationm.s. [AI wellbeing] argue that some language agents have beliefs and desires, but it is not obvious that they are agents at all, since they select outputs by querying language models. This paper investigates agency and desires in language agents.

Most philosophers who have expressed a view about whether forgiveness is compatible with forgivers’ continuing to punish, or support the punishment of, people who have wronged them hold that forgiveness is compatible with punishing or favouring punishment of wrongdoers. I argue that whether forgiveness entails forbearing punishment depends on which of two senses of forgiveness is operative. On the first, sentiment-based sense of forgiveness as consisting essentially in a change of heart on the part of a victim, a victim can, (...) I submit, forgive while continuing to punish or to support the punishment of a person who has wronged her. On the second sense of forgiveness as consisting in debt remission whether or not accompanied by a change of heart, the state’s remission of the entirety of criminal offenders’ punishment qualifies as forgiveness and, moreover, the state could not forgive offenders in this sense while continuing to punish them. (shrink)

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

L’article commence par dresser un résumé de la controverse sur la traduction d’ Aufhebung qui, depuis la fin des années 1990, a opposé l’auteur à Lucien Sève, qui prit soin de récuser l’« idée fausse, non marxienne d’abolition » pour lui substituer celle de « dépassement ». Après avoir analysé les rétractations successives de Sève, l’article élargit les données du problème traductologique en examinant les usages chez Marx et Engels d’un autre terme signifiant sans conteste « abolition » ou « (...) suppression », Abschaffung, et conclut que le concept d’abolition est bel et bien un concept clef du marxisme, comme du mouvement social et révolutionnaire porté par son époque. (shrink)

A new solution to the liar paradox is developed using the insight that it is illegitimate to even suppose (let alone assert) that a liar sentence has a truth-status (true or not) on the grounds that supposing this sentence to be true/not-true essentially defeats the telos of supposition in a readily identifiable way. On that basis, the paradox is blocked by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sequent-calculus. The lesson of the liar is that not all (...) assumptions are for free. One merit of this proposal is that it is free from the revenge problem. (shrink)

The emerging view of early dorso‐ventral patterning of amphibian embryos is that two opposing gradients of dorsalising and ventralising secreted factors are necessary. while several transcription factors acting upstream or downstream of the dorsalising molecules have been identified, until recently little was known about the transcriptional response to ventralising signals. Now two groups describe the identification of related homeodomain proteins, Xvent‐1 and Vox, which are able to convert dorsal cells of Xenopus embryos into more ventral ones(1,2).

La cuestión de la agencia animal aparece como un problema filosófico fundamental en el campo del saber contemporáneo. Este dossier que nos ofrece la Revista de Filosofía es un acontecimiento intelectual porque, con los cinco estudios presentados, disponemos de lo mejor del conocimiento actual sobre la agencia.

Despite any shortcomings of Kant's transcendental philosophy, the spirit of Kant's approach is correct. In particular, Kant is correct to believe an accurate account of the types of “access” humans possess to internal and empirical content should form the groundwork for epistemic and ethical investigation and epistemic and ethical investigations cannot successfully circumvent this groundwork. In this context, the term “access” concerns the mental processes that render internal and external experience possible. In supporting the above claims, this article outlines and (...) defends what can be considered a weak version of Kant's transcendental approach. This weaker approach does not require the achievement of synthetic a priori judgments, which permit deductive conclusions concerning possible experience. (shrink)

Au cours des deux ou trois dernières décennies, l’éthique théologique a vu se développer aux Etats-Unis un fort mouvement “communautarien”, inspiré particulièrement par l’oeuvre marquante du théologien méthodiste Stanley Hauerwas. Selon la thèse essentielle de Hauerwas, l’éthique chrétienne consiste à vivre de la foi en Jésus Christ, et cela ne peut être mis en oeuvre de manière authentique que dans une communauté qui se conforme à l’Evangile. Hauerwas ne s’intéresse pas tant à l’action politique qu’à la fidélité chrétienne. Il préconise (...) une politique de la communauté chrétienne, apte à former le caractère selon sa vision propre, ses valeurs et ses relations. Cependant, il y a une contradiction entre l’opinion de Hauerwas selon laquelle l’éthique chrétienne ne peut avoir d’influence significative sur les cultures et sur les gouvernements, et l’enseignement social catholique qui tient que l’action politique des chrétiens peut faire progresser la dignité humaine et le bien commun, au plan national et international.During the last twenty or thirty years, theological ethics witnessed the development of a strong “communitarian” movement in the United States, inspired, in particular, by the seminal work of the Methodist theologian Stanley Hauerwas. According to the main thesis of Hauerwas, Christian ethics consists in living one’s faith in Jesus Christ, and this can only be done in an authentic way in a community based on the Gospel. Hauerwas is not so much interested in political action as in Christian fidelity. He recommends a “politics” of the Christian community, capable of forming character according to its own vision, its values, and its relationships. There is a contradiction, however, between Hauerwas’ opinion according to which Christian ethics cannot have a significant influence on cultures or governments, and Catholic social teaching which holds that the political action of Christians can advance human dignity and the common good at the national and international level. (shrink)

In this paper we provide a formal description of what it means to be in a local or partial information-state. Starting from the notion of locality in a relational structure, we define so-called adaptive gen- erated submodels. The latter are then shown to yield an adaptive logic wherein the derivability of Pφ is naturally interpreted as a core property of being in a state in which one holds the information that φ.

Descartes with his sharp separation of the mental and the physical set the stage for the philosophy of mind for the next 350 years. Philosopher Patrick T. Mackenzie finds in the later writings of Wittgenstein the suggestion that Descartes got off on the wrong foot. Following Wittgenstein's lead, Mackenzie argues that instead of analyzing our human nature as a composite of mind and body, we should view ourselves as whole persons. One of the dividends of this approach to the (...) mind-body problem is that it provides us with a resolution to the problem of human freedom—i.e., how can a human being be free if his or her body (including the brain) belongs to a deterministic world? Mackenzie here argues that the person is largely free even though the movements of the body are determined by neurophysiological events. He takes the same approach to the philosophy of mind as that taken by M.R.Bennett and P.M.S.Hacker in their recent and controversial book, The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Mackenzie's approach is, however, much more accessible. Students of philosophy and philosophers interested in the problem of human freedom will welcome Mackenzie's fresh approach, especially those disenchanted by the present list of mind-body "isms.". (shrink)

The Don W. Davis Program in Ethical Leadership is seeking manuscripts for the “Challenges to Digital Media Flourishing” symposium. Submission deadline is 15 April 2024.[Exact Symposium dates to be...

Patrick L. Miller - Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher, and Mathematician-King - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 46.1 165-166 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Patrick Lee Miller Duquesne University Carl Huffman, Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher, and Mathematician-King. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xv + 665. Cloth, $180.00. Archytas of Tarentum has in some ages been considered a major philosopher. He was one of the three (...) most important early Pythagoreans—along with Philolaus and Pythagoras himself—and so his reputation has risen and fallen with the popularity of this movement. When Pythagoreanism captivated some Romans at the end of the Republic, they championed him as a native talent; much later, some medieval Europeans inflated him into one of the great wise men of the ancient world. But Pythagoreanism has ebbed in recent centuries, and Archytas is now known only to specialists in ancient philosophy, and even then only by acquaintance from a few passages of Plato and.. (shrink)

By drawing on the work of Ivan Illich, John Holt, and Jacques Ellul, one can see that alternatives to the modern concept of education are desirable and practical. The homeschooling movement enables teachers, parents, and children to step outside the concept of education and discover how it is possible to teach and learn in various ways throughout their lives, not just through organized learning in conventional schools. By using homeschooling as the lens to view the concept of producing "good citizens" (...) (the stated purpose for compulsory schooling), new possibilities for achieving lifelong learning can be seen. This analysis also suggests how technology can become a means to achieve various personal ends, rather than just an expansion of educational techniques to use on people. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt is one of the most prominent thinkers of modern times, whose profound influence extends across philosophy, politics, law, history, international relations, sociology, and literature. Presenting new and powerful ways to think about human freedom and responsibility, Arendt's work has provoked intense debate and controversy. 'Hannah Arendt: Key Concepts' explores the central ideas of Arendt's thought, such as freedom, action, power, judgement, evil, forgiveness and the social. Bringing together an international team of contributors, the essays provide lucid accounts of (...) Arendt's fundamental themes and their ethical and political implications. The specific concepts Arendt deployed to make sense of the human condition, the phenomena of political violence, terror and totalitarianism, and the prospects of sustaining a shared public world are all examined. 'Hannah Arendt: Key Concepts' consolidates the disparate strands of Arendt's thought to provide an accessible and essential guide for anybody who wishes to gain a deeper understanding of this leading intellectual figure. (shrink)

Non-naturalists claim that the nature of normativity precludes the possibility of normative naturalism. In particular, they think that normative reduction amounts to normative elimination. This is because it always leaves out the normative. In this paper, I examine the force that the normativity objection has against Humean reductionism. I argue that the normativity objection has no argumentative force against reductionism. When it is presented as a bare intuition, it begs the question against reduction. A more interesting reading of the argument (...) claims that the normative cannot be explained in terms of the natural because the natural is arbitrary. Yet, this version of the argument fails as well because the natural is not arbitrary in the relevant sense. The natural is contingent, so what has value is contingent. That is not an elimination of the normative though, because contingent reasons are still reasons. (shrink)

‘Good’ is nothing specific but is transcendentally or generally applied over specific, and specified, ‘categories’. These ‘categories’ may be seen—at least for the purposes of this note—as under Platonic Forms. The rule that instances under a category or form need a Form to be under is valid. It may be tautological: but this is OK for rules. Not being specific, however, ‘good’ neither needs nor can have a specifying Form. So, on these grounds, the Form of the Good is otious. (...) Any rule of the kind, ‘Everything needs a Form, so good needs a Form of the Good’ is mistaken, in that good is not a kind, but a transcendental. To give a Form to the transcendental ‘good’ is a mistake: it is a Rylian category mistake. And the Form of the Good either does no work, or works unprofitably in any but an aesthetic sense. (shrink)

This essay addresses a stream of thought manifested in some forms of social justice activism – namely, that members of marginalized groups have privileged insight into the nature of social reality which others cannot understand, much less critique. This position, which I call “epistemic isolationism,” seems to rest on the claim that the knowledge that is embedded in lived experience is incommunicable. The essay proceeds in three parts: first, there is a brief overview of standpoint epistemology, including a recent version (...) which seems to support epistemic isolationism. Second, there is an explication of the concept of “lived experience” as developed by Wilhelm Dilthey. Third, there is an argument against the claim that lived experience is incommunicable, drawing from the work of Dilthey, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur. The payoff of the argument is that sharing lived experience through expressions like literature and narrative inspires mutual recognition and respect which can, in turn, support a robust form of solidarity and serve as a foundation for more effective social justice advocacy. (shrink)

The originally published review of this book did not include the information that an electronic version is available.