According to Diogenes Laertius, the concept of ‘appearance’ played a central role in Stoic philosophy. As staunch corporealists, the Stoics believed that appearances are physical structures in our corporeal soul which provide the foundation for all our thoughts. One of the crucial features of appearance is that it is a representational mental state that has the ability to provide us with accurate awareness of the world through causal interaction between our senses and external objects, and thus supply the means for (...) acquiring knowledge about the reality. However, the Stoics recognized that we can also be aware and think of objects that are real but are not presently affecting our senses, as well as objects that are altogether fictional and thus incapable of ever interacting with our senses. Because of this, it was important for them to distinguish between representational mental states which are and those which are not caused by external objects at the moment in which they are formed. Chrysippus was one of the Stoics who paid special attention to this distinction; in a key text, Aet. 4.12, he is reported as reserving the name ‘appearance’ only for the former states, while for the latter he used a different term, ‘imagination’. (shrink)

Utilizes Heidegger in rethinking common environmental paradigms.

INTRODUCTION Building upon the "preliminary conception of Phenomenology" introduced by Heidegger in Section II of the Introduction to Sein und Zeit,1 one ...

The Stoics thought that knowledge depends on a special kind of appearances which they called ‘apprehensive’, which are by definition true. Interestingly, Sextus Empiricus reports in M 7.247 that they held that there are appearances that are true but that are not apprehensive because they are true merely by chance and thus cannot constitute knowledge. I believe that this suggests that the Stoics were aware of what is in modern literature known as the problem of epistemic luck. Unfortunately, Sextus’ report (...) leaves out a lot of important details, which makes it difficult to understand exactly which appearances the Stoics thought are true by chance, and why. I argue that the true non-apprehensive appearances in question here are imaginations, representational states which are not immediately caused by external objects through perception, but produced solely by the mind. I propose an explanation why the Stoics, who defined chance in terms of hidden causes, would have thought that imaginations can only be true by chance. The explanation stems from their view that the essential characteristic of imagination is that it leaves the actual cause of its representational content hidden from the subject. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to suggest a new outlook concerning the nature of Zeno’s paradoxes. The attention is directed towards the three famous paradoxes known as “Dichotomy,” “Achilles and the Tortoise,” and “The Arrow.” An analysis of the paradigmatic proposals for a solution shows that an adequate solution has not yet been reached. An answer is provided instead to the question “How Zeno’s paradoxes emerge in their quality of aporiae?,” that is to say in their quality of impasses, (...) of problem situations without an exit, what is the original meaning of the Greek word “aporia.” It is my claim that this is the correct rational approach for solving these conceptual puzzles. In other words, I am not proposing formal solutions by criticizing and/or altering their premises assuming the continuous or discrete nature of space and time, but I try to draw the philosophical attention to the way we possess the phenomenon of motion as a result of the perception of space-time in human experience. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument was received within the Pittsburgh School of Philosophy as raising new and interesting difficulties for the traditional empiricist model of knowledge justification. While McDowell’s attempt to solve the difficulties in question is still debated, I claim that a different solution to the same difficulties might have been suggested by Wittgenstein himself in On Certainty.

The paper contains a conceptual proposal, its key idea being that the successful functioning of a rule embedding artifact designed to regulate a practice (not pertaining to its use) produces the same result as the successful performance of the rule-invoking non-communicative actions belonging to the practice in case.

Cicero’s De divinatione portrays the Stoics as unanimous in advocating both natural and technical divination. I argue that, contrary to this, the earlier leaders of the school like Chrysippus had reasons to consider natural divination to be significantly epistemically inferior to its technical counterpart. The much more favorable treatment of natural divination in De divinatione is likely the result of changes introduced later, probably by Posidonius.

Abstract. The strong similarity between the use of ostension and that of a simple demonstrative to predicate something of an object seems to conflict with equally strong intuitions according to which, while “this” does usually refer to an object, the gesture of holding an object in your hand and showing it to an audience does not refer to the demonstrated object. This paper argues that the problem is authentic and provides a solution to it. In doing so, a more general (...) thought is given support by the approach used. Namely, the thought that our abilities to directly refer to things require some basic referential abilities exhibited in ostension and the use of demonstratives which, in their turn, rest upon our abilities to cooperate in performing non-communicative actions on our environment. Several concepts introduced in order to solve the initial problem can be used to articulate this thought in more detail. (shrink)

How can we ever judge about the truth of a scientific theory? Ostensibly it seems to be no problems concerning such a judgement. Each scientific theory is expressed by a set of statements, formulated in a definite language; and we know, in principle, to ascertain whether a sentence is true or false, If we take any formula, say in the first order predicate calculus, no matter how complex, and if we know its interpretation, i.e. the appropriate finite domain of individuals, (...) functions, and truth values of the atoms entering the formula, then we immediately come to know whether our formula is true or false. It is admitted by analogy, that if we come to know the truth values of the basic theory statements, then we can judge if a given theory is true or false. It can be shown, however, that there exists no similar reliable prescription [1]. Let me comment on this in some more detail. (shrink)

Jolted Images brings together a large cast of mainstream and avant-garde cineastes, artists, photographers, comics creators, poets, and more, to reflect on a wide range of phenomena from the realms of cinema and visual culture in the Yugoslav region, broader Europe, and North America. Far from a staid monograph, the book takes a cue from filmmaker Dusan Makavejev, who once wrote that there are times when it is necessary "to jolt art, no matter what the outcome"; to that end, the (...) book infuses its analysis with playful, creative transfiguration of the material at hand. (shrink)

Ovaj rad govori o odnosu znanosti i filozofije ili, preciznije, o naturalizaciji filozofije. U prvom dijelu rada namjeravamo predstaviti Quineov teorijski okvir vezan za znanstveni utjecaj na filozofski diskurs i istraživanje. Quine je u svojim filozofskim spisima naglašavao važnost znanosti, u naturaliziranim ili normativnim epistemološkim oblicima. Ideja jedne održivije pozicije znanja utemeljene na znanosti često se smatra središnjom idejom Quineove epistemologije. Daleko od bilo kakvog oblika kozmičkog egzila, i filozofi, prema Quineu, prihvaćaju najbolje znanje koje im je u određenom trenutku (...) dostupno.Sličan fenomen pronalazimo u Descartesovom konceptu životinjskih duhova te se time potvrđuje teza o upotrebi najboljeg dostupnog znanstvenog znanja u određenom trenutku. Quineovu koncepciju, razvijenu u području analitičke filozofije, analiziramo na primjeru Descartesovog pojma životinjskih duhova, gdje se pokazuje utjecaj dominantne znanstvene paradigme na filozofski diskurs. Budući da Quineov okvir smatramo vrlo relevantnim, njegovo smo stajalište usvojili kao svojevrsnu interpretativnu paradigmu koja nam pomaže da bolje razumijemo određeni problem iz domene povijesti filozofije. Drugi dio rada analizira pojam životinjskih duhova koji su u Descartesovoj filozofiji shvaćeni kao posrednički entiteti koji povezuju um i tijelo. Nekoć snažna znanstvena ideja, životinjski duhovi su gotovo iščezli s napretkom znanosti te su zamijenjeni drugim znanstvenim paradigmama. Pojam životinjskih duhova smatran je Descartesovom kritičkom točkom i stoga je često zanemaren u filozofskim analizama. U ovom radu iznosimo hipotezu o tome kako je znanost preobrazila Descartesov filozofski diskurs analizirajući neobičan slučaj životinjskih duhova, pokazujući u isto vrijeme ograničenja i nedostatke novog modusa philosophandi. (shrink)

We conducted a thorough investigation of the impact of representativeness on reasoning and metacognitive processes by employing the Linda problem. In congruent versions, the more representative res...

The aim of this paper is to suggest a new interpretation to the Gettier problem by showing that the standard JTB definition of knowledge is not epistemologically incomplete, being at the same time formally incomplete. The Gettier problem is shown to emerge through the implicit self-application of the JTB definition of knowledge to prove its own incompleteness. A conclusion is drawn, which runs counter to the traditional view that the problem necessarily requires a conceptual amendment of the standard defi nition, (...) in spite of the formal incompleteness of the latter. The Gettier problem is construed to be related to the ancient Meno problem within a contemporary justifi cational discourse. (shrink)