Ob eine sportliche Leistung anerkannt wird, hängt maßgeblich davon ab, ob sie im Einklang mit Werten steht, die wir für wesentlich für den Sport halten. Die philosophischen Standardargumente gegen Doping im Sport behaupten eine Unvereinbarkeit von Doping mit Werten wie Fairness, Gesundheit oder Natürlichkeit. Ich möchte im Gegensatz zu diesen Argumenten eine grundsätzliche Unvereinbarkeit von Doping mit dem Wert eines nachhaltigen Umgangs einer Person mit sich selbst behaupten. Wer dopt, so meine These, folgt einem verabsolutierten Leistungsdenken, was aus ethischer Perspektive (...) kritisiert werden kann, wenn man den Wert der Nachhaltigkeit als ethischen Wert annimmt. (shrink)

Ist es moralisch verantwortbar, Menschen mit technischen Eingriffen zu verbessern? Der Aufsatz versucht diese Frage zu beantworten, indem zwei Gefahren für Verbesserungswillige beleuchtet werden: der Verlust der Menschlichkeit und der unerwünschte Wandel der individuellen Persönlichkeit. Sodann wird ein „Liberalismus mit Auffangnetz“ als Lösung des Problems vorgestellt, die eine unterschiedliche Bewertung von reversiblen und irreversiblen Eingriffen vornimmt. Im letzten Schritt wird überprüft, wie weit diese Konzeption auch anwendbar ist, wenn Eltern ihre Kinder verbessern lassen wollen, also ein „informed consent“ nicht vorausgesetzt (...) werden kann. Dabei werden Argumente zurückgewiesen, die Habermas gegen eine Verbesserung von Kindern vorgebracht hat. (shrink)

Für die Argumentation von Moralphilosophen, die die Legalisierung der aktiven Sterbehilfe befürworten, spielt das Autonomieprinzip eine wichtige Rolle. Ihrer Auffassung nach verlangt der Respekt vor der Autonomie, die Entscheidung eines schwer kranken Menschen gegen die Fortsetzung des Lebens vorbehaltlos anzuerkennen. Dagegen haben verschiedene Theoretiker auf Gefahren hingewiesen, die die rechtliche Zulassung der Tötung auf Verlangen für die individuelle Autonomie mit sich bringt. Sobald der Kranke über die Möglichkeit der aktiven Sterbehilfe verfüge, falle ihm die Verantwortung für die Inanspruchnahme von Pflegeleistungen (...) zu. In der Folge könne u. a. von Seiten der Familie die Forderung an ihn gestellt werden, den vom Gesetzgeber eröffneten Ausweg zu nutzen und sie von der Last seiner Pflege zu befreien. Die Bedenken erscheinen insofern berechtigt, als Formen sozialen Zwangs vorstellbar sind, die eine freie Entscheidung des Patienten verhindern. Allerdings vermag weder das Verbot noch die Zulassung der aktiven Sterbehilfe eine autonome Entscheidung aller Individuen zu gewährleisten. Die Abwägung der Risiken, mit denen beide Optionen behaftet sind, spricht im Ergebnis für die Legalisierung der Tötung auf Verlangen. (shrink)

Am 1. Februar 2010 ist das Gendiagnostikgesetz (GenDG) in Kraft getreten. Die Debatte um einige Regelungsbereiche, wie beispielsweise das Neugeborenenscreening, reißt nicht ab. Ein Aspekt des Gesetzes ist im Rahmen der Debatte um die Präimplantationsdiagnostik (PID) in Deutschland unter neuen Vorzeichen zu diskutieren: Das – international bislang einzigartige – Verbot der pränatalen Diagnostik so genannter spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen, die erst nach der Vollendung des 18. Lebensjahres ausbrechen. In diesem Beitrag möchten wir Hinweise zur differenzierten Diskussion dieser in § 15(2) GenDG bestimmten (...) Verbotsnorm liefern. Obgleich Argumente, insbesondere das Recht auf Nichtwissen des geborenen Kindes, für ein solches Verbot sprechen, kommen wir aufgrund der medizinischen Sachlage und nach einer Analyse der Pro- und Kontraargumente aus ethischer und rechtlicher Sicht zu dem Schluss, dass ein generelles Verbot der pränatalen Diagnostik spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen im Sinne der Zielsetzung womöglich insuffizient ist sowie in der Begründung Inkonsistenzen zum bereits bestehenden Regelwerk aufweist, und lenken daher den Blick auf unter Umständen bessere Alternativen. (shrink)

Die prospektive Analyse der ethischen Implikationen medizinisch-technischer Innovationen läuft immer auch Gefahr, sich in den Wunschbildern von Marketingexperten zu verfangen. Vor diesem Hintergrund könnte es durchaus nützlich sein, die Erkenntnisse der Wissenschafts- und Technikforschung zur Genese und Entwicklung neuer Techniken auszuschöpfen. Dies erscheint gerade auch für die ins Phantastische weisende Zukunft der Individualisierung medikamentöser Therapie, wie man ihr häufig in der Beschreibung pharmakogenetischer Behandlungskonzepte begegnet, angebracht. Techniken, die sich noch im Entwicklungsstadium befinden und deren breite Anwendung noch einige Jahre auf (...) sich warten lassen wird, sollten sehr sorgfältig auf ihren Realitätsgehalt und das zu erwartende Leistungspotenzial hin analysiert werden. Dazu gehört v. a. auch eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit den Leitbildern, Visionen und Nutzenversprechen, mit denen technische Innovationen oft sehr absichtsvoll ausgestattet werden. Wird dabei die Distanz zur Rhetorik der Protagonisten der neuen Techniken nicht gewahrt, gerät die ethische Reflexion unvermittelt in die Rolle, profane Marketingstrategien wortgewandt und ideenreich zu veredeln. (shrink)

Patientenmobilität und grenzüberschreitende Gesundheitsversorgung sind alltägliche Phänomene in der Europäischen Union (EU). Im Jahr 2011 hat die EU eine Richtlinie erlassen, um in diesem Kontext Rechtssicherheit herzustellen. Bisher gibt es keine umfassenden systematischen Studien über ethische Aspekte grenzübergreifender Gesundheitsversorgung. In dieser Arbeit werden die rechtlichen Entwicklungen der grenzübergreifenden Gesundheitsversorgung dargestellt und die in der Literatur vereinzelt erwähnten ethisch relevanten Aspekte heuristisch und auf Patiententypologien aufbauend systematisch inventarisiert und diskutiert. Es zeigt sich, dass die Möglichkeit der Patientenmobilität und die damit vor (...) allem verbundenen Finanzierungsregelungen die Autonomie einiger Patienten sicherlich verbessern kann. Allerdings können wohl nicht alle Patienten Versorgungsverbesserungen erwarten. Im Gegenteil können sogar negative Konsequenzen für einige Patienten folgen, was vor allem aus gerechtigkeitstheoretischen Überlegungen kritisch zu sehen ist. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a fundamental but under-appreciated distinction between two ways of understanding the desire-satisfaction theory of well-being. According to proactive desire satisfactionism, a person is benefited by the acquisition of new satisfied desires. According to reactive desire satisfactionism, a person can be benefited only by the satisfaction of their existing desires. I first offer an overview of this distinction. I then canvass several ways of developing a general formulation of desire satisfactionism that would capture the reactive view, (...) and argue that all come with significant costs. (shrink)

I argue that we have not only individual reasons for action but also collective reasons for action: reasons which apply to us as a group. I next argue that if we together have a reason to act, then I may have a reason to do my part, but only when others will do theirs. Finally, I argue that collective reasons to do good can never make a difference to what individuals ought to do, but that other kinds of collective reasons (...) can. (shrink)

Effective altruism (EA) is a movement devoted to the idea of doing good in the most effective way possible. EA has been the target of a number of critiques. In this article, I focus on one prominent critique: that EA fails to acknowledge the importance of institutional change. One version of this critique claims that EA relies on an overly individualistic approach to ethics. Defenders of EA have objected that this charge either fails to identify a problem with EA's core (...) idea that each of us should do the most good we can, or makes unreasonable claims about what we should do. However, I argue that we can understand the critique in a way that is well motivated, and that can avoid these objections. (shrink)

When we think about ethics, we normally focus on a particular sort of agent: the individual person. Some philosophers have argued that we should rethink the limits of what counts as an ethically relevant unit of agency by expanding outward, and claiming that groups of people can have normative reasons for action. In this paper, I explore whether we can go in the other direction. Are there sub‐personal beings who count as agents with their own reasons for action? In particular, (...) might the temporal parts of persons, beings like “me‐in‐my‐twenties,” be thought of as normative agents? This idea, I argue, has deep attractions, and deep, but surmountable, challenges. And if we do accept this idea, I argue, this can indirectly help to support the case for thinking that groups can have reasons for action. (shrink)

Pattern-based reasons are reasons for action deriving not from the features of our own actions, but from the features of the larger patterns of action in which we might be participating. These reasons might relate to the patterns of action that will actually be carried out, or they might relate to merely hypothetical patterns. In past work, I have argued that accepting merely hypothetical pattern-based reasons, together with a plausible account of how to weigh these reasons, can lead to disastrous (...) consequences. However, in this article, I argue that this problem is not limited to hypothetical pattern-based reasons: it turns out that there are analogous issues for reasons deriving from actual patterns. I then suggest that we can avoid this problem by adopting a different account of the weight of pattern-based reasons. (shrink)

Could it be true that even though we as a group ought to do something, you as an individual ought not to do your part? And under what conditions, in particular, could this happen? In this article, I discuss how a certain kind of case, introduced by David Copp, illustrates the possibility that you ought not to do your part even when you would be playing a crucial causal role in the group action. This is because you may have special (...) agent-relative reasons against participating that are not shared by the group as a whole. I defend the claim that these are indeed cases in which you ought not to do your part in what the group ought to do. I then argue that we can expect these cases to produce a troubling kind of rational conflict. (shrink)

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGIm Diskurs zum Theodizeeproblem beschäftigen sich die einzelnen Autoren mit sehr unterschiedlichen Ausgangsfragen, und zwar meist ohne diese Tatsache zu reflektieren. Wenn man jedoch ernst nimmt, dass »das Theodizeeproblem« einen Sammelbegriff für sehr unterschiedliche Fragen darstellt, setzt eine sinnvolle Bearbeitung des Theodizeeproblems eine bewusste Benennung der genauen Ausgangsfrage und idealerweise eine sachliche Begründung für die Wahl eben dieser Frage voraus. Davon, ob die Ausgangsfrage im Horizont des Glaubens formuliert wird oder nicht, in existenzieller oder in abstrahierender Perspektive, mit Gott als (...) Adressat oder nicht, anhand eines schöpfungstheologischen, kreuzestheologischen oder eschatologischen Zugangs, unter Zugrundelegung eines traditionell-theistischen oder eines nicht traditionell-theistischen Gottesbegriffs, agnostisch oder atheistisch, logisch oder empirisch, hängt es ab, ob es eine Antwort gibt, welche Antwortmöglichkeiten in den Blick kommen können und welche nicht, welche Bedürfnisse des Fragenden befriedigt werden und welche nicht, kurz: was von der weiteren Problembearbeitung erwartet werden kann und was nicht.SUMMARYIn the discourse on theodicy, individual authors deal with very different initial questions and for the most part fail to reflect upon this very fact. However, if one does recognize the importance of understanding THE problem of evil as an umbrella term for quite distinct issues, a proper treatment of theodicy implies precisely specifying the initial question and, ideally, a factual justification for the choice of this question. Whether the initial question is phrased in the horizon of faith, in an existential or abstract perspective, whether it directly adresses God, whether it is approached by means of creation theology, a theology of the cross or eschatological theology, whether it is based on a traditional theistical idea of god, agnostic or atheistic, logical or empirical, ultimately determines the actual existence of an answer, which possible answers can be brought to the questioner's attention and which of his or her needs can be satisfied in this regard; in short, what can be expected from the treatment of the problem and what cannot. (shrink)

The paradox of hedonism is the idea that making pleasure the only thing that we desire for its own sake can be self-defeating. Why would this be true? In this paper, I survey two prominent explanations, then develop a third possible explanation, inspired by Joseph Butler's classic discussion of the paradox. The existing accounts claim that the paradox arises because we are systematically incompetent at predicting what will make us happy, or because the greatest pleasures for human beings are found (...) in certain special goods which hedonists cannot enjoy. On the account that I develop, the paradox is a consequence of a theory about the nature of pleasure, together with a view about the requirements of rational belief. Which of these explanations is correct, I argue, bears on central questions about how to understand the nature and extent of the paradox. (shrink)

The paradox of hedonism is the idea that intrinsically desiring nothing other than pleasure can prevent one from obtaining pleasure. In this article, I show how the paradox of hedonism can be used as the basis for an objection against hedonism about well-being, and one that is more defensible than has been commonly recognized. Moreover, I argue that the challenge presented by the paradox can be used to target not only hedonism about well-being, but also desire satisfactionism and the hybrid (...) theory. However, I argue that certain sophisticated versions of all three theories can escape it. (shrink)

Plausibly, one important part of a good life is doing work that makes a contribution, or a positive difference to the world. In this paper, however, I explore contribution pessimism, the view that people will not always have adequate opportunities for making contributions. I distinguish between three interestingly different and at least initially plausible reasons why this view might be true: in slogan form, things might become too easy, they might become too good, or we might be too late. Now, (...) one response to these problems might be to deliberately attempt to undo them. However, I claim that this solution is intuitively misguided, and argue that explaining this supports a holistic approach to the value of contributions. Finally, I argue that if contribution pessimism is correct, it could provide an explanation of some widely held intuitions about issues in population ethics, with implications about the practical issue of how much priority we should give to addressing risks of human extinction. (shrink)

In der Diskussion über Ökonomisierung im Gesundheitswesen werden oft wesentliche Begriffsunterscheidungen außer Acht gelassen. Um feststellen zu können, in welchem Fall die Rede von Ökonomisierung oder Ökonomismus im negativen Sinn angemessen ist, muss zwischen dem Gesellschaftsbereich Wirtschaft und der ökonomischen Dimension in allen Gesellschaftsbereichen (wie dem Gesundheitswesen) unterschieden werden. Es muss geklärt werden, wo ökonomische Ziele verfolgt werden sollen und wo andere Ziele mit ökonomischen Mitteln verfolgt werden sollen. Im Blick auf die Frage nach einer Marktsteuerung des Gesundheitswesens ist zu (...) unterscheiden zwischen dem Gut Gesundheit und Gesundheitsgütern sowie zwischen öffentlichen, privaten und meritorischen Gütern. Außerdem ist die Frage nach einer Marktsteuerung des Gesundheitswesens zu unterscheiden von der Frage nach der Verwendung marktwirtschaftlicher Instrumente zur Steuerung des Umgangs mit bestimmten Gesundheitsgütern durch den Staat. Erst diese begrifflichen Differenzierungen können zu einer angemesseneren Beurteilung der komplexen wirtschaftsethischen Fragen jenseits von wirtschaftsfeindlichen oder ökonomistischen, von marktfeindlichen oder marktradikalen Ideologien führen. (shrink)

In virtue of what do we enjoy episodes of pleasure? According to the phenomenological theory of pleasure, we enjoy pleasures in virtue of having certain kinds of phenomenal experiences. According to the attitude theory of pleasure, we enjoy pleasures in virtue of having a certain kind of pro-attitude. In this chapter, we show that the attitude theory faces a dilemma. The attitude that is relevant to pleasure—the desire, liking, or favoring—is either necessarily co-instantiated with certain phenomenology, or not. If the (...) attitude theorist denies that the relevant attitudes are phenomenologically enriched in this sense, then their theory has the problematic implication that pleasure can come radically apart from phenomenology. This leads to a *problem of hedonic inversion*. If the attitude theorist instead affirms that the relevant attitudes are phenomenologically enriched, then they undermine their main objection to the phenomenological theory of pleasure. This is the so-called *heterogeneity problem*, according to which pleasures do not feel alike. Either way, the attitudinal theorist faces a difficult challenge in their ongoing debate with phenomenological theorists. (shrink)

The article discusses issues of interaction between the scientific systems of Eastern and Western Europe in the context of current global and local conflicts. Also, ethical issues are considered in connection with solving such problems in science, as well as examining similarities and differences of the scientific systems and their possible modelling. Some practical recommendations are included, based on the suggested academic speculations.

The central conflicts of the world today are closely related to cultural, traditional, and religious differences between nations. As we move to a globalized world, these differences often become magnified, entrenched, and the cause of bloody conflict. Growing out of a conference of distinguished scholars from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States, this volume is a singular contribution to mutual understanding and cooperative efforts on behalf of peace. The term paideia, drawn from Greek philosophy, has to do with (...) responsible education for citizenship as a necessary precondition for effective democracy. (shrink)

Zoos attract millions of visitors every year, many of whom are schoolchildren. For this reason, zoos are important institutions for the environmental education of future generations. Empirical studies on the educational impact of environmental education programs in zoos are still rare. To address this issue, we conducted two studies: In study 1, we investigated students’ interests in different biological topics, including zoos ( n = 1,587). Data analysis of individual topics revealed large differences of interest, with advanced students showing less (...) interest in zoos. In study 2, we invited school classes of this age group to visit different guided tours at the zoo and tested connection to nature before and after each educational intervention ( n = 608). The results showed that the guided tours are an effective tool to raise students’ connection to nature. Add-on components have the potential to further promote connection to nature. The education programs are most effective with students with a low initial nature connection. (shrink)

This volume views human existence from various perspectives and asks what its purpose is. The underlying thesis is that humans are creatures of relationships. Any anthropology that fails to take this fact seriously will of necessity remain abstract. Instead the authors are interested in how different academic disciplines describe the variety of relationships in human life, taking into account their ethical and theological dimensions.

RésuméDans ce bref exposé qui sľstématise, complète ou corrige certaines suggestions éparses dans ľœuvre de Freud, le Dr Alexander formule les trois principes dľnamiques fondamentaux qui lui paraissent gouverner le comportement des êtrès vivants:I. Principe de Stabilité visant au maintien de ľéquilibre homéostatique de ľorganisme. Cet équi‐libre est assuré sur le plan Psychologique par ľego intégrant les données des sensations externes et internes de façon à déclencher les actes ?exécution et ?adaptation souhaitables.II. Principe ?Economie et ?Inertie . Les actes (...) ?adaptation au monde externe doivent être appris par essais et erreurs. lis tendent ensuite à se répéter automatiquement au prix de la moindre dépense ?énergie. Ľavantage est évident en cas de conditions extérieures constantes. Si ces conditions viennent à changer, ľautomatisme perd son rôle adaptatif et se cristallise en fixations et régressions, génératrices de troubles névrotiques. La plasticité souhaitable en pareils cas suppose ľintervention ?un troisième principe.III. Principe de ľEnergie de Surplus. Quand ils ont paréà tous leurs besoins, les êtrès vivants disposent ?un surplus ?énergie qu'ils dépensent librement sous forme ?expérimentation ludique et de jeu. Le jeu sert àéprouver et à stabiliser les fonctions, dont il rend possible le déploiement utilitaire ultérieur. II donné au comportement sa plasticité et sa possibilitľé de faire face à des situations neuves. II procure ?autre part un plaisir eArotique qui est fondamentalement de même nature que le plaisir liéà la sexualité. En effet, dans la sexualité adulte, ľorganisme aftecte son surplus ?énergie à la production ?un nouvel être, distinct des géniteurs. Dautre part, les satisfactions érotiques dispersées de ľenfance viennent confluer et s'unir dans le plaisir de ľorgasme. (shrink)

Este pequeno texto é uma singela homenagem que dedico para o meu exprofessor da graduação em Filosofia e meu orientador no mestrado em Ética e Epistemologia da UFPI. Trata-se de um texto rememorativo e de agradecimentos pela convivência e aprendizagem que tive com o professor Dr. José Sérgio D. da Fonseca. A grata oportunidade de conhecer o professor Dr. José Sérgio ocorreu-me por volta do ano 2009 em uma disciplina de seminário, na qual o professor José Sérgio ministrou um curso (...) sobre filosofia da mente, se minha memória não falha. (shrink)

Over the last few years there has been a resurgent interest in various scientific disciplines in Popper’s arguments. To gain a greater appreciation of Popper’s scientific arguments, they need to be viewed in relation to his broader philosophy and where this stands within the history of ideas. This book aims to take seriously those aspects of Popper’s writings that have received less attention and wherein he advanced metaphysical, speculative, mystical-poetic, aesthetic and Platonic arguments. Such arguments are crucial for an appreciation (...) of his scientific and political writings. I argue that Popper, much like Wittgenstein previously has been misconstrued as an Anglo-analytic philosopher. This book provides an interpretation of Popper’s mature philosophy within his Central-European intellectual context. The aim of which is to open up a fruitful line of investigation into Popper’s thought that I hope would continue over the coming years. Alexander Naraniecki has spent time at the Popper Archives at the University of Klagenfurt in Austria whilst researching for this book. He has also been a visiting scholar at Duke University and has completed a postdoctoral research fellowship at Deakin University in Melbourne. Dr Naraniecki also publishes on issues relating to multiculturalism, globalization, cosmopolitanism as well as inter-cultural relations and dialogue. He has published on Popper in various leading journals such as Philosophy, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, and The European Legacy. He is currently building his research on Popper in a broader direction by exploring issues related to creativity and problem solving for critical thinking. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Alexander Dietz argues that what I have called the ‘institutional critique of effective altruism’ is best understood as grounded in the claim that ‘EA relies on an overly individualistic approach to ethics, neglecting the importance of our collective obligations’. In this reply, I argue that Dietz’s view does not represent a plausible interpretation of the institutional critiques offered by others, primarily because, unlike Dietz, they appear to believe that their (...) critiques provide reasons to reject the EA view about the content of our individual obligations. I also argue that EA’s identity as a social movement provides grounds for denying Dietz’s claim that it is objectionably incomplete. (shrink)

"One of the outstanding authorities on the early days of the Republic, Saul K. Padover offers in this volume a generous sampling of the letters, essays, speeches, discourses, and personal documents--many of them previously unpublished--of the men who made America. Included are extensive selections from the papers and speeches of John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George Washington. There are also copious extracts from the private and public utterances of secondary, but important, figures of (...) the founding days--Samuel Adams, Elbridge Gerry, Patrick Henry, John Dickinson, Oliver Ellsworth, William Paterson, Benjamin Rush, George Wythe, and many others. A number of the speeches made at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 are given in full, and several of the important debates are reproduced. John Dickinson's Letters from an American Farmer in Pennsylvania appear in these pages as well as many of Alexander Hamilton's famous and brief opinions. Also included are John Hancock's speech on the Boston Massacre; Thomas Jefferson's Notes on Virginia; James Madison's Memorial against Religious Assessments; two of the most important of John Marshall's Supreme Court decisions (Marbury vs. Madison and McCulloch vs. Maryland); Robert Morris' Letters on Finance; John Taylor's paper On Aristocracy, and William Paterson's Plan for a Constitution. Taken together, these writings offer in one volume a complete picture of the thinking, the debate, the legal maneuvers, the compromises, the manners, and the morals of the American nation's earliest days. The book provides a sound basic appreciation of the atmosphere in which the Founding Fathers worked and planned and debated with one another. All the many counter-currents that contributed to the building of the Constitution, the stresses to which the young nation was subjected, the rebellion that continued to seethe, the moral climate of the days--these are all recreated in the speeches and writings of America's first patriots. Dr. Padover has bound the selections together with enlightening commentary that enables the reader to understand the exact circumstances of each utterance and brings the particular work into historical perspective."--Jacket. (shrink)