The history of ideas is most prominently understood as a highly specialized group of methods for the study of abstract ideas, with both diachronic and synchronic aspects. While theorizing the field has focused on the methods of study, defining the object of study – ideas – has been neglected. But the development of the theories behind material culture studies poses a sharp challenge to these narrow approaches. It both challenges the integrity of the notion of abstract ideas and also offers (...) possibilities for enlarging the scope of the ways in which we can study ideas historically. It is proposed here to regard ideas as mental relations deeply connected to human communication by both thinking and doing. This connection of ideational thought to human production and behavior is a deep foundation for the history of ideas as an interdisciplinary historiographic means of understanding moral life. (shrink)

These lectures are concerned with spiritual forces and influences working in world history and in the karma of human beings. Steiner's penetrating insights into the events and personalities history are one of his major contributions to modern times. Steiner focuses here on the Babylonian and Greek cultures and the connecting threads running between individual personalities and the evolution of humanity as a whole.

These lectures are concerned with spiritual forces and influences working in world history and in the karma of human beings. Steiner's penetrating insights into the events and personalities history are one of his major contributions to modern times. Steiner focuses here on the Babylonian and Greek cultures and the connecting threads running between individual personalities and the evolution of humanity as a whole.

This article mainly discusses the standardization of the translation of personal and place names. In the first section, common problems in the translations of foreign names and Chinese names are summarized. The basic principles of the translation of personal names are discussed and several systems used in the transliteration history of Chinese names are presented in detail. The author also makes a brief review and comments on bilingual dictionaries of personal names published in modern China. In the second section, based (...) on the practices and lessons of translation of place names from and into Chinese, the author refines the basic principles of the standardization of translated place names, summarizes the methods and strategies for place names translation, and sums up the unified translations of certain disputed place names based on the summary of common problems in place names translation in official publications. In the third section, it is believed that the standardization of place names translation depends on the compilation of authoritative dictionaries of place names. In this section, several representative translated dictionaries of place names in late Qing dynasty, the Republic of China, and the People’s Republic of China are reviewed. The author analyses the characteristics of these dictionaries and their contributions to the unification of translated place names and sums up the overall translation history of the standardization of place names in modern China. (shrink)

On Yongjo, King of Korea, 1694-1776, Confucianism and kingship. Examines the individual's sense of achievement, drawing the current thinking of anthropology and psychology into the framework constructed by contemporary philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer. Also considers other modern thought in delineating the relationship between self and history. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Editor's introduction by Leonard Levin -- A personal viewpoint: autobiographical essay -- My way in the research and teaching of Jewish thought -- Judaism and the lonely Jew -- Faith: its trusting and testing - the question of God's righteousness -- History in the postmodern age -- The idolatrous values and rituals of the global village.

For Max Scheler, St. Francis represented perhaps the highest ideal of the moral life, an ideal he felt compelled to articulate throughout his philosophical work. In this paper, I examine the significance of the person of St. Francis for Scheler’s philosophy. I begin by developing Scheler’s notion of “exemplary person,” the idea that persons act as influences on moral life and thought. I then hypothesize that St. Francis functioned as an exemplary person for Scheler. Finally, I attempt to justify that (...) hypothesis by examining Scheler’s discussion of Francis in Sympathy and by comparing Scheler’s philosophy to elements of the thought of Bonaventure and of Scotus. I conclude with a discussion of the significance of using exemplary persons for understanding the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and the “Geneva Declaration” by the World Medical Association, both in 1948, were preceded by the foundation of the United Nations in New York (1945), the World Medical Association in London (1946) and the World Health Organization in Geneva (1948). After the end of World War II the community of nations strove to achieve and sustain their primary goals of peace and security, as well as their basic premise, namely the health of human beings. (...) All these associations were well aware of the crimes by medicine, in particular by the accused Nazi physicians at the Nuremberg Doctors Trial (1946/47, sentence: August 1947). During the first conference of the World Medical Association (September 1947) issues of medical ethics played a major role: and a new document was drafted concerning the values of the medical profession. After the catastrophe of the War and the criminal activities of scientists, the late 1940s saw increased scrutiny paid to fundamental questions of human rights and medical ethics, which are still highly relevant for today’s medicine and morality. The article focuses on the development of medical ethics and human rights reflected in the statement of important persons, codes and institutions in the field. (shrink)

In the aftermath of the Port Arthur shootings, Dunblane or the schoolyard killings in America, communities try to come to terms with private and public trauma and there is a need to understand what kind of person can commit such terrible acts. The problem of how to understand dangerousness often centres on the role of the mental health and criminal justice systems and it is from the intersection of these two institutions that the categorisation of dangerous persons has emerged. This (...) 2001 book traces the history of the category of antisocial personality disorder and shows how it is linked to particular kinds of governing. It examines key legal and institutional developments in Australia, the UK and the US and also parallel developments within psychiatry and psychological medicine. Applying a social theoretical analysis to this material, McCallum challenges our assumptions about the formation and control concepts of dangerousness and personality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and History, Customs and EthicsHui-Chieh Loy (bio)Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom. By Tao Jiang. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021.Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China is a serious tour de force of a study. In many ways, I am reminded of Angus Graham's Disputers of the Tao and Benjamin Schwartz' The World of Thought in Ancient (...) China—but updated. A signal difference is that it is more constrained in its coverage of figures, texts, and especially in having the topical focus upon moral-political philosophy. At the same time and within the chosen (narrower) confines, it often examines its subject in greater detail and draws on more recent discussions.One neat thing that Jiang does is to deliberately weave in explicit discussions of how each subsequent thinker or text incorporated or criticized ideas associated with earlier thinkers. (I formulated it this way since there isn't enough historical evidence about who-actually-read-what in the ancient world, citation practices being what they were.) In this regard, I am especially heartened to read, for example, the sections on "Traces of Mohist Elements in the Laozi" (3.3.2), and "Mohist Elements in Han Feizi's Thought" (7.3.3).By no means should the desultory remarks below be counted as a full review or assessment (impressionistically, this is the sort of book I will recommend that my grad students read—there, I've said it). Think of them as humble shards of pottery thrown in the hope for some jade in response. To make my task more focused, I will comment on the Sinology versus Philosophy distinction, and Jiang's treatment of the Mohists.I. Philosophy and History of PhilosophyAn important part of Jiang's Introduction is devoted to discussing the situation of Chinese Philosophy as a field in the Western Academy, caught between Sinology on the one hand and academic Philosophy on the other. Due to the different scholarly objectives and norms in the two disciplines, scholars working on Chinese Philosophy often find themselves caught [End Page 420] between two distinct audiences who demand different things. Jiang's aim is to propose an "interpretive model to distinguish two sets of scholarly objects operative in Sinology and philosophy. These objects are related and at times overlap, but they are also often irreducibly distinct, i.e., original text versus inherited text, historical author versus textual author, and authorial intent versus textual intent, with the former in the pairs belonging to Sinologists and the latter to philosophers" (p. 7). In general, I am highly sympathetic to the distinctions Jiang draws. But I do wonder if we need to step back and start from a wider context involving what is potentially a deeper divide.Now, it is entirely a caricature but the joke around the water cooler is that philosophers—especially those of a more "analytic" bent—often exude the attitude that they are not in the business of reading old books. Their project is one focused on issues and problems and puzzles that are ultimately about the natural and human world, rather than about texts and their interpretation, or even the historical thinkers themselves. To give some obvious examples, the intellectual questions they see themselves as answering are the likes of:• Can we know that God exists, if God exists at all?• What is the nature of moral claims? Do they admit of truth and falsity?• How is causation related to possibility?• Is a logic that dispenses with the law of non-contradiction viable?• What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge?• Is abortion morally justifiable?Sometimes the questions they ask even infringe on the results and insights from nearby fields, for instance linguistics and the natural and empirical sciences:• What is time?• Can a presentist conception of time be made consistent with contemporary physics?• What is the nature of consciousness? How is it related to physical neural states or informational computational processes?• Can computers be sentient?• How is morality related to the passions?• In what sense is a political order that does justice to diversity of moral beliefs... (shrink)

In the course of his polemic against Kant’s moral philosophy, Scheler was led to depreciate moral obligation and its place in the existence of persons. This depreciation is part of a larger anti-authoritarian strain in his personalism. I attempt to retrieve certain truths about moral obligation that tend to get lost in Scheler: moral obligation is not merely “medicinal” but has a place at the highest levels of moral life; the freedom of persons is lived in an incomparable way in (...) responding to moral obligation; obligation and obedience even have an indispensable place in the existence of Christians. Drawing on the studies of Scheler by Rudolf Otto, Karol Wojtyla, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Dietrich von Hildebrand, I show how Scheler’s personalism is corrected and enhanced once we distance ourselves from his anti-authoritarian animus against obligation and restore obligation to its place in the existence of persons. (shrink)

We can, in view of what we have said, ask if Tugarinov is doing a sort of structuralism; and, however we answer that question, one will want to know if he is doing something that can succeed, at least better than other moderns who have attempted a similar enterprise.The answer is that Tugarinov is doing a sort of (quasi-Aristotelian) structuralism — at least in the sense of refusing any absolute fixity to history, and of asserting a multi-level poly-directionality to the (...) historical flow — an approach that suffers from most of the weaknesses of other such structuralisms.If Tugarinov succeeds better than other moderns — and we think that he does — this is because he refuses to make of historicism a relativism, maintaining a certain “categorial integrity” that is within history but not historical. In this he identifies with the best in the philosophic tradition; but it is not at all clear how he remains “Marxist”. (shrink)

PREFACE. THE Author of this very practical treatise on Scotch Loch - Fishing desires clearly that it may be of use to all who had it. He does not pretend to have written anything new, but to have attempted to put what he has to say in as readable a form as possible. Everything in the way of the history and habits of fish has been studiously avoided, and technicalities have been used as sparingly as possible. The writing of this (...) book has afforded him pleasure in his leisure moments, and that pleasure would be much increased if he knew that the perusal of it would create any bond of sympathy between himself and the angling community in general. This section is interleaved with blank shects for the readers notes. The Author need hardly say that any suggestions addressed to the case of the publishers, will meet with consideration in a future edition. We do not pretend to write or enlarge upon a new subject. Much has been said and written-and well said and written too on the art of fishing but loch-fishing has been rather looked upon as a second-rate performance, and to dispel this idea is one of the objects for which this present treatise has been written. Far be it from us to say anything against fishing, lawfully practised in any form but many pent up in our large towns will bear us out when me say that, on the whole, a days loch-fishing is the most convenient. One great matter is, that the loch-fisher is depend- ent on nothing but enough wind to curl the water, -and on a large loch it is very seldom that a dead calm prevails all day, -and can make his arrangements for a day, weeks beforehand whereas the stream- fisher is dependent for a good take on the state of the water and however pleasant and easy it may be for one living near the banks of a good trout stream or river, it is quite another matter to arrange for a days river-fishing, if one is looking forward to a holiday at a date some weeks ahead. Providence may favour the expectant angler with a good day, and the water in order but experience has taught most of us that the good days are in the minority, and that, as is the case with our rapid running streams, -such as many of our northern streams are, -the water is either too large or too small, unless, as previously remarked, you live near at hand, and can catch it at its best. A common belief in regard to loch-fishing is, that the tyro and the experienced angler have nearly the same chance in fishing, -the one from the stern and the other from the bow of the same boat. Of all the absurd beliefs as to loch-fishing, this is one of the most absurd. Try it. Give the tyro either end of the boat he likes give him a cast of ally flies he may fancy, or even a cast similar to those which a crack may be using and if he catches one for every three the other has, he may consider himself very lucky. Of course there are lochs where the fish are not abundant, and a beginner may come across as many as an older fisher but we speak of lochs where there are fish to be caught, and where each has a fair chance. Again, it is said that the boatman has as much to do with catching trout in a loch as the angler. Well, we dont deny that. In an untried loch it is necessary to have the guidance of a good boatman but the same argument holds good as to stream-fishing... (shrink)

In his critique of aesthetic individualism, R.G. Collingwood provides an account of persons that anticipates the post-Wittgensteinians; notably, Peter Strawson, Daniel Dennett, and Annette Baier. According to this view, persons emerge in the midst of other persons. This process is always unfinished and ongoing throughout one's life. One difficulty with this perspective is the problem of firstness: if persons are essentially second persons or one's personhood is contingent upon other persons, how could there be a first person or early persons? (...) One solution to this problem is to employ the notion of family or community. This solution can be found in both Collingwood and Baier.After this discussion,we look at his autobiography for evidence of his own 'discoveries' of personhood. There is tension here because he was a rebel and a loner, but there were a few (but not many) good relationships that confirm or exemplify his view of persons in his own life. Also briefly addressed is how this view fits into his theories of history and art. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 323 Person and Religion: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. By ZOFIA J. ZDYBICKA, U.C.J.A. Translated by Theresa Sandok. New York: Peter Lang, 1991. Pp. xix+ 397 (cloth). Zdybicka's volume is the third in Peter Lang's series, "Catholic Thought from Lublin." A convenient way to display the contents of Person and Religion is to elaborate the meaning of " philosophy of religion " and its comprising (...) terms. Philosophy of religion designates the attempt to arrive at an ultimate explanation of the empirically given and existentially apprehended fact of religion (p. 96). In other words, why does religion exist at all and what are its subjective and objective grounds? This endeavor Zdybicka understands to be a recent one. Despite a wealth of reflection on religion over the centuries (See her historical survey, pp. 1-49), only since the 19th century have there been separate disciplines with the phenomenon of religion as their object. Zdybicka also emphasizes that not any kind of philosophy is equal to the task of carrying out the above mentioned attempt. Since the ultimate explanation of religion as truth or fantasy will entail determining whether God exists, only philosophies capable of grasping the real can serve the interests of philosophy of religion. Forms of Kantianism and phenomenology are not equal to the task (p. 97). Only a realistic philosophy connected with a theory of being stands a chance of offering an ultimate explanation of religion. In particular, the metaphysics borne in mind here is that of Krapiec. Peter Lang has recently published an English translation of it under the title, Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being (see my review in the January issue of The Thomist.) This work is indispensable background reading for Part III of Zdybicka's volume. Though this metaphysics is existential Thomist, its employment in a philosophy of religion will not resolve the question of which religion is true, though some religions will be ruled out as unsuitable for the human being (p. 97). What is understood as "religion"? In its basic meaning the religious fact is the reference or orientation of the human being toward a transcendent reality (p. 109). Considered more closely, the religious fact is actually multiphasic. First, there is the experience of our own ontic insufficiency and the consciousness of our transcendence and search for a value capable of preserving us in being and giving us complete existential meaning. Second, there is the religious experience in its strict sense. This second phase is itself divided into three phases. First is some kind of revelation from the religious object. Zdybicka stresses that this revelation occurs through signs to which we respond in faith; there is no direct cognitive contact with the religious object. 324 BOOK REVIEWS Second, there is the active response of the one struck by this revelation. The response consists in pursuing union with the deity. This second phase involves purification. Finally, there is the realization of the bond with the sacrum. What is achieved in the human person is holiness. The book concludes (pp. 315-22) with an extended discussion of this value. In sum, the phases of the religious experience properly speaking are: encounter, dialogue, and union. Zdybicka regards religious cults and rites as simply the externalization of religious acts (p. 129). They complete the description of the religious fact. Zdybicka also takes some time to distinguish religious experience from cognitive, moral, and aesthetic experience. Finally, pp. 157-59 contain an interesting inductive argument that the object of religious experience has always been understood as personal. In Part III Zdybicka performs a philosophical assessment of the religious fact. Specifically, the assessment is of the above mentioned introductory phase. Also as mentioned, Zdybicka takes advantage of Krapiec's Gilsonian existential Thomism which has denominated "classical philosophy." This philosophy's analysis of the human person and of reality critically validates both the subjective and objective grounds for the fact of religion properly speaking. The philosophically established subjective grounds include the contingent ontic status of the human person as this is evinced in the presence of the essence/existence composition. They also include an analysis of the person's ability to know and... (shrink)

Social freedom may be taken to be primarily a property of persons, derivatively a property of choices, or the other way round. Nowadays it is standard to take it the other way round. But there is much to be said for the person-based rather than the choice- based way of thinking. And this way of thinking is characteristic of the neo-Roman, republican tradition.

Much of Edith Stein’s work on personhood is influenced by Max Scheler’s ethically focused Christian personalism. But Stein’s own treatment of the ethical implications of personalism is not yet well studied. While the ethical theme is visible early on, it is not until the 1930s that the implicitly Christian dimension of her personalism became explicit. Stein mined her Christian personalism for its ethical and pedagogical implications on the topic of self-formation. This paper reviews the lines of development of Stein’s Christian (...) personalism and examines its centrality for a concept of ethical education. (shrink)

Medical ethics, principles, persons, and perspectives is discussed under three headings: History, Theory, and Practice. Under Theory, the author will say something about some different approaches to the study and discussion of ethical issues in medicine—especially those based on principles, persons, or perspectives. Under Practice, the author will discuss how one perspectives based approach, hermeneutics, might help in relation first to everyday ethical issues and then to public controversies. In that context some possible advantages of moving from controversy to conversation (...) will be explored; and that will then be illustrated with reference to a current controversy about the use of human embryos in stem cell therapy research. The paper begins with history, and it begins in the author’s home city of Edinburgh. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger cited him as “the most potent philosophical power... in all of contemporary philosophy.” Ortega y Gasset called him “the first man of genius, the Adam of the new Paradise.” Writing at a crucial time in intellectual history, his influence has extended to persons as diverse as Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Karol Wojtyla, Jurgen Habermas, Ernst Bloch, and members of the generation of thinkers that developed in the German universities during the Weimar years. Despite this far-reaching impact, the (...) social theory and philosophy of Max Scheler have never been examined for the significance of their political thought. This book opens the possibility of deriving a contemporary political theory from Scheler’s philosophy and social theory, based on his understanding of the person, the community, and the significant new directions these elements suggest. Standing at some distance from modern liberalism, conservatism, and Marxism, both in their bourgeois and Enlightenment varieties, Scheler’s personalism has its roots in the rich admixture of life philosophy and phenomenology that gave rise to Martin Heidegger’s early philosophy. It is a philosophical anthropology founded on Scheler’s own realist phenomenology, sociology of knowledge, and non-formal ethics. The book considers Scheler’s many works and includes translations and reviews of unpublished materials. It includes an extensive bibliography of primary and secondary name sources. (shrink)

Courts are often criticised as undemocratic. The backlash against international courts in the last decade is also partly driven by this concern. Human rights courts’ legitimacy is particularly challenged because they aim to protect human rights against the very states that need to comply with and implement the courts’ judgements. Therefore, several international courts have developed mechanisms of deference to states. One especially interesting tool is the European Court of Human Rights’ margin of appreciation doctrine. This paper proposes that the (...) margin of appreciation can ensure the conditions of personal autonomy by protecting human rights while respecting the democratic decisions of states. Yet, states’ decisions should only be respected insofar as they realise political autonomy. Understanding the margin in this way allows us to critically evaluate arguments made under this label. The paper reviews developments in the ECtHR practice with regard to (a) different cases that use the margin of appreciation doctrine, (b) appeals to a European consensus, and (c) the procedural turn in its review and assesses whether and how they can be justified in the light of considerations about personal and political autonomy. (shrink)

La conscience, qui est un attribut de tous les êtres vivants, se développe, chez l’homme, en conscience de soi et personnalité. Dans le sommeil, l’hypnose et l’évanouissement reste seule la subconscience. Mais la conscience de soi disparaît aussi dans l’activité créatrice artistique, dans la contemplation du grand art, dans la concentration de la recherche scientifique, dans l’expérience émotionnelle de l’accroissement de pouvoir et dans la psychologie des foules. Dans des cas de ce genre, la connaissance de soi et la dualité (...) du sujet et de l’objet disparaissent, mais la personnalité humaine est plus harmonieuse et intégrée. Cette superconscience ou superpersonnalité supérieure est une et indivisible pour toute la race humaine : c’est le Moi social, dans lequel plongent nos moi séparés. (shrink)

Karol Wojtyła—the future pope John Paul II—chose the human being, especially in its personalistic dimension, as the main point of his philosophical research. Inaccordance with the metaphysical rule agere sequitur esse, he investigated the dynamisms proper to a human being: the reactive dynamism of the human body, the emotive dynamism of the human psyche, and the personalistic dynamism associated with free choice of the will. These allowed him to experience and understand the human being as a complex yet integrated entity. (...) The personal structure of the human being is manifest in terms of selfpossession, self-determination, and self-governance. Thanks to self-possession, human beings experience freedom of the will, which expresses itself in each free act. Being endowed with a free will, the human being is able to grow in freedom but can also lose his freedom. Wojtyła’s philosophical investigations are innovative by way of the use that he made of the philosophy of being according to Thomas Aquinas and the philosophy of consciousness articulated by Husserl. He not only pointed out man’s structure but also presented man as an objective entity in an objective world. Each human being is constituted by his or her inner self, which is absolutely exceptional because it is completely irreducible to anything else in the world. (shrink)

Personality theories often identify sets of primary parts. These are sets of a few personality parts expansive enough to collectively describe the total personality. Examples of such sets include the trilogy of mind , Freud’s structural set , and the recently-introduced systems set . These groups may be of unrecognized importance in understanding human personality. The defining characteristics of such sets are identified, their history is reviewed, their theoretical contributions considered, and then, criteria for distinguishing good (...) from bad sets of primary parts are proposed. Finally, the potential contribution of primary parts sets to personality psychology is revisited. (shrink)

True to his longstanding bias against grand unifying theories, Hacking chooses to pursue these questions by focusing on a specific case of memory-thinking: the history of multiple personality. His excavation of the contemporary terrain leads him, however, to the surprisingly grand conclusion that the various sciences of memory—including neurological studies of localization, experimental studies of recall, and studies in the psychodynamics of memory—all emerged in connection with attempts to “scientize the soul,” as a result of which spiritual battles have (...) been recast as scientific controversies “where we suppose there is such a thing as knowledge to be had”. (shrink)

Given that social studies pedagogy often runs in direct opposition to how students best learn, social studies teacher preparation must intervene by providing teachers robust experiences for inquiry, interpretation, creation, and personal meaning making. Digital history represents an area of innovation in social studies that can be a useful context for providing such interventions. This research applies a design-based methodology to develop a teacher education activity that reflects research on digital history and how students learn best by constructing and extending (...) prior knowledge, processing information into knowledge, and scaffolding. Design-based research has proven to be suitable as an intervention for classroom settings in that it can be rapidly refined in response to ongoing research on an intervention. The research asked what methods and tools can teacher educators use to promote digital history in their classrooms. Through the project, 200 teacher education students, over four iterative design phases, learned to process historical information into knowledge using technology to communicate refined versions of their knowledge to outside audiences. Seven design factors and six commonalities and differences were identified as influencing the design process. The results of this design-based research informed the development of generalizations and guidelines for designing similar digital history projects. (shrink)

John Christman, in 'Autonomy and Personal History,' advances a novel genetic or historical account of individual autonomy.1 He formulates 'the conditions of the [i.e., his] new model of autonomy' as follows: (i) A person Pis autonomous relative to some desireD if it is the case that P did not resist the development of D when attending to this process of development, or P would not have resisted that development had P attended to the process; (ii) The lack of resistance to (...) the development of D did not take place (or would not have) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection; and (iii) The self-reflection involved in condition (i) [sic] is (minimally) rational and involves no self-deception. (11) Although Christman makes a telling case for the relevance of personal history to personal autonomy, I shall argue that he has gone too far in that direction. (shrink)