If we take the indexical, “I”, to be epistemologically identical across different contexts, as in, for example, it is the same “I” that at one moment observes, “I see a puddle of water on the floor”, and then, subsequently, exclaims, “I detect a leaking tap”, and, furthermore, we attribute not only self reference but self awareness in the use of the indexical, “I”, then a question arises as to how the “I” finds itself to be in reference to the speaker (...) in one context and not another. We cannot look to the ingredients of the context that the “I” inhabits for the answer because, based upon the above assumptions, the identity, or character, of the “I” stands independently of the context of the speaker. The answer, I argue, requires both the admission of the unreality of space and time, as well as an explanation as to why we have a sense of the here and now despite space and time being unreal. To this end, I turn to the juxtaposition of Kant’s a priori forms of inner sense and outer sense to explain how the cognitive faculty arrives at a sense of time and place despite the declared unreality of time and space. To sustain this explanation in the face of the problem of localisation, I draw on the full implications of Kant’s transcendental idealism in which the properties of time and space are not only withdrawn from things as they exist externally to the mind but also from mental representations insofar as mental representations can be said to exist in themselves. (shrink)

Using this bit of dialogue from Oscar Wilde as introduction, we propose to demonstrate the pertinence of the hostess’ remark and to show that the “Fin de siècle” really did mark a certain “Fin du globe”, connoting as it does the decline of art, the end of an era and of the eras in which artistic experience, and even experience of the world, was realized in a specific style. It was indeed the end of what we will here call “globe (...) style”.For a long time the notion of style had a very general significance. The origin of the word can no doubt be traced back to the term stilus, designating the punch that monks used for writing, and also probably an Egyptian etymon signifying a pillar. Through metonymic extensions the name of the instrument (an instrument, nevertheless, used in a highly intellectual activity) and the name of the individual work (but a work of cultural and artistic nature) have been subject to generalization and ultimately designate the specific quality of a phenomenon. Obviously it was necessary that this phenomenon be confirmed and made official through imitation and tradition. As for generalization of the phenomenon of style, its scope has become almost unlimited, taking in all forms of creative activity whether artistic or not, and ultimately almost all beings as long as they have assumed a form hallowed by tradition. (shrink)

In The Geographer′s Art, Peter Haggett expounds his view of the nature and purpose, philosophy and methodology of the discipline and practice of geography. Ranging over every aspect of the subject, he considers the attractions, opportunities and responsibilities of life as a geographer and tries to answer some of the basic questions facing the discipline. The result is a highly individual look at geography and geographers, illustrated throughout from his own research and experience. Geography is immemorial and universal: it (...) touches us in many ways, in many forms and frequently in a manner neither fully perceived nor understood. Today interest in geography is booming: both the need for greater geographic awareness and the geographer′s vital role in understanding the processes and consequences of global and environmental change have received widespread recognition throughout the world. Yet the nature of the subject and the role of geographers remain little known to non–geographers and have yet to penetrate many hallowed academic and government halls. Just what do geographers do? What fires their imagination? Why are they so devoted to their subject? How can geography be used? Do we need more or less geographers, and how should they be educated? These and many other issues are addressed by Peter Haggett as he ranges over every aspect of the subject, theoretical and applied, physical and human, in order to explain the essence and importance of this multi–faceted subject. Few books can have conveyed so convincingly and so vividly the intellectual challenge of working in the field and the vital relevance of the discipline to contemporary human and environmental problems. (shrink)

For many years—and with some energy since Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism” —the scientific realist has sought to accommodate examples of false-yet-successful theories in the history of science. One of the most prominent strategies is to identify ‘success fueling’ components of false theories that themselves are at least approximately true. In this article I develop both sides of the debate, introducing new challenges from the history of science as well as suggesting adjustments to the divide et impera realist strategy. A (...) new ‘recipe’ for the prospective identification of working/idle posits is considered. (shrink)

In this book, Peter Achinstein proposes and defends several objective concepts of evidence. He then explores the question of whether a scientific method, such as that represented in the four "Rules for the Study of Natural Philosophy" that Isaac Newton invoked in proving his law of gravity, can be employed in demonstrating how the proposed definitions of evidence are to be applied to real scientific cases.

We compare astronomers' removal of Pluto from the listing of planets and psychiatrists' removal of homosexuality from the listing of mental disorders. Although the political maneuverings that emerged in both controversies are less than scientifically ideal, we argue that competition for "scientific authority" among competing groups is a normal part of scientific progress. In both cases, a complicated relationship between abstract constructs and evidence made the classification problem thorny.

Working in constructive set theory we formulate notions of constructive topological space and set-generated locale so as to get a good constructive general version of the classical Galois adjunction between topological spaces and locales. Our notion of constructive topological space allows for the space to have a class of points that need not be a set. Also our notion of locale allows the locale to have a class of elements that need not be a set. Class sized mathematical structures need (...) to be allowed for in constructive set theory because the powerset axiom and the full separation scheme are necessarily missing from constructive set theory. We also consider the notion of a formal topology, usually treated in Intuitionistic type theory, and show that the category of set-generated locales is equivalent to the category of formal topologies. We exploit ideas of Palmgren and Curi to obtain versions of their results about when the class of formal points of a set-presentable formal topology form a set. (shrink)

Theories of explanation are characterized as being either pragmatic or non-pragmatic, without a clear sense of what this is supposed to mean. The present paper offers a definition of a "pragmatic explanation-sentence", and in terms of this, of a "pragmatic theory of explanation". It is argued that van Fraassen's theory of explanation, despite claims to the contrary, is not genuinely pragmatic. By contrast, the author's own "illocutionary" theory is pragmatic. Attention is devoted particularly to sentences of the form "E is (...) a good explanation of q", which, it is urged, are pragmatic in a strong sense. In defense of this claim, and of the advantages of a pragmatic account generally, appeal is made to Rutherford's 1911 subatomic explanation of the results of his scattering experiments. Implications of a pragmatic theory are drawn for the debate between realists and anti-realists and absolutists and relativists. (shrink)

Peter Alexander; XIII*—The Names of Secondary Qualities, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 203–220, https://doi.or.

This chapter shows how al-Kindī interweaves ideas from Greek cosmology to give a theory that can explain the efficacy of astrology and how God’s providence is dispersed by means of heavenly influence. A concrete example is found in al-Kindī’s works on meteorology, since he thinks that weather is produced by celestial causation. The mechanics of this causation are explained differently in different works, which leads to a consideration of the authenticity of On Rays, which is ascribed to al-Kindī, and its (...) place in his corpus. Finally, the chapter considers whether al-Kindī’s account commits him to determinism, and whether he thinks universal causal determinism is compatible with human freedom. (shrink)

The past is, indeed, so essential to the club that they might just as well be called the Sons of History. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel argues that history follows a rational course of development that begins with civilization's earliest and crudest forms of thinking but culminates in modern science and philosophy. Thinking develops and matures through a process Hegel calls “dialectic.” A dialectical process has often been described as one in which an initial “thesis” is set against an opposing “antithesis,” (...) with the opposition between the two provoking a process that “sublates” or “uplifts” them into a hybrid or unified “synthesis.” This dialectical hybrid preserves what is good and right in those originally one‐sided positions, forging them into something higher. (shrink)

This book offers a nuanced understanding of God's power and draws on a rich plurality of voices to describe God as much more loving than wrathful, as persuasive rather than coercive, as more passible than impassible, and offers three claims for confidence in the idea of God.

In this study, we replicated what is known about the relative importance of dealbreakers and dealmakers in romantic and sexual relationships and extended it to an examination of self-reports of mate value, self-esteem, and loneliness. In two experiments we manipulated the information people were told about potential partners and asked them about their intentions to have sex again with or go on a second date with opposite sex targets. People were less interested in partners after learning dealbreakers, effects which operated (...) more strongly in the long-term than short-term context, but similarly in men and women. People who reported less self-esteem or more loneliness were more receptive to people with dealbreakers. People who thought they had more mate value, more self-esteem, or less loneliness were more receptive to dealmakers. Results are discussed using sociometer, prospect, and sexual strategies theories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Renaissance Thought on the Celestial Hierarchy:The Decline of a Tradition?Feisal G. MohamedThe Dionysian arrangement of the angels was dismantled on the one hand because its author was increasingly regarded as a "counterfait," and on the other hand because Protestants upheld the Bible's supremacy over all the "vain babblings of idle men." In consequence, those who like Spenser celebrated the "trinall triplicities," look back upon a great past that had (...) provided a vision hallowed by time and graced by an impressive array of intellects.—C. A. Patrides1It has been some forty years now since C. A. Patrides first argued in these pages that English Renaissance views on the celestial hierarchy constitute "the decline of a tradition," an argument made so convincing by his encyclopedic articles on the subject that scholars have been content to accept it. Indeed there is a good deal of evidence suggesting that the tradition of the ninefold hierarchy of angels associated with the Pseudo-Dionysius suffered serious injury at the hands of the Renaissance and Reformation. Subjected to the scrutiny of Renaissance scholarship and in light of the rediscovery of several Neoplatonists, particularly Proclus, it became quite clear that the Corpus Dionysiacum had been written centuries later than its author pretended. In the mid-fifteenth century Lorenzo Valla argued that because the Areopagus was a legal rather than a philosophical assembly, because none of the Greek or Latin fathers make mention of Dionysius, and because the claim in the letter to Polycarp to have witnessed [End Page 559] in Heliopolis the solar eclipse at the moment of Christ's death is a clear fabrication, placement of the Corpus in the first century should be doubted.2 These suggestions went largely unnoticed until Desiderius Erasmus, returning from England (where William Grocyn had begun murmurs regarding the Areopagitic origin of the Corpus), discovered in Louvain a manuscript of Valla's commentary on the book of Acts and incorporated its conclusions in his influential annotations on the New Testament.3 The discovery of Dionysius's pseudonymity and Erasmus's suggestion that Dionysian ceremonies could no longer be connected to the apostolic church would damage permanently the now Pseudo-Areopagite's influence. In a classic case of complicity between Renaissance humanism and Reformation theology—both Protestant and Catholic, it must be stressed—the sixteenth century turned away from Dionysian thought in general and from The Celestial Hierarchy in particular. The interrogation of apostolic origin begun by prominent Catholic thinkers like Erasmus and Cardinal Cajetan was most convenient to reformers like Martin Luther and John Calvin, both of whom described the author of the Corpus as "Dionysius, whoever he was."4Such an open-and-shut presentation of sixteenth-century Dionysiana, however, ignores several factors. One of them is that Renaissance scholars were not the first to question the dating of the Corpus: Peter Abelard fueled general perception of his heretical tendencies by suggesting that Dionysius may not have been the Pauline convert mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles.5 Much more important, however, is the number of Renaissance scholars for whom Dionysius was a formative influence. Despite his stance on the authenticity of the Corpus, Lorenzo Valla describes Dionysius in the peroration to his Encomium Sancti Thomae Aquinatis as playing the flute in a celestial symphony before the throne of God.6 For Nicholas Cusanus, as F. Edward Cranz describes [End Page 560] it, "Dionysius is the most important Christian theologian with no runner-up who is even close."7 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola saw Dionysius's writings as following directly from the teachings of Paul.8 Marsilio Ficino employed Dionysius in his comments on angels in the Theologia Platonica, translated and commented on The Divine Names and The Mystical Theology, and consistently endorsed first-century dating of the Corpus Dionysiacum.9 Ambrogio Traversari, who described Dionysius as "Apostoli disciplus," would also produce a fresh translation acceptable to humanist tastes in 1437, which would receive wide dissemination in the 1499 edition produced by Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples.10 Lefèvre saw the Corpus as apostolic in origin and authority and went so far as to endorse the traditional conflation of Dionysius with Saint... (shrink)

Virtue ethics is often proposed as a third way in health‐care ethics, that while consequentialism and deontology focus on action guidelines, virtue focuses on character; all three aim to help agents discern morally right action although virtue seems to have least to contribute to political issues, such as austerity. I claim: This is a bad way to characterize virtue ethics. The 20th century renaissance of virtue ethics was first proposed as a response to the difficulty of making sense of ‘moral (...) rightness’ outside a religious context. For Aristotle the right action is that which is practically best; that means best for the agent in order to live a flourishing life. There are no moral considerations besides this. Properly characterized, virtue ethics can contribute to discussion of austerity. A criticism of virtue ethics is that fixed characteristics seem a bad idea in ever‐changing environments; perhaps we should be generous in prosperity, selfish in austerity. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that people indeed do change with their environment. However, I argue that virtues concern fixed values not fixed behaviour; the values underlying virtue allow for different behaviour in different circumstances: in austerity, virtues still give the agent the best chance of flourishing. Two questions arise. In austere environments might not injustice help an individual flourish by, say, obtaining material goods? No, because unjust acts undermine the type of society the agent needs for flourishing. What good is virtue to those lacking the other means to flourish? The notion of degrees of flourishing shows that most people would benefit somewhat from virtue. However, in extreme circumstances virtue might harm rather than benefit the agent: such circumstances are to be avoided; virtue ethics thus has a political agenda to enable flourishing. This requires justice, a fortiori when in austerity. (shrink)

Peter Anstey rejects the widespread view that all knowledge for Locke is propositional. He argues, instead, that Locke accepts a form of non-propositional knowledge. The perception of the agreement and disagreement of ideas, according to Anstey's interpretation, is akin to what Bertrand Russell called “knowledge by acquaintance.” He presents a careful, four-step analysis of Locke’s view of the acquisition of knowledge, which is designed to show how the mind proceeds from perceiving to affirming, then to assenting, and finally to (...) verbalizing propositions. This comprehensive account takes into account a variety of remarks Locke makes about perception, knowledge and true or false propositions, and Anstey claims that overall this interpretation is a better fit than the orthodox view that Locke held all knowledge to be propositional. (shrink)

Przypadek czy sprawczość? Odpowiedź na „Divine Providence and Chance in the World” Dariusz Łukasiewicz wyróżnia sześć pojęć przypadku, spośród których jedne są spójne z ludzką wolnością rozumianą po libertariańsku, a inne nie. W tym eseju argumentuję na dwa sposoby, że teiści powinni odrzucić przypadek ontologiczny i odwołać się zamiast tego do nieredukowalnej sprawczości w odniesieniu do zdarzeń, które nie są opatrznościowo wyznaczone przez Boga. Moje argumenty zależą od jednoznacznego rozumienia twierdzeń, że Bóg jest kochającym sprawcą oraz że istoty ludzkie, w (...) swoim najlepszym zachowaniu, są kochającymi sprawcami. Łukasiewicz zakłada milcząco, że takie twierdzenia cechuje niewłaściwy antropomorfizm. Opowiadam się za antropocentryzmem i będę bronić jednoznaczności. (shrink)

Researchers have identified how in some rapidly developing countries, road and aviation transportation CO2 emissions are rising faster (over time) when compared to the experiences of the USA at similar levels of economic development. While suggestive of how experiences of the rapidly developing Asia are different from those of the developed world these studies have used only one developed country for comparison, the USA, arguably a special case when it comes to transportation. To address this point this research compares the (...) road transportation CO2 experiences of rapidly developing Asian economies (Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) with the USA and six other developed economies (Australia, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The findings confirm previous results, to wit, Asian economies demonstrate faster annual growth of CO2 emissions in comparison to the experiences of the developed world. (shrink)

_Purpose:_ In order to develop an evidence-based, sport-specific minimum impairment criteria (MIC) for the sport of vision-impaired (VI) shooting, this study aimed to determine the relative influence of losses in visual acuity (VA) and contrast sensitivity (CS) on shooting performance. Presently, VA but not CS is used to determine eligibility to compete in VI shooting. _Methods:_ Elite able-sighted athletes ( n = 27) shot under standard conditions with their habitual vision, and with their vision impaired by the use of simulation (...) spectacles (filters which reduce both VA and CS) and refractive blur (lenses which reduce VA with less effect on CS). Habitual shooting scores were used to establish a cut-off in order to determine when shooting performance was ‘below expected’ in the presence of vision impairment. Logistic regression and decision tree analyses were then used to assess the relationship between visual function and shooting performance. _Results:_ Mild reductions in VA and/or CS did not alter shooting performance, with greater reductions required for shooting performance to fall below habitual levels (below 87% of normalized performance). Stepwise logistic regression selected CS as the most significant predictor of shooting performance, with VA subsequently improving the validity of the model. In an unconstrained decision tree analysis, CS was selected as the sole criterion (80%) for predicting ‘below expected’ shooting score. _Conclusion:_ Shooting performance is better predicted by losses in CS than by VA. Given that it is not presently tested during classification, the results suggest that CS is an important measure to include in testing for the classification of vision impairment for athletes competing in VI shooting. (shrink)

The primary aim of this important study is to produce a reliable account of Peter Martyr’s life before he left Italy in 1542. Earlier biographers had been content to follow the Swiss Calvinist Josiah Simler, who knew Peter Martyr in later years, delivered his funeral oration and published it in 1563. Dr McNair has tried ‘to delve beneath Simler to contemporary records’. He has discovered, for example, that Peter Martyr was born in 1499 not, as is usually (...) said, in 1500. He has been concerned to find out when Peter Martyr left his order and his Church, suggesting that there is little reason to believe that his apostasy began in his years at the University of Padua, 1518-26; it was in Naples, between 1537 and 1540, when he came to know Juan de Valdés, that Peter Martyr’s conversion took place. ‘He arrived a reformer after the order of Ximénez, he left a reformer after the order of Zwingli’, writes Dr McNair, meaning by this the Zwingli of the years immediately before 1523, when he wished to go further than Erasmus but not so far as Luther. (shrink)

We introduce a new axiom scheme for constructive set theory, the Relation Reflection Scheme . Each instance of this scheme is a theorem of the classical set theory ZF. In the constructive set theory CZF–, when the axiom scheme is combined with the axiom of Dependent Choices , the result is equivalent to the scheme of Relative Dependent Choices . In contrast to RDC, the scheme RRS is preserved in Heyting-valued models of CZF– using set-generated frames. We give an application (...) of the scheme to coinductive definitions of classes. (shrink)

Working in the weakening of constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in which the subset collection scheme is omitted, we show that the binary refinement principle implies all the instances of the exponentiation axiom in which the basis is a discrete set. In particular binary refinement implies that the class of detachable subsets of a set form a set. Binary refinement was originally extracted from the fullness axiom, an equivalent of subset collection, as a principle that was sufficient to prove that the (...) Dedekind reals form a set. Here we show that the Cauchy reals also form a set. More generally, binary refinement ensures that one remains in the realm of sets when one starts from discrete sets and one applies the operations of exponentiation and binary product a finite number of times. (shrink)

This chapter deals with al-Kindī’s metaphysics, which in this context means theology and the idea that being is an emanation or creation from God. Depending on the Neoplatonists, especially Proclus, al-Kindī proves God’s existence by arguing for the need for a “true One”, whose absolute simplicity rules out a multiplicity of divine attributes.

RésuméJe critique dans cet article la théorie «naïve»des attributions de croyances, selon laquelle la signification d'un nom propre dans la clause qui figure comme complément d'une telle attribution est son référent. Je soutiens que l'usage que nous faisons de ces attributions dans l'explication du comportement oblige à rejeter la version simple de la sémantique «naïve» au profit de sa cousine plus sophistiquée. Et je soutiens que la théorie «naïve» sophistiquée se compare défavorablement à des versions plausibles de la sémantique non (...) naíve. (shrink)

Frederick Kronz constructs interesting examples in an attempt to show deficiencies in my concept of evidence and the advantages in Carnap's positive relevance idea. His discussion raises general questions of importance in developing an adequate account of scientific evidence questions about the relationship between evidence and belief and the role of emphasis in determining evidence. His examples are challenging, but do they work?