A landmark work of environmental philosophy that seeks to transform the debate about climate change. As the icecaps melt and the sea levels rise around the globe—threatening human existence as we know it—climate change has become one of the most urgent and controversial issues of our time. For most people, however, trying to understand the science, politics, and arguments on either side can be dizzying, leading to frustrating and unproductive debates. Now, in this groundbreaking new work, two of our most (...) renowned thinkers present the realities of global warming in the most human of terms—everyday conversation—showing us how to convince even the most stubborn of skeptics as to why we need to act now. Indeed, through compelling Socratic dialogues, Philip Kitcher and Evelyn Fox Keller tackle some of the thorniest questions facing mankind today: Is climate change real? Is climate change as urgent as the “scientists” make it out to be? How much of our current way of life should we sacrifice to help out a generation that won’t even be born for another hundred years? Who would pay for the enormous costs of making the planet "green?" What sort of global political arrangement would be needed for serious action? These crucial questions play out through familiar circumstances, from an older husband and wife considering whether they should reduce their carbon footprint, to a first date that evolves into a passionate discussion about whether one person can actually make a difference, to a breakfast that becomes an examination over whether or not global warming is really happening. Entertaining, widely accessible, and thoroughly original, the result promises to inspire dialogue in many places, while also giving us a line of reasoning that explodes the so-far impenetrable barriers of obfuscation that have surrounded the discussion. While the Paris Agreement was an historic achievement that brought solutions within the realm of possibility, The Seasons Alter is a watershed book that will show us how to make those possibilities a reality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eschatology, Sacred and Profane* PHILIP MERLAN LET ME BEGINthis paper with a double motto. The first is from a German poet, C. F. Meyer. It reads in my own translation: "We hosts of the dead ones--more numerous are we--than you who tread the earth and you who sail the sea." The second is a piece of statistical information for the correctness of which, however, I cannot vouchsafe. It (...) reads: "From the time when man first appeared, 77 billion people have been born. Thus, today's population of about 3 billion represents only 4 per cent of all men ever born" (Universitas 6 [1964], p. 423). With these two mottoes in mind let me proceed. Kant is one of the great representatives of the belief both in a goal to history and in progress. As he sees it, this goal is one world-wide society living under one law, which law coincides with the demands of morality, or as we could also say, in which legality and morality at least do not conflict. Kant is convinced that nature will by-and-by compel man to establish this world-wide society characterized, among other things, by eternal peace. Thus, Kant is an optimist with regard to the future. Yet, he is profoundly pessimistic with regard to the past. For him, history is one long chain of sufferings inflicted on man by man; and on the whole he has a very dim view of man's nature. The synthesis of his pessimism with his optimism is contained in a remarkable sentence which we find in one of his last writings--1793, when Kant was 69. The title is On the Adage--This May be Right in Theory, But Is Inapplicable to Practical Purposes, and here he says: When one contemplates the evil which in the course of history man has inflicted on man, one would be inclined to give up in despair. But there is one thought on the thinking of which our mind will cheer up. It is the thought: things will improve in the future. This kind of cheer will be entirely benevolent and unselfish, for this improvement will take place after we * I am indebted for the posthumous edition of this paper of my late husband Philip Merlan to Professor Frederick Sontag of Pomona College. My husband prepared this paper for, and read it to, various philosophical groups. In the course of these readings, he made numerous pencil additions. Thus, what Professor Sontag has done, is to change the tone to suit a printed presentation and to work the additions into the text as the logic of the arguments and notes seemed to dictate. Franciszka Merlan. [193] 194 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY have been buried for a long, long time. We ourselves will not be able to harvest what we ourselves have helped to plant. (WW8, 273-13) In whose name did Kant speak? Who are the altruists who feel cheered up by the prospect of a goal which they themselves will not live to reach? No easy answer can be found in Kant's writings. However it would not be surprising if Kant, a Rousseauian in so many respects, retained some of Rousseau's belief in the innate goodness of man (in spite of his pietistic heritage which encourages him to see man as thoroughly corrupt). Thus, he expects everybody to be capable of this altruistic attitude. We all do then cheer up when we think of the prospects for mankind. This means that our altruism permits us in some way to participate in mankind's bright future, to reach the goal, if I may say so, in hope and expectation, though not physically. For Kant the problem of history was never in the center of his own interest, nor would he have admitted that it is of central importance for man. Hegel's attitude is quite different. Man's participation in history is Hegel's main topic. At this point let me remind you briefly of Hegel's fundamental ideas. The enlightenment and romanticism produced two highly characteristic interpretations of religion. According to the former, the kernel of every religion is morality. According to the latter, the... (shrink)

In the introductory remarks to his Mulierum Virtutes, Plutarch notes the value of comparisons for establishing the diverse manifestations of the same virtue: ‘Achilles was brave in one way, Ajax in another; and the intelligence of Odysseus differed from that of Nestor, nor were Cato and Agesilaus just in the same way, nor was Irene loving of her husband () as Alcestis was, nor Cornelia high-minded in the manner of Olympias’. All the examples are well known, and quite apposite, except (...) for Irene (). Who is this paragon of wifely love? A search through encyclopedias and mythological handbooks proves fruitless. Wyttenbach in his note ad loc. suggested the courtesan friend of a minor Ptolemy killed at Ephesus, yet this extremely obscure figure hardly merits mention in the same breath with Alcestis. The name must be corrupt. (shrink)

"Religion," Bernard Bosanquet observed in one of his last books, "is the only thing that makes life worth living at all." While some might attribute this remark to latter day angst and senility, Bosanquet's entire career testifies to its sincerity and reality. Helen Bosanquet recollects Dr. Gow speaking in the following manner at the memorial service for her husband in 1923.

Gang Jeongildang acknowledged that she was inspired by and sought to continue the work of Im Yunjidang. Gang established herself as an original and important philosopher in her own right and as part of what is the first and only example of a tradition of Korean female Confucian philosophers. Her extant writings consist mostly of philosophical poetry and short personal missives to her husband and these present—in both content and style—a rich and profound resource not only for how she struggled (...) to pursue the Confucian ideal of becoming a female sage in the face of the poverty and hardship of her daily life but also for how anyone might take the challenges of everyday life as the primary arena for moral cultivation. Her letters to her husband are especially valuable as an example of how this most basic familial relationship did, can, and should figure more centrally in Confucian reflection on self-cultivation and more generally in our account of the moral life. (shrink)

In the monograph under review, a revised version of a dissertation submitted at the University of Konstanz in 2019, Polcar sets out to provide a full-scale commentary on a single letter of Jerome’s correspondence such as will be familiar to those who have read the work of Scourfield, Adkin, and Cain. The letter under investigation, epistula 79, is addressed to the newly widowed Salvina, containing both consolation for the loss of her husband, Nebridius, and exhortation to chaste widowhood. After a (...) brief introduction to Jerome and the letter’s place in the ancient epistolographic tradition (pp. 11–19) and a survey of the edition and the manuscripts consulted (21–24), there follows a Latin text with a facing translation (pp. 24–45). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.1 (2003) 231-240 [Access article in PDF] Rescuing the Rescuers in Philip Hallie's Ethical Sublime Patrick Henry "Only stories or visions of transcending personal isolation and indifference can move me... hope, joy lie only in the transcendence of self-absorption—in expansion." —Philip Hallie I THROUGHOUT HIS LIFE, Philip Hallie expressed strong distrust for abstract philosophy. He wanted his own philosophy constituted of flesh and (...) blood, and he believed in the centrality of narration in ethical writing. The personality of stories, the irrefutable nature of the individual's account had to form the essential basis in the teaching of ethics. It is no surprise, then, that in his posthumous Tales of Good and Evil, Help and Harm 1 Hallie leaves us with a series of powerful stories, biographical and autobiographical, as the final expression of his lifelong agonizing struggle to come to terms with his own ethical beliefs. There are no general proofs here. No abstract principles. No definitions of goodness and evil. Only stories that depict the being referred to by e. e. cummings as "manunkind" mysteriously achieving the "realizable ideal" of rescuer of strangers.Given Hallie's major work on the rescuers of Jews in the village of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed. The Story of the Village of Le Chambon and How Goodness Happened There, 2 it seems appropriate that he begin this particular account of "tales of good and evil" in that same [End Page 231] village. Thus, the first biography he presents is that of Magda Trocmé, the wife of the pastor of the Protestant Church in Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, André Trocmé, who, with his fellow pastor Edouard Theis, is said to have inspired the rescue mission in the village. Hallie underscores the communal nonviolent effort by clergy and villagers alike in this "city of refuge." While he admires both André and Magda as practitioners of the "great virtues," he more readily identifies with Magda's secularism than with her husband's piety. He celebrates her generosity, her refusal to turn anyone away from her door, her "quiet habit of efficacious compassion," and her terse explanation as to why the rescuers in the village did what they had done: "What do you mean? It had to be done, that's all."As much as Hallie related to Magda's secularism, he was unable to identify fully with her because he felt tainted by the killing he had done as an artillery man in the United States Army during World War II. "I was a helpful killer who violated the negative demand against killing ["Thou shalt not kill"] in order to obey the positive one to spread life. But Magda and her villagers! Their ethical purity was beyond me. They obeyed the negative demands of ethics by hating and hurting no one even while they obeyed the positive demands of ethics by saving [thousands of refugees]." Compared to Magda and the villagers, Hallie clearly saw himself as someone operating in the grey zone.With the introduction of Joshua James and the community of Hull, Massachusetts, we ascend from Hallie's personal quagmire of moral ambiguity to the realm of the "ethical sublime." Here the author relates the story of James, whose mother and sister died at sea in 1837 when he was 11 years old, and who would go on to a career of life-saving activity on the Massachusetts coast. James founded the Life-Saving Rescue Service, an organization that evolved into the Coast Guard (or more specifically The Search and Rescue Service of the Coast Guard). He spent his entire life in Hull (1826-1902) and over the course of nearly sixty years saved hundreds of sailor's lives and tens of thousands of dollars worth of property.Many coastal villages around the world, Hallie explains, profited greatly from shipwrecks. Their cargoes and the stuff the ships were made of were highly valuable to the generally poor people who inhabited such villages. Yet the village of Hull, the smallest village in the state, having roughly... (shrink)

In 1924 W. W. Tarn published an article in which he attempted to prove that the mother of Philip V of Macedon was the Epirot princess Phthia. Previously all historians had accepted the statement of Eusebius that Philip was the son of Demetrius II and Chryseis, whom, after the death of her husband, the Macedonians gave in marriage to Antigonus Doson. Despite the cogency of Tarn's arguments, his theory has been rejected by both Beloch and Dinsmoor, who adhere (...) to the traditional view. This problem of the identity of Philip's mother is one of considerable importance, and consequently in this paper I intend to collect the evidence once again and subject it to a careful analysis. The results will be found strongly to corroborate Tarn's contention. (shrink)

Philip and Roger Knight, a private eye and a Notre Dame professor, work to solve the murders of a trustee and her husband.--.

Sometimes dictators are benevolent. Sometimes masters are kind and gentle to their slaves. John Adams was a pretty good "husband" to Abigail Adams. But it seems like there’s something very wrong with being a dictator or a master or a spouse with the power that John Adams had over Abigail Adams in late 18th Century America. A theory of domination tries to pinpoint what’s distinctive about dictatorship and mastery and traditional husbanding, and what is distinctively wrong with such—even the benevolent, (...) kind, gentle, and pretty good varieties. -/- There has been a lot of thinking about domination over the last twenty-five or so years. This is due largely to the efforts of republican political philosophers, who have used domination and its absence — nondomination — as the primary moving part in their conceptions of freedom. Even so, perhaps because domination has often appeared in a supporting role for the analysis of other concepts, conceptualizing domination itself is still a fairly nascent endeavor. -/- Accounts of domination need at least two movements. First, domination is a subset of a social phenomenon with—at least more or less—unobjectionable varieties. Maybe this social phenomenon is power; maybe it’s the capacity to interfere with choice; maybe something else. Whatever it is, it’s plausible to think it’s not always bad. Sometimes it’s perfectly alright to have power over someone else; sometimes there’s nothing wrong with the capacity to interfere with someone’s choices. (For example, if what you’d rather do is go after your neighbor with a meat-axe, it’s a good thing if someone is in a position to interfere with you, or if your choice situation can be worsened, so that charging next door, axe in hand, without having to worry about a lengthy prison sentence is not among your options.) The first task of a theory of domination is to specify exactly what this broader social phenomenon is. -/- Next we need to figure out what gives domination its negative moral valence, and thus sets it apart from that broader social phenomenon. Republicans usually say that what makes domination morally problematic is its arbitrariness. Frank Lovett claims that domination is instantiated in a social relationship between A and B only if A is permitted to exercise power over B arbitrarily (2010, 120). Philip Pettit, until recently, claimed that domination is a capacity for arbitrary interference. Marilyn Friedman calls it “arbitrary interference in someone’s choices…”(2008, 265). If that’s right, and arbitrariness is the difference maker between forms of social power that aren’t domination and those that are, we need a story about what arbitrariness is. -/- Such are the two essential tasks of conceptualizing domination. I offer here what I think are important course-corrections for recent attempts to complete them. In §1 I set out some desiderata for a useful conception of domination before sketching the elements of earlier attempts I think we can’t do without. §2 addresses the problem of “cheap domination”. This is the problem of identifying ordinary, innocuous human interactions with anything we call domination. I don’t think we should do this, but some of the most influential accounts of domination on offer nowadays — in particular, Lovett’s and Pettit’s — have this result. Instead, I contend that only certain forms of social power can underwrite domination, and try to provide a principled way of identifying what these forms are like. Finally, in §3, I address the nature of arbitrariness. (shrink)

That certain paper bills have monetary value, that Vladimir Putin is the president of Russia, and that Prince Philip is the husband of Queen Elizabeth II: such facts are commonly called ‘institutional facts’. IFF are, by definition, facts that exist by virtue of collective recognition. The standard view or tacit belief is that such facts really exist. In this paper we argue, however, that they really do not—they really are just well-established illusions. We confront realism about IFF with six (...) criteria of existence, three established and three less so but highly intuitive. We argue that they all tell against the existence of IFF. An obvious objection to IFF non-realism is that since people’s behaviour clearly reflects the existence of IFF, denying their existence leaves an explanatory gap. We reject this argument by introducing a variant of the so-called ‘Thomas Theorem,’ which says that when people collectively recognize a fact as existing, they largely behave accordingly, regardless of whether that fact really exists or not. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:
ources VICTORIA, LADY WELBY’S PAPERS AT YORK UNIVERSITY, TORONTO I. G-G Mathematics / Middlesex U.  St. Leonard’s Road, Bengeo, Herts.  ,  .-@.. ne of the fringe figures in British philosophical life during Russell’s early Ocareer was Victoria, Lady Welby (–). Coming in middle age to academic concerns, she was the most receptive person in Britain to the semiotics of C. S. Peirce (–), giving his work (...) some publicity especially in her books What Is Meaning? () and Significs and Language (). After her death much of her library went to the University of London Library; her heavily annotated copies of journals such as Mind and The Monist are worth consulting. Her papers remained with her family until they were purchased from Sir Oliver Welby in  by York University, Toronto. The large collection is stored in  large boxes, with the general reference number -; the archival staff has prepared an excellent catalogue. I sampled the collection in a short recent visit. It divides into two nearly equal halves. One half includes her own manuscripts and essays, sometimes including comments made by friends. Some manuscripts by others, or transcripts thereof (for example, H. G. Wells) were also stored. I looked at the manuscripts related to logic and language, and found that several were composed of transcriptions of her notes typed out on strips and then set in a chosen order by fixing to large sheets with pins. Logic as such did not feature strongly; more prominent were aspects of linguistics or speech practice. Lady Welby strove to popularize the work of fellow enthusiasts for linguistics. In particular, box  comprises her commissioned English translations of several articles published during the s by the logician and philosopher Giovanni Vailati (–), also the earliest follower of Russell’s hero Giuseppe Peano. Presumably Vailati’s and Welby’s deaths prevented the publication of the planned book. The other half of the collection comprises Lady Welby’s extensive correspondence, including copies or drafts of some of her own letters. Attached to many russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s.  (summer ): – The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U.  -  . - letters are partial typewritten transcriptions, presumably prepared by or for her daughter Nina Cust (–) for a two-volume edition. As these transcriptions suggest, the originals were not only selected but also mauled quite a bit; the edition provides only extracts both locally within a letter and also globally across a file. They are organized chronologically in chapters each covering a short run of years, so that any extensive exchange is spread across several chapters. Further, the precise date of each letter is never given. This is a pity, for the full collection reveals an impressive range of serious contacts in the philosophical and other communities, and also with some figures related to her social status (from the aristocratic Stuart-Wortley family, Very Important in those days). Some letters relate to a discussion group which met at her home; first at Denton Manor, Grantham, Lincolnshire, and then during her widowhood in Harrow, London. To Lady Welby herself, one of the most important exchanges was that with C. S. Peirce (–), some of which appeared in the daughter’s edition and since has been published in full. For my interests two other files stood out. One is an intense exchange, especially in , with Mary Boole (–), in which her working relationship with her late husband and their religious stance were discussed. The other exchange was with Philip Jourdain (–); they used to lend each other books and recent issues of journals. When Lady Welby planned a visit in September , Jourdain assured her that a “tyred fly” would be hired to bring her to his home from the railway station, and that it had a large room which should be satisfactory to “you and your maid”. These two also exchanged opinions on recent philosophical literature, including that by Russell, whose work is mentioned in other files. There is a small exchange with Russell himself; both sides are available here, and of course also at the Russell Archives. Some or all of these files are printed in the Cust volumes, but the full collection needs to be consulted in order to do justice to the material. Researchers visiting the Russell... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.3 (2000) 385-407 [Access article in PDF] Plautus' Stichus and the Political Crisis of 200 B.C. William M. Owens What to make of Stichus? Scholars have written appreciatively of its separate parts: the sisters who are loyal wives to their absent husbands, the sympathetic depiction of the parasite Gelasimus, and even the wild celebration of the slaves that ends the play. 1 However, when (...) considering Stichus as an artistic whole, scholarship has tended to blanket the play with anathema. Thus Norwood: "What of Stichus, which falls into three mere lumps?" 2 Duckworth is more discursive but no less disparaging: "The Stichus is hardly a drama; there is no real plot and complication and denouement of the usual sort are lacking. The scenes fall into three groups: these might be called 'The Abandoned Wives' (1-401), 'The Homecoming, or the Disappointed Parasite' (402-640), and 'The Carousal of the Slaves' (641-775)." 3Previous readings have focused on the relation of Stichus to Plautus' model, Menander's first Adelphoe, attributing the deficiencies in the Roman play to Plautine departures from the model, either through free invention of scenes and characters or through contaminatio, the introduction of scenes from Greek plays other than Adelphoe. 4 However, even those who believe that Plautus was more or less faithfully following the contents of Menander's Adelphoe consider Stichus to be a poorly constructed work. 5Given this general critical disparagement and the almost complete [End Page 385] loss of its model, source criticism of Stichus has come to resemble a kind of philological shadowboxing against an invisible and superior opponent. The present reading seeks to understand the difficulties of this play in terms of its Roman audience of 200 B.C. The broad outlines of this approach were developed by Segal in Roman Laughter (1987), who argued that Plautine humor was accommodated to Roman concerns and preoccupations. Wagenvoort (1931) anticipated Segal's approach with specific reference to Stichus in his suggestion that the play reflects the jubilant mood of the people who had defeated Hannibal in the previous year and recently celebrated Scipio's triumph. Such a people, he argued, were in no mood for a play constructed by the book, but wanted one that was accommodated to their mood: Plautus Stichum [composuit]... cum etiam atque etiam aliae aliunde copiae domum reverterentur, isdem fortasse diebus, quibus summo cum gaudio Romani Scipionem aspicerent triumphantem. Tali tempore non id profecto cives a poeta suo poposcerunt, ut comoediam sibi praeberet rigidis normis adstrictam quodque ad compositionem attinet omnibus numeris absolutam, sed ut spectaculum sibi offerret ad commune gaudium quam poterat maxime accommodatum. 6There is evidence that Stichus was matched to the mood of its audience; the Ludi Plebeii for which the play was produced in 200 B.C. were repeated three times, and the popularity of Stichus may have been one of the reasons for the multiple instaurationes. 7 However, the mood of the people of Rome in 200 B.C., a politically turbulent year, was more complex than summum et commune gaudium. Fresh upon the victory [End Page 386] over Hannibal, the Senate was preparing to fight a war in Greece against Philip V of Macedon. Since the autumn of 201 senatorial ambassadors had been sent to various Greek states to canvass support for Roman intervention; during this same period ambassadors from a number of Greek states had been in Rome to complain about Philip's aggressions. 8 In March 200 the consul P. Sulpicius Galba, having received Macedonia as his province, proposed a declaration of war against Philip to the Centuriate Assembly. But a tribune, Q. Baebius, spoke against the bill, and war was rejected by nearly every voting division (ab omnibus ferme centuriis antiquata est, Liv. 31.6.3). Livy reports that the people were exhausted from the length of the war they had just completed and that Baebius was able to exploit their discontent.In response, the Senate advised Galba to try again. The war was approved after a vigorous speech from the consul. Livy does... (shrink)

Both in the pre-war and the post-war period right-wing extremism was not very strong in Britain. Historians, political scientist and politicians have suggested a whole range of elements to explain this failure. In the light of this limited success the victory of the British National Party in an election of the Millwall district in the London Bourough of Tower Hamlets was indeed a surprise. lt raised the question whether this was the beginning of something similar to what happened earlier in (...) France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. The very specific characteristics of the London East End and ofthe Millwall district in particular make the BNP victory however quite exceptional, and do not enable a generalization of the phenomenon. This is supported by the electoral results for the London Borough and District Council of May 5 1994. Yet one can still argue that the specific danger of the BNP is not its electoral potential, but the impact of its local activities on the relations between the ethnic groups in the neighbourhoods where it is present. (shrink)

This paper compares the treatment of private sensations in the works of Wittgenstein and Klossowski. Its aim is to show that, despite the differences between their traditions and methods, they align in at least one important respect: rejecting relations of reference between signs and private sensations. The paper briefly contextualises their lines of attack on these relations, situating the two thinkers’ commonalities amidst what are undeniably divergent wider purposes. It proceeds to argue for two more specific conclusions. Firstly, Klossowski’s own (...) rejoinder directed at reference to private sensations is rooted in his comparison of linguistic meaning to economic valuation in Living Currency. Secondly, Klossowski goes beyond Wittgenstein in arguing that, regardless of the status of reference of this sort, no complete account of sensation can view it only as private. (shrink)

Limited scholarly attention has been committed to the analysis of Nietzsche’s 1873 Time-Atom Theory, a fragment whose contentions strike both the seasoned and unseasoned reader of the Nachlass as especially speculative and grandiose. The principal objective of this essay is to critically review and extend the recent aspects of this limited commentary, focusing on the work of Gregory Whitlock, Robin Small and Keith Ansell-Pearson. I argue that an important and overlooked ambiguity is latent in Nietzsche’s framing of his argument, which (...) impinges upon the scope and purpose of the fragment. I consider the question posed by Small as to the status of the time-points in the fragment which, I contend, Nietzsche does not hold to be empirical. Thirdly, I discuss a central point of debate between Whitlock, Small and Ansell-Pearson: the extent of the analogy between Roger Boscovich and Nietzsche. I submit in conclusion that the connections between the two have been over-emphasised in the context of the 1873 fragment, and that this relationship cannot yield a complete account of Nietzsche’s approach. (shrink)

This innovative approach to freedom starts from an account of what we mean by describing someone, in a psychological vein, as a free subject. Pettit develops an argument as to what it is that makes someone free in that basic sense; and then goes on to derive the implications of the approach for issues of freedom in political theory. Freedom in the subject is equated with the person's being fit to be held responsible and to be authorized as a partner (...) in interaction. This book is unique among contemporary approaches - although it is true to the spirit of classical writers like Hobbes and Kant - in seeking a theory that applies to psychological issues of free agency and free will as well as to political issues in the theory of the free state and the free constitution. The driving thesis is that it is only by connecting up the different issues of freedom, psychological and political, that we can fully appreciate the nature of the questions involved, and the requirements for their resolution. The book does not not seek a comprehensive reach just for its own sake, but rather for the sake of the illumination it provides._ _ _A Theory of Freedom_ is a ground-breaking volume which will be of wide interest to scholars and students in political philosophy and political science. (shrink)

Studdert-Kennedy, Gerald, Evidence and Explanation in Social Science. ... Kauffman, Stuart, "Articulation of Parts Explanation in Biology and the Rational ...