Claude Levi-Strauss mentioned several times in his work that the notion of transformation is the keystone of the structural analysis he pratices. By his own admission, this notion stems from his reading of D’Arcy Thomson’s book On Growth and Form during World War II in the United States. But Levi-Strauss makes use of two very different meanings of transformation, relating to two distinct morpho-genetic traditions. On the one hand, he is inspired by Goethe’s Morphology. All forms can be seen as (...) transformation of a Urform, an original form, from which they grow out like a tree. But on the other hand, D’Arcy Thomson’s emphasis lies on the geometric simplicity of a transformation grid that allows the transition from one biological form to the other without considering any original from which other forms would be derivable. Levi-Strauss’ epistemological choice to study myths and masks can be better understood when his concept of transformation is clearly defined in relation to Goethe and D’Arcy Thomson. Thus, the originality of his own interpretation will become clear. (shrink)

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My colleague, Professor W. M. Lindsay, invites, or challenges, me to reply to his note on ‘Ciris’ ; I can but take him at his word.Professor Lindsay seeks to identify the two birds Haliaetus and Ciris, and finds the task an easy one; he identifies Ciris with a Tern confidently and categorically. We learn ‘from Gallus' epyllium … that it was a sea-bird with red legs, so rapid in flight that it always evaded the swoop of the sea-eagle. What can (...) this be but a tern?’. (shrink)

Introductory, by B. H. Streeter.--Love and omnipotence, by C. F. D'Arcy.--The survival of the fittest, by Lily Dougall.--Power, by Lily Dougall.--The defeat of pain, by B. H. Streeter.

My aim in this paper is fairly modest. I obviously do not claim that there has never been or could never be an instance of irrational or fallacious appeals to quotations from canonical sources in the marxist tradition. Instead, I claim that the practice of using quotations from canonical sources is not, as such, irrational. If we understand the epistemological infrastructure of the practice -- the rational underpinnings of it -- we can grasp how these citations appeal to the presumptive (...) authoritativeness of formulations that condense or concisely convey the core of insights that emerged from learning processes that the intellectual tradition of marxism has already traversed. The rational underpinnings of the practice include, first, the neo-Hegelian idea that we can justify a view we now hold by rationally reconstructing the insight-motivated learning process from which it emerged, and second, the convention that these rational reconstructions do not have to be elaborated in each insistence, but can be invoked in a short-form way, such as by citing the name of a decision or a concise statement of it (like a short quotation), as is common in the epistemologically similar practice of precedential reasoning in common law juridical justification. No claim is true just because of who made it; but a claim might be presumptively authoritative in cases where it was made at the end of a learning process, which has not been overtaken by a change in the circumstances or further learning. (shrink)

In its opening chapters, ‘Languages of the Unheard’ offers a broad account of militancy as an aid to democracy and a principled response to the intransigence of elites and the unresponsiveness of institutions to the public interest. It proposes an understanding of militancy as a civic virtue and a contribution to democratic politics, relying on a normative conception of ‘autonomous democracy.’ In the second part of the book, this understanding of admirable militancy is applied to a wide range of protest (...) styles, including the nonviolent civil disobedience promoted by Gandhi and King, the disruptive direct action of strikes and other forms organized disruption, the rioting and black blocs of militant street protest, and the armed insurgency promoted by both urban and rural guerrilla groups. (shrink)

This book is the first to examine in minutiae the politics of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), and his connections with various traditions of far right and fascist thought. Frege was a philosopher of logic, language, and mathematics. But he also believed that one could reconcile the politics of the far right with a firm commitment to reason-guided inquiry and scientific objectivity. The fundamental claim of the text is that Gottlob Frege was from the early 1890s to the mid-1920s an anti-democratic, nationalist (...) political thinker, and that his political thought eventually took on a fascist character. This book makes no attempt to vilify or demonize Gottlob Frege, nor does it try to rescue him from criticism. It simply seeks to tell the truth about Frege's descent into fascism: to document it in hitherto unprecedented detail; to situate it in the context of intellectual and political debates in early Weimar-era Germany; and to explain how it could have happened that someone so intelligent and so manifestly devoted to reason and logic could have embraced fascism with such unreserved enthusiasm. It will be of interest to scholars of analytic philosophy, intellectual history, fascism, and anti-democratic thought. (shrink)

Is religion becoming ‘deregulated’ in secular, pluralist societies? In the public sphere in which freedom of opinion laid the foundations of democracy, no single comprehensive worldview could be allowed to dominate. The warring Christian confessions of Europe discredited the public role of religion, which gave way to Enlightenment rationalism as the regulative norm of society and the newly emerging sciences. But religion is now assuming a new status as the public sphere becomes global. The religions themselves are part of the (...) new global dynamic and the search for a global ethic. Human dignity, on which human rights must be based in global civil society, is nurtured by the narrative traditions of the religions. The God of the monotheistic faiths is thus regaining a public and political role, but there is a danger that this will turn out to be that of a legitimator of violence and a guarantor of exclusive truth claims. The mystics of these traditions teach us that God’s absence can be a mode of God’s presence. If God’s presence in the public sphere does not take the form of dominance, it could also provide a basis for dialogue with non-theistic traditions. Neither the neutral public rationality of the Enlightenment nor a universal theology is an adequate response to the need for shared values in the emerging global public sphere. We must learn to negotiate meanings and values in an ongoing process of communicative interaction and intersubjective universality. (shrink)

In my translation of the Historia Animalium, now thirty-five years old, I pointed out a couple of passages where νθρωπος stood in the text though νος seemed to be the appropriate word. It had not occurred to me for the moment, though it soon after wards did, that ανος was at hand to account for so curious a misreading. The same contraction has other misreadings to account for, as we may read in Cobet; but I do not know that this (...) one has been drawn attention to. (shrink)

The recent speculation which I have in view is that which finds its inspiration in the great development of scientific discovery and scientific thought in our day. It would be impossible to range over the whole field. Moreover, the efforts which have been made to frame a comprehensive scheme of thought on the foundation supplied by science are those which are truly characteristic of our time. In recent years, science has been passing beyond the experimental stage, and also beyond the (...) limits which, in former times, made it departmental. The great conception of Evolution, and the intimate linking up of astronomy with chemistry and physics, and of chemistry and physics with physiology and biology, have quite altered our outlook on the universe. The mind of to-day passes from space-time to the electron, and from the electron to the structure of the cell, and from the cell to the living organism, with hardly a jolt. Not that the problems which mark the passage from stage to stage in this series have been solved, far from it; but that the different tages have so much the appearance of closing up into one continuous process that we seem to be approaching a view which will regard the whole as one unbroken development. No wonder that philosophic minds, among students and dreamers speculating on the mystery of the Universe, begin to think that some account of it, based on assured results of science, is becoming possible. (shrink)