This thesis examines the concept of civil disobedience, and the role the latter can play in a democratic society. It aims to offer a moral justification for civil disobedience that departs from consequentialist or deontological considerations, and focuses instead on virtue ethics. By drawing attention to the notion of civic virtues, the thesis suggests that, under some circumstances, an act of civil disobedience is the very act displaying a virtuous disposition in the citizen who disobeys. Such disposition is interpreted in (...) light of a duty each individual has to respect her fellow citizens as autonomous agents. This grounds, in turn, a moral obligation to respect the law. The central claim of the thesis is that the obligation towards the law is fulfilled not only through acts of obedience but also, under different circumstances, through acts of disobedience. The status of non-violence as a necessary component of civil disobedience is questioned, and it is argued that a degree of force or violence may be permissible in civil disobedience, when it is compatible with the duty to respect others’ autonomy. Subsequently, the thesis offers an analysis of ‘reasonableness’ as a civic virtue, and by comparing three different approaches to the issue of reasonable disagreement among democratic citizens, it defends the deliberative approach as the most suited for treating fellow citizens as autonomous agents. The last two chapters focus on the importance, for an act of civil disobedience, of the agent’s willingness to accept the legal consequences of her law-breaking behaviour. It is argued that a civil disobedient has an obligation to face the prospect of being punished for the breach of the law. However, in considering the behaviour of a virtuous civil disobedient who appears at her criminal trial, it is also claimed that she should plead not guilty and aim to persuade her fellow citizens that she does not deserve to be punished, because what she did does not constitute a criminal wrong. In doing so, this thesis depicts civil disobedience not as a merely permissible form of behaviour, but as a morally praiseworthy conduct within a democratic community. (shrink)

This chapter offers a critique of mainstream accounts of civil disobedience (CD) in contemporary political theory. Its goal is to highlight how the notion of “civility” is used as a political tool to sanitise and domesticate social protest. Focusing on Australia’s 2017 marriage equality campaign, the chapter highlights how the dominant conception of “civil” disobedience reproduces the logic of a patriarchal system in which women and non-mainstream men are expected to remain quiet and behave with “decorum”. The chapter draws attention (...) to the peculiarity of the Australian context, where the lack of a bill of rights fosters power inequalities by hindering vulnerable groups’ access to justice. Overall, the chapter highlights the risk of an excessive (or exclusive) focus on the behaviour of protesters, at the expense of the structural injustices they seek to unveil. (shrink)

The complexity and mysteriousness of mental processes during sleep rule out thinking only in term of generators. How could we know exactly what mental sleep experience (MSE) is produced and when? To refer to REM versus NREM as separate time windows for MSE seems insufficient. We propose that in each cycle NREM and REM interact to allow mentation to reach a certain degree of complexity and consolidation in memory. Each successive cycle within a sleep episode should contribute to these processes (...) with a different weight according to the time of night and distance from sleep onset. This view would avoid assuming too great a separation between REM and NREM functions and attributing psychological functions only to a single state. [Nielsen]. (shrink)

The fair-play theory of punishment claims that the state is justified in imposing additional burdens on law-breakers, to remove the unfair advantage the latter have enjoyed by disobeying the law. From this perspective, punishment reestablishes a fair distribution of benefits and burdens among all citizens. In this paper, I object to this view by focusing on the case of civil disobedience. I argue that the mere illegality of this conduct is insufficient to establish the agent’s unfair advantage over his lawabiding (...) fellows, hence the imposition of additional burdens upon him through legal punishment. I articulate a broader account of citizens’ fair-play duties, able to capture disobedience as well as obedience to the law. While claiming that some law-breakers may not be treated as free-riders, I also gesture at the fact that some law-obeying citizens may not be ‘playing fair’: in some cases, a failure to engage in civil disobedience represents a failure to do one’s own part within the cooperative scheme of society. (shrink)

The paper tries to elucidate some of the implications of using phenomenology in anthropological research. The starting point is Blumenberg’s critique of the Husserlian Anthropologieverbot, against which he proposes a phenomenological anthropology as a “description of man” that can never be completed. This idea resonates with the use of phenomenology in contemporary ethnographic and anthropological works: the problem stems from the “disempowering” effect that this anthropological use has on the phenomenological analytical power. Phenomenology has, from an anthropological point of view, (...) the great advantage of offering a “trans-ontological” perspective able to let the Other speak. Many influential anthropologists cite Merleau-Ponty as a key figure in their approach, as in the case of Csordas’ “embodiment paradigm”, Jackson’s “existential anthropology” or Throop’s idea of an “ethnographic epoché”. This is equally true for two of the key figures of the “Ontological turn”, Descola and Ingold, albeit in radically different ways. On the contrary, it is difficult to find philosophers influenced by “non-philosophical” anthropology. The paper discusses both advantages and limits of phenomenological approaches in anthropology, adopting philosophical and anthropological perspectives, attempting to understand the deeply asymmetrical relation of the two disciplines. (shrink)

El autor plantea que el Estado ha ingresado en una creciente crisis y la sospecha sobre su real “utilidad” para la sociedad, y vincula a este tema el surgimiento de la cuestión del espacio público. Sostiene que un cambio radical se produce a partir de la nueva percepción del territorio, cuando ya no parece posible que el Estado, y por lo tanto el espacio público, pueda ser pensado exclusivamente en términos nacionales. Discute luego la relación espacio público-vida privada, y los (...) nuevos modos de hacer política en este nuevo espacio público. Afirma finalmente que la construcción de un bien común puede ser pensado y diseñado colectivamente. (shrink)

These proceedings collect the selected contributions of participants of the First Karl Schwarzschild Meeting on Gravitational Physics, held in Frankfurt, Germany to celebrate the 140th anniversary of Schwarzschild's birth. They are grouped into 4 main themes: I. The Life and Work of Karl Schwarzschild; II. Black Holes in Classical General Relativity, Numerical Relativity, Astrophysics, Cosmology, and Alternative Theories of Gravity; III. Black Holes in Quantum Gravity and String Theory; IV. Other Topics in Contemporary Gravitation. Inspired by the foundational principle ``By (...) acknowledging the past, we open a route to the future", the week-long meeting, envisioned as a forum for exchange between scientists from all locations and levels of education, drew participants from 15 countries across 4 continents. In addition to plenary talks from leading researchers, a special focus on young talent was provided, a feature underlined by the Springer Prize for the best student and junior presentations. (shrink)

Part of an eleven-volume set which contains all of Ricardo's published and unpublished writings, and provides great insight into the early era of political economics.

Part of an eleven-volume set which contains all of Ricardo's published and unpublished writings, and provides great insight into the early era of political economics.

Jason Brennan has argued that democracy is intrinsically unjust, for it grants voting power to politically incompetent individuals, thus exposing people to an undue risk of harm. He claims democracy should be replaced by epistocracy, i.e., the rule of the knowers. In this paper, I show that his argument fails. First, Brennan mistakes voters’ competence for voters’ trustworthiness. Second, despite Brennan's claim to the contrary, an epistocracy may not reduce people’s exposure to an undue risk of harm. Third, Brennan overlooks (...) the fact that citizens are not equally affected by ‘bad voting.’ Fourth, far from being a defence of libertarian ideals, Brennan's argument supports paternalism. (shrink)

Many believe that a citizen who engages in civil disobedience is not exempt from the sanctions that apply to standard law-breaking conduct. Since he is responsible for a deliberate breach of the law, he is also liable to punishment. Focusing on a conception of responsibility as answerability, I argue that a civil disobedient is responsible (i.e. answerable) to his fellows for the charges of wrongdoing, yet he is not liable to punishment merely for breaching the law. To support this claim, (...) I defend an account of political obligation framed in terms of respect for (rather than mere obedience to) the law, and argue that the mere illegality of civil disobedience does not suffice to establish wrongdoing. I then discuss and reject three objections to my argument. (shrink)

In the histories of science, technology and aviation Christiaan Huygens has been unjustly neglected. Documents in the corpus of his works show a life-long interest in the problem of human flight together with some considerable anticipations of, and contributions to, its solution. He was among the first, if not the first, in perceiving the potential of the heavier-than-air approach. He clearly recognized the need for a powerful, mechanical motive source. He stated the first laws of aerodynamics and conceived the modern (...) propeller for propulsion. He was the first to conceive of the aeroplane. His approach to the problem of flying was both global and scientific. (shrink)

Contrary to what has been asserted or implied by Mach and more recent writers, the law of illumination and the study of photometry were not ignored in the years between Kepler's first enunciation of the former in 1609 and Bouguer's Essai on the latter in 1729. The law of illumination was in fact denied in 1613 by Aguilonius. It was probably rediscovered independently and certainly reformulated in more modern terms by Mersenne and Castelli in 1634, and by Boulliau in 1638. (...) It was again formulated and this time demonstrated empirically by Montanari no later than 1676, and possibly as early as 1634 by Castelli. Although neither the law nor photometry were major concerns before Bouguer, they were not completely neglected either. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 105 Heft: 4 Seiten: 642-642.

According to the Samaritan principle, we have a duty to rescue others from perils when we can do so at no unreasonable cost to ourself or others. Candice Delmas has argued that this principle generates a duty to engage in civil disobedience, when laws and practices expose people to ‘persistent Samaritan perils’: by engaging in this form of protest, she claims, citizens can contribute to the rescue of the victims of serious injustice. In this article, I contend that her argument (...) confuses duties of rescue with duties of justice. Furthermore, I point out that two central features of civil disobedience, namely, communicativeness and conscientiousness, make it unsuitable as a strategy for ‘rescue operations’. On the one hand, communicative constraints make civil disobedience time-consuming, and dependent on others’ willingness to engage in the communicative exchange. On the other, conscientiousness often requires agents to accept costs well beyond the threshold warranted by the Samaritan principle. Treating civil disobedients akin to ‘good Samaritans’ trivialises the selflessness of their sacrifices. (shrink)