The most recent resurgence of philosophical attention to the so-called ‘functional talk' in the sciences can be summarized in terms of the following questions: (Q1) What kind of restrictions, and in particular, what kind of evolutionary restrictions as well as to what extent, is involved in functional ascriptions? (Q2) How can we account for the explanatory import of function-ascribing statements? This paper addresses these questions through a modified version of Cummins' functional analysis. The modification in question is concerned with phylogenetical (...) restrictions on causal role functions, and it stems from an analysis of some primary areas in molecular biology. I examine how evolutionary consideration affects the so-called ‘function-analytical explanatory strategy' (Cummins [1975] 1998, 2002). Finally, I argue that the neo-functional analysis here proposed accounts for a certain convergence between the main rival theories of biological function. ‡I wish to thank David Davies, Eva Jablonka, Thomas Reydon, and Marcel Weber for their helpful comments. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka, Omladinska 14, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Let T be a countable complete first-order theory with a definable, infinite, discrete linear order. We prove that T has continuum-many countable models. The proof is purely first order, but it raises the question of Borel completeness of T.

Kant's central goal in the Critique of Pure Reason is to investigate conditions of the possibility of cognition. He assumes that what is given to us by means of the senses is not sufficient for cognition. The senses yield us only the "raw material" for cognition. It is because of our conceptual apparatus that we are able to determine, or discriminate among, what is presented by the senses. ;My main task in the dissertation is to examine Kant's account of the (...) nature of concepts relevant for empirical cognition. Contrary to some recent commentators, like Walsh, and Guyer, I conclude that Kant's account is philosophically defensible and that it has relevance to issues of contemporary concern in epistemology. ;Central to Kant's account of the possibility of empirical concepts is his understanding of concepts as rules. Even empirical concepts, like 'table' and 'book', function as rules because of their multiple instantiability. By means of such rules we identify and re-identify items of perceptual encounters and ascribe to them various properties and relations. However, the employment of such concepts yields cognition only if they are not formed and applied arbitrarily. Instead, those concepts have to be formed and employed in accordance with some rules. Kant argues that categorial concepts, like 'substance' and 'cause', function as meta-rules for the formation and cognitive application of empirical concepts. ;Kant further argues that categories are not arbitrary rules. I attempt to clarify and defend Kant's view by comparing categories with Searlean constitutive rules. By means of categories we construct cognizable properties for items of perceptual encounters; they must conform to categories for the reason that only by means of the application of categories can any of them become objects of cognition. It is, thus, the role of constitutive rules of cognition which proves the legitimate right of categories to be employed in cognition. (shrink)

This essay analyzes Marcel Proust’s claim that “Crime and Punishment” could be the title of all of Dostoevsky’s novels. Although Proust reveals some important points regarding the motivation for Dostoevsky’s writings, his account is also inadequate in some relevant respects. For example, while Proust calls our attention to what happens to victimizers, he ignores the perspective of victims; thus Ivan Karamazov’s challenge remains unaccounted for in Proust’s interpretation. More importantly, Proust does not account for Dostoevsky’s optimism, which, in connection with (...) his realism, is the central aspect of Dostoevsky novelistic and philosophical approach. (shrink)

U ovom radu autor prvo analizira razlike i slicnosti izmedju rata i terorizma, a zatim argumentise da su i jedan i drugi duboko nemoralni. Njihove razlike su mnogo manje znacajne od njihovih slicnosti, o kojih je glavna ona koja se sastoji u negiranju stanovista da je svaki ljudski zivot jednako vredan. To negiranje otvara put ka nehumanom i nasilnom tretmanu onih (neprijatelja, drugih) koji nisu toliko vredni koliko i mi, sto karakterise i terorizam i rat. Pored neprihvatljivih moralnih implikacija proisteklog (...) iz takvog tretmana drugih ljudskih bica, dalja zajednicka i problematicna posledica terorizma i rata se sastoji u cinjenici da dehumanizacija drugih vodi, na kraju, i ka dehumanizaciji nas samih. (shrink)

U ovom radu autor nastoji da svoju knjigu Filozofska zivotinja: zoografski nagovor na filozofiju izlozi vlastitoj bespostednoj analizi ne bi li je preventivno odbranio od potencijalnih kritika drugih. Na taj nacin, s druge strane, on veruje da upravo otvara prostor za takav govor o knjizi i temama koje ona provocira koji ne bi bio tek nakanadno uredno registrovanje i/ili prigodna pohvala, vec njome inspirisan samosvojni prilog koji joj nazad odjekuje.

This paper tries to extricate philosophical education from the restrictions of social and school systems and to commend some independent and subversive views. This is to be accomplished through a conceptual dissection of the term?education?. On the one hand, there is education seen as transmitter of the tradition, where to be educated is seen as being able to fit into an established community. There is also another education to which the authority of tradition is a permanent target of resistance, always (...) trying to undermine any educational uniformity. This second history of education, genuinely philosophical, is radically opposed to the history of institutionalized mass-education. However, intention of this paper is not to proclaim this as an "alternative" model, or to build it up as a new mythology. On the contrary, it is being written as a history of continuous subversion. Viewed from this vantage point, autonomous philosophical education is not a subsystem of a social system. This education has itself as a measurement, and always resists the wider community that has accidentally befallen it. Its honor is exactly in this attitude of resistance, in being watchful against any conscription and integration. Understood in this manner, philosophical education is not a useful "implemented" function of society, but is rather its dysfunction. Rad nastoji da izdvoji filozofsko obrazovanje iz ogranicenja drustvenog i skolskog sistema i da sugerise mogucnost njegovog nezavisnog i "subverzivnog" sagledavanja. Potonje se postize pojmovnim razlaganjem termina "obrazovanje". S jedne strane, postoji obrazovanje kao transmisija tradicije, u kom slucaju se obrazovanost vidi kao sposobnost da se uklopi u ustanovljenu zajednicu. Postoji, medjutim, takodje i jedno drugacije obrazovanje, u cijem registru je autoritet tradicije permanentna tacka otpora. Ono istrajno pokusava da potkopa svaku obrazovnu jednoobraznost. Ova druga istorija obrazovanja, radikalno je suprotstavljena istoriji institucionalizovanog masovnog obrazovanja. Namera ovog rada nije, medjutim, da nju proglasi "alternativnim" modelom ili da je uspostavi kao novu mitologiju. Naprotiv, ona je pisana kao istorija neprestanih diverzija. Sa ovog stanovista sagledana, autonomna filozofska obrazovanost nije podsistem drustvenog sistema. Ovo obrazovanje ima svoju meru u samom sebi i uvek se odupire zajednici koja ga okruzuje i koja ga slucajem dopada. Njegova cast je upravo u ovom stavu otpora, u budnosti prema svakom podvodjenju i integraciji. Na ovaj nacin shvaceno, filozofsko obrazovanje nije tek na jedan odredjeni nacin "implementirana" funkcija drustva, vec pre njegova disfunkcija. (shrink)

Na osnovu analize relevantnih mesta iz Dekartovih spisa u clanku se pokazuje da Dekartove ideje reprezentuju stvari u duhu, ali da on nije reprezentacionalista u malbransovskom smislu: kod Dekarta se percipira reprezentovani objekt a ne reprezentacija objekta. Nakon toga, analiziraju se tri smisla ideje kod njega, objektivni, formalni i materijalni, a potom i razumevanje pojmova conceptus formalis i conceptus objectivus kod Franciska Suareza sto cini neposredan istorijskofilozofski izvor Dekartove teorije ideja. U zakljucku se istice centralnost pojma ideje uzete formalno i (...) iznose se razlozi za tvrdnju da u okviru Dekatove teorije ideja reprezentacionalizam i direktni realizam jesu ekvivalentni. Na kraju se daje sumarni pregled uticaja i preobrazaja razumevanja ideja u ranoj modernoj filozofiji. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179049. (shrink)

The article analyzes Aquinas?s arguments for real distinction between essence and being as presented in the chapters 52-54 of the second book of the Summa contra gentiles, in the wider context of his metapyhsics. First, the paper analyzes the determinations of God on the basis of real distinction, and after that it analyzes the role of the act and potency, priority of act, separation of the act from the form in Aquinas?s understanding of esse, as well as the concept of (...) existential participation; in doing so, the difference among those concepts in Plato and Aristotle and in Aquinas is accentuated. At the end, the paper analyzes the role of two kinds of causality, efficient and formal in real distinction. (shrink)

Deklaracija o svjetskome ethosu, što su ju predstavnici velikih svjetskih religija i manjih duhovnih konfesija usvojili na drugom Parlamentu religija svijeta u Chicagu 1993., utrla je put prema onoj vrsti sporazumijevanja koju nije imala nikada do sada. Naime, pokušaji dijaloga među religijama, ekumenizam i tolerancija, koji su bili ključni pojmovi u drugoj polovini 20. stoljeća, imali su bazični nedostatak, a to je pokušaj prihvaćanja i uvažavanja tuđeg učenja, koje se razlikuje od vlastitoga, tj. sve se svodilo na »vježbanje tolerancije«. Naspram (...) navedenih nastojanja u međureligijskoj i međukonfesionalnoj suradnji, svjetski ethos nastoji doći do zajedničkih temelja, i to ne samo zajedničkih u religijama već i u nereligijskim etičkim sustavima, te se trudi pronaći i odrediti ethos na kojemu bi se zasnivale profesije koje čine bazu razvoja suvremenog društva.Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, adopted by representatives of great world religions and lesser spiritual confessions at II. Parliament of World Religions in Chicago 1993, have paved the way towards that kind of understanding that was never reached before. Namely, attempts of dialogue between religions, ecumenisms of tolerances, that were key terms in the second half of 20th century, all have basic failure, i.e., an attempt to accept and respect doctrines of the others, different from our own, i.e. everything was reduced to “practicing tolerance”. Against the above mentioned efforts in interreligious and interconfessional cooperation, the global ethic try to reach the common grounds, not just common in religion but also in unreligious ethical systems, and it attempts to find and determine the ethos which should serve as fundamentals for professions that make basics of contemporary society development. (shrink)

We consider semi-isolation on the locus of a strongly non-isolated, RK-minimal type in a small theory, and we prove that its asymmetry (as a binary relation) is caused by a specific form of the strict order property: the partial definability of semi-isolation.

Eu me proponho resumir aqui, para o uso daqueles que estudam a linguagem, algumas observações de Freud, dispersas em diversos escritos, e consagradas aos problemas da enunciação (termo do qual Freud não se serve).

This article compares two different approaches to the humanities in general and to anthropology in particular, represented by two renowned French scholars, Claude Levi-Strauss (1908–2009) and Germaine Tillion (1907–2008). While Levi-Strauss emphasized the importance of an objective stance in the humanities and wanted to eliminate all subjectivity, Tillion desired to reserve an exclusive role for subjectivity, preferring human individuals to abstractions. The article suggests looking for the reason for these opposite positions within the disparate experiences the two scholars had during (...) World War II: an American university life for Levi-Strauss, and “humanist classes” in a German concentration camp for Tillion. A person who had been through the schooling at Ravensbruck could not arrive at the same conception of the field as another whose experiences came from the campus of an American university.В этой статье сравниваются два разных подхода к гуманитарным наукам вообще и к антропологии в частности, представленные двумя знаменитыми французскими учеными Клод Леви-Строссом (1908–2009) и Жерменой Тильон (1907–2008). В то время как Леви-Стросс подчеркивал важность объективной позиции в гуманитарных науках и хотел устранить всякую субъективность, Тильон хотела зарезервировать исключительную роль для субъективности, предпочитая людей абстракциям. В статье предлагается найти причину этих противоположных позиций в несопоставимом опыте двух ученых во время Второй мировой войны: жизнь американского университета у Леви-Стросса и «уроки гуманизма», усвоенные Тильон в немецком концентрационном лагере. Человек, прошедший школу жизни в Равенсбрюке, не мог прийти к той же концепции, что и другой, живший в кампусе американского университета.Artiklis korvutatakse kahte erinevat lahenemist humanitaarteadustele uldisemalt ning antropoloogiale konkreetsemalt, mida esindasid kaks tunnustatud prantsuse teadlast, Claude Levi-Strauss (1908–2009) ja Germaine Tillion (1907–2008). Kui Levi-Strauss rohutas objektiivse hoiaku olulisust humanitaarias ning tahtis vabaneda igasugusest subjektiivsusest, siis Tillion soovis reserveerida subjektiivsusele eksklusiivset rolli, eelistades inimesi abstraktsioonidele. Artiklis pannakse ette otsida nende vastandlike seisukohtade pohjusi kahe opetlase erinevatest kogemustest II maailmasoja ajal: Levi-Straussi elust Ameerika ulikoolis ning Tillioni Saksa koonduslaagris omandatud “humanismioppetundidest”. Inimene, kes oli teinud labi Ravensbrucki koolituse, ei saanud hakata valdkonda kontseptualiseerima samamoodi kui teine, kelle kogemus parines Ameerika ulikoolilinnakust. (shrink)

Husserl?s concept of imagination has been systematically presented in Husserliana XXIII, in which its manifold role has been set out. Through the different texts, the author shows that phantasy should be considered as one of the modifications of pure re-presentation. The article first tries to underline the distinction between Husserl?s deliberation on this phenomenon and the traditional concept of imagination. Second, it shows the fundamental moments of constitu?tional consciousness in order to relate the notion of imagination to perceptual apprehension. At (...) the very end, the notion of phantasy is connected with the idea of first philosophy and the question of possibil?ity of its realization. (shrink)

We cannot "go back" to the Enlightenment today; its world is not ours. However, we should not reject it as revolutionaries and anti-humanists tried to during the last century. Rather, we need a rebirth of the Enlightenment to preserve its heritage at the same time subjecting it to a critical appraisal. The Enlightenment has taught us how to do this by lucidly and fearlessly contrasting it with its desirable and undesirable consequences. In criticizing the Enlightenment we remain faithful to it.

We long to love and to be loved. We also fear love because we risk betrayal by those we love, or we betray them. Predrag Cicovacki's charming book, Luminosity of Love, uses the extraordinary love story of the great unconventional Serbian poet Laza Kostić and the vivacious aristocratic young woman, Lenka Dundjerski, as a starting point for a wide-ranging discussion of the nature of love, its importance in the Western philosophical tradition, and its relevance for living a meaningful life (...) in our high-tech materialistic world of the 21st century. By combining real love stories and philosophical reflections on them, the author focuses on the moments of betrayal that bring us to a crossroads at which point we may choose to retreat from loving, and instead satisfy ourselves with substitutes for love. Alternatively, we may realize that our fear and sense of betrayal need not get the last word when it comes to love, and that we can aspire to transform ourselves into more caring and radiating personalities. Our struggle to realize this aspiration is a love story--the ultimate love story that should concern us. This book is a superb philosophical essay about the transformative power of love. (shrink)

Summary Amodal completion involves the impression of existence and properties of visually occluded parts of objects. One aspect of this phenomenon that has been somewhat neglected is the amodal completion of color, which involves the impression that amodally completed surfaces have a particular color. In this paper, this aspect is investigated by constructing a large number of displays with identical target figures embedded in systematically varying contexts, to find out which contexts are conducive for amodal completion of color and which (...) are not. In this setup, the main effects of changes of contexts are changes of geometric and photometric features of junctions along the borders of the target regions, which can cause dramatic differences in the appearance of those regions. Generally, a certain arrangement of T-junctions supports the impression of amodal completion of color, and it can be argued that certain types of X-junctions support a variant of this effect as well. (shrink)

We prove that a Kueker theory with infinite dcl(Ø) does not have the strict order property and that strongly minimal types are dense: any non-algebraic formula is contained in a strongly minimal type.

The article debates the problems of metaphors in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The most important four Kantian metaphors analyzed here are: the Copernican revolution, the island of truth and the stormy ocean of illusion, the starry heavens and the moral law, and the vision of perpetual peace. Besides the extensive analysis of these four metaphors and of some criticism directed towards some of the core problems of Kantianism, these pages try to answer to the question if Kant‟s metaphors are (...) still capable of stimulating our systematic thinking. (shrink)

Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) became well-known for his ethics of reverence for life. While Schweitzer’s life and his ethics have had an enormous appeal to wide audiences all over the world, philosophers have generally ignored his contribution. This may be a loss for philosophy, for, despite some internal problems and inconsistencies, Schweitzer’s ethics of reverence for life promises a viable alternative to utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. The task of my paper is the following. Schweitzer argues that reverence for life is (...) the basic ethical principle and the highest moral value. After briefly presenting Schweitzer’s view, I will consider two questions: 1. Can Schweitzer show that reverence for life is the highest moral value (principle)? 2. Is reverence for life a moral value in the firstplace? I will argue that, with some provision, Schweitzer’s position is tenable. In response to the second question, by comparing Schweitzer with Isaiah Berlin, I maintain that reverence for life is a moral value. In response to the first question, Schweitzer’s position must be modified. By comparing Schweitzer with Nicolai Hartmann, I make a case that reverence for life is the most basic and fundamental, but not the highest moral value. (shrink)

Our time has seen the end of the “big narrative”, the era in which there are no reliable criteria, making it difficult to establish what can and cannot be considered art. Phenomenology has conveyed very clear views on this matter. Its most prominent representatives draw attention even nowadays. Can philosophies that use the phenomenological method offer answers on the nature of the arts, what art is, and its essence? The author claims that this is still possible, but with the realisation (...) regarding different aesthetic experiences and the new historical and social situation. (shrink)

Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) was one of the greatest artists of all time, but also one of the harshest critics of the contemporary art. In the conclusion of his controversial book, What is Art?, Tolstoy claimed: “The purpose of art in our time consists in transferring from the realm of reason to the realm of feeling the truth that people’s well-being lies in being united among themselves and in establishing, in place of the violence that now reins, that Kingdom of God (...) – that is, of love – which we all regard as the highest aim of human nature.” In my paper I want to examine what Tolstoy means by that, and also how his understating of the purpose of art applies to his own works of art, as well as how it applies to some other contemporary works of art. (shrink)

U ovom prilogu autor sagledava i analizira kakvu ulogu igra metafora 'korena', kao i citav onaj diskurzivni sklop koji se za nju veze - 'ukorenjenost', 'iskorenjenost' i tako dalje - te kako funkcionisu botanicke analogije uopste u modernoj politickoj teoriji. Ideoloska podvajanja se iz ovog aspekta prikazuju kao u jednakoj meri, samo na razlicite nacine, fiksirana za predstavu korena ljudske egzistencije ili dobro uredjenog drustva - i odgovarajucu sliku rascvetalog drveta ukoliko je izniklo na tim osnovama - u cijem su (...) povlascenom posedu i iz kojeg crpu pravo i na 'radikalno' postupanje. Razlika, pak, pocinje tek tamo gde jedni zagovaraju bezuslovno negovanje datog korena a drugi preku neophodnost njegovog zamenjivanja novim. U zakljucku rada se sugerise da bi napustanje floralnih metafora moglo ne samo da otvori prostor za razlozan disput o pitanjima na koja se mislilo da one pruzaju odgovore, nego i da bi tek takvo odstupanje od fascinacije korenom u savremenosti bilo zaista - korenito. (shrink)

This paper aims to question anew the popular and supposedly self-evident affirmation of education, in its modern incarnation as in its historical notion. The “naive” questions suggest that we have recently taken for granted that education ought to be for the masses, that it ought to be upbringing, and that it is better than ignorance. Drawing on the tradition that calls such an understanding of education into question, the author shows that the hidden costs of disregarding such reflection end up, (...) camouflaged and smuggled, taxing the current debates regarding generally accepted education strategies. The characteristic feeling of the currently accepted model of education being in chronic crisis is less a testament to an absence of alternative approaches than to a lack of thorough self-reflection. (shrink)