Kant's central goal in the Critique of Pure Reason is to investigate conditions of the possibility of cognition. He assumes that what is given to us by means of the senses is not sufficient for cognition. The senses yield us only the "raw material" for cognition. It is because of our conceptual apparatus that we are able to determine, or discriminate among, what is presented by the senses. ;My main task in the dissertation is to examine Kant's account of the (...) nature of concepts relevant for empirical cognition. Contrary to some recent commentators, like Walsh, and Guyer, I conclude that Kant's account is philosophically defensible and that it has relevance to issues of contemporary concern in epistemology. ;Central to Kant's account of the possibility of empirical concepts is his understanding of concepts as rules. Even empirical concepts, like 'table' and 'book', function as rules because of their multiple instantiability. By means of such rules we identify and re-identify items of perceptual encounters and ascribe to them various properties and relations. However, the employment of such concepts yields cognition only if they are not formed and applied arbitrarily. Instead, those concepts have to be formed and employed in accordance with some rules. Kant argues that categorial concepts, like 'substance' and 'cause', function as meta-rules for the formation and cognitive application of empirical concepts. ;Kant further argues that categories are not arbitrary rules. I attempt to clarify and defend Kant's view by comparing categories with Searlean constitutive rules. By means of categories we construct cognizable properties for items of perceptual encounters; they must conform to categories for the reason that only by means of the application of categories can any of them become objects of cognition. It is, thus, the role of constitutive rules of cognition which proves the legitimate right of categories to be employed in cognition. (shrink)

This essay analyzes Marcel Proust’s claim that “Crime and Punishment” could be the title of all of Dostoevsky’s novels. Although Proust reveals some important points regarding the motivation for Dostoevsky’s writings, his account is also inadequate in some relevant respects. For example, while Proust calls our attention to what happens to victimizers, he ignores the perspective of victims; thus Ivan Karamazov’s challenge remains unaccounted for in Proust’s interpretation. More importantly, Proust does not account for Dostoevsky’s optimism, which, in connection with (...) his realism, is the central aspect of Dostoevsky novelistic and philosophical approach. (shrink)

U ovom radu autor prvo analizira razlike i slicnosti izmedju rata i terorizma, a zatim argumentise da su i jedan i drugi duboko nemoralni. Njihove razlike su mnogo manje znacajne od njihovih slicnosti, o kojih je glavna ona koja se sastoji u negiranju stanovista da je svaki ljudski zivot jednako vredan. To negiranje otvara put ka nehumanom i nasilnom tretmanu onih (neprijatelja, drugih) koji nisu toliko vredni koliko i mi, sto karakterise i terorizam i rat. Pored neprihvatljivih moralnih implikacija proisteklog (...) iz takvog tretmana drugih ljudskih bica, dalja zajednicka i problematicna posledica terorizma i rata se sastoji u cinjenici da dehumanizacija drugih vodi, na kraju, i ka dehumanizaciji nas samih. (shrink)

Na osnovu analize relevantnih mesta iz Dekartovih spisa u clanku se pokazuje da Dekartove ideje reprezentuju stvari u duhu, ali da on nije reprezentacionalista u malbransovskom smislu: kod Dekarta se percipira reprezentovani objekt a ne reprezentacija objekta. Nakon toga, analiziraju se tri smisla ideje kod njega, objektivni, formalni i materijalni, a potom i razumevanje pojmova conceptus formalis i conceptus objectivus kod Franciska Suareza sto cini neposredan istorijskofilozofski izvor Dekartove teorije ideja. U zakljucku se istice centralnost pojma ideje uzete formalno i (...) iznose se razlozi za tvrdnju da u okviru Dekatove teorije ideja reprezentacionalizam i direktni realizam jesu ekvivalentni. Na kraju se daje sumarni pregled uticaja i preobrazaja razumevanja ideja u ranoj modernoj filozofiji. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179049. (shrink)

We consider semi-isolation on the locus of a strongly non-isolated, RK-minimal type in a small theory, and we prove that its asymmetry (as a binary relation) is caused by a specific form of the strict order property: the partial definability of semi-isolation.

We introduce notions of strong and eventual strong non-isolation for types in countable, stable theories. For T superstable or small stable we prove a dichotomy theorem: a regular type over a finite domain is either eventually strongly non-isolated or is non-orthogonal to a NENI type . As an application we obtain the upper bound for Lascar’s rank of a superstable theory which is one-based or trivial, and has fewer than 20 non-isomorphic countable models.

Eu me proponho resumir aqui, para o uso daqueles que estudam a linguagem, algumas observações de Freud, dispersas em diversos escritos, e consagradas aos problemas da enunciação (termo do qual Freud não se serve).

The paper traces a three-century-long tradition of a mistaken attribution of the Defence of Eunuchs by Theophylact of Ohrid. Since Peter Lambeck, chief librarian of the Hofbibliothek in Vienna, identified in 1671 the author of the treatise as Theodore Pedagogue, a poorly known tutor to the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, the incorrect attribution was readily adopted and further disseminated by a series of scholars of the next generations. Although the issue of the authorship was successfully resolved as early as 1768 (...) by Angelo Bandini, head of the Laurentian Library in Florence, the information remained unfamiliar to writers of the following centuries, leaving the entrenched error to persist until the late 1970s, on the eve of the first critical editions of the Defence. The article follows the tangled history of the erroneous attribution, attempting to establish a kind of stemmatic regularity between several branches of the abortive tradition. (shrink)

This article compares two different approaches to the humanities in general and to anthropology in particular, represented by two renowned French scholars, Claude Levi-Strauss (1908–2009) and Germaine Tillion (1907–2008). While Levi-Strauss emphasized the importance of an objective stance in the humanities and wanted to eliminate all subjectivity, Tillion desired to reserve an exclusive role for subjectivity, preferring human individuals to abstractions. The article suggests looking for the reason for these opposite positions within the disparate experiences the two scholars had during (...) World War II: an American university life for Levi-Strauss, and “humanist classes” in a German concentration camp for Tillion. A person who had been through the schooling at Ravensbruck could not arrive at the same conception of the field as another whose experiences came from the campus of an American university.В этой статье сравниваются два разных подхода к гуманитарным наукам вообще и к антропологии в частности, представленные двумя знаменитыми французскими учеными Клод Леви-Строссом (1908–2009) и Жерменой Тильон (1907–2008). В то время как Леви-Стросс подчеркивал важность объективной позиции в гуманитарных науках и хотел устранить всякую субъективность, Тильон хотела зарезервировать исключительную роль для субъективности, предпочитая людей абстракциям. В статье предлагается найти причину этих противоположных позиций в несопоставимом опыте двух ученых во время Второй мировой войны: жизнь американского университета у Леви-Стросса и «уроки гуманизма», усвоенные Тильон в немецком концентрационном лагере. Человек, прошедший школу жизни в Равенсбрюке, не мог прийти к той же концепции, что и другой, живший в кампусе американского университета.Artiklis korvutatakse kahte erinevat lahenemist humanitaarteadustele uldisemalt ning antropoloogiale konkreetsemalt, mida esindasid kaks tunnustatud prantsuse teadlast, Claude Levi-Strauss (1908–2009) ja Germaine Tillion (1907–2008). Kui Levi-Strauss rohutas objektiivse hoiaku olulisust humanitaarias ning tahtis vabaneda igasugusest subjektiivsusest, siis Tillion soovis reserveerida subjektiivsusele eksklusiivset rolli, eelistades inimesi abstraktsioonidele. Artiklis pannakse ette otsida nende vastandlike seisukohtade pohjusi kahe opetlase erinevatest kogemustest II maailmasoja ajal: Levi-Straussi elust Ameerika ulikoolis ning Tillioni Saksa koonduslaagris omandatud “humanismioppetundidest”. Inimene, kes oli teinud labi Ravensbrucki koolituse, ei saanud hakata valdkonda kontseptualiseerima samamoodi kui teine, kelle kogemus parines Ameerika ulikoolilinnakust. (shrink)

Husserl?s concept of imagination has been systematically presented in Husserliana XXIII, in which its manifold role has been set out. Through the different texts, the author shows that phantasy should be considered as one of the modifications of pure re-presentation. The article first tries to underline the distinction between Husserl?s deliberation on this phenomenon and the traditional concept of imagination. Second, it shows the fundamental moments of constitu?tional consciousness in order to relate the notion of imagination to perceptual apprehension. At (...) the very end, the notion of phantasy is connected with the idea of first philosophy and the question of possibil?ity of its realization. (shrink)

We cannot "go back" to the Enlightenment today; its world is not ours. However, we should not reject it as revolutionaries and anti-humanists tried to during the last century. Rather, we need a rebirth of the Enlightenment to preserve its heritage at the same time subjecting it to a critical appraisal. The Enlightenment has taught us how to do this by lucidly and fearlessly contrasting it with its desirable and undesirable consequences. In criticizing the Enlightenment we remain faithful to it.

Mahatma K. Gandhi's dedication to finding a path of liberation from an epidemic of violence has been well documented before. The central issue and the novelty of this book is its focus on what Gandhi wanted to liberate us for. The book also provides an assessment of how viable his positive vision of humanity is. Gandhi revolutionized the struggle for Indian liberation from Great Britain by convincing his countrymen that they must turn to nonviolence and that India needed to be (...) liberated from its social ills--poverty, unemployment, opium addiction, institution of child marriage, inequality of women, and Hindu-Muslim frictions--even more than it needed political freedom. Although Gandhi's legacy has not been forgotten, it has often been distorted. He is called "Mahatma" and venerated as a saint, but not followed and often misinterpreted. Predrag Cicovacki attempts to de-mythologize Gandhi and take a closer look at his thoughts, aims, and struggles. He invites us to look at the footprints Gandhi left for us, and follow them as carefully and critically as possible. Cicovacki concludes that Gandhi's spiritual vision of humanity and the importance of adherence to truth are his lasting legacy. (shrink)

We long to love and to be loved. We also fear love because we risk betrayal by those we love, or we betray them. Predrag Cicovacki's charming book, Luminosity of Love, uses the extraordinary love story of the great unconventional Serbian poet Laza Kostić and the vivacious aristocratic young woman, Lenka Dundjerski, as a starting point for a wide-ranging discussion of the nature of love, its importance in the Western philosophical tradition, and its relevance for living a meaningful life (...) in our high-tech materialistic world of the 21st century. By combining real love stories and philosophical reflections on them, the author focuses on the moments of betrayal that bring us to a crossroads at which point we may choose to retreat from loving, and instead satisfy ourselves with substitutes for love. Alternatively, we may realize that our fear and sense of betrayal need not get the last word when it comes to love, and that we can aspire to transform ourselves into more caring and radiating personalities. Our struggle to realize this aspiration is a love story--the ultimate love story that should concern us. This book is a superb philosophical essay about the transformative power of love. (shrink)

What is The Awkward Age about? It is not easy to answer that apparently simple question. But the reader can take consolation from the fact that the characters themselves seem to have just as much trouble understanding as he does. Actually, a large proportion of the words exchanged in this novel—a novel made up, moreover, almost exclusively of conversations—consists of requests for explanation. These questions may touch upon different aspects of discourse and reveal various reasons for obscurity. The first, the (...) simplest and the rarest, is an uncertainty about the very meaning of words; it is like the uncertainty a foreigner would naturally feel whose knowledge of the language was imperfect: the questions here are matters of vocabulary. In The Awkward Age there are no foreigners who speak bad English, but one of the characters, Mr. Longdon, has for a long time lived far from London; now that he has come back, he has the feeling that he no longer understands the meaning of words, and, in the course of his first conversations at least, he often asks questions like: "What do you mean by early?" "What do you mean by the strain?"1 These questions, innocent as they appear, nevertheless require those to whom they are addressed both to explain and to take full responsibility for the meaning of the words—that is why the questions sometimes provoke lively refusals. "What do you mean by fast?" Mr. Longdon asks again, but the response of the Duchess is cutting: "What should I mean but what I say?" . We shall see, however, that the Duchess' own niece is a victim of the same disorder—not understanding the meaning of words. · 1. P. 43. References are to the Penguin Modern Classics edition . All further references will appear in the text. Tzvetan Todorov has written numerous books on literary theory, the last of which is Théories du symbole , and has translated the works of the Russian Formalists into French. Two of his books have been translated into English, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre and Poetics of Prose. He is editor of the journal Poétique and works as Maître de recherche at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris. "The Last Barthes" appeared in the Spring 1981 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

An assessment is offered of the recent debate on information in the philosophy of biology, and an analysis is provided of the notion of information as applied in scientific practice in molecular genetics. In particular, this paper deals with the dependence of basic generalizations of molecular biology, above all the ‘central dogma’, on the so-called ‘informational talk’ (Maynard Smith [2000a]). It is argued that talk of information in the ‘central dogma’ can be reduced to causal claims. In that respect, the (...) primary aim of the paper is to consider a solution to the major difficulty of the causal interpretation of genetic information: how to distinguish the privileged causal role assigned to nucleic acids, DNA in particular, in the processes of replication and protein production. A close reading is proposed of Francis H. C. Crick's On Protein Synthesis (1958) and related works, to which we owe the first explicit definition of information within the scientific practice of molecular biology. Introduction 1.1 The basic questions of the information debate 1.2 The causal interpretation (CI) of biological information and Crick's ‘central dogma’ Crick's definitions of genetic information The main requirement for (CI) Types of causation in molecular biology 4.1 Structural causation in molecular biology 4.2 Nucleic acids as correlative causal factors The ‘central dogma’ without the notion of information Concluding remarks This is a new version of this article as there were errors in the abstract and full text in the previous version. (shrink)

Let T be a countable complete first-order theory with a definable, infinite, discrete linear order. We prove that T has continuum-many countable models. The proof is purely first order, but it raises the question of Borel completeness of T.

The key assumption behind evolutionary epistemology is that animals are active learners or ‘knowers’. In the present study, I updated the concept of natural learning, developed by Henry Plotkin and John Odling-Smee, by expanding it from the animal-only territory to the biosphere-as-a-whole territory. In the new interpretation of natural learning the concept of biological information, guided by Peter Corning’s concept of “control information”, becomes the ‘glue’ holding the organism–environment interactions together. The control information guides biological systems, from bacteria to ecosystems, (...) in the process of natural learning executed by the universal algorithm. This algorithm, summarized by the acronym IGPT (information-gain-process-translate) incorporates natural cognitive methods including sensing/perception, memory, communication, and decision-making. Finally, the biosphere becomes the distributed network of communicative interactions between biological systems termed the interactome. The concept of interactome is based on Gregory Bateson’s natural epistemology known as the “ecology of mind”. Mimicking Bateson’s approach, the interactome may also be designated “physiology of mind”—the principle behind regulating the biosphere homeostasis. (shrink)

This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia’s view that sentient animals have interests in (...) continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan’s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider whether a straightforward answer can be provided to the following question regarding function ascriptions in genome biology: when does the activity of a genomic segment become functional or, perhaps, fully functional? We respond by examining de novo explanatory models for the emergence of genes, i.e., functional genomic entities. Our case study is especially pertinent to discussions about genome functionality, because what is meant by function, then, is crucial in assessing what constitutes a de novo gene (...) origination. We show that, according to these models, there is no single point at which a genome segment acquires functionality. On the contrary, there is a continuum going from non-functional, through proto-functional, to fully functional. This suggests a gradational functionality for genomic objects, instead of an all-or-nothing one, as implied by standard views in the debate on biological functions. It has recently been argued by Matthewson (Biology Philos 35:4, 2020) that proper functions come in degrees because natural selection comes in degrees. We extend that argument and show that the continuum of functionality or, at least, proto-functionality, can be applied to genomic segments even before they are under the influence of natural selection. Accordingly, we argue that a weak etiological account is most suitable for capturing the phenomenon of new biological functions arising at the genomic level. (shrink)

The article debates the problems of metaphors in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The most important four Kantian metaphors analyzed here are: the Copernican revolution, the island of truth and the stormy ocean of illusion, the starry heavens and the moral law, and the vision of perpetual peace. Besides the extensive analysis of these four metaphors and of some criticism directed towards some of the core problems of Kantianism, these pages try to answer to the question if Kant‟s metaphors are (...) still capable of stimulating our systematic thinking. (shrink)

Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) became well-known for his ethics of reverence for life. While Schweitzer’s life and his ethics have had an enormous appeal to wide audiences all over the world, philosophers have generally ignored his contribution. This may be a loss for philosophy, for, despite some internal problems and inconsistencies, Schweitzer’s ethics of reverence for life promises a viable alternative to utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. The task of my paper is the following. Schweitzer argues that reverence for life is (...) the basic ethical principle and the highest moral value. After briefly presenting Schweitzer’s view, I will consider two questions: 1. Can Schweitzer show that reverence for life is the highest moral value (principle)? 2. Is reverence for life a moral value in the firstplace? I will argue that, with some provision, Schweitzer’s position is tenable. In response to the second question, by comparing Schweitzer with Isaiah Berlin, I maintain that reverence for life is a moral value. In response to the first question, Schweitzer’s position must be modified. By comparing Schweitzer with Nicolai Hartmann, I make a case that reverence for life is the most basic and fundamental, but not the highest moral value. (shrink)

This book is the first to systematically develop, explain, and apply diagrammatic projection operators to construct all semi-simple Lie algebras, both classical and exceptional.

Svaka djelatnost iskazuje identitet djelatnika. U autobiografiji se reprezentira pluralni identitet pisca autobiografije. U njoj otkrivamo ono što je neka osoba. U autobiografiji njen pisac traga za sobom, za svojim osobnim identitetom. U pitanju o identitetu osoba u autobiografiji zapravo pita što je događaj njenog života. Autobiografija je svijest o sebi. Sjećanje i iskustvo izgrađuje i oblikuje osobnu svijest, potvrđuje znanje o vlastitom identitetu, o identitetu koji nije dan nego nastajući, jer tek kroz sjećanje i iskustvo osoba istodobno gradi imaginarnu (...) stvarnost prošlog i postaje ono što jest. U svaku osobnu priču se utka sve što je iskustvo te osobe, iskustvo koje nikako nije samo osobno iskustvo, nego i iskustvo jedne kulture, jezika, obrazovanja, drugih… Autobiografija je tekst u kojem pisac gradi svoj identitet, pokazuje svoju »osobnu kartu« i retušira svoju sliku koju će u njoj priložiti. U pisanju autobiografije pisac ponovo izgrađuje svoj identitet, sebe sama. U svakom djelu stvaralac stvara i sebe samog. U svakoj biografiji je moguće raspoznati mnoga filozofiji relevantna pitanja, od pitanja identiteta do pitanja reprezentiranja subjekta. U onim koje su pisali filozofi posebno. U odluci da piše u prvom licu filozof iskazuje svoju senzibilnost, a iznad svega potvrđuje da je osobno odgovoran za ono što se u njegovom djelu tvrdi, da to nije neka apersonalna, božanska riječ ili kaza anonimnog narodnog mudraca, nego njegova temeljna riječ, filozof sam. Subjekt govori. Presudan je Ego Cogito, koji postaje Osobnost, Ja Pisanja, Autorstvo. Filozofsko djelo je osobna karta filozofa. U autobiografskom tekstu autor otkriva, potvrđuje i definira svoj identitet, ali na kraju ono njegovo uistinu osobno nije njegovo Ja, jer njegovo Ja zapravo postaje junak osobne priče. Pisac autobiografije na kraju postane Ja teksta.Every activity reflects the identity of the person who is engaged in it. In an autobiography a multiple identity of the autobigrapher is displayed. It discloses everything that a person is or was. And no other can do it better than the person in question. In an autobiography, the writer is searching for himself, his own identity. In the identity question of the autobiography , the person asks what has been the crucial event in his or her life. Autobiography is awareness of the self. Memories and experience develop and shape a personal conscience, they attest the awareness of the personal identity, identity which is not a given, but is ever evolving. It is only through remembering and experiencing that a person simultaneously develops the imaginary reality of the past and evolves into what he or she is. Every personal story consists of the experience of that particular person, experience that is not only a personal one, but also experience involving a particular culture, language, education, and contact with others… An autobiography is a text in which a writer develops his own identity, displays his “identity card” and retouches his own image. When writing an autobiography, the writer reinvents his own identity, his own self. In every creative work the creator creates himself, as well. In every biography it is possible to recognize many relevant philosophical issues, from the question of identity to the question of representation of a subject, especially those written by philosophers. By deciding to write in the first person singular, a philosopher expresses his sensitivity, confirming that the philosophy he embodies belongs to him, affirms that he is personally responsible for what he claims in his work, that is certainly not an apersonal, divine sentence or a tale of an anonymous folk sage, but his own quintessential sentence. A subject speaks. This is Ego Cogito that becomes personality, the I of the writing. Authorship. A philosophical work is an identity card of a philosopher. In an autobiographical text, the author discloses, develops, affirms and defines his own identity, but in the end his personal I is not his own I, because his I becomes a protagonist of a personal story. The writer of an autobiography becomes I of the text, in the end. (shrink)

Can human nature be defined? The author advocates for describing the human nature, wherein he sees the possibility of pointing out its essential traits, not only the differences but also the sameness. The very question of human nature speaks about the necessity of philosophical reflection on all things human. Thus, the question regarding human nature is perpetual and open.

Our time has seen the end of the “big narrative”, the era in which there are no reliable criteria, making it difficult to establish what can and cannot be considered art. Phenomenology has conveyed very clear views on this matter. Its most prominent representatives draw attention even nowadays. Can philosophies that use the phenomenological method offer answers on the nature of the arts, what art is, and its essence? The author claims that this is still possible, but with the realisation (...) regarding different aesthetic experiences and the new historical and social situation. (shrink)