According to Carl Schmitt, the phenomenon of the political has different forms. These forms can be distinguished based on different possible relationships between political action and the state. This article presents the history of what Schmitt refers to as the phenomenon of partisanship. Partisanship is a specific form of politics, established in the early ninetieth century, which has gradually expanded its presence. Partisan activity is characterized by totality, which has evolved to become the dominant component of political action over time, (...) particularly in the twentieth century. This totality affects not only the size and range of political activity, but it is also – and perhaps first of all – ruthless in its use of terror and violence, which is considered entirely justified by total partisans/terrorists. (shrink)

On many interpretations of Spinoza’s political philosophy, democracy emerges as his ideal type of government. But a type of government can be ideal and yet it can be unwise to implement it if certain background conditions obtain. For example, a dominion’s people can be too ‘wretched by the conditions of slavery’ to rule themselves. This begs the following question. Do Spinoza’s arguments for democracy entail that all political bodies should be democracies at all times (the received view), or do they (...) merely entail that we should only have a democracy when the right sort of background conditions are in place (the challenging view)? This paper argues that a new interpretation of one of the four versions of the rationality argument for democracy as it features in the Tractatus entails that the received view is correct. The paper also explains away part of the appeal of the challenging view by arguing that none of the other versions of the rationality argument supports the received view. It closes by arguing that a slightly modernised version of the rationality argument can be important for contemporary political philosophy. (shrink)

Who makes decisions concerning defence policy in Belgium? Not the public opinion, because otherwise there would be no Cruise missiles.Not the Parliament, because the parliamentarians only ratify international treaties. Not the Minister of Foreign Affairs, because the Minister of Defence makes decisions without contacting Foreign Affairs. Even the Government as a whole and the Prime Minister do not much take care about the defence policy. The so-called experts concerning defence policy are the militaries, the diplomats and the NATO-bureaucrats.Yet, the political (...) problems with respect to the Atlantic Alliance and the division of the European continent, wilt constrain the politicians to reconsider the basic options of the policy. (shrink)

The contention in this paper is that the theological-political disputes Spinoza was concerned with 350 years ago are similar to the conspiratorial disputes we experience today. The world in Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus, a political intervention in his time, serves as a “mirror image”, that is to say, it deals with the same problem we face today albeit in a different mode. Understanding our contemporary condition under the auspices of a Spinozist perspective, problems in countermeasures to the conspiratorial disputes come (...) to light. Scholarly work and practice focus on the epistemological dimension of conspiracy theories, tying in the extent to which they are problematic to the degree in which they deal in untruth. However, the lesson from Spinoza’s analysis of the theological-political disputes is that such theories do not deal in truth, but, in affect, they do not spring from a lack of education but a lack of certainty. The work of Spinoza opens up a different approach, and if our aim is like that of the TTP, to defend political life against the threat of civil war, such a different approach is in order. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION BRAD S. GREGORY Until now those interested in Spinoza have lacked an adequate English translation of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. ...

In the Tractatus Politicus Spinoza argues that politically unequal societies can be extremely stable. This feature of his work is at odds with a view, common in the literature, that Spinoza is a democratically-minded author who defends inclusive political systems, and in this paper I consider how he thinks inequality can be sustained. I focus on his discussion of the ways in which envy can be offset or redirected; and I apply my conclusions to his notorious claim that women (...) are not fit to rule. (shrink)

O presente texto tem como objetivo apontar algumas das razões pelas quais Spinoza foi considerado um herege. Acreditamos que as três principais razões que colaboraram para essa interpretação do seu pensamento estão contidas mais explicitamente no _Tratado Teológico Político_ do que em sua principal obra filosófica, a _Ética_. Ademais, o _Tratado Teológico Político_ teve maior alcance entre o vulgo, pois era o objetivo de Spinoza que a obra tivesse a maior repercussão possível e influenciasse no conflituoso cenário político e religioso (...) de sua época, ao mesmo tempo em que a _Ética_ permanecia confinada entre as mãos dos seus amigos e leitores mais próximos. (shrink)

This article intends to analyze the implications of a hypothesis that extends Foucault's analysis of neoliberalism from its effects on modern democracy. For this purpose, Wendy Brown's recent work examines how neoliberal rationality affects democracy, transforms its imaginary and even its main subject, namely the demos. Brown points to two problems of the "neoliberalism's stealth revolution," namely that the neoliberal rationality transforms and undoes democracy by directly affecting its fundamental principle of popular sovereignty. Such transformation is made from the change (...) produced in the democratic imaginary and, mainly, from the transformation of the economic subject from a subject of interest to human capital, as well as the political subject, relegated to the background. From this first problem, we examine how they happen and what are the consequences of changing the democratic imaginary and its central political subject. The second problem pointed out by Brown deals with the interference of neoliberal reason in sovereign autonomy. The second part of this article seeks, therefore, to analyze the relationship between the sovereignty of the nation-state and the notion of popular sovereignty from the problem of the expansion of capital and the vulnerability of the frontiers and territory where citizenship is exercised. (shrink)

In his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Spinoza seeks to separate religion from philosophy and from politics. Yet the true metaphysical understanding of God remains relevant to a proper grasp of the state for Spinoza. Through identifying a common logical structure underlying Spinoza’s conception of God and the two subjects of the TTP - the relation of faith and reason, and the origin of the state and its relation to individual citizens – the paper attempts to demonstrate that Spinoza’s argument for the (...) autonomy of secular reason and the secular state in the TTP is inseparable from his metaphysical theology. (shrink)

Platonic dialogues are self-concealing, presenting ideas by indirection or in riddling form, often exploring a difficulty or aporia without arriving at a solution. Since philosophers have begun to see Plato's work as imbued with irony, double meaning, and ambiguity, literary techniques that accommodate such layered meanings become a necessary adjunct to interpretation. The dialogue Politicus explores through an aporetic process a central Platonic concern, the relation between ideal and real. Close analysis of the important section dealing with law and (...) constitutions reveals some of the complexity. By his wayward conduct of the argument, the Eleatic stranger repeatedly forces reevaluation of earlier arguments or conclusions. At the close of the cosmic myth , the Stranger warned against confusing the divine monarch, a true shepherd, with his mortal counterpart, the best ruler, whose discovery is the aim of the dialogue. The distinction that was made then is simple in context, but complex in view of the conclusion at 303b8-c5 that the participants in all governments except the ideal monarchy are supreme wizards and fakers. The truly real statesman thus recedes into a distance remote from the world of practical politics, while the familiar regimes are marked as irretrievably flawed and inauthentic. The ability of the fake statesmen to deceive by impersonating the true king also means that it may be impossible to make the crucial distinction between king and tyrant, since either may disregard the laws. The strange fable of legalism run wild confirms the ludicrous and destructive results of rigid obedience to law, but concludes that rigidity is necessary to the false regimes. The corollary is that seekers after truth, like Socrates or even the Stranger himself, must always be rejected by law-based societies. (shrink)

Historia, as both a type of critical inquiry and a source of information about nature and the human world, is a key category in Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus. In this work, the Latin word cannot be simply and invariably translated as “history,” not even if we add the proviso that its meaning wavers inevitably between “history” and “story,” for its semantic range is too broad and complex. At the two ends of the semantic spectrum we have the impartial report, on (...) the one hand, and the creations of sheer fantasy, on the other. Historia may therefore denote the detached observation of nature and the philological analysis of a text, but it can also refer to the free exercise of the imagination in a variety of narrative contexts. While Spinoza denies that the inquiry resulting from historia and its products may have true cognitive value, he acknowledges that historia plays a fundamental role in society and politics. The reason is that historia and the imagination are bound up together by a special relationship. This is apparent at all levels of the historical engagement with reality, but is particularly true in the case of religion, moral norms and belief systems, for in this variegated domain the link between imagination and historia functions as the connective tissue that keeps societies united and functioning. This specific nexus of imagination and historia is Spinoza’s original contribution to the early modern notion of “moral certainty.” More importantly, it is only at this level that Spinoza grants a modicum of intelligibility to the ‘historical’ productions of the imagination, be they signa, revelationes, or even nugae. The fact remains, though, that to a certain extent humans keep having a distorted grasp of reality, indeed hallucinate, even when their ‘historical’ accounts of reality are socially and politically productive. Here the key element is the notion of fictional continuity based on a socially constructed trust in narrative accounts of reality: the imagination turns reality into stories, but in so doing it keeps the otherwise constitutively hallucinatory nature of humans at bay and under control. Perceptibilitas, that is, the ability to provide acceptable cognitive solutions between intelligible knowledge and moral certainty, is ultimately what defines the contribution of the imagination to the human work of knowledge. (shrink)

This article explores Richard Rorty’s status in academic political theory in the decades after his conscious departure from disciplinary philosophy. Rorty found a receptive audience in this pluralistic field, and he became a point of orientation in a number of ongoing, research-agenda driving conversations, if often as an extreme example against which interlocutors could define themselves. In like fashion, Rorty refined his own self-conception as a patriotic liberal ironist in the course of his political theoretical engagements. I offer a sketch (...) of political theory’s landscape as a contrast to the reductivism and esotericism Rorty criticized in disciplinary philosophy, and survey his presence in the field over the years substantively, qualitatively, and quantitatively. (shrink)

At his death, Spinoza left two major works, very different from one another. The first is the Ethics, rigorously set out in geometrical terms, with definitions, axioms, and theorems. In the Ethics, Spinoza takes the reader down the path of reason to an ultimate beatitude, a rational salvation, a kind of peace of mind attained through the true knowledge of God, oneself, and one's place in the world. The other is of a very different sort. The Tractatus theologico-politicus is (...) set out in twenty chapters. It begins with a discussion of prophecy and revelation, followed by a detailed description of Scripture, and what we can learn from it, the message of scripture. And that message is to be obedient to God, and to love our neighbours as ourselves. Two books, two styles of argument, two very different paths to salvation, arguably two Gods and arguably two very different kinds of kinds of salvation at the end. But one author. The challenge is evident: how do these books fit together? One is about reason, the other about revelation, one is about personal salvation, the other more focused on how we live together. Spinoza's writing has always drawn strong reactions, both positive and negative: he was accepted by some as a kind of secular prophet offering us a guide to life, and rejected by others as a kind of atheist and heretic. In this book, a diverse international group of seventeen scholars confronts these two central works in the philosophical canon, and explores what Spinoza is trying to tell us about life, the world, and our place in it. (shrink)

This volume analyzes in detail Spinoza's reasoning in Tractatus theologico-politicus, identifies allies and enemies in its historical context, and explores its more or less obvious connection with the Ethica.

Dans cet ouvrage, nous nous proposons de parcourir le Tractatus Theologico-Politicus de Spinoza afin de donner au lecteur philosophe tous les éléments susceptibles de l'aider à saisir la place des citations bibliques dans cette œuvre, ainsi que ses conséquences sur la pensée philosophique de l'auteur. D'autre part nous voulons montrer au lecteur hébraïsant l'utilisation que Spinoza a faite des sources bibliques au sens large, mais traditionnel. Nous utiliserons également la grammaire de l'Hébreu que Spinoza a laissé inachevée : Compendium (...) Grammatices Linguoe Hebroeoe, Abrégé de Grammaire Hébraïque, publié dans les Opera Posthuma, 1671. Nous tenterons une approche de son œuvre en dehors des luttes et des passions que son seul nom inspire, lui qui sa vie durant s'écartera par tous les moyens des combats de son époque afin de pouvoir accéder à la connaissance vraie qui seule apporte le bonheur. (shrink)

This study analyses Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico politicus from the point of view of the confrontation between revealed Scripture and philosophy, and links it with the history of this confrontation in Maimonides and the Arab philosophers, highlighting similarities and differences. The three key points of the analysis are the following: Salvation through philosophy; Salvation through religion; and the guarantor of Salvation: political power.

The first complete English translation of Spinoza's Tractatus theologico-politicus was published anonymously in London in 1689 under the title A treatise partly theological and partly political, though prior to it Charles Blount had incorporated a liberal translation of chapter 6 of the Tractatus in his Miracles no violations of the laws of nature. The language employed in the 1689 translation suggested a decidedly political intention for the work and thus certain liberties were taken with the text. Since that time (...) there have been translations of passages or chapters from the Tractatus into English. Most recently, A. G. Wernham has translated and edited selections from the Tractatus theologico-politicus and Tractatus politicus in The Political Works of Spinoza. Still, the standard source for English language readers of Spinoza has been R. H. M. Elwes's two-volume translation of The Works of Spinoza, published originally in 1883 and reprinted without emendations in 1951. His translation, however useful, is far from adequate and the appearance of Samuel Shirley's translation of Spinoza's Tractatus is most welcome. (shrink)

Plato’s Politicus argues for a striking normative claim about the law: the ideal expert ruler will not only change the laws of the city when he thinks it best, but will also contravene them. The Eleatic Stranger’s argument for this conclusion reveals important features of Plato’s views on expertise in general, and political expertise in particular. Laws should not be inviolable for an expert ruler because no craft lays down inviolable rules for its practitioners. There are no inviolable rules (...) of action for experts because crafts are teleological: expert action aims only to produce some good. The expert ruler’s political action recognizes no constraints besides the aim of best promoting the good condition of the whole city. Plato believes that the statesman will do markedly better at promoting this end when unconstrained by even the best laws, and there is evidence that he will harm individual citizens in order to do so. (shrink)

This new and complete translation of Spinoza's famous 17th-century work fills an important gap, not only for all scholars of Spinoza, but also for everyone interested in the relationship between Western philosophy and religion, and the history of biblical exegesis.

In his final, incomplete Tractatus Politicus (1677), Spinoza’s account of human power and freedom shifts towards a new, teleological interest in the ‘highest good’ of the state in realising the freedom of its subjects. This development reflects, in part, the growing influence of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Dutch republicanism, and the Dutch post-Rampjaar context after 1672, with significant implications for his view of political power and freedom. It also reflects an expansion of his account of natural right to include independence of (...) mind, a model of autonomy that in turn shapes the infamous sui juris exclusions of his unfinished account of democracy. This article focuses specifically on the Tractatus Politicus, a hitherto under-addressed work in Spinoza’s corpus and one too often considered indistinct from his earlier Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670). It argues for a reconsideration of its importance to early modern political thought, particularly regarding the role of the state in realising the freedom and harmony of its subjects through reasonable laws. (shrink)