The article deals with the contra Secundinum in order to present some of the Christological elements that Augustine brings to the front as a way of contrasting Catholic Christology with Manichaean Christology, and to show the falsity of the sect of Mani by highlighting the incoherence of some of the ideas of the Manichaeans. The article focuses particularly on two Christological titles present in contra Secundinum, namely those of Primogenitus and Unigenitus. These are two Christological titles which appear only (...) rarely in the anti-Manichaean works, but which in the contra Secundinum acquire a particular value. For this purpose, the article, after a brief introduction, reviews the Augustinian anti-Manichaean works, in order to see how these titles are only found very scarcely and generally in the mouth of St. Augustine in contra Fortunatum, contra Adimantum, contra epistulam Fundamenti and contra Faustum. The article presents the nuances and elements that these titles have in the aforementioned works, and then focuses on the contra Secundinum, to see which are the Manichaean and Catholic Christological implications of the titles of Primogenitus and Unigenitus. Throughout the article, some texts from the Manichaean Works are quoted to confirm the assertions of the article. (shrink)

Le Dieu de la Première Méditation de Descartes reste une figure énigmatique de la Divinité ; le développement de la métaphysique cartésienne opposera à cette vetus opinio d’un Dieu tout-puissant et bon l’idée innée du « vrai Dieu ». Les commentateurs ont cherché à préciser l’origine d’une telle opinion : nous tenterons à notre tour de lever l’anonymat de ce Dieu en montrant que la Première Méditation s’élabore à partir d’une lecture des premières confessions d’Augustin, à savoir le De beata (...) vita. Cette source augustinienne est d’ailleurs confirmée par Régis qui rattache spontanément les attributs du Dieu de la vetus opinio à la théologie d’Augustin. (shrink)

This chapter analyses Malebranche’s theory that the human, finite mind participates in two separate and, at least prima facie, incompatible unions: one with the body to which it is joined and one with God. By looking at the way that Malebranche borrows from both the mechanical philosophy as articulated by Descartes and Augustine’s dictum that we are not “lights unto” ourselves, the unique, difficult, and at times problematic Malebranchean philosophy of mind is revealed. This discussion is divided into two (...) main parts. First, it situates Malebranche’s view of the nature of mind in relation to Descartes’ and Augustine’s views by way of discussion of the roles of intellect and will, the intelligibility of mind, and the manner in which the mind is involved in sensation, imagining, and passionate responses. These are the operations that depend on the mind’s relationship to its body. Second, the chapter moves to explore Malebranche’s view of the operations of the mind as united to God: ideation, which involves a discussion of Malebranche’s famous doctrine of the Vision of All Things in God, and pure understanding. In this second part, attention is paid to Malebranche’s disputes with Antoine Arnauld, Pierre-Sylvain Régis, and Dortous de Mairan over the central philosophical principle that underwrites the Malebranchean view of ideas: intelligible extension. While intelligible extension is the legitimate object of critique, it is suggested here that Malebranche, by relying on faith, can answer his critics. The chapter concludes by articulating the manner in which that Malebranche sees the relationship between the two unions of the mind, with body and with God, in his science of man. -/- . (shrink)

La question de la liberté est à la fois fondamentale et posée en des termes qui la rendent insoluble : comment penser une action libre si l'on admet que les phénomènes sont soumis à la causalité? En analysant l'émergence du concept de libre arbitre, Olivier Boulnois propose une autre généalogie de la morale.00Sous un problème en apparence évident (la liberté de la volonté, née de l'idée de responsabilité, et la difficulté de penser cette liberté dans un monde régi par des (...) rapports de cause à effet), l'auteur débusque une série de questions correspondant aux différents sens de la liberté : la liberté à l'égard d'une contrainte n'est pas la liberté à l'égard des causes extérieures ou internes ; elle peut viser la liberté d'agir, mais aussi la liberté de choisir entre plusieurs options et la liberté de vouloir ou de ne pas vouloir. Les approches classiques et modernes (celles d'Aristote, d'Augustin, de Descartes ou de Leibniz) sont confrontées aux pensées critiques des XlXe-XXe siècles (de Nietzsche à Freud et Wittgenstein). D'une liberté à l'autre, les questions ne sont pas les mêmes - ainsi, Aristote élabore une théorie cohérente de l'action sans poser la question de la liberté.00Il fallait faire apparaître l'± impensé? des théories du libre arbitre pour poser correctement la question, et espérer la résoudre. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 442-443 [Access article in PDF] Steven Nadler, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche. Cambridge Companions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 319. Cloth, $54.95. With his own Cambridge Companion, the seventeenth-century French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche has at last arrived in the English speaking world. As editor Nadler puts it, "Malebranche was widely recognized by his philosophical and theological (...) contemporaries... as an intellectual force to be reckoned with, a bold... synthesizer of... St. Augustine and Descartes and a systematic thinker of the first rank" (1). Yet until the relatively recent arrival of books or translations by scholars such as Nadler, McCracken, Jolley, Schmaltz, and Riley, Malebranche has largely been treated by Anglo-American scholars as merely the solitary proponent of the allegedly rather silly doctrine of occasionalism. The tide is now turning, and we may expect that over the next few years Malebranche's wide-ranging sophistication and significance will be more widely appreciated. Invaluable to that end will be Nadler's volume, which is of great interest both to those new to Malebranche and to seasoned scholars, for it presents accessible yet thorough introductions to Malebranche's many interesting doctrines—concerning self-knowledge, vision in God, continuous creation, occasionalism, theodicy, grace, freedom, morality, etc.—as well as raises important questions for future research. All of the essays Nadler has assembled are by well-known scholars, and all are worthwhile.The first point to make is that occasionalism—the view that God is the only true cause, and that finite substances lack all true causal power—was neither silly, nor was Malebranche its only proponent. As Nadler's own essay makes clear, the doctrine (or variations thereof) has roots in medieval philosophy as well as in Descartes, and was favored by other Cartesians preceding Malebranche, such as Cordemoy, la Forge, Geulincx, and Clauberg; further, Malebranche offered numerous distinct arguments for it, and, as evidenced in essays by Schmaltz, Rutherford, Kremer, and Riley, intended it to fit with his other metaphysical views in a complete and coherent system. Even if, as some of these same authors suggest, Malebranche failed to get everything to fit quite right, it's at least clear that the oft-raised charge that occasionalism was merely an ad hoc solution to the Cartesian mind-body problem is unjustified. There is of course room to disagree with certain details here: I've argued elsewhere, for example against Nadler, that despite evidence to the contrary Malebranche does not invoke continuous creation as an argument for occasionalism, and, in effect, against Kremer, that Malebranche can succeed in reconciling occasionalism and his conception of free will. But then the fact that scholars can disagree on points such as these is precisely evidence that Malebranche is a rich subject of study.Different essays have different virtues. Some are especially strong in philosophical analysis. Schmaltz provides penetrating analyses of Malebranche's doctrine that we see [End Page 442] all things "in God" as well as of related issues (such as the distinction between the intellectual and the sensible), and also traces their roots in or ramifications for thinkers such as Augustine, Descartes, Arnauld, and Regis; Kremer, too, does an impressive job disentangling the many discrete threads in Malebranche's theory of free will. Essays by Moreau and Riley are particularly useful for their overview or synthetic nature: Moreau presents the many points of contention in the decades-long dispute between Malebranche and Arnauld, while Riley makes explicit the implications that many of the doctrines discussed by other contributors have for Malebranche's moral theory (in the process perhaps implicitly supporting the claim that Malebranche's moral theory may be essential for understanding his metaphysics). Brown's and Robinet's contributions, the former detailing Malebranche's positive influence on or critical reception by figures such as Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, and Reid, the latter focusing on disputes between Malebranche, Arnauld, and Leibniz, are essential for those interested (as all should be) in working Malebranche into standard undergraduate courses on modern philosophy, and will also be... (shrink)

Why should we seek and tell the truth? Does anyone know what truth is? Many are skeptical about the relevance of truth. Truth Matters endeavours to show why truth is important in a world where the very idea of truth is contested. Putting philosophers in conversation with educators, literary scholars, physicists, political theorists, and theologians, Truth Matters ranges across both analytic and continental philosophy and draws on the ideas of thinkers such as Aquinas, Balthasar, Brandom, Davidson, Dooyeweerd, Gadamer, Habermas, Kierkegaard, (...) Plantinga, Ricoeur, and Wolterstorff. Some essays attempt to provide a systematic account of truth, while others wrestle with the question of how truth is told and what it means to live truthfully. Contributors address debates between realists and anti-realists, explore issues surrounding relativism and constructivism in education and the social sciences, examine the politics of truth telling and the ethics of authenticity, and consider various religious perspectives on truth. Most scholars agree that truth is propositional, being expressed in statements that are subject to proof or disproof. This book goes a step farther: yes, propositional truth is important, but truth is more than propositional. To recognize how it is more than propositional is crucial for understanding why truth truly matters. Contributors include Doug Blomberg (ICS), Allyson Carr (ICS), Jeffrey Dudiak (King’s University College), Olaf Ellefson (York University), Gerrit Glas (VU University Amsterdam), Gill K. Goulding (Regis College), Jay Gupta (Mills College), Clarence Joldersma (Calvin College), Matthew J. Klaassen (ICS), John Jung Park (Duke University), Pamela J. Reeve (St. Augustine’s Seminary), Amy Richards (World Affairs Council of Western Michigan), Calvin Seerveld (ICS), Ronnie Shuker (ICS), Adam Smith (Brandeis University), John Van Rys (Redeemer University College), Darren Walhof (Grand Valley State University), Matthew Walhout (Calvin College), and Lambert Zuidervaart (ICS). (shrink)

The A. compares the psalmus contra partem Donati, written by Augustin about 394, with the anonymous psalmus responsorius from a papyrus preserved in the Benedictine abbey in Montserrat, near Barcelona, under the shelf mark P.Monts.Roca inv. 128-178, dating maybe to the mid-IV century AD, from which only the strophes from A to L are complete. Particularly, he focuses on four lines before the acrostic strophes, whose reading is very controversial, and whose prosody he presents as different from the common one, (...) restoring it fully to its function of hypopsalma: Páter qui ómnia régis péto / Chrísti nós sciás herédes / Chrístus uérbo nátus pér quem pópulús est líberátus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:498 BOOK REVIEWS generations of theologians across denominational lines. Both Placher and Hunsinger at the end of their essays choose quotations from within Frei's own writings to give a synoptic portrait of the man and his work. Placher chooses a remark about Niebuhr's sense of vocation as a theologian (20), and Hunsinger one about knowledge of that seemingly elusive reality, a person's identity (257). However one might come away (...) from this challenging collection of essays, further confused or more enlightened, more in agreement or disagreement, I think every reader will recognize the coincidence of intellectual perspicuity and generosity with passionate faith. Regis College, Toronto School of Theology Toronto, Ontario, Canada GEORGE P. SCHNER, S.J. Reasoned Faith. Edited by ELEONORE STUMP. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. x + 364. As the editor remarks in her "Introduction," it is not so long ago that the analytical philosophy of religion consisted very largely of discussions of the meaningfulness of religious language, and of arguments about the existence of God. Nowadays it is more adventurous, ranging over such topics as creation, providence, and God's responsibility for sin. According to Robert Merrihew Adams, the statement "truth is subjectivity," though one of the most famous, is also one of the most misunderstood in Kierkegaard's writings. He argues that, taken in context within the Concluding Unscientifu: Postscript, the statement is by no means incompatible with the objective truth of religious belief. From the point of view of the Postscript, a member of an idolatrous community who prays to her God with "the entire passion of the infinite" has more of the truth than one who prays in a false spirit from within Christendom; but this implies that the latter does have some truth. Whatever the deficiencies in her faith, she is clearly admitted to be in possession of the true concept of God objectively speaking (223 ). Adams maintains, quite rightly in the reviewer's opinion, that the Postscript is excessively pessimistic about the integration of the ideals of subjectivity and objectivity, of passionate commitment on the one side and rational assessment of evidence on the other, in religious faith (21). A useful distinction is made by Scott MacDonald between "occurrent" and "dispositional" belief; this seems to resolve some of the more puzzling paradoxes about the relation of the more cognitive and propositional side of faith to other aspects which may be thought essential to it. The demons alluded to by St. James (2:19) might believe dispositionally that their highest fulfillment BOOK REVIEWS 499 was to be found in obeying the divine will, and so performing acts of charity and service to other creatures. But to avoid the inconvenience of acting in such a way, they could think of God occurrently as just a powerful being who makes burdensome demands (55). For MacDonald, the cognitive component of faith has only two elements, belief that certain propositions are true, and belief that the kind of response of the will which is also essential to faith may be grounded on these (56). "We can make sense of Christian faith if we think of it simply as belief that Christianity is true plus an appropriate volitional response to that truth" (69). Against mainline Christian accounts like those of Augustine and Aquinas, he sees no good reason to suppose that one cannot have faith in propositions for which one has conclusive proof, but only in those for which one's justification is relatively weak. He provides interesting grounds for contradiction of a view which has been expounded by both Robert Adams and John Hick, that only such uncertainty can ground the trust which is essential to the relationship which human beings ought to have to God (59). "My ability to love and trust my wife, to commit myself without reservation to her well-being and to the goals and purposes we have chosen as definitive of our common life seem in no way dependent on my being uncertain about what she is like or what she will do" (60). On the question of how faith ought to be related to the demands of reason, Robert Audi remarks that, up to the middle 1970s... (shrink)

My dissertation focuses on the moral philosophy of Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza in the context of the revival of Stoicism within the seventeenth century. There are many misinterpretations about early modern ethical theories due to a lack of proper awareness of Stoicism in the early modern period. My project rectifies this by highlighting understated Stoic themes in these early modern texts that offer new clarity to their morality. Although these three philosophers hold very different metaphysical commitments, each embraces a different (...) aspect of Stoicism, letting it influence but not define his work. By addressing the Stoic themes on the morality of these three authors, I also hope to help better capture the intellectual climate of the time by bringing Stoic themes into the foreground. Stoicism is a Hellenistic philosophy that considered the passions a sickness of the intellect and the source of all human suffering; they believed the cure was virtue, which was obtained through replacing irrational passions with rational beliefs. Stoicism had a revival in the Renaissance ushering in a wave of Neostoic authors who play an important role in shaping the intellectual landscape of the following centuries. My first two chapters discuss Descartes, who wrote a “provisional morality” early in his public life, only (as I show) to ignore the subject of ethics until near his death. In my first chapter I argue that, though many present-day scholars misread Descartes’ first ethics as part of his final ethics, this earliest “provisional morality” mimics Neostoic Skeptics such as Montaigne and is provisional because his method of doubt is also provisional. In my second chapter I show that Descartes’ late, and more developed, moral theory attempts to synthesize a variety of ancient, and seemingly contradictory, ethical traditions: Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism. In many ways Descartes embraces Stoic morality, but as a mechanist he does not view passions as an intellectual sickness; rather they are a physiological event, an amoral instrument that can be used to help control one’s irrational desires. I further defend my thesis externally by showing that this is the reading supported by Descartes’ contemporaries including critics such as Leibniz and early Cartesians such as Antoine Le Grand and Pierre-Sylvain Régis My third chapter discusses Pascal, who embraces Stoicism differently. Pascal offers Stoicism as the first tier of a binary ethics: modeled after Augustine’s city of God and city of man, it is an alternative moral code for those who are ignorant of the good and true happiness. Finally, in my fourth chapter, I discuss two common misinterpretations of Spinoza’s ethics: one of them neglects the Stoic influence on his thought while the other embraces it too strongly, portraying him as an unadulterated Stoic. Although there are ways that he is more Stoic than Descartes and Pascal, such as in his panpsychism and monism, this does not extend to his morality. Rather than accepting either of the two readings, I highlight anti- Stoic themes that are also present. I conclude that if the discussion is contained to his morality, Spinoza is no more Stoic than the other Neostoics I discuss in previous chapters. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 365 an unattainable historical goal seems to offer not hope but only frustration for those who pursue it. Hodgson's suggestion that humans find momentary satisfaction in the partial attainment of the goal (128) can only be reminiscent of the consolation a Sisyphus might find in the partial achievement of his ultimately hopeless task. In effect, Hodgson's eschatology is hardly a human affair at all. Human action in (...) history has no connection with or effect upon its realization (197). Whether personal human identity is preserved in " the ultimate consummation of all things in God " remains at best an ambiguous question in Hodg· son's thought (129, 250-1). The consummation itself concerns God rather than humanity: "The final comedy is the divine comedy, not a human comedy " (129). Hodgson presents a meticulously researched and carefully written argument. He is to be congratulated for so clearly and forcefully formulating the challenge that faces theology in these last years of the twen· tieth century. Yet the very clarity with which his conclusions-themselves so foreign to the Christian tradition-proceed from his premises invites the reader to question whether the philosophy of Hegel can ac· tually provide an adequate or appropriate starting point for the work of Christian theology. Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology Graduate Theological Union Berkeley, California MICHAEL J. DODDS, 0.P. Patience and Power: Grace for the First World. By JEAN-MARC LAPORTE, S.J. New York: Paulist Press, 1988. Pp. iv + 297. $14.95. Jean-Marc Laporte, professor of systematic theology at Regis College in the Toronto School of Theology has previously published Les strztctures dynamiques de la grace: grace medicinale et grace elevante d'apres Thomas d'Aquin (Montreal: Editions Bellarmin, 1974), a work based on his doctoral dissertation at the University of Strasbourg. Patience and Power draws on his earlier study of Aquinas but ranges more widely in the theological tradition and in contemporary analyses of modern society to provide a thought-provoking interpretation of the doctrine of grace for 20th century Western culture. The book is replete with diagrams, designed to demonstrate structural affinities among various factors relevant to theological reflection on grace. BOOK REVIEWS Opening chapters offer an initial account of the current separation of the human race into First (Western European; North American), Second (Eastern European), and Third (Southern) Worlds and suggest a structural affinity between these contemporary cultural and economic divisions and the historical development of Western, Eastern, and Southern Churches. With an eye toward constructing a theology of grace attuned to the problems and needs of the First World, especially Canada and the United States, Laporte then provides a capsule analysis of the history of Christian thought on grace. A line of thought running from Paul through Augustine stresses the healing function of grace as forgiveness of sin and accents the incompleteness of the gift already received. In contrast to this approach, which became typical of Western theology, a trajectory extending from John through the Eastern Fathers emphasized the elevating function of grace as conferral, even in this world, of participation in the life of God. Thomas Aquinas, more familiar with Aristotle and more adept systematically than his predecessors, sought with considerable success to integrate Eastern and Western perspective on grace into a comprehensive theological vision. Underappreciated in its own day, the Thomistic synthesis proved short-lived. In the late Middle Ages, movements in the direction of voluntarism and nominalism reified and quantified the understanding of grace and thus unwittingly paved the way for the 16th breakdown in the unity of Western Christendom and for the sterile debates on grace characteristic of the following centuries. Only in our own time has the rich heritage of the authentic Western tradition begun to he retrieved, as historical spadework has prepared the ground for new and deeper theological conceptions. Recognition of Christianity's need for personal categories, for concepts drawn from specifically human existence, is essential if this undertaking is to hear fruit; the anthropocentric (as.distinguished from cosmocentric) thought-form which Johann Baptist Metz has rightly identified in Aquinas must become a more explicit element of contemporary Western Christian thought. This analysis of the history of the doctrine of... (shrink)

_A fresh, new translation of Augustine’s fourth work as a Christian convert_ The first four works written by St. Augustine of Hippo after his conversion to Christianity are dialogues that have influenced prominent thinkers from Boethius to Bernard Lonergan. Usually called the Cassiciacum dialogues, these four works are of a high literary and intellectual quality, combining Ciceronian and neo-Platonic philosophy, Roman comedy and Vergilian poetry, and early Christian theology. They are also, arguably, Augustine’s most charming works, exhibiting (...) his whimsical levity and ironic wryness. _Soliloquies_ is the fourth work in this tetralogy. Augustine coined the term “soliloquy” to describe this new form of dialogue. _Soliloquies__,_ a conversation between Augustine and his reason, fuses the dialogue genre and Roman theater, opening with a search for intellectual and moral self-knowledge before converging on the nature of truth and the question of the soul’s immortality. Foley’s volume also includes _On the Immortality of the Soul__,_ which consists of notes for the unfinished portion of the work. (shrink)

_A fresh, new translation of Augustine’s inaugural work as a Christian convert_ The first four works written by St. Augustine of Hippo after his conversion to Christianity are dialogues that have influenced prominent thinkers from Boethius to Bernard Lonergan. Usually called the Cassiciacum dialogues, these four works are a “literary triumph,” combining Ciceronian and neo-Platonic philosophy, Roman comedy and Vergilian poetry, and early Christian theology. They are also, arguably, Augustine’s most charming works, exhibiting his whimsical levity and (...) ironic wryness. In this second, brief dialogue, Augustine and his mother, brother, son, and friends celebrate his thirty-second birthday by having a “feast of words” on the nature of happiness that includes a bittersweet metaphorical birthday cake. Using a process of reasoning that is philosophical as well as theological, Augustine and the group conclude that the truly happy life consists of “having God” through faith, hope, and charity. Michael Foley’s clear, precise and playful translations are accompanied by his brief, illuminating commentaries. (shrink)

Alan Gewirth's Reason and Morality directed philosophical attention to the possibility of presenting a rational and rigorous demonstration of fundamental moral principles. Now, these previously unpublished essays from some of the most distinguished philosophers of our generation subject Gewirth's program to thorough evaluation and assessment. In a tour de force of philosophical analysis, Professor Gewirth provides detailed replies to all of his critics--a major, genuinely clarifying essay of intrinsic philosophical interest.

_A fresh, new translation of Augustine’s inaugural work as a Christian convert_ The first four works written by St. Augustine of Hippo after his conversion to Christianity have influenced prominent thinkers from Boethius to Bernard Lonergan. Usually called the Cassiciacum dialogues, these four works are a “literary triumph,” combining Ciceronian and neo-Platonic philosophy, Roman comedy and Vergilian poetry, and early Christian theology. They are also, arguably, Augustine’s most charming works, exhibiting his whimsical levity and ironic wryness. In (...) this first dialogue, Augustine and his interlocutors have retreated to a quiet country villa north of Milan to explore the history and teachings of Academic Skepticism. Augustine is both sympathetic to and critical of the Skeptics, eventually hypothesizing that they could not possibly have believed everything they taught. The dialogue serves as a fitting launch point for a knowledge of God and the soul, the overall subject of the Cassiciacum tetralogy. Michael Foley’s clear, precise and playful translations are accompanied by his brief, illuminating commentaries. (shrink)

This paper proposes an approach to investigate norm-governed learning agents which combines a logic-based formalism with an equation-based counterpart. This dual formalism enables us to describe the reasoning of such agents and their interactions using argumentation, and, at the same time, to capture systemic features using equations. The approach is applied to norm emergence and internalisation in systems of learning agents. The logical formalism is rooted into a probabilistic defeasible logic instantiating Dung’s argumentation framework. Rules of this logic are attached (...) with probabilities to describe the agents’ minds and behaviours as well as uncertain environments. Then, the equation-based model for reinforcement learning, defined over this probability distribution, allows agents to adapt to their environment and self-organise. (shrink)

Our aim is to show that translating the modal graphs of Moretti’s “n-opposition theory” (2004) into set theory by a suited device, through identifying logical modal formulas with appropriate subsets of a characteristic set, one can, in a constructive and exhaustive way, by means of a simple recurring combinatory, exhibit all so-called “logical bi-simplexes of dimension n” (or n-oppositional figures, that is the logical squares, logical hexagons, logical cubes, etc.) contained in the logic produced by any given modal graph (an (...) exhaustiveness which was not possible before). In this paper we shall handle explicitly the classical case of the so-called 3(3)-modal graph (which is, among others, the one of S5), getting to a very elegant tetraicosahedronal geometrisation of this logic. (shrink)

The thesis that Weber was without influence in Weimar Germany is examined. It is shown that in contemporary published assessments and in private statements in interviews contemporary sociologists regarded him as important. The many dissertations on Weber and the enormous secondary literature are noted. This literature, which was contributed by some of the best minds of the day, included both the philosophical and sociological aspects of Weber's work. It is concluded that the thesis that Weber was without influence is false.

O autor esboça seu projeto de apresentar a liberdade como independente da versão forte - ontológica - da contingência; e discutir certas afinidades indeterministas de Aristóteles com a interpretação dominante da física quãntica, em contraste com o determinismo da ciência moderna.

Penser l’acte de décider en droit comme une opération mentale d’interprétation conduit bien souvent à en faire un objet métaphysique donné à la connaissance du droit et non construit par elle. Cette réification implique également de recourir à un modèle causal de la décision judiciaire, lequel recèle de nombreuses difficultés au regard du caractère proprement juridique d’une telle enquête. En appréhendant cette problématique de la décision par les outils de la philosophie analytique de l’esprit et de l’action, cet article entend (...) défendre une autre approche qui, dans le prolongement des travaux du juriste Hans Kelsen, s’efforce de penser la décision judiciaire comme un acte de justification au sein d’un cadre de rationalité stipulé. (shrink)

"Williams's masterful translation satisfies (at last!) a long-standing need. There are lots of good translations of Augustine's great work, but until now we have been forced to choose between those that strive to replicate in English something of the majesty and beauty of Augustine's Latin style and those that opt instead to convey the careful precision of his philosophical terminology and argumentation. Finally, Williams has succeeded in capturing both sides of Augustine's mind in a richly evocative, impeccably (...) reliable, elegantly readable presentation of one of the most impressive achievements in Western thought--Augustine's Confessions." --Scott MacDonald, Professor of Philosophy and Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies, Cornell University. (shrink)

In this book, Augustine Brannigan provides a critical examination of the major theories which have been devised to account for discoveries and innovations in ...

The Itinerarium provides a concise introduction to Bonaventure's theological understanding. This new translation presents Latin and English on facing pages, followed by an extensive and detailed commentary on the historical, scriptural, and linguistic contexts of the text and its translation.

On peut lire " L'Emprise " de deux manières : comme un texte de rupture ou bien de continuité. Dans le premier cas, assez subalterne, on y verra le " persiste et signe " de l'hérétique après les foudres qui l'ont frappé lors de la guerre du Kosovo. Dans le second, plus intéressant, une mise à jour du " Pouvoir intellectuel " (1979), pour décrire comment l'ordre moral est aujourd'hui passé aux mains d'un nouveau magistère, la presse. Assumant avec les (...) moyens du bord la fonction immémoriale de pouvoir spirituel, le journalisme serait alors la figure moderne du cléricalisme. Dans cette situation, il n'est pas inutile de rappeler que le règne du clergé n'est pas celui du bon Dieu. (shrink)

À partir de l'observation du nord de la région Midi-Pyrénées, cet article défend l'hypothèse que les logiques économiques, les réseaux sociaux et les jeux d'acteurs locaux sont à l'origine de la construction d'une identité territoriale. Fruit d'une histoire collective celle-ci n'empêche pas l'expression d'enjeux et de stratégies aux intérêts divergents mais entraîne deux changements majeurs. Elle permet de penser de façon positive le futur de ce territoire et conduit à l'envisager à partir des relations qu'il entretient avec d'autres espaces parfois (...) fort éloignés.From the observation of the northern region of Midi-Pyrénées, this article defends the hypothesis that economic logic, social networks and local games are at the origin of the construction of a regional identity. Result of a collective history it does not prevent the expression of issues and strategies with different interests but has two major changes. It helps to think positively the future of this country and led to the consideration from its relations with other areas sometimes far apart. (shrink)

Masochism brings Freud up against the accursed share of analysis, which was always the female. Masoch undermines the epistemological apparatus of the Freudian unconscious, which could reinvent sex, but not the world : it gives way to the old demons of metaphysics, where the death drive triumphs. The return of the repressed.

= Klappentext: Die totalitäre Herrschaftsform des vergangenen Jahrhunderts war ein Alptraum für die Menschheit im Sinne des Wortes. Für sie ist der Mensch überflüssig. Auschwitz steht als Symbol und Chiffre der von ihr produzierten katastrophalen Tragödie. Wie konnte das geschehen? Wie war eine solche irrtümliche Blindheit möglich? Warum waren Menschen in der Lage, das radikal Böse in einer zivilisierten Gesellschaft zu tun? Mit ihrem Schlagwort der Banalität des Bösen entdeckte Hannah Arendt einen Schlüssel zur Erklärung dazu.