Masochism brings Freud up against the accursed share of analysis, which was always the female. Masoch undermines the epistemological apparatus of the Freudian unconscious, which could reinvent sex, but not the world : it gives way to the old demons of metaphysics, where the death drive triumphs. The return of the repressed.

The aim of this paper is to propose a new perspective on the difficulty and meaning of ethical work for financial controllers. This is achieved by drawing on concepts from Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life in the field of business ethics. The French philosopher Michel Henry is distinguished by his identifying two modes of appearing: ‘intentionality’ and ‘affectivity’ . Henry suggests that relying only on abstract representations constitutes a specific ideology that causes individuals at work to ignore the (...) actual experience of being affected, and hinders the appearance of life to guide their actions, in turn hindering ethics. Empirical illustrations are provided by a case study that explores the practices of management accountants in a travel retail corporation. By observing the empirical practices of management accountants, a body of professionals whose role is largely dependent on information technology, abstraction and technical expertise to trace organisational flows and transactions, we shed light on the difficult ethical issues associated with their role of surveillance and control of other managers’ work. The case study illustrates a wide range of everyday working practices among management accountants. Some convey the impression that they lack empathy and consideration for other individuals, while others engage in close cooperation and ethical practices despite the constraining configuration of their role. A significant result of this research is that it illustrates and interprets, based on Henry’s phenomenology, a wide range of working practices. Consistent with Henry, we argue that the source of business ethics lies beyond professional standards, codes and values. (shrink)

This article presents an outline of Régis Debray's mediology. Situated at the crossroads of philosophy, theology, anthropology, archaeology, history, sociology, political sciences, semiotics, media and cultural studies, mediology is a relatively autonomous discipline that analyses the totality of the processes of mediation that intervene between culture and agency, and transform ideas into a material force. Mediology or mediation studies broadens the notion of media so as to include all material and institutional vectors of communication and defines mediation as the (...) totality of interactions between culture and technology that make the diffusion (through space) and the transmission (over time) of ideas possible. (shrink)

The theorist and philosopher Julia Kristeva is invited to curate an exhibition at the Louvre in Paris as part of a series-Parti Pris - and to turn this into a book, The Severed Head: Capital Visions. The organiser, Régis Michel, wants something partisan, that will challenge people to think, and Kristeva delivers in response a collection of severed heads neatly summarising her critique of the whole of western culture! Three figures dominate, providing a key to making sense of (...) the exhibition: Freud, Bataille, and the maternal body. Using these figures, familiar from across the breadth of her work over the last half a century, she produces a witty analysis of western culture’s persistent privileging of disembodied masculine rationality; the head, ironically phallic, ironically and yet necessarily severed; the maternal body continually arousing a “jubilant anxiety”, expressed through violence. Points of critique are raised in relation to Kristeva’s normative tendencies-could we not tell a different story about women, for example? The cultural context of the exhibition is also addressed: who are the intended viewers/readers and whose interests are being served here? Ultimately, however, this is a celebration of Kristeva’s tribute to psychic survivors. (shrink)

This book is an English-language translation of a bestselling book in France that explores the relationship between humans and new technologies.

In this paper, I criticize Putnam’s argument, which contends that scientific realism implies adherence to a God’s eye point of view. I also show that some sort of God’s eye point of view in a weak sense, i.e. interest-free, is indeed accessible to humans and that a moderate version of scientific realism is philosophically defensible.

As I am not at all a specialist on Gottlob Frege’s work, my comments intended initially to be focused on an aspect that emerges in the last part of Peter Clark’s paper “Frege, neo-logicism and applied mathematics” 1, where he treats the question of “applied mathematics” — an aspect that appealed to me and that was triggered by Frege’s relationship between numbers and concepts, and reasoning. Starting with this concern, I have been led by my subject to propose some considerations (...) about foundations and rationality which will go — briefly — in two directions. The first direction is that of a distinction between logical and rational foundations, whilst the second direction is that of taking into account as a fact the historical development of mathematics among the sciences, which modifies the terms of any foundational program. In delineating these considerations, I found that what I had in mind could apply to mathematics itself as well as to “applied mathematics”, thus deviating somewhat from my first explicit intention. In conclusion I shall consider the possibility of a rational foundation programme for mathematical and physico-mathematical sciences which would take into account the changes in the scientific contents and the widenings of the forms of rationality that, in my view, make these changes possible. Such foundations for knowledge would not be any more static, but dynamical and would be possibly considered only retrospectively: they would be “forward foundations”, in a sense that will be discussed in detail elsewhere. (shrink)

This article tries to demonstrate that the promise made to Nathanael through Gen 38:12-19 in Jn 1:51, foretells the glorification of the Son of Man at the end of his terrestrial journey, described as a descent and an ascent. But this glorification will be carried out by means of the crucifixion ; hence the recourse to two other texts of the O.T. to prove, first in Jn 3:14-15, that the crucifixion of Jesus would be a salvific elevation prefigurated by the (...) serpent raised by Moses on a stake (Nm 21:4-9). But the crucifixion of Jesus is also the ultimate step of the descent of the Son of Man, its salvific value is then proven by the gift of manna, bread descended from heaven (Ex 16:4.15.35 ; Ps 78:24). Jesus, as the true bread of life, transmits the life he continuously receives from his Father to those who remain faithful to him unto the foot of the cross (6:48-58). (shrink)

Toute science, admet-on, commence par détacher un objet en le rendant indépendant des sujets et des situations. Mais cette conception étroite de la connaissance scientifique laisse subsister des zones d'ombre. La conscience n'est pas un objet. Elle est ce sans quoi rien ne pourrait être pris pour objet. La conscience n'est pas détachable des sujets, car elle s'identifie à ce qui est vécu par un sujet. De façon analogue, en physique quantique, un phénomène n'est pas dissociable de son contexte expérimental, (...) car il s'identifie à ce qui se manifeste à grande échelle au laboratoire. Que faire pour ne pas laisser ces cas extrêmes de côté? Généraliser la méthode scientifique. Ne plus la borner à définir et à caractériser des objets, mais l'étendre à la coordination directe des expériences. Telle est la révolution de pensée qu'il faut accomplir pour résoudre, ou plutôt dissoudre, deux questions-limites de la science : le problème de l'origine de la conscience et le paradoxe du "chat de Schrödinger" en physique quantique. (shrink)

The focus of this article is a question that has been neglected in debates about digitalization: Could machines replace human scientists? To provide an intelligible answer to it, we need to answer a further question: What is it that makes (or constitutes) a scientist? I offer an answer to this question by proposing a new demarcation criterion for science which I call “the discoverability criterion”. I proceed as follows: (1) I explain why the target question of this article is important, (...) and (2) show that it leads to a variant of the demarcation problem of science. (3) By arguing that it is probably an essential feature of science that we can make scientific discoveries, I suggest a novel way of dealing with this problem by proposing a new demarcation criterion. Before introducing it, (4) I analyze an exemplary case of a real scientific discovery, and (5) argue that scientific discovery processes have a general underlying structure. (6) I introduce my discoverability criterion for science and present my master argument that helps us understand which criteria have to be fulfilled in order to decide whether machines can replace human scientists or not. (7) I conclude by answering the article’s target question and bringing forward a take-home message. (shrink)

En contrepoint à son œuvre mathématique et physique — et en relation avec elle — d'Alembert a développé une théorie de la connaissance influencée par Locke et le sensualisme de Condillac, mais centrée avant tout sur une épistémologie de la physique newtonienne. Réaliste, prônant le recours à l'expérience, il est en même temps profondément rationaliste, et même précisément, quoiqu'il s'en défende plutôt, dans la lignée de Descartes, Mais, bien que la Raison soit sa référence fondamentale, à tel point qu'il voudrait (...) fonder sur ses principes les plus évidents toute la science physico-mathématique — c'est-à-dire par excellence la Mécanique —, son programme ne peut être dit cartésien : non seulement il rejette les idées innées, mais il accepte la critique d'une rationalité apparente requise par la considération de faits irréductibles (l'attraction par exemple). Son épistémologie est un réalisme rationnel référé à l'être même de la Nature (la Raison et la Nature se rejoignent en profondeur). C'est en fonction de ces conceptions qu'il accepte ou rejette certaines notions physiques soit ambiguës, soit incertaines. Son rejet du concept de force comme celui de la considération d'une texture intime des corps semblent en faire, par le refus de ce qui ne serait pas directement mesurable, l'annonciateur du positivisme de Laplace et de Comte : une telle interprétation serait inexacte, et d'Alembert considère que la pensée peut parvenir à la connaissance du réel. Si ses conceptions s'élaborent en contrepoint de son activité scientifique, c'est en même temps en lutte et polémique contre la métaphysique, au sein de son engagement philosophique — il est tête de file, avec Voltaire, du « parti philosophique » — et notamment dans l'Encyclopédie. Bien qu'il se réfère, comme Newton, à une Intelligence suprême à l'œuvre dans l'Univers, il n'est pas déiste et affiche bientôt une position sceptique. Sa recherche et son affirmation de l'autonomie des lois de la Nature sont a-thées au sens privatif qui annonce Laplace. Il s'oppose au matérialisme de d'Holbach ou Helvétius, mais il se rapproche peu à peu — et notamment vers 1765, sans doute sous l'influence de Diderot qui rédigea vers cette époque Le rêve de d'Alembert et avec qui il venait de renouer — d'un matérialisme dynamique : mais, ce matérialisme, il ne le professe qu'en privé (essentiellement dans sa correspondance avec Frédéric de Prusse). L'âme est matérielle, et si « le plus simple raisonnement prouve qu'il y a un être éternel » , ce Dieu est matériel, il « n'est que la matière en tant qu'intelligente » , ce qui rejoint la définition du matérialisme donnée par Diderot dans l'Encyclopédie. Toutefois, refusant de se prononcer sur l'en-soi des choses, et sur la nature de la matière elle-même, comme de se définir métaphysiquement, son matérialisme tardif est encore marqué de scepticisme. (shrink)

According to the traditional view, meaning presents itself under the form of some kind of identity.

Certains écrivains contemporains choisissent de raconter leur vie ou un épisode de leur vie de manière originale, délaissant ainsi l’autobiographie traditionnelle ainsi que la plus récente autofiction. Cette originalité peut résider dans des choix énonciatifs déconcertants (Annie Ernaux, Les Années, Michel Rostain, Le Fils, Régis Jauffret, Lacrimosa, Daniel Pennac, Le Journal d’un corps) et/ou dans l’inscription même de la démarche d’écriture dans le texte : l’auteur raconte sa vie passée et l’écriture du récit que nous lisons (Les Années, (...) Delphine de Vigan, Rien ne s’oppose à la nuit). Cette narration inattendue a pour conséquence de refléter un lien particulier entre le passé raconté et le présent de l’écriture, car là où l’autobiographie traditionnelle permettait un clair départ entre le temps raconté et le temps de la narration, on mesure ici combien le passé s’écrit à l’aune du présent de l’écriture. Cette mise en abîme de l’écriture montre comment elle participe de la quête identitaire qui est au cœur de tout récit autobiographique. Les écrivains sont à la recherche d’une forme qui leur permettra d’approcher au plus près leur vérité ou au moins de tenter de l’approcher, et ils rendent compte de cette recherche. (shrink)

A concept of the ‘actual now’ is introduced. The ‘actual now’ is negatively characterized by the fact that it is absent from the time-series. This does not mean that the ‘actual now’ is outside the time-series. For saying so would wrongly suggest the existence of an ‘outside’ where the ‘actual now’ could be located. Instead, one considers that the ‘actual now’ is just the name of ‘that with respect to which’ any event can be said to be past or future, (...) yet being no event by itself. It holds the same role with respect to time as Husserl’s transcendental ego with respect to the empirical self. McTaggart’s celebrated refutation of the reality of time is reinterpreted accordingly. To express this argument, one no longer needs to use the notions of ‘change’ or ‘time flow’, but only to point out the in-principle impossibility to refer to the ‘actual now’. (shrink)

Having established why and how, he, a sociologist of “social work in action” has sometimes become a historian, or more exactly a social historian, the author presents to us the ins and outs of two research programmes conducted in contrasting and methodological conditions. These involve, on the one hand, studies on the emergence of the maladjusted children sector and the profession of special needs teacher, both quite traditional in their approach, and, on the other hand, an investigation conducted over a (...) long period of time, and even published with the actors concerned, which sought to explore the history of certain family associations founded on the Social Catholicism model. He concludes by emphasising why it is necessary to update his problematisation on a regular basis and by reiterating the need for favourable institutional and professional conditions, to ensure that research does not slide towards a mere exchange of points of view. (shrink)

In Kant, remarkably, and for the first time perhaps in the history of philosophy, the problem of the Ego receives an ontological signification. The critique of the paralogisms of rational psychology concerns, explicitly, this fundamental problem of the being of the ego. Kant’s examination of this problem constitutes an essential moment of the history of modern philosophy. This examination results finally in the complete failure to determine such a being, a failure that Kant attempts to pass off ultimately as a (...) metaphysical impossibility. This is affirmed constantly through the labyrinthine analysis of the Transcendental Dialectic: what emerges from its difficulties, and obscurities, is that the being of the Ego can be neither determined, nor posited, metaphysically. The conclusion is unquestionably the following: the ego cogito does not contain in itself any sum, at least if, by the latter, one intends, as does rational psychology, the metaphysical and, in some way, absolute being of the ‘I’. (shrink)

An issue of Revue d’Histoire des sciences devoted to Leibniz will be published in December 1993. The three main articles are “Concepts juridiques et probabilistes chez Leibniz,” by Marc Parmentier, “La caractéristique géométrique leibnizienne: travail du discernement et relations fondamentales,” by Jean-Pascal Alcantera, and “Leibniz lecteur de Mariotte”, by Michel Fichant.